Claim No: CFI 019/2025

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

ATUL ASHOK AMIR CHAND DHAWAN

Claimant

and

ZURICH INTERNATIONAL LIFE LIMITED

Defendant

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE THOMAS BATHURST

UPON the Claimant’s Part 7 Claim Form dated 25 February 2025 (the “Claim”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim dated 25 February 2025

AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. CFI-019-2025/1 dated 26 March 2025 seeking the Claim Form and service of the Claim Form to be set aside on the basis that the DIFC Courts lack jurisdiction (the “Defendant’s Application” or the “Application”)

AND UPON hearing the Claimant as a litigant in person and hearing Counsel for the Defendant at a hearing held on 16 June 2025 before H.E. Justice Thomas Bathurst (the “Hearing”)

AND UPON the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Defendant’s Application is allowed.

2. The DIFC Courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the proceedings.

3. Pursuant to RDC 12.7, the Claim Form and service of the Claim Form be set aside on the basis that the DIFC Courts lacked jurisdiction.

4. The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs of the Application, to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 9 September 2025
At: 8am

Introduction

1. In proceedings commenced on 25 February 2025, the Claimant, Atul Ashok Amir Chand Dhawan (the “Claimant”), sought damages of AED 5 million as compensation for what was described as a breach of confidentiality and financial losses relating to the Insurance policy No.6226591 in respect of which it was claimed that the Defendant, Zurich International Life Limited (the “Defendant”), was the insurer.

2. The Defendant has asserted the DIFC Courts have no jurisdiction to hear the Claim.

The Claim

3. The Claimant, in his Particulars of Claim dated 25 February 2025, asserted that he was previously bound by the policy and adhered to all its terms. He claimed that under a conditional assignment the policy was transferred to Mashreq Bank as collateral for a loan.

4. The Claimant claimed he discovered that Mashreq Bank had halted the transaction and refused to grant the loan. He claimed this was based on personal financial confidential information provided by the Defendant to the bank stating the policy was not valid since there were unpaid premiums. He also asserted that other confidential information was disclosed to the bank without the consent of the Claimant. He claimed the disclosure included unnecessary details such as the policy’s validity and payment history which went beyond what was necessary for the bank’s loan assessment, despite records indicating the policy was valid until 2028.

5. The Claimant stated that as a direct result of the Defendant's actions, Mashreq Bank denied the loan request based on the false information. He asserted that error forced the Claimant to sell his property in a distressed sale for GPB 1 million, significantly below the market value of GBP 1.35 million. He claimed he also incurred additional personal losses of GBP 2 million.

6. The Claimant claimed compensation for these losses.

The Challenge to Jurisdiction

7. By an Application Notice dated 26 March 2025, the Defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts to hear the Claim. The Defendant claimed it is not a DIFC Body, DIFC Establishment or Licensed DIFC Establishment and, therefore, does not fall within the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts pursuant to Article (5)(A)(1)(a) of Law No.12 of 2024.

The Arguments on the Challenge to Jurisdiction

8. In support of the Application, the Defendant relied on two witness statements of its solicitor, Max Edward Davis (“Mr Davis”), together with various supporting material. Both the Claimant and the Defendant relied on certain documentary material in support of their respective contentions. I shall refer to the extent necessary to this material in dealing with the parties’ submissions and my conclusion.

The Relevant Legislation

9. The jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts is set out in Article (14) of the DIFC Courts Law No. (2) of 2025. Relatively, Article (14)A(1)-(3) are in the following terms:

10. DIFC Bodies, DIFC Establishments and Licensed DIFC Establishment are defined in Article (1) in the following terms:

11. This is the legislation which was in force at the time of the hearing of the application to set aside the claim for lack of jurisdiction. It should be noted that at the time, the Claim was made, the relevant legislative provisions were contained in Article 5 of the Judicial Authority Law (Dubai Law 12/2024). However, it was established in Al Khorafi & Ors v Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Limited & Anor [2011] DIFC CA 003 (“Al Khorafi”) at [4]-[6] that the relevant jurisdictional provision is that in force at the time of the jurisdictional hearing (see also, Tavira Securities Limited v Re Point Ventures Fzco & Ors [2017] CFI 026 (“Tavira”) at [32]).

