Claim No: CFI 095/2023

IN THE COURTS OF DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

AHMED SEDDIQ MOHAMED SAMEA ALMUTAWA

Claimant

and

MOHAMED SEDDIQ MOHAMED SAMEA AL MUTAWA

Defendant

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JUDGMENT OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE

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UPON the Part 7 Claim Form dated 20 December 2023 (the “Claim”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-095-2023/8 dated 21 July 2025 seeking an immediate judgment on the whole of the Claim (the “Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application”)

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant at the Trial held from 6 - 8 October 2025 before H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere (the “Trial”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the principal sum of AED 16,030,000.

2. The Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of AED 2,447,156.28 by way of pre‑judgment interest.

 

3. The total amount payable under paragraphs 1 and 2 is AED 18,477,156.28.

4. The Defendant shall pay post‑judgment interest on the sum of AED 16,030,000 at the rate of 5% per annum, calculated on a simple interest basis, from the date of this Judgment until payment in full.

5. The Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application is dismissed.

6. Any party seeking an order for costs, including in relation to the Immediate Judgment Application, is to file written submissions not exceeding five pages, stating the orders sought and the grounds relied upon, within 14 days.

7. Any other party may file written submissions in response, not exceeding five pages, within 14 days of service of the initial submissions.

8. The party seeking the costs order may file written submissions in reply, not exceeding five pages, within 14 days of service of the responsive submissions.

9. The Court will determine the costs orders on the papers without further oral hearing.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 17 November 2025
At: 12pm

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

Judgment summary

1. On 25 November 2018, the Claimant and Defendant executed a Share Sale and Purchase Agreement (“SSPA”), under which the Defendant agreed to purchase the Claimant’s 70% shareholding in Atlas Dynamic Electronic System LLC (“Atlas Dynamic”) for AED 16,030,000.

2. The dispute centres on the enforceability and interpretation of the SSPA.

3. The Claimant asserts that the SSPA was a valid and binding contract, negotiated in good faith and supported by a jointly commissioned valuation by Deloitte Professional Services. The Defendant received full ownership and control of the company but failed to pay the agreed consideration despite repeated demands and extensions.

4. Supporting evidence includes the SSPA (English and notarised Arabic versions), correspondence, and testimony from Atlas Group CFO Mr Walaa Belacy and legal counsel Mr Mohammed Omer. The Claimant denies any duress, misrepresentation, or lack of informed consent, noting the Defendant’s education, fluency in English, and active involvement in negotiations.

5. Clause 5.1 of the SSPA confirms that the AED 16,030,000 price was based on the Deloitte valuation and was agreed upon as binding. The Claimant argues that the price is fixed and not subject to company performance or future contracts.

6. The Claimant contends that the Defendant’s defences—alleging misunderstanding, duress, and that only intercompany debt was owed—are unsupported, inconsistent with the documentary record, and legally untenable under DIFC law.

7. The Court finds in favour of the Claimant and orders:

Factual background

8. The Claimant, founder of the Atlas brand established in 1983, is the older brother of the Defendant. The brand encompassed entities such as Atlas Telecom and Atlas Dynamic, operating in security, telecommunications, oil and gas services, and defence, often in partnership with government and international bodies.

9. The Defendant graduated in 1989 from Baptist California College (USA) with a degree in business, economics, marketing, and finance. He joined Atlas Telecom in 2000 as Division Manager of the Electronics and Security Systems Department.

10. In 2006, the Defendant founded Dynamic Securities LLC in Abu Dhabi, initially holding 100% of its shares. In 2010, he transferred all shares to the Claimant, who returned 30% to him in 2014. The company was renamed Atlas Dynamic Electronic Systems LLC in 2015 (“Atlas Dynamic”).

11. By 2018, the Claimant held 70% of Atlas Dynamic, and the Defendant held 30%. That year, they began negotiations for the Claimant to sell his shares to the Defendant. Deloitte Professional Services was engaged on 11 April 2018 to conduct a valuation, with the Defendant actively participating by providing financial data and attending meetings.

12. Deloitte issued a draft valuation on 12 August 2018, which was shared with the Defendant on 15 August for comment.

13. Mr Walaa Belacy, CFO of the Atlas Group, facilitated negotiations and liaised with Mr Mohammed Omer of Al Wifaq Advocates, who was instructed to draft the SSPA. Mr Omer confirmed that both parties agreed on the terms, and that the Defendant reviewed drafts, requested amendments to payment schedules, and attended meetings at Al Wifaq’s offices in November 2018. Two versions of the SSPA were prepared to reflect the Defendant’s preferences.

