October 08, 2025 court of first instance - Orders
Claim No: CFI 063/2025
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
ODIN
Claimant/Appellant
and
OZZY
Defendant/Respondent
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE SAPNA JHANGIANI
UPON reviewing the Judgment of H.E. Justice Maha Al Mheiri (the “Judge”) dated 17 April 2025 issued in SCT-459-2024 (the “Judgment”)
AND UPON reviewing the Judgment of H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani dated 23 June 2025 issued in SCT-459-2024 (the “Permission to Appeal Judgment”)
AND UPON reviewing the Claimant’s submissions filed on 28 June 2025
AND UPON reviewing the Defendant’s submissions filed on 18 July 2025
AND UPON considering the documents and submissions filed by both parties and recorded on the case file
AND UPON hearing the parties at the hearing on 18 August 2025 held before H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani (the “Appeal Hearing”)
AND UPON the Judgment of H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani dated 4 September 2025 (the “Appeal Judgment”)
AND UPON hearing the parties at the hearing on 3 October 2025 held before H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani (the “2nd Appeal Hearing”)
AND UPON the Appeal Judgment being set aside on 8 October 2025
AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the DIFC Courts (the “RDC”)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Court finds that the Claimant’s termination for cause by the Defendant was wrongful, and the Appeal against the Judgment is allowed in the following respects (as defined in the Permission to Appeal Judgment):
(a) Wrongful termination;
(b) Notice Period; and
(c) Visa and Emirates ID.
2. The Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of AED 5,520.37 to the Claimant within 14 days of this Order.
3. In relation to the Claimant’s employment visa with the Defendant, the Defendant is ordered to:
(a) withdraw the Claimant’s “abscond” status;
(b) cancel the Claimant’s visa; and
(c) pay any related accrued fines (including any fines accrued because of the non-renewal of the Claimant’s Emirates ID).
4. There shall be no order as to costs.
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 8 October 2025
At: 10am
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
Introduction
1. These reasons are to be reviewed alongside the Permission to Appeal Judgment, the definitions in which are adopted here.
2. The Claimant was granted permission to appeal on the following grounds (as defined in the Permission to Appeal Judgment):
(a) Wrongful termination;
(b) Notice Period;
(c) Visa and Emirates ID;
(d) Holiday Leave;
(e) Employment Record;
(f) Additional Compensation; and
(g) Investigation
3. Following the Permission to Appeal Judgment, the parties were issued the following directions by the Court:
“The Claimant has requested “an investigation into harassment and cover-up by the Defendant’s HR department, with proper disciplinary actions to prevent future incidents” relating to his allegation of assault by his manager in July 2024….the Claimant is to provide further information on what legal obligation he alleges the Defendant has breached in relation to this aspect of his claim.
…the Defendant is to disclose the following:
i. All documents relating to disciplinary action and warnings issued to the Claimant leading up to his termination for cause by the Defendant;
ii. Its report into the assault alleged by the Claimant, along with any surveillance footage relating to the alleged assault;
iii. Documents fully explaining and substantiating the final settlement paid to the Claimant, including the Defendant’s calculation and evidence of (i) any overtime or leave entitlements due to the Claimant; and (ii) deductions for work breaks.
The Defendant is at liberty to disclose any further documents it wishes to rely upon relating to its termination of the Claimant for cause.”
4. In response to the above directions:
(a) The Claimant filed submissions stating that his claim for an investigation was supported by Articles 43, 54, 59, 60 of the Employment Law and Article 17 of the Law of Obligations (DIFC Law No. 5 of 2005). Further, that his employment contract was violated, as it explicitly guaranteed a transparent and fair investigation, and protected him from retaliation or confrontation as a result of his complaint. The Claimant argues that his employment contract states that immediate disciplinary action should be taken in the case of assault, and the Defendant breached the contract and the company’s policies.
(b) The Defendant filed submissions including the following:
(a) Photographs of the Claimant holding beverages for personal use which the Defendant states were company-owned and intended for customer sales.