The Defendant’s Argument on Jurisdiction

12. In its skeleton argument, the Defendant submitted that where there is a dispute concerning jurisdiction it was up to the Claimant to establish a good arguable case that the claim fell within jurisdiction. He submitted that the DIFC Courts followed the English test as explained by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Brownlie v Four Seasons Holdings Inc [2018] 1 WLR 192, namely, what is required is the claimant must supply a plausible evidential basis for the application of the relevant jurisdictional gateway and where there is an issue of fact, must show a good arguable case for the application of the gateway if there is a plausible (albeit contested) evidential basis for it (see [2018] 1 WLR 192 at [7], [33]).

13. The Defendant submitted that the question for the purpose of Article 14A (1) of the DIFC Courts Law is whether the Defendant is a DIFC Establishment.

14. The Defendant noted that the Claimant relied on two matters in support of its contention that the DIFC Court had jurisdiction by virtue of Article 14A (1). First, the fact that Zurich Insurance Group had a branch in the DIFC and is licensed by the DFSA and, second, that the Defendant is an entity which is part of the Zurich Insurance Group and also had operations in the DIFC.

15. The Defendant stated that there is a company called Zurich Insurance Company Limited (DIFC Branch) which is established in the DIFC and licensed by the DFSA as an insurer. Reference was made in that context to an extract from the DFSA records to that effect. It was accepted that that company was a DIFC Licensed Establishment, therefore, a DIFC Establishment. However, it was pointed out that that was a different company to the Defendant, and it was submitted that the fact the Defendant might be part of a group of companies that includes a DIFC Establishment, does not make the Defendant a DIFC Establishment. It referred in that context to Globe Investment Holdings Ltd v Commercial Bank of Dubai & Ors [2023] DIFC CFI 028 at [42]-[47]. The Court therefore concluded at [46] that the DIFC Courts will not (save when justified in accordance with established principles) disregard the corporate personality of an incorporated vehicle carrying on regulated or unregulated activities in the DIFC so as to extend the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts to its shareholders absent other grounds personal to the shareholders. I accept that principle would have equal application to subsidiary and associated companies.

16. It was accepted in the skeleton argument that the Defendant was registered as a recognised foreign company under Part 12 of the DIFC Companies Law. It was stated, however, that its licence to carry on business expired on 8 November 2019 and it has carried on no operation in the DIFC since that date. It was also noted that the Defendant has applied to the Registrar of Companies to be de-registered from the DIFC. It was submitted the Defendant has done everything it needs to do regarding that application and is simply waiting on the Registrar to remove it from the register. Reference was made to the second affidavit of Mr Davis dated 12 May 2025. Mr Davis referred to the extract from the DIFC Public Register which noted that the Defendant is “pending de- registration”.

17. In that context, it was submitted that the Defendant was not a DIFC Establishment. It was submitted it was not a DIFC Licensed Establishment because such a body must be registered “to operate or to carry on any activity in or through the DIFC Laws and the DIFC Regulations”. It submitted that as the Defendant’s license has expired it is not a DIFC Establishment because it is not permitted to carry on any business.

18. So far as Articles 14(A)(2) and (3) are concerned, it was submitted that the assertions made in the claim to the effect “that all transactions and meetings relating to the policy took place in the DIFC” and “during any transaction in the DIFC area all illustrations and documents were pulled out from their DIFC office” did not identify any specific event that occurred in the DIFC. It was submitted that the assertions made by the Claimant are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction.

19. So far as Article 14(A)(2) was concerned, it was submitted that there was no evidence the policy was negotiated or concluded in the DIFC. It referred to the evidence of Mr Davis to the effect that the policy was brokered through brokers in onshore Dubai and the Defendant was unaware of any meetings with the Claimant in the DIFC. Reference was made to the original application for the policy which was received by Nexus Insurance Brokers on 2 September 2015. The evidence of Mr Davis is to the effect the office of that company was in onshore Dubai. In the circumstances it was submitted that the Claimant has not established an arguable case that Article 14(A)(2) is satisfied.

20. In relation to Article 14(A)(3), it was submitted that there is no evidence that an incident or transaction which was relevant to a DIFC Establishment, its activities or those of its employees occurred in the DIFC. It was submitted there was no evidential basis whatsoever to support the proposition that a transaction occurred in the DIFC or some element of the Claimant’s cause of action occurred in the DIFC. It was submitted that a good arguable case that there was jurisdiction under Article 14(A)(3) was not established.

21. Counsel for the Defendant submitted at the hearing that for an entity to be a DIFC Establishment, it requires that the entity be established, licensed, registered or permitted to operate or carry on any activity through the DIFC pursuant to the DIFC Laws and DIFC Regulations. It submitted mere establishment, licensing or registration is not enough it was necessary to be established or licensed for a purpose, namely, a purpose to carry on an activity pursuant to DIFC Laws.