14. On 21 November 2018, the Defendant approved and signed the final draft of the SSPA.

15. On 7 January 2019, the parties executed and notarised an Arabic Share Sale and Transfer Agreement before a Notary Public in Abu Dhabi, formalising the transfer under UAE law. The Defendant was registered as the sole shareholder, and the company’s trade licence and name were amended accordingly

16. The Defendant promptly complied with Clause 4.1 of the SSPA by removing the “Atlas” name from all company materials and notifying stakeholders of the change.

17. Despite repeated reminders and extensions, the Defendant failed to pay AED 7,696,845.51 owed to Atlas Telecom by the 31 December 2018 deadline. Payment was eventually made after persistent follow-up.

18. Crucially, the Defendant has not paid any part of the AED 16,030,000 consideration for the Claimant’s 70% shareholding.

19. The Claimant issued notices of default and, under Clause 6.1 of the SSPA, gave the Defendant 30 days to remedy the breach. When the first instalment due on 30 June 2019 remained unpaid, and default continued for over three months, the Claimant issued a formal warning on 28 March 2023 via the Dubai Courts, demanding full payment and indicating intent to initiate proceedings in the DIFC Courts.

20. The Defendant’s principal defences include allegations of duress, lack of informed consent, and misunderstanding of the SSPA terms. He also claims the valuation was unreliable and that the consideration was based on assumptions that later failed.

21. These defences are addressed and rejected in subsequent sections of the judgment.

Procedural history and case management

22. The proceedings were initiated on 20 December 2023. The case has since followed a protracted and contentious procedural trajectory.

23. Early in the proceedings, a default judgment was entered but later set aside.

24. The litigation involved a contested application for a Document Production Order, which was granted after opposition.

25. The Court granted multiple extensions of time to accommodate the parties’ evolving positions and procedural requirements.

26. Orders were made for the submission of expert evidence; however, such evidence was ultimately not presented.

27. The matter experienced postponements and temporary stays, primarily to facilitate ongoing settlement discussions between the parties.

28. On 21 July 2025, following the listing of the matter for trial on 6 October 2025, the Claimant applied for immediate judgment. This Application was reiterated in the Claimant’s trial skeleton argument.

29. At the commencement of the Trial, however, counsel for the Claimant confirmed that the Claimant would not pursue the Immediate Judgment Application. Instead, the Claimant elected to proceed with a full Trial, given that both parties were prepared, and their witnesses were in attendance.

30. The Defendant did not object to the withdrawal of the Immediate Judgment Application but noted that he had incurred costs in responding to it.

31. The Court accordingly will dismiss the Immediate Judgment Application. Directions will be given for the parties to file written submissions on the issue of costs arising from that Application.

Summary of evidence

The Claimant’s Evidence

32. The Claimant relied on documentary evidence and the testimony of two witnesses:

33. The Claimant did not testify due to age and health concerns, supported by medical documentation. The Court draws no adverse inference from his absence.

34. Mr Walaa Belacy provided three witness statements. His evidence addressed the parties’ business relationship, the negotiation and execution of the Share Sale and Purchase Agreement (SSPA), and the Defendant’s failure to fulfil payment obligations. He testified that:

35. While Defence counsel questioned Mr Belacy’s impartiality, they did not challenge the substance of his testimony. The Court finds Mr Belacy to be a credible and reliable witness

36. Mr Mohammed Omer testified that he was instructed to draft the SSPA based on terms agreed by both parties. He confirmed that:

37. Although Defence counsel raised concerns about Mr Omer’s independence, they did not dispute the factual content of his evidence. The Court accepts his testimony as accurate and impartial.

Defendant’s Evidence

38. The Defendant submitted several witness statements, asserting that:

39. The Court finds the Defendant’s evidence to lack credibility, for the following reasons:

40. The documentary record—including the SSPA, the notarised Arabic agreement, and extensive correspondence—contradicts the Defendant’s version of events. The Court finds his testimony inconsistent, unsubstantiated, and unreliable.

Construction and terms of the Share Sale and Purchase Agreement (SSPA)

41. The key provisions of the SSPA are clauses 2 (Sale and Purchase of Shares), 3 (Consideration), and 5 (Outstanding Indebtedness).