(b) A statement that the Teams messages between the Claimant and the Defendant’s representatives referred to in the Permission to Appeal Judgment show that the Defendant had approved the Claimant for leave on Monday 23 and Tuesday 24 September and that he was required to report for work on Wednesday 25 September. As a result of his absence from work without justification, smoking on company premises, and stealing the Defendant’s goods and using them for personal purposes, he was immediately terminated.
(c) The Defendant denied all allegations made by the Claimant regarding any assault by his manager and HR department at work and indicated that consequently there are no reports on this matter “as no such assault ever occurred”. The Defendant states that it has well-established standards and policies that strictly prohibit any verbal or physical assault, and in the event such behaviours were to occur, appropriate disciplinary measures would be taken immediately. Further, “if there was any form of assault in this case, it was committed by the claimant against the defendant, when he stole company products, used them for personal purposes, and caused financial loss to the defendant”.
(d) The Defendant filed a document detailing the Claimant’s final entitlements, stating that the Claimant never worked any overtime hours and utilised his full annual leave balance.
5. The Appeal judgment was issued in this matter on 4 September 2025, following the Appeal Hearing on 18 August 2025. Following the Appeal Judgment, the Claimant wrote to the Court to indicate that evidence and authorities referred to in his case bundle filed with the Court on 5 August 2025 (the “Bundle”) were not discussed at the Appeal Hearing. The Registry informed the parties that the Judge was not referred to the Bundle at any stage during the Appeal Hearing, and accordingly, its contents were not taken into account when the Appeal Judgment was handed down. The Judge directed that the 2nd Appeal Hearing take place to discuss any points or evidence raised in the Bundle that the Claimant would like to rely upon, or the Defendant would like to respond to.
6. Following the 2nd Appeal Hearing, the Appeal Judgment has been set aside and this Judgment comprises the final Court of First Instance appeal judgment in this matter.
Applicable Principles
7. Under Rule 53.87 of the Rules of the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts 2014 (the “RDC”), the “Court”, meaning the Court to which an appeal is made, will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was:
(1) wrong
(2) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings; or
(3) wrong in relation to any other matter provided for or under any law.
8. Pursuant to Article 21B of DIFC Law No. (2) of 2025 (pertaining to the DIFC Courts), the Court of First Instance may, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction over judgments of the Small Claims Tribunal:
(a) issue any order that could have been issued or granted by the Small Claims Tribunal;
(b) affirm or vary the judgement or decision issued by the Small Claims Tribunal;
(c) attach terms or conditions to an order it issues;
(d) annul or set aside a judgement or decision;
(e) refer any claim or issue for determination by the Small Claims Tribunal;
(f) issue an order for a new trial or hearing;
(g) compel or prohibit a specific action or an action of a specific class;
(h) issue an order on a declaration of facts;
(i) order the payment of interest;
(j) make an order with respect to costs; or
(k) make any other order that it considers appropriate or just.
The Court’s Decision
Investigation
9. The basis of the Claimant’s claim relating to an Investigation is set out in the Permission to Appeal Judgment.
10. There is no evidence on the Court record in relation to the assault alleged by the Claimant. The Defendant submits that it did not file its report into the incident and any relevant footage, as directed by the Court, because no report exists, and any surveillance footage of the alleged assault would have been deleted within a month. The Defendant denies that the assault occurred.
11. The Claimant produced to the Court the following documents:
(a) a screenshot of an exchange with his supervisor on 18 July 2022 in which his supervisor indicated “I will make security report against roman”; and
(b) a screenshot of an exchange with a former colleague who supervised the Claimant when he worked at the Defendant, and is not identified. The Claimant has asked the colleague the following question:
“After Odin submitted a formal complaint to both Security and HR regarding the incident on 17 July 2024 involving the assistant manager, did HR take immediate and fair action in response?”
The former colleague’s response is:
“No, no action was taken and no response was given for long time”.
12. Notwithstanding the above documents adduced by the Claimant relating to the filing of a report and formal complaint on the incident which is alleged to have occurred on 17 July 2024, the Court does not have sufficient evidence to determine whether or not the Claimant’s allegations about the incident are made out.
13. Further, and in any event, the Claimant has not made out a legal basis for the remedy he seeks from the Court; namely an order for an investigation into harassment and alleged cover-up by the Defendant’s HR department.