22. He submitted that the definition of “Licensed DIFC Establishment” has a similar structure requiring that the entity not only be licensed but licensed to carry out a financial or ancillary service. He contrasted it to the definition of “DIFC Body” where the mere existence is enough to bring the entity within the jurisdictional pathway.

23. He submitted the Defendant is a recognised foreign company under DIFC Law and when a foreign company is recognised it is recognised for a specific purpose, namely, carrying on a business in the DIFC. He submitted that for the purpose of testing whether an entity is a DIFC Establishment, one asks of a recognised foreign company what is the purpose for which it is licensed, registered or “permitted, etc, under DIFC Law”. He submitted the answer was to carry on business, and to carry on business the foreign company needed a commercial licence, and the Defendant did not have one because it was in the process of being de-registered. He submitted the question must be assessed at the time the claim was made referring to Tavira at [32]. He submitted the position at the time at which the contract was concluded or the material events occurred was irrelevant.

24. Counsel referred to the extract from the DIFC Register to which I have referred at [16] above and to the entry “Licence Validity: 08.11.2019”. He referred to the evidence of Mr Davis that that was the date of the expiry of the licence.

25. In dealing with the need for a licence to carry on a business, counsel for the Defendant referred to Article 133 of the DIFC Companies Law 2018 which provides a foreign company shall not carry on business in the DIFC unless it is registered as a Recognised Company and to Article 136(1)(c) to the effect that a Recognised Company shall at all times hold a licence pursuant to Article 9 of the Operating Law unless exempted by the Registrar. He also pointed to Regulation 7.4 of the Companies Regulations which describes carrying on business as including establishing and maintaining a place of business, administering, leasing or managing property or employing persons.

26. Counsel for the Defendant also referred to the Operating Law (DIFC Law No.7 of 2018). He noted that Article 8 of the Operating Law prohibited any persons from operating or conducting a business in or from the DIFC unless that person is incorporated, registered or continued under a Prescribed Law or any other legislation administered by the Registrar. He also referred to Article 9(2) that a registered person who operates or conducts business in or from the DIFC to whom a licence has been issued shall at all times maintain a valid licence. He also referred to Article 9(10) which obliges a licensed person to renew the licence unless the person has ceased to carry on business and given the prescribed notification to the Registrar. He finally referred to Regulation 2.3.3 of the Operating Regulations which provided that a Recognised Company must hold a commercial licence.

27. In dealing with the second and third gateways contained in Article 14(2) and Article 14(3), counsel for the Defendant first submitted it would be inherently improbable the Defendant was concluding insurance contracts in the DIFC because that would involve it breaching the regulatory law.

28. He referred to the evidence of Mr Dhawan to the effect that the jurisdiction for this case in DIFC is “all the transactions and meetings relating to the policy took place in the DIFC area” and “during my transactions in the DIFC area all illustrations and documents were pulled out from the DIFC office”. He submitted there was no specific evidence in relation to the conclusion of the contract.

29. He referred in that context to the evidence of Mr Davis to the effect there were no records of the Claimant meeting with anyone at the Defendant or having attended the Defendant’s DIFC office prior to November 2019. He pointed out that that date was the date that the Defendant ceased to have any kind of physical establishment in the DIFC. He also referred to Mr Davis’s evidence to the effect that Nexus Insurance Brokers LLC through whom the policy was purchased was authorised by the UAE Central Bank and its head office was in onshore Dubai.

30. Counsel for the Defendant also referred to the policy schedule. Whilst he accepted there was no evidence where the policy was entered into, he noted that the policy schedule was executed by the Defendant in the Isle of Man.

31. In relation to the application for the policy to which I have referred at [19], he noted the stamp “Received 2 September 2015 Nexus Insurance Brokers LLC”. He submitted that contrary to the submissions made by Mr Dhawan, there was nothing in that document to show that there was a meeting in the DIFC. He also referred to the information contained on the concluding page of the application to the effect that Zurich Insurance is the business name of Zurich International Life Limited and is registered under UAE Federal Law No.6 of 2007. He pointed out that its activities in the UAE are governed by that law and there is no reference to the DFSA or registration by the DFSA or operation in the DIFC.

32. He also referred to an email from Nexus Insurance Brokers LLC dated 15 January 2005 which showed an onshore address.

33. He submitted that this evidence showed there was no plausible evidential basis that the contract was concluded in the DIFC because the statement by Mr Dhawan, that everything happened in the DIFC, was flatly contradicted by all the contemporaneous evidence.

