



CODE OF CONDUCT

MR MOHAMMED JAWDAT AYESH MUSTAFA AL BARGUTHI

(Complainant)

and

MR MAZEN BOUSTANY

(First Respondent)

and

BAKER & MCKENZIE HABIB AL MULLA

(Second Respondent)

CODE OF CONDUCT DECISION 1 OF 2020 DECISION OF THE DEPUTY REGISTRAR NOUR HINEIDI

Summary of the Complaint

1. A formal letter of complaint was lodged with the DIFC Courts' Registry on 16 July 2019 (the "**Complaint**") by Mr Mohammad Jawdat Ayesh Mustafa Al Barguthi ("**Mr Al Barguthi**" or the "**Complainant**") against Baker McKenzie Habib Al Mulla ("**Baker McKenzie**") and Mr Mazen Boustany ("**Mr Boustany**") (jointly, the "**Respondents**").
2. In short, Mr Al Barguthi's Complaint was that Baker McKenzie, acting through Mr Boustany, commenced enforcement proceedings against Mr Al Barguthi, in the Dubai Courts, in July 2019 (the "**Enforcement Proceedings**"), wrongly relying on an annulled Default Judgment

order in DIFC Court proceedings CFI-033-2017 (the “**Default Judgment**”) as its basis for enforcement. Mr Al Barguthi claimed that the Default Judgment was annulled by reason of a set aside order issued by the DIFC Courts on 22 April 2018 (the “**Set Aside Order**”) and on that basis, to enforce the Default Judgment over one year after the Set Aside Order was issued was wrong and in breach of various provisions of the Mandatory Code of Conduct for Legal Practitioners in the DIFC Courts (the “**Code of Conduct**”) as well as the Supplementary Code of Conduct Practice Direction No. 1 (the “**SCC**”).

Complaint - Procedural history

3. Mr Al Barguthi filed the Complaint with the DIFC Courts in the form of a letter dated 15 July 2019 and sent on 16 July 2019, heavily supported by documents backing his Complaint.
4. Mr Boustany acting for himself and Baker McKenzie responded to the Complaint by submitting an affidavit on 24 July 2019 (“**Mr Boustany’s First Affidavit**”), as directed by me, supported by a single letter exhibit dated 16 July 2019 and addressed to the Complainant’s solicitors, international law firm Mayer Brown LLP (“**Mayer Brown**”).
5. Upon receiving Mr Boustany’s First Affidavit, it was clear that Mr Boustany’s narrative was different to Mr Al Barguthi’s on the basis that Mr Boustany denied that any Enforcement Proceedings were underway.
6. In light of the conflicting positions between Mr Al Barguthi who was insisting the Enforcement Proceedings were filed and still active, and Mr Boustany’s response denying any truth to Mr Al Barguthi’s Complaint, I sought to dig a little deeper in my investigation and so I directed the Complainant to provide his response (ideally by way of an affidavit) to Mr Boustany’s First Affidavit.
7. On 5 September 2019, the Complainant filed his affidavit response to Mr Boustany’s First Affidavit (“**Mr Al Barguthi’s First Affidavit**”). Mr Al Barguthi’s First Affidavit, like his initial Complaint letter, was substantially detailed and supported by various Court documents, emails and letters to back up his detailed affidavit.
8. On 30 September 2019, Ms Delvin Sumo, on behalf of the DIFC Courts’ Registry wrote to the Respondents asking them whether they intended, pursuant to Article 36 of the Code of Conduct, for independent assessors (“**Assessors**”) to be appointed. Ms Sumo also directed

the Respondents to provide their response to Mr Al Barguthi's First Affidavit.