42. Clause 2 confirms the sale of 70 shares of AED 1,500 each in Atlas Dynamic LLC from the Seller to the Purchaser.

43. Clause 3 states:

44. This clause establishes a fixed purchase price, payable in 60 monthly instalments, without reference to any valuation mechanism or adjustment formula.

45. Clause 5 provides:

46. While Clause 5 references the Deloitte valuation as the basis for agreeing the consideration, it does not incorporate a mechanism for recalculating or adjusting the price. It serves to explain the rationale behind the fixed sum, not to create a floating or contingent pricing structure.

47. The agreement, when read as a whole, clearly imposes an obligation on the Purchaser to pay the fixed sum of AED 16,030,000, as specified in Clause 3. Clause 5 supports this by confirming that the Deloitte valuation informed the agreed price but does not override or modify the fixed nature of the consideration

48. Two other clauses should be noted. Clause 4 imposes a post-sale obligation on the Purchaser to remove the “Atlas” name from all company materials and notify stakeholders of the change by 31 December 2019. The Defendant complied with this obligation promptly following execution of the SSPA.

49. Clause 10 is an entire agreement clause, confirming that the SSPA supersedes all prior understandings and representations not expressly included in the agreement.

50. On 7 January 2019, the parties executed and notarised an Arabic Share Sale and Transfer Agreement before a Notary Public in Abu Dhabi, formalising the transfer required under UAE law. The notarised agreement and amended Memorandum of Association confirm that the Claimant transferred his 70 shares (70% of the company’s capital) to the Defendant for the agreed consideration, after which the Defendant was registered as the sole shareholder and the company’s trade licence and name were amended.

51. The transfer was subsequently registered with the Department of Economic Development.

52. The Defendant failed to pay AED 7,696,845.51 to Atlas Telecom by the 31 December 2018 deadline and repeatedly delayed settlement despite reminders from the Claimant. Payment was ultimately made only after persistent follow-up and extensions granted by the Claimant. Correspondence from July 2019 shows the Defendant sought further time and proposed a revised payment plan for the intercompany balance, which the Claimant accommodated.

53. It is common ground that the Defendant has not paid any part of the purchase price of AED 16,030,000 for the shares.

54. The Defendant’s failure to pay any portion of the AED 16,030,000 consideration constitutes a breach of Clause 3. Under Clause 6.1, the Seller was entitled to issue a 30-day notice to remedy the breach, and if default persisted for three months, to demand immediate payment of the full outstanding amount. The Claimant exercised this right through a formal notice issued on 28 March 2023.

55. Therefore, the consideration of AED 16,030,000 is due and owing by the Defendant to the Claimant unless the Defendant can establish a valid defence to the Claim.

Defendant’s defences

56. The Defendant raises the following defences to the Claim:

Legal principles on duress

57. The Defendant’s primary defence centres on the allegation of economic duress.

58. Under Article 41 of the DIFC Contract Law, a contract may be avoided if one party was induced to enter into it by the other party’s unjustified threat, which, in the circumstances, was so imminent and serious that it left the aggrieved party with no reasonable alternative.

59. A threat is unjustified if the act or omission threatened is wrongful in itself or if it is wrongful to use it as a means to procure the contract.

60. Where these elements are established, the contract is voidable at the election of the aggrieved party, and avoidance operates retroactively, requiring restitution of benefits exchanged.

61. The right to avoid must be exercised by notice within a reasonable time after the party becomes aware of the relevant facts or is able to act freely. This right may be lost if the party expressly or impliedly confirms the contract, if the other party promptly performs as understood by the avoiding party, or if notice is not given within the required period.

62. Under English law, the doctrine of economic duress similarly requires:

63. The UK Supreme Court in Pakistan International Airline Corp v Times Travel (UK) Ltd [2021] UKSC 40 clarified that lawful act duress is confined to exceptional cases. A demand motivated by commercial self-interest is generally considered justified.

64. In summary, for the Defendant’s claim of economic duress to succeed, he must establish:

Evidence relating to duress allegations

 

65. The Defendant’s primary contention is that he was induced to enter into the SSPA under duress. He alleges that the Claimant exerted undue pressure by obstructing company operations and creating financial hardship, thereby leaving him with no viable alternative but to sign the agreement. The Court has carefully considered these allegations in light of the legal principles governing economic duress and the evidence presented

Alleged Refusal to Co-Sign Company Documents

66. The Defendant asserts that the Claimant, as majority shareholder and joint signatory, refused to sign essential company documents—particularly those related to military contracts and banking facilities—thereby paralysing operations and jeopardising high-value government projects. He claims this conduct exposed him to reputational harm and the risk of blacklisting.