34. In dealing with Article 14(A)(3) he submitted, referring to Al Khorafi, that what is being looked at is some element of the cause of action arising in the DIFC. He submitted that was logical when regard is had to the Article as a whole, the first limb asked is the Claimant or the Defendant a DIFC Establishment, the second limb asked, is there a contract which has a nexus with DIFC, or does it have to be performed in the DIFC, whilst the third limb looks at some event relevant to the claim happening the DIFC. He submitted the wording in Article 14(A)(3) “relevant to DIFC Bodies or DIFC Establishments” was not present in the predecessor legislation and it is not clear what the words meant. He submitted, however, whatever they meant, the Claimant had not established there was any incident or transaction which arose in the DIFC.

35. In dealing with the question whether the words “DIFC Bodies or DIFC Establishments” in Article 14(A)(3) refers to those bodies or establishments at the date of the claim or at the date of the transaction, he submitted if it was referring to incidents or transactions relevant to DIFC Bodies or DIFC Establishments it would substantially overlap with Article 14(A)(1). He submitted it must be looking at something different and submitted in those circumstances, it must be looking at the bodies at the time the claim arises.

36. He submitted that the Particulars of Claim did not state when the material events relevant to the Claim occurred. He noted, however, that the relevant complaint was that the Defendant had told the bank that the Claimant had ceased paying the premiums on the policy. He referred to the letter sent by Mr Dhawan to the Isle of Man Financial Services Ombudsman Section which stated the events complained of took place two or three months before 23 December 2021. He pointed out it was some time after the Defendant’s licence expired in 2019 and it had ceased to carry on business in the DIFC. He submitted that in these circumstances, whatever the construction of Article 14(A)(3), there is no material event relevant to the claim that occurred in the DIFC because the contract was not concluded in the DIFC and the communication with the bank occurred after the Defendant had ceased operating in the DIFC.

37. In these circumstances he submitted the Court had no jurisdiction.

The Claimant’s Argument on Jurisdiction

38. In a document entitled “Reply to the Application Notice”, the Claimant asserted that all transactions and meetings relating to the policy took place in the DIFC. He submitted that the Zurich Insurance Group had a branch office in Dubai licensed by the DFSA. He submitted Zurich Insurance Life Limited is an entity which is part of the Zurich Insurance Group and also had operations in the DIFC.

39. He also stated that during the transactions in the DIFC, all illustrations and documents were pulled out from the DIFC office which was the backend and administrative office for Zurich Australia Life Limited.

40. Although the reply does not state when the initial breach of contract occurred, it stated there was a further breach on 30 January 2025.

41. In its skeleton argument, the Claimant relied on clause 7.10B of a document containing the extracts of a policy apparently issued by the Defendant. The clause, so far as relevant, was in the following terms:-

“When the policy owner is resident in the UAE, the company will submit to the jurisdiction of the UAE in respect of any litigation arising out of the policy and the policy shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the UAE.”

42. The Claimant also relied on a letter to him from the Defendant dated 17 March 2010 concerning a policy No.3021523 which is a different policy to the policy the subject of the present proceedings. The letter stated the address of the Defendant to be Level 6, East Wing, The Gate, Dubai International Finance Centre.

43. It should also be noted that the documents tendered by the Defendant include a schedule to policy No.6626891 (the policy in question) stating the policy commenced on 1 October 2015 and containing different policy terms including a jurisdiction provision, clause 21, which so far as relevant was in the following terms:

“This policy is governed by and shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the United Arab Emirates and the Company will submit to the non- exclusive jurisdiction of any competent legal authority in the United Arab Emirates in respect of any litigation arising out of the Policy.”

44. The Claimant raised a number of other matters relevant to the merits of the Claim in his skeleton argument. However, they are not relevant on the question of jurisdiction.

45. At the Hearing, the Claimant pointed out that the policy schedule document relied upon by him did not refer to a competent court. He said he had not received the document relied upon by the Defendant. He claimed he had not received the original policy but only the booklet containing the policy wording upon which he relied. He stated he was medically examined in connection with the policy in 2015 in the DIFC.

Consideration

46. In my opinion, the Court does not have jurisdiction to determine this Claim.

47. I agree with counsel for the Defendant for the reasons given by him (see [11] above) that the relevant jurisdictional provision to be considered is the one in force at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, namely, Article 14 of the DIFC Courts Law No.(2) of 2025.