9. On 20 October 2019, Mr Boustany wrote to Ms Sumo confirming that his preference was for the Complaint to proceed to the Registrar for determination, rather than invite the appointment of assessors.
10. On the same day, the Respondents filed a further affidavit sworn by Mr Boustany on 20 October 2019 ("**Mr Boustany's Second Affidavit**"). This affidavit was not supported by documents.
11. Given that Mr Boustany's evidence, by virtue of his First Affidavit and Second Affidavit, was brief and lacked the requisite detail which would have enabled me to arrive to a fully informed decision, I decided to call a meeting between the parties. This is not uncommon practice, and I have adopted this process of meetings parties, jointly, in previous investigations of Code of Conduct complaints where the conduct complained of, is serious, and where the respondent to the complaint fails to submit sufficient documentation to support his or her response to a well detailed complaint with merit.
12. On 13 November 2019, a meeting took place before me (the "**First Meeting**"). Mr Al Barguthi, along with his counsel, Mr Alain Farhad of Mayer Brown, Mr Boustany and Mr Andrew Massey (of Baker McKenzie) attended.
13. At the start of the meeting, I let everyone in the room know, including Mr Al Barguthi, Mr Boustany, Mr Massey and members of the Registry team who were in attendance for training purposes, that I had also allowed Mr Farhad and his associate, Mr Al Barguthi's counsel, to attend the meeting subject to any objection raised by Mr Boustany. I explained that typically, counsel would not be permitted to attend such meetings but given the very serious repercussions allegedly suffered by Mr Al Barguthi by reason of the Enforcement Proceedings, I would make an exception and allow his counsel to attend on the strict provision that everything pertaining to the investigation, including the discussions had at the First Meeting and any other meeting thereafter, would remain absolutely confidential and that my preference was for Mr Al Barguthi, rather than his counsel, to speak so I could hear his narrative.
14. Mr Boustany did not object to the Complainant's counsel being present at the meeting.

15. This meeting was audio recorded and the recording is saved on a private network accessible only by authorized members of the DIFC Courts' Registry team.
16. The purpose of the First Meeting was to help gather all necessary facts to conclude the investigation of the Complaint. Mr Al Barguthi was first given the opportunity to detail, in his own words, the Complaint. Mr Boustany was then given a chance to respond to the Complaint and provide the Respondents' side to the story.
17. At the First Meeting, Mr Boustany's main response to the Complaint was that Enforcement Proceedings were commenced by his firm, acting on behalf of its client, against Mr Al Barguthi, but this was done by reason of an administrative oversight.
18. In light of Mr Boustany's response, which the Complainant did not accept, I urged Mr Boustany to go away and prepare a further affidavit, with a more specific outline of how the administrative error, with respect of the commencement of the Enforcement Proceedings, came about, and whether documents could be provided to support that claim, including some proof of the steps which were then taken by Mr Boustany, as supervisor on the file, to immediately rectify that error. The main purpose of sending Mr Boustany away to gather supporting documents was to allow him a further opportunity to demonstrate that he had not intended to commence the Enforcement Proceedings and that he had not intended to wrong the Complainant.
19. On 17 November 2019, Mr Boustany filed his third affidavit ("**Mr Boustany's Third Affidavit**").
20. Like his Second Affidavit, Mr Boustany's Third Affidavit was brief; although once again, it lacked the requisite documentation in support of his response to the Complaint, that the Enforcement Proceedings were accidentally commenced by reason of an administrative oversight, there was some, albeit, very brief insight into the administrative error.
21. Following receipt of Mr Boustany's Third Affidavit, I invited Mr Al Barguthi and Mr Boustany in for a second meeting which took place on 18 November 2019 (the "**Second Meeting**").
22. At the start of the Second Meeting, I decided to separate the Complainant (and his counsel) and Mr Boustany, to discuss the current state of play with each of them separately, in the

hope of facilitating discussion between the parties to help them resolve the Complaint amongst themselves. At this stage, and following review of Mr Boustany's Third Affidavit, I wondered whether Mr Boustany's respective affidavits were deliberately brief perhaps in an effort to conceal sensitive information which could not be discussed before an officer of the Court, but may perhaps be disclosed to the Complainant.

23. The parties were not able to settle the Complaint amongst themselves. On that basis, I asked that final affidavits be submitted by:
 - (a) Mr Al Barguthi explaining the impact that the Enforcement Proceedings had on him; and
 - (b) the Respondents, namely Mr Boustany on behalf of the Respondents, setting out, a to the best of his ability, more detailed account of the facts on how the administrative error came about and the provision of documents in support of that contention (that the Enforcement Proceedings were commenced by virtue of an administrative error).
24. The Second Meeting was also audio recorded and the recording is saved on a private network accessible only by authorized members of the DIFC Courts' Registry Team.
25. On 5 December 2019, Mr Barguthi filed his Second Affidavit, supported by a significant suite of documents ("**Mr Al Barguthi's Second Affidavit**") and Mr Boustany filed his fourth and final affidavit ("**Mr Boustany's Final Affidavit**"), which again, failed to attach documents in support of his response.