67. However, this assertion is unsupported by contemporaneous documentation. The Defendant has not produced any emails, contract drafts, or formal communications evidencing such refusals. In contrast, Mr Belacy, whose testimony the Court finds credible and reliable, denies any such refusals. He affirms that the Defendant remained actively engaged in company operations and negotiations throughout the relevant period.

68. The timeline of events further undermines the Defendant’s claim. The SSPA was negotiated over several months, with the Defendant participating in meetings, requesting amendments, and ultimately approving the final draft.

69. There is no indication of an operational crisis or coercive conduct by the Claimant.

70. Moreover, the Defendant did not raise any allegations of duress at the time of signing or in the immediate aftermath, only doing so years later during litigation.

Alleged Withholding of Operational Funds (“Drying Out”)

71. The Defendant also asserts that the Claimant deliberately withheld salary and supplier payments, creating a liquidity crisis over a six-month period to exert economic pressure. He claims this left the company unable to function, compelling him to sign the SSPA.

72. Again, this claim is unsubstantiated. The Defendant has not provided any supporting evidence—such as financial records, correspondence, or board minutes—to corroborate the alleged financial distress. Mr Belacy denies any such conduct, and the Court accepts his evidence. The Defendant’s assertion rests solely on his own testimony, which the Court finds implausible and lacking credibility.

Defendant’s arguments related to the Deloitte valuation

73. The Defendant contends that the agreed consideration under the SSPA was based on assumptions that later failed, including the continued use of the “Atlas” brand, banking support, and pipeline projects, which he says were lost after the Claimant’s shares were transferred. He further asserts that the Deloitte valuation was only a draft, subject to change, and expressly not for reliance or transactional use.

74. These arguments are irrelevant. The SSPA expressly provides that the valuation is binding on the Defendant and that the agreed consideration is fixed, not subject to variation or adjustment for any inaccuracy in the valuation or for subsequent events affecting the company’s value.

Alleged Urgency and Lack of Legal Advice

75. The Defendant contends that he signed the SSPA under extreme time pressure, driven by imminent project deadlines and reputational risks, and without adequate legal or linguistic (Arabic) advice.

76. The evidence does not support this claim. The negotiation process spanned several months, with the Defendant actively involved throughout. He requested and received amendments to the draft SSPA, and time extensions were granted at his request. There is no evidence that the Claimant imposed any artificial deadlines or denied requests for additional time.

77. While the Defendant claims he lacked legal advice, he admitted during cross-examination that he consulted with legal professionals, albeit informally.

78. His assertion of limited English proficiency is contradicted by his educational background, business experience, and fluency demonstrated in written and oral communications. He conducted negotiations and legal proceedings in English without requesting translation or interpretation services

79. Furthermore, the Defendant executed an Arabic version of the SSPA before a Notary Public on 7 January 2019, which mirrored the English version. His signature appears on the notarised document, confirming his understanding and acceptance of the agreement’s terms.

Subjective Assertions of Coercion

80. The Defendant’s statements that he “would have signed even ten times,” was “blind,” and “pushed” into signing, reflect a subjective sense of pressure rather than evidence of unjustified threats or coercion. These assertions are vague, generalised, and unsupported by contemporaneous documentation or third-party testimony.

81. The Court finds that the Defendant had alternatives. Notably, the Claimant initially proposed purchasing the Defendant’s 30% stake—a proposal the Defendant rejected in favour of acquiring full ownership. There is no evidence that other options, such as restructuring or continued joint ownership, were explored or foreclosed by the Claimant.

Conclusion on Duress

82. The Court concludes that the Defendant’s decision to enter into the SSPA was a result of his own commercial judgment and desire to assume full control of the company, not the product of unjustified threats or illegitimate pressure.

83. The elements required to establish economic duress are not satisfied. In particular:

84. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Defendant’s allegations of duress in their entirety.

Defendant’s alleged misunderstanding of contractual obligations

85. The Defendant contends that he misunderstood the nature of the consideration under the SSPA, believing that the AED 16,030,000 referenced in the agreement was not an additional payment for the Claimant’s 70% shareholding, but rather a reflection of existing intercompany debts owed by Atlas Dynamic to Atlas Telecom. He further asserts that the absence of legal or translation support contributed to this misunderstanding.