48. Article 14(A)(1) relates to claims by or against DIFC Bodies or DIFC Establishments. It seems to be clear from the text that the entity in question must be a DIFC Body or a DIFC Establishment at the time the claim was brought. That is consistent with authority, see Tavira at [32].

49. Thus, for Article 14(A)(1) to confer jurisdiction on the Court it must be shown that at the time the claim was made the Defendant was a DIFC Body or a DIFC Establishment which includes a Licensed DIFC Establishment.

50. For an entity to be a DIFC Body, it must be established and regulated in accordance with Law No.5 of 2021. DIFC Bodies are defined to include the DIFCA (the Dubai International Finance Centre Authority), the DFSA (the Dubai Financial Services Authority), the DIFC Court or any other body established under the DIFC Laws or established upon approval of the President as independent or affiliated entities of the said bodies. It is clear the Defendant is not a body which falls within this definition.

51. It is a necessary requirement for a body to be a DIFC Establishment or a Licensed DIFC Establishment that it must be either established, licensed registered or permitted to carry on any activity in the DIFC. In the case of a Licensed DIFC Establishment, the activity must be the provision of Financial or Ancillary Services. The Defendant, although a recognised foreign company in the DIFC, was not established to carry out any such activities or services.

52. As I indicated, the Defendant was a recognised foreign company under DIFC Law. Article 133 of the DIFC Company Law prohibits a foreign company from carrying on business in the DIFC unless it is registered as a recognised company under the DIFC Laws. Article 136(c) requires a recognised company to hold a license in the DIFC pursuant to Article 9 of DIFC Operating Law No.7 of 2018. Article 9.2 relevantly provides that any person who operates or conducts business in the DIFC to whom a licence has been issued, shall at all times maintain a valid licence whilst Article 9(5) provides that a person who holds such a licence shall only conduct the activities permitted under the licence. Article 9(10) obliges a licensed person to renew the licence unless it has ceased to carry on business and given the prescribed notice to the Registrar.

53. It appears that for a period prior to 8 November 2019, the Defendant was a recognised foreign company and licensed to carry on business in the DIFC. As such it would have been a DIFC Establishment. However, the extract from the DIFC Register exhibited to the second witness statement of Mr Davis shows that the licence held by the Defendant expired on 9 November 2005 and the Defendant is presently pending deregistration as a recognised company. Mr Davis also states in his second witness statement that the Defendant has completed all necessary steps to effect the deregistration of the Defendant’s DIFC branch office with the Registrar. It follows that as at the date of the Claim, the Defendant was not licensed to carry on any business in the DIFC and, as such, was not a DIFC Establishment or a Licensed DIFC Establishment.

54. Article 14(A)(2) confers jurisdiction relevantly in relation to claims arising from or related to contracts whether concluded, completed or performed wholly or partly within the DIFC or which will be performed wholly or partly within the DIFC as expressly provided in such contracts.

55. Article 14(A)(2) thus confers jurisdiction on contracts entered into the DIFC or to be performed in the DIFC. In Al Khorafi, the Court described the operation of the predecessor to Article 14(A)(2) in the following terms at [60]:

“The purpose of Article 5A(1)(b) is to bring within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts claims arising out of or relating to a contract or to the negotiation for a contract where the connecting factor is that the contract or intended contract had been wholly entered into or partly entered into in the sense of negotiated or had been wholly or partly agreed upon or wholly or partly performed by conduct or an event which had taken place within the DIFC. The essence of the provision is that the court is given jurisdiction where there has been relevant activity with regard to the contract or related to it within the DIFC.”

56. Although the wording of the predecessor legislation (Article 5(A)(1)(b) of Law No.16 of 2012) is somewhat different, it seems to me the effect is the same. Having regard to what was said in Al Khorafi, Article 14(A)(2) could extend to circumstances where the contract was negotiated in the DIFC although entered into elsewhere.

57. However, it is unnecessary to form a firm view on that question as there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate a plausible evidential basis that the contract was either entered into or wholly or partly negotiated within the DIFC. The proposal form was signed by the Claimant on 1 September 2015 and was stated to be signed in the UAE. It was received by Nexus Insurance Brokers LLC on 2 September 2015, the evidence of Mr Davis being that that company’s head office was located in onshore Dubia. The proposal seems to have been accepted by the Defendant in the Isle of Man. Further, the evidence of Mr Davis was that the Defendant had no record of any meetings with the Claimant in the DIFC prior to late November 2019. Having regard to this material the evidence of the Claimant to which I have referred at [38]-[39] does not give rise to a plausible albeit contested evidential basis to found jurisdiction under Article 14(A)(2).