Details of Complaint

26. As above, the Complaint generally arose in connection with CFI-033-2017.
27. In his First Affidavit, Mr Al Barguthi also briefly describes the existence of Court of Appeal proceedings (in CA-001-2019) which arose in connection with CFI-033-2017. These proceedings, amongst other things, involved a cross appeal filed by Mr Al Barguthi against comments made in *obiter* made by H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi in his order with reasons, issued on 12 November 2018 ("**12 November Order**").

28. For the avoidance of doubt, the 12 November Order:
- (a) did not directly affect Mr Al Barguthi; the order was made on application of the Second Defendant (who in effect, shared a corroborated defence with Mr Al Barguthi), in the CFI-033-2017 proceedings, against the Claimant; and
 - (b) was made in favour of the Second Defendant.
29. Also for the avoidance of doubt, it should to be emphasized that Mr Al Barguthi, and the Second Defendant made the appeal in CA-001-2019 for rather peculiar¹ reasons and the following extract from the judgment of Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke ought to be highlighted:

It will at once be appreciated that the two defendant were the “winners” on their applications to set aside the judgment entered against them, but now seek to appeal, not against the decisions themselves, but against some of the reasons given by the judge when setting aside the judgment entered against the Second Defendant in an order dated 12 November 2018.

30. The Court of Appeal, in CA-001-2019, issued its decision on 11 June 2018. Less than one month later, on 4 July 2019, Mr Al Barguthi becomes notified of the Enforcement Proceedings, and reports as follows²:

I was informed on Thursday, 4 July 2019, that Baker [McKenzie] (under the direction of Mr Boustany) had attempted to enforce the set-aside Default Judgment against me and had sought and obtained an arrest warrant against me from the onshore Dubai Courts...
...In addition, since the arrest warrant has been wrongly issued against me, I have been unable to travel to seek medical attention to treat my critical illness. The issuance of the arrest warrant against me has caused me undue stress and has negatively impacted on my health.

31. When he first learned about the arrest warrant on 4 July 2019, Mr Al Barguthi explains that he immediately informed his solicitors, Mayer Brown, who then emailed Mr Boustany on the same day at approximately 5.30pm and asked him to: (a) confirm whether Mr Boustany’s client had taken any steps towards enforcing the annulled default judgment (or any other judgment of the DIFC Courts) against Mr Al Barguthi; (b) if so, clarify the reasons and basis upon which such Enforcement Proceedings were taken; and (c) confirm that Mr Boustany’s client will immediately cease such enforcement actions. This email from Mayer Brown to Mr Boustany sent on 4 July 2019 is exhibited, as “Attachment 4”, to Mr Al Barguthi’s First

¹ At [3] of Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke’s reason in Court of Appeal’s Judgment in CA-001-2019, being *(1) Ali Mohammed Salem Abu Adas (2) Mohammed Jawdat Ayesah Mustafa Al Bargouthi [sic] v Bankmed (SAL) Trading in the DIFC under the Trade Name Bankmed (Dubai)*.

² Page 2 of the Complaint.

Affidavit.

32. Also included in this “Attachment 4” is Mr Boustany’s response to Mayer Brown’s email. In his email, also sent on 14 July 2019 at approximately 11.00pm, Mr Boustany responds as follows:

- 1) I can confirm that we are enforcing against your client...before the Dubai Courts and that an arrest warrant was issued against [him]...
- 2) I beg to disagree with you that nothing changed after the Court of Appeal judgment (in CA-010-2019) as:
...
(b) ... any purported defense [sic] seemed vain.
....
- 3) Your client was supposed to submit a defense [sic] within 14 days after the Court of Appeal judgment which he did not do and thus any purported defense will be rejected as submitted out of time.
...

33. On 8 July 2019, Mayer Brown, in a strongly worded letter³, wrote to Mr Boustany and Baker McKenzie clarifying the current state of affairs in CFI-033-2017, including that:

5. Mr Al Barguthi’s Arbitration Application has not yet been determined and the Stay Order is still in place and has not been amended. As a result, contrary to your assertions, Mr Al Barguthi was not required to file a defense [sic] and the time limit for such filing has not yet passed (nor even been determined).