86. This argument appears to invoke a defence of unilateral mistake under Article 37 of the DIFC Contract Law 2004. However, the Defendant did not articulate the legal foundation of his claim with precision.

87. The Court finds this defence to be wholly unpersuasive for the following reasons.

Clarity of Contractual Terms

88. The SSPA is unambiguous in its language. Clause 3 explicitly states that the total consideration for the 70% shareholding is AED 16,030,000, payable in 60 monthly instalments. Clause 5.1(a) further confirms that this amount was agreed upon based on the Deloitte valuation and accepted as binding by both parties. There is no textual basis for interpreting the agreement as limiting the Defendant’s obligations to the repayment of intercompany debt.

Inconsistency with Defendant’s Own Assertions

89. The Defendant’s claim of misunderstanding is irreconcilable with his concurrent assertion that the consideration was based on the Deloitte valuation. If he believed the payment was merely to settle existing debts, there would be no need to reference or rely upon a valuation of the company’s shares. The two positions are mutually exclusive.

Contemporaneous Conduct and Communications

90. The Defendant’s emails and correspondence, both before and after the execution of the SSPA, refer to the agreed instalment payments for the purchase of shares. These communications make no mention of a belief that the payments were limited to intercompany debt. On the contrary, they reflect an understanding that the AED 16,030,000 was the agreed price for the Claimant’s 70% shareholding.

Separate Treatment of Intercompany Debt

91. The SSPA treats the outstanding debt owed by Atlas Dynamic to Atlas Telecom (approximately AED 7.7 million) as a distinct obligation, separate from the share purchase consideration. The Defendant’s own conduct—such as his requests for extensions and revised payment schedules—further evidences his awareness of the dual obligations.

Execution of Arabic Notarised Agreement

92. On 7 January 2019, the Defendant executed an Arabic version of the SSPA before a Notary Public. This document mirrored the English version and confirmed the agreed consideration. The Defendant’s signature on this notarised agreement undermines his claim of linguistic or legal misunderstanding.

Entire Agreement Clause and Affirmation

93. Clause 10 of the SSPA contains an entire agreement clause, precluding reliance on any prior or extrinsic representations. Moreover, the Defendant’s subsequent conduct—accepting full ownership, complying with post-sale obligations, and failing to raise any objection for several years—constitutes affirmation of the contract. These actions are inconsistent with any genuine misunderstanding of the agreement’s core terms.

Failure to Satisfy Legal Requirements for Mistake

94. Even if the Defendant genuinely misunderstood the nature of the consideration (which the Court does not accept), the requirements of Article 37(2) and (3) of the DIFC Contract Law are not met. There is no evidence that the Claimant knew or ought to have known of any mistake or caused the mistake

Conclusion

95. The Defendant’s assertion of a misunderstanding regarding the consideration is contradicted by the clear language of the SSPA, the surrounding circumstances, and his own conduct. The Court finds that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to pay AED 16,030,000 for the Claimant’s 70% shareholding, and that no valid defence of mistake or misunderstanding arises on the facts or the law.

Evaluation and rejection of defences

96. The Defendant has advanced several defences to the Claimant’s Claim under the SSPA, including allegations of duress, misunderstanding, lack of informed consent, and reliance on a flawed valuation. Upon careful consideration of the evidence and applicable legal principles, the Court finds that none of these defences has merit.

Duress and Lack of Informed Consent

97. The Defendant’s claim that he was coerced into signing the SSPA under economic duress is unsupported by credible evidence. The Court has already found that:

98. Accordingly, the defence of duress fails both factually and legally.

Alleged Misunderstanding of Consideration

99. The Defendant’s assertion that he misunderstood the nature of the AED 16,030,000 consideration—believing it to represent repayment of intercompany debt rather than a purchase price—is contradicted by:

100. Even if the Defendant had misunderstood the agreement (which the Court does not accept), the requirements for a defence of unilateral mistake under Article 37 of the DIFC Contract Law 2004 are not met. There is no evidence that the Claimant knew or ought to have known of any such mistake, nor that the Claimant induced the mistake.

Challenge to the Valuation

101. The Defendant’s criticisms of the Deloitte valuation—namely, that it was a draft, not intended for reliance, and based on assumptions that later failed—are legally irrelevant. The SSPA expressly states that the valuation was accepted as binding by both parties and that the consideration was fixed. There is no contractual mechanism for adjusting the price based on subsequent events or changes in company performance. The Defendant’s attempt to revisit the valuation post hoc is inconsistent with the clear terms of the agreement and the principle of contractual certainty.