58. I have set out Article 14(A)(3) above. The previous equivalent legislation was in the following terms:

“Civil or Commercial claims and actions arising out of or relating to any incident or transaction which is wholly or partly performed within DIFC and is related to DIFC activities.”

59. In Al Khorafi, the Court described the effect of this section in the following terms:

“The wording of this provision is somewhat oblique but the sense which reflects the legislative intent is fairly clear. The claim or action has to arise out of or relate to either an incident or a transaction. The meaning to be accorded to ‘incident’, as under Law 12, Article 5(A)(1)b, comprehends any of the essential elements of conduct or the incidence of loss or damage necessary to give rise to a cause of action in tort or for breach of statutory duty. The meaning to be accorded to ‘transaction’ is any commercial relationship between the Claimant and defendant giving rise to mutual rights and obligations, including, but not limited to, a contractual relationship. Whereas it is meaningful to speak of a ‘transaction’ as being ‘performed’ in a particular place, that is not so of an ‘incident’. Accordingly, the words should be understood as referring to an incident which has occurred within the DIFC.”

60. As was pointed to in argument, the words in Article 14(A)(3) “relevant to the DIFC Bodies or DIFC Establishments their own activities or those related to the activities of the employees in any of them” were not included in the previous legislation. Although the words are difficult to interpret, they seem, in my view, an attempt to make it clear the incident or transaction even if it takes place within the DIFC must have a connection to the DIFC Bodies or DIFC Establishments involved in the claim or the activities of their employees.

61. In the present case, the only incident in question was the alleged provision of misleading information to the Mashreq Bank. That communication took place after the Defendant ceased to be a DIFC Establishment (see [38] above) and the conduct was, thus, not relevant to a DIFC Establishment. In these circumstances, Article 14(A)(3) does not operate to confer jurisdiction on the Court.

Did the Defendant Submit to Jurisdiction

62. Article 14(B) of the DIFC Courts Law provides as follows:

“The DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine civil and commercial claims and applications where the parties expressly agree in writing to the DIFC Courts jurisdiction whether before or after the dispute arises provided that such agreement is made pursuant to specific and clear provisions.”

63. As I have indicated above (see [41], [43]) the Claimant and the Defendant claim different jurisdictional clauses apply to the policy. It should be noted that the booklet which the Defendant asserts contain the relevant policy clauses was entitled “Futura Policy Terms and Conditions – United Arab Emirates”. However, the policy schedule which was produced along with that document did not directly refer to it.

64. The document provided by the Claimant was entitled “Policy Schedules and Conditions – Futura International Lifetime Protection”. However, there is no evidence that was the policy terms to which the current insurance contract was subject. No policy schedule was produced by the Claimant.

65. In my opinion, the Claimant has failed to establish the terms on which he relied relate to the policy. There was no indication of its provenance or whether that was the booklet containing the terms of the policy. By contrast, the policy document produced by the Defendant was produced in conjunction with the relevant policy schedule. Although the evidence is unsatisfactory, on balance I am satisfied that the policy terms and conditions relied upon by the Defendant contain the relevant terms and conditions to which the policy was subject.

66. In considering whether this Court has jurisdiction, I accept that it is well established that the expressions “Dubai Courts” and “Courts of the UAE” should be construed to include DIFC Courts and Courts of Dubai (see Investment Group Private Limited v Standard Chartered Bank [2015] DIFC CA 004 at [123]-[154]; Goel v Credit Suisse (Switzerland) Ltd [2015] DIFC CA 002 at [91]).

67. However, neither of those cases were concerned with the construction of a clause conferring jurisdiction upon “any competent legal authority in the United Arab Emirates”. Although I accept that the expression “legal authority” would extend to a court, including the DIFC Courts, it seems to me that the use of the word “competent” implies that the legal authority or court must have jurisdiction over the claim irrespective of the submission to jurisdiction provision. Put another way, the submission to jurisdiction is a submission to any legal authority or court in the United Arab Emirates which has the jurisdiction to deal with the claim.

68. In the present case, I have concluded the DIFC Courts do not have such jurisdiction. It follows it not being a competent court the provision in the policy does not oblige the Defendant to submit to their jurisdiction

Conclusion

69. It follows that the Defendant’s Application should be allowed. In the circumstances, it is unnecessary to deal with the argument that the provisions of Federal Law Decree No.48 of 2023 Regulating Insurance Activities exclude the jurisdiction of DIFC Courts in respect of the Claim in question.

70. I would make the following orders: