(a) The Claimant’s Claim is essentially one for breach of the Grant Agreement and/or the Share Incentive Plan, in particular the allegation that the fair market value of the shares has been wrongly determined.

(b) I hold that the nature of the Claim is contractual, arising from the Grant Agreement and the Share Incentive Plan pursuant to which the Claimant was granted stock options. The Claimant’s case is that the fair market value of those options has been wrongly determined. Both the Grant Agreement and the Share Incentive Plan confer jurisdiction on the DIFC Courts, one being governed by English law and the other by DIFC law. The Defendant’s contention that the Claim is no more than an employment law claim subject to the DIFC Employment Law is rejected.

(c) As to limitation, the Defendant argues that the Claim is out of time under the six- month period prescribed by the DIFC Employment Law, submitting that the Claimant’s employment terminated on 3 August 2024 following his resignation on 4 July 2024, with any subsequent period treated as an ex gratia extension of garden leave. I reject this argument. The written resignation notice expressly states that the final working day is 31 August 2024, and contemporaneous documents, including the final settlement statement, salary records, and pension contributions, all reflect termination on that date. The Defendant adduces no evidence to the contrary. Moreover, the Employment Contract requires at least 30 days’ notice, making a longer notice period permissible. Accordingly, I find that termination occurred on 31 August 2024. On that basis, the Claim Form filed on 28 February 2025 is within six months. In any event, insofar as the Claim arises under the Grant Agreement governed by English law, the applicable limitation period is six years. The Claim is therefore brought in time under either regime, and the Application to contest jurisdiction is dismissed.

(d) I further hold that the jurisdiction clause in the Employment Contract, which provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Islamabad, conflicts with the jurisdiction clauses in the Grant Agreement and the Share Incentive Plan, both of which confer jurisdiction on the DIFC Courts. In light of these inconsistent provisions, it cannot be said that the parties have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts. I therefore conclude that the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to determine the Claim.

(e) I order the Defendant to pay the Claimant’s costs of the Application, such costs being summarily assessed in the amount of AED 43,000.