34. In that same letter, Mayer Brown put Baker McKenzie on notice, to, within 24 hours:

- (a) cease any further attempts to pursue enforcement proceedings against Mr Al Barguthi;
- (b) provide any unequivocal apologies to Mr Al Barguthi;
- (c) undertake to refrain from taking any further enforcement actions against Mr Al Barguthi until [Baker McKenzie’s] client’s claim against [Mr Al Barguthi] is finally determined; and
- (d) Compensate Mr Al Barugthi for the legal costs he has had to incur both in the DIFC and onshore to protect himself from [Baker McKenzie’s] client’s behavior.

35. Finally, on 11 July 2019, Mr Boustany wrote to Mayer Brown:

In terms of any case against your client in the Dubai Courts, we can confirm that no case is proceeding until the outcome of the proceedings in the DIFC Courts. Accordingly, your client suffers no prejudice.

36. Correspondence continued to be exchanged between Mayer Brown and Baker McKenzie,

³ Exhibited to Mr Al Barguthi’s First Affidavit also as part of “Attachment 4”.

from 11 July 2019 until 16 July 2019.

37. It was clear that Mayer Brown was still confused as to the basis upon which the Enforcement Proceedings were commenced by Mr Boustany, so on 16 July 2019, it again wrote to Baker McKenzie seeking such clarifications.⁴
38. It was also on 16 July 2019 that Mr Al Barguthi filed his Complaint with the DIFC Courts Registry.
39. On 17 July 2019, Mr Boustany confirms by virtue of paragraph 20 of his Second Affidavit that he made a request to the Dubai Courts that the Enforcement Proceedings against Mr Al Barguthi be suspended, and any arrest orders against Mr Al Barguthi cancelled.
40. In his Complaint, Mr Al Barguthi claims that in commencing the Enforcement Proceedings, the Respondents were in breach of the following provisions of the Code of Conduct and the SCC, namely:⁵

Code of Conduct

Part E – General Duties

- SPD E-17: Practitioners shall not engage in conduct that undermines the Overriding Objective or which may otherwise result in procedural unfairness.⁶
- SPD E-19: Practitioners shall abstain from any behavior which may tend to discredit the Court and the reputation of its Practitioners.⁷

SCC

Part E – General Duties

- SPD E-17 (viii): a Practitioner shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or deliberate misrepresentation.⁸
- SPD E-17 (ix): a Practitioner shall not knowingly assist his client to disobey an order or direction of the Court.⁹
- SPD E-17 (x): a Practitioner must comply with any order of the Court requiring him to do or

⁴ Exhibited to Mr Al Barguthi's First Affidavit also as part of "Attachment 4".

⁵ The Code of Conduct and SCC were repealed by virtue of DIFC Courts Order No. 4 of 2019, and replaced with – Mandatory Code of Conduct for Legal Practitioners in the DIFC Courts which came into effect on 18 September 2019 (the "New Code"). For the avoidance of doubt, all provisions in the Code of Conduct and SCC, subject of this Complaint, also exist in the New Code, but under a different numbering format. Given that the Code of Conduct and SCC were the relevant instruments applicable at the time the Complaint arose, all further references in this decision will be references to the Code of Conduct and the SCC.

⁶ Now article 22(A) of the New Code.

⁷ Now article 24 of the New Code.

⁸ Now article 22(J) of the New Code.

⁹ Now article 22(K) of the New Code.

refrain from doing something; equally, a Practitioner is bound to honor his undertakings given to the Court.¹⁰

41. On behalf of the Court, I am tasked to determine whether Baker McKenzie and Mr Boustany, on the balance of probabilities, have breached the relevant provisions of the Code of Conduct or the SCC. This is pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Code of Conduct which states:

The Court, acting through the Registrar, the Chief Justice...or any nominee of the Chief Justice, may impose the following sanctions upon any Practitioner found on a balance of probabilities to have committed a breach of the Code [of Conduct]:

- private admonition;
- public admonition;
- ...
- suspension from the Register of Practitioners for a period of time not exceeding 3 years; and
- removal from the Register of Practitioners.

Findings

42. Many cases in the DIFC Courts are subject to enforcement in the onshore courts. For this reason, these “hybrid” cases, operating in dual jurisdictions, are governed by a suite of enforcement laws and regimes. In light of this, while the legality of Mr Boustany’s decision to commence the Enforcement Proceedings, is a question beyond the scope of my exercise, the question for determination before me, was whether Mr Boustany acted ethically and in line with the standards of conduct expected of a DIFC Court Registered Practitioner.
43. To be found in breach of the Code of Conduct is no laughing matter. The Code imposes significant sanctions on practitioners found in breach – sanctions which could permanently damage a practitioner’s career. It is for this reason, that during my investigation of any complaint, I will typically indulge practitioners by giving them as much opportunity as possible to provide proof and justification of their conduct complained of.
44. This case was no exception. Mr Boustany was given ample opportunity to explain why Enforcement Proceedings had, in effect, been wrongfully commenced against Mr Al Barguthi.
45. Mr Boustany’s narrative is clarified with each further affidavit he files in response to the Complaint. In his:

¹⁰ Now article 22(L) of the New Code.

- (a) First Affidavit, Mr Boustany states at paragraph 6 that “*no case was proceeding in the Dubai Courts against Mr Al Barguthi*”;
- (b) Second Affidavit, Mr Boustany clarifies at paragraph 20 that the Enforcement Proceedings had commenced, however, “*upon [Mr Boustany’s] request [to the Dubai Courts] dated 17 July 2019 enforcement proceedings against Mr Barguthi were suspended and any arrest orders against Mr Barguthi were cancelled*”.
- (c) Third Affidavit, Mr Boustany describes at paragraphs 6 to 14, the sequence of events which took place when he became aware that the Enforcement Proceedings were wrongfully commenced. He also states at paragraph 4:

I would like to make clear that there was no deliberate intention to cause Mr Al Barguthi any personal stress or inconvenience. I apologise unreservedly to Mr Al Barguthi for any harm that has been caused as a result of this regrettable oversight as well as the DIFC Courts.

and;

- (d) Final Affidavit, Mr Boustany finally clarifies: “*I acknowledge that I sought to enforce the Court of Appeal Judgment in the Dubai Courts on the basis that it was capable of being enforced in the Dubai Courts.*”
46. In an attempt to justify the delay in stopping the Enforcement Proceedings, Mr Boustany explains in his Third and Final Affidavits that when he initially received an email from Mayer Brown on 4 July 2019, and when he responded to that email on the same day, he did so in haste, late at night just before he was about to board a flight. Mr Boustany then explains that on further reflection of Mayer Brown’s email, he instructed his “*court staff*”, on 7 July 2019 to cease the Enforcement Proceedings immediately. In my view, the noble thing for Mr Boustany to have done at this stage was to explain the error, in commencing the Enforcement Proceedings, to Mayer Brown immediately and to then do everything necessary in his power to ensure that the Enforcement Proceedings were halted. Mr Boustany does not provide any proof of such steps.
47. It is plain that Mr Boustany should not have directed his team at Baker McKenzie to commence the Enforcement Proceedings in the absence of a final determination in CFI-033-2017 and without fully reading and understanding the judgment handed down in CA-001-2019. That conduct was wrong and Mr Boustany accepts this in his Second Affidavit at

paragraph 22, where he says:

To clarify, regrettably, the reason the Dubai Court proceedings were commenced was due to an administrative oversight. As soon as the error became known, I took immediate action to cease the enforcement proceedings and requested my court staff to submit a freeze to the enforcement proceedings to the Dubai Courts.

48. I was hoping that in his Final Affidavit, Mr Boustany would give a very honest account of how the administrative error unfolded and the exact steps he took to rectify the error. In my view, the awkward truth is that Mr Boustany blatantly misread the Court of Appeal's Judgment in CA-001-2019. I can see how an admission of such a grave error, could be extremely embarrassing for a practitioner, particularly one who is as experienced as Mr Boustany.
49. The original Complaint was based on the presumption that the Respondents sought to enforce the annulled Default Judgment. I do not agree with this proposition. Based on the many documents submitted in the Complaint, my view is that Mr Boustany incorrectly relied on the Court of Appeal's judgment in CA-001-2019 when he commenced the Enforcement Proceedings.
50. The difference in each of the scenarios, as above, is critical. The original Complaint, if true, would have meant that in enforcing an annulled Default Judgment, Mr Boustany knowingly and intentionally meant to harm the Complainant. As the truth and facts unfolded, however, it is clear to me that Mr Boustany was not relying on the Default Judgment when he commenced the Enforcement Proceedings; he instead relied on an extremely careless reading of the Court of Appeal's Judgment in CA-001-2019. The difference in each of the scenarios is that the former inevitably gives rise to an intent to cause harm, but the latter while blatant carelessness, is a one-off honest mistake.
51. While it should be accepted that mistakes happen, mistakes are much more capable of being rectified if they are mitigated at the earliest opportunity and in a proper way. Based on the very brief affidavits submitted by Mr Boustany, I do not believe that he acted as urgently as he ought to have acted, given the severity of the outcome of the Enforcement Proceedings on the Complainant, in ensuring that the Enforcement Proceedings were stopped.
52. I also find that Mr Boustany did not immediately act in a way which is consistent with the Overriding Objective of the Rules of the DIFC Court, or in a way which is consistent with the General Duties set out in the Code of Conduct. In particular, I refer to the number of times

Mr Boustany was asked to speak his truth and immediately give the Court a proper, full and truthful account of the mistake, being the commencement of the Enforcement Proceedings by reason of his misinterpreted reading of the Court of Appeal's Judgement. This is something that Mr Boustany ought to be held responsible for.

Decision and Sanctions

53. Legal practitioners are capable of making mistakes. The Code of Conduct is not intended to penalize practitioners for one-off human errors, but rather exists, to regulate, amongst other things, how practitioners' approach and rectify those errors. Often, a criterion in rectifying such errors will involve acknowledging those errors and voluntarily reporting them to the Court given that practitioners owe their first and foremost duty to the Court. Rectifying errors will frequently mean, too, that a practitioner will need to compromise his or her pride and confess such errors to the client and to the damaged party. Finally, given the (often) very grave impact of legal professional errors, it is usual that errors ought to be rectified as urgently as possible after they are brought to the wrongdoer's attention, so as to avoid irreparable damage to the Complainant. On the documents provided, Mr Boustany did not prove that he rectified his error with any real urgency.
54. Mr Boustany made a very big mistake and it took him practically two weeks to fix it. Despite his four affidavits to the Court, Mr Boustany fails to properly explain why it took so long for the Enforcement Proceedings to be stopped. As above, I form the view that Mr Boustany could have taken immediate steps to rectify the error in commencing the Enforcement Proceedings, in line with his general obligations under the Code of Conduct and the Overriding Objective of the DIFC Court Rules. These steps, for example, would have included:
- (a) being upfront with Mayer Brown about the error when Mr Boustany properly became aware of it;
 - (b) reassuring Mayer Brown that the Enforcement Proceedings against Mr Al Barguthi's would be immediately dropped;
 - (c) taking accountability and personally apologising to Mr Al Barguthi for the mistake;

- (d) making the request mentioned at paragraph 20 of Mr Boustany's Second Affidavit much sooner than on 17 July 2019;
- (e) informing the DIFC Courts of the mistakes; and
- (f) informing his client of the mistake.

55. On this basis, I find that Mr Boustany's conduct falls short of the standard expected of DIFC registered practitioners pursuant to the Code of Conduct and to the Overriding Objective.

56. Notwithstanding my comments in paragraph 55, I do not believe that Mr Boustany, on the balance of probabilities (that is, to a degree more likely than not), intended to harm Mr Al Barguthi. For this reason, I find that Mr Boustany is not in breach of any of the provisions of the SCC as spelt out at paragraph 40 of this decision.

57. In summary, with regard to the reasons set out in this decision, the Court imposes the following sanctions on Mr Boustany:

- (a) suspension from the DIFC Court Register of Practitioners for a total period of 2 months, with immediate effect; and
- (b) public admonition by publishing this decision on the DIFC Courts' website.

58. Given that Mr Boustany is a senior partner at Baker McKenzie, acting under the cloak of his firm (which he is entitled to do), and is not a practitioner who requires supervision in his practice, I do not believe that Baker McKenzie ought to be held responsible for Mr Boustany's conduct. On that basis, I dismiss the Complaint against the Second Respondent.



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Nour Hineidi'. The signature is fluid and cursive, written over a white background.

Issued by:
Nour Hineidi
Deputy Registrar
Date of Issue: 9 April 2020
Date of Re-issue: 12 April 2020
Time: 4pm