Conclusion

102. The Court finds that the SSPA was the product of a deliberate, informed, and armslength negotiation between two experienced businessmen. The Defendant’s defences are internally inconsistent, unsupported by contemporaneous evidence, and contradicted by his own conduct. The agreement is valid and enforceable, and the Defendant’s failure to pay the agreed consideration constitutes a breach of contract.

103. Accordingly, all of the Defendant’s defences are rejected.

Award of pre- and post- interest

104. The Claimant seeks pre-judgment interest pursuant to Article 118 of the DIFC Contract Law 2004, which provides that where a party fails to pay a sum of money when due, the aggrieved party is entitled to interest from the due date until payment, regardless of whether the non-payment is excused. The applicable rate is the average short-term bank lending rate to prime borrowers for the currency and place of payment.

105. This provision reflects the principle of full compensation, ensuring that the successful party is made whole by accounting for the time value of money and preventing unjust enrichment of the defaulting party. The award of pre-judgment interest is compensatory, not punitive, and is consistent with the objective of promoting timely contractual performance.

Pleading Issues

106. The Defendant contends that the Claimant’s claim for pre-judgment interest is defective due to non-compliance with Rule 17.18 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”), which requires particulars of the interest rate, calculation method, and accrual period. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the Claimant’s reliance on EIBOR plus 1% was not properly pleaded and should be disallowed.

107. The Court does not accept that the pleading deficiency is fatal. Although the Particulars of Claim did not fully comply with RDC 17.18, the Defendant was aware of the interest claim, had ample opportunity to respond, and did so during the proceedings. The issue was addressed in submissions and evidence, and no prejudice has been demonstrated. In line with the overriding objective under RDC Part 1 to deal with cases justly and proportionately, the Court exercises its discretion to allow the claim for interest.

Pre-Judgment Interest

108. The Claimant claims interest on the unpaid purchase price of AED 16,030,000, which was due in 60 monthly instalments beginning 30 June 2019. The Defendant failed to pay any instalments.

109. The Court accepts the Claimant’s submission that the appropriate rate is EIBOR plus 1%, a rate commonly accepted by the DIFC Courts as a reasonable approximation of the average short-term lending rate to prime borrowers. Based on data from the UAE Central Bank, the Claimant’s legal representative calculated the average 3-month EIBOR from 2019 to 2025 as 2.8790%, resulting in a total rate of 3.8790% per annum.

110. The Court calculates pre-judgment interest on each missed instalment from its due date to 17 November 2025, using the formula:

111. This methodology was applied to all 60 instalments, resulting in a total pre-judgment interest award of AED 2,447,156.28, broken down as follows:

112. The Court therefore orders the Defendant to pay AED 2,447,156.28 in prejudgment interest, in addition to the principal sum of AED 16,030,000, a total of AED 18,477,156.28.

Post-Judgment Interest

113. Under Article 9(C)(2) of the DIFC Court Law 2025, judgments carry legal interest from the date of judgment. Practice Direction No. 4 of 2017 sets a default simple interest rate of 9% per annum, unless the Court determines otherwise. In light of the Dubai Court of Cassation’s General Assembly Decision No. 1 of 2021, which reduced the default rate to 5%, and considering the 2025 average EIBOR of 4.2114%, the Court finds that a 5% simple interest rate is appropriate in this case.

114. The Court therefore orders the Defendant to pay post-judgment interest on AED 16,030,000 at 5% per annum, calculated on a simple interest basis, from the date of this Judgment until full payment is made.

Costs

115. At the conclusion of the Trial, the Court indicated that the issue of costs would be reserved pending delivery of judgment on liability and quantum. In light of the Court’s findings in favour of the Claimant, it is appropriate to now address the procedure for determining costs.

116. The Court notes that the Claimant’s Application for Immediate Judgment was dismissed, albeit without opposition from the Defendant at Trial. The Defendant has indicated that he incurred costs in responding to that Application. Accordingly, the Court considers it appropriate to allow the parties an opportunity to make submissions on the appropriate costs orders, including in relation to the Immediate Judgment Application.

117. The Court therefore directs as follows:

118. The parties are reminded of their obligations to assist the Court in achieving the overriding objective, including by conducting litigation in a proportionate and costeffective manner.

119. The Court will determine the issue of costs on the papers, without a further oral hearing, unless it considers that an oral hearing is necessary.