14. In the circumstances, this aspect of the Claimant’s claim is rejected and the Judgment is upheld.
Wrongful Termination
15. All the remaining claims of the Claimant which are under appeal relate to whether or not the Claimant’s termination for cause by the Defendant was wrongful.
16. The Permission to Appeal Judgment found that there was a prospect of an Appeal Court finding that the learned Judge was wrong to hold that the Defendant’s termination of the Claimant with cause was justified, for the following reasons:
“(a) The Defendant must substantiate with evidence why the Claimant’s conduct warranted termination and that a reasonable Employer would have terminated the employment as a consequence, pursuant to Article 63 of DIFC Employment Law.
(b) The Defendant provided 3 reasons for terminating the Claimant:
i. In relation to the Claimant’s alleged unauthorised absences from work, the Claimant’s absence from work on 25 September was a trigger for the Defendant’s termination of the Claimant. The Judgment acknowledged that there was a misunderstanding between the Claimant and the Defendant as to whether he was required to be at work on 25 September, and yet found that his absence from work on 25 September (and not being in Dubai that day) formed part of his conduct warranting immediate termination.
ii. Whilst evidence was adduced relating to the Claimant’s smoking in a non-authorised area, no evidence was tendered in relation to the allegation that the Claimant was consuming beverages intended for hotel guests.
(c) The Defendant contends that the Claimant was on a “Final Warning” when he was terminated, but no evidence was put forward to substantiate this. The Claimant relies upon evidence suggesting that his “Final Warning” from the Defendant was issued after he was terminated on 27 September 2025.”
17. As held by this Court in Al Herz v Dubai International Financial Centre Authority [2012] DIFC CFI 011 10 July 2013 at [110] (the relevant part of which was upheld on appeal), where an employee is terminated for cause, the Court may assess whether the dismissal was conducted in accordance with the employer’s disciplinary procedure.
18. I set out below my findings on some key facts relating to the termination of the Claimant’s employment, based on the evidence submitted and the parties’ submissions at the Appeal Hearing and the 2nd Appeal Hearing. It is necessary to examine these facts in some detail in order to ascertain whether or not the Judgment was wrong to find the Defendant’s wrongful termination of the Claimant to be justified.
19. It is not disputed that the Claimant was subject to the following relevant disciplinary action during his employment by the Defendant:
(a) On 19 October 2023, the Claimant was reminded of service standards because he had served rosé wine to guests when champagne was not available. The guests complained to the manager.
(b) The Claimant received a verbal warning on 16 May 2024 for behaviour described by the Defendant in its disciplinary record for the Claimant as creating “an intimidating, hostile, offensive, or inappropriate work environment”.
20. The following incident gave rise to the Final Warning issued to the Claimant:
(a) On 5 August 2025, the Claimant was found smoking during working hours at the Obert Club on the hotel premises, rather than in the designated staff area. The Claimant acknowledged that he had made a mistake for not smoking in a designated smoking area, and signed a statement confirming this.
(b) The Claimant was also observed drinking beverage taken from the Obert Club fridge. The evidence relating to this is as follows:
(a) At the Appeal Hearing, the Claimant did not deny consuming beverages taken from his workplace, but stated that the drinks he consumed were not part of the hotel inventory, but part of his “Manager’s inventory”. The Defendant denied that such a “Manager’s inventory”, separate from the hotel inventory, would exist.
(b) At the 2nd Appeal Hearing, the Claimant relied on a screenshot of messages in which the manager of the Obert Club informs the Defendant’s F&B manager that soft drinks, water and juice “are not part of our inventory”. The F&B manager responds, “So beverage is his?” (presumably referring to the Claimant’s consumption of beverage ), and the Obert Club manager replies, “beverage it’s not part of our inventory”. The Claimant went on to explain at the 2nd Appeal Hearing that the beverage he consumed was in fact his own and not taken from the Obert Club.
(c) The Defendant explained at the 2nd Appeal Hearing that only alcoholic beverages are included in the inventory of the Obert Club, and that soft drinks fall under the inventory of food at the Hotel (i.e. a different inventory). This does not mean that soft drinks are for employees to drink; they remain a source of revenue for the Defendant to sell at the hotel.
(c) The Defendant’s employment record indicates that the date of the Final Warning was 5 August 2024, but the Defendant clarified that its records date a warning to the date of an incident, even if the warning was issued subsequently. The Defendant’s representative at the hearing explained that the investigation was completed on 8 August 2024, and the Defendant’s management then decided to issue a Final Warning to the Claimant within two to three days. However, the Claimant subsequently went on medical leave in August and so he was only informed of the Final Warning when he returned to work in September. The Defendant’s position was that the Final warning was issued verbally to the Claimant sometime around 19 or 20 September.
(d) The Claimant clarified that he did not go on medical leave until 22 August and confirmed that the Final Warning was not issued to him until after his return to work from medical leave in September. There is no dispute that the Final Warning was referred to in a meeting between the Claimant and the Defendant on 23 September, although the Defendant asserts that the Claimant was aware of the Final Warning prior to that meeting.
(e) The Claimant’s position is that the Final Warning was not uploaded to his employment record on the “Workday” app (used to monitor his employment with the Defendant) until 27 September, after his termination by the Defendant, and he relies on screenshots from his phone to substantiate this. The Defendant acknowledged that there was some delay in uploading the Final Warning to “Workday” but was not able to point to what date it was uploaded.
21. At the 23 September meeting, it is not disputed that the Defendant offered the Claimant an opportunity to transfer or resign (with a positive reference offered), and invited him to take two days off to think about it.
22. There is a dispute between the Claimant and the Defendant as to when the Claimant was due to return to work after being invited to take two days off on 23 September. The Claimant understood he was to return to work on Thursday 26 September. The Defendant’s representative is adamant that the Claimant was informed he should return to work on Wednesday 25 September. However, the Teams messages between the Claimant and Defendant on 25 September make clear that that the Claimant misunderstood that he did not need to be at work on Wednesday 25 September. This misunderstanding was apparent to the Learned Judge of the Small Claims Tribunal, who referred to this misunderstanding between the Claimant and the Defendant in the Judgment.
23. Following the 23 September meeting, the Claimant decided that he would neither resign nor transfer, and would continue working. He was asked to leave the premises when arriving for work on 26 September 2024. He was called to a meeting on 27 September 2024, at which he was handed a termination letter filled with what he considered to be unfounded accusations.
24. The termination letter dated 27 September 2024 which was issued to the Claimant states as follows:
“Despite being under a Final Warning for behavioural issues, Odin’s repeated unauthorized absences continue to intensify both behavioral and attendance concerns. The F&B management team, along with the P&C team, has closely monitored Odin’s behaviour and attendance issues, providing him with coaching sessions to address these concerns.
However, even after these interventions, Odin has failed to demonstrate significant progress towards meeting the standards expected by the Ozzy at DIFC.
Based on the above, the management of the hotel has decided to terminate Odin’s [sic] employment, effective today September 27, 2024.”
25. The three reasons provided by the Defendant for the termination of the Claimant comprise (a) his smoking outside designated staff areas; (b) his consumption of beverages intended for hotel guests; and (c) his unauthorised absences from work.
26. In relation to reason (a), the Claimant has admitted in a signed statement that he smoked outside designated staff areas.
27. In relation to reason (b), the Claimant’s case is not clear. He has suggested that the soft drink beverages he consumed were part of the “Manager’s inventory”, and not part of the hotel’s inventory, with the implication that these drinks were taken from the Obert Club, but could be freely consumed by employees. He has adduced evidence in support of this position. However, towards the end of the 2nd Appeal Hearing and in his skeleton argument in the Bundle, he has suggested that the drinks he had consumed were in fact his own, purchased outside the hotel. The Claimant’s shifting case undermines the strength of his position on this point, and there is merit in the Defendant’s submissions that regardless of which inventory soft drinks at the Obert Club fell under, they were not to be consumed by employees, but rather sold to hotel guests. However, it is not necessary for me to make any finding on this specific issue, given my findings on reason (c) immediately below, and in paragraph 31 below.
28. The final trigger for the Claimant’s termination for cause was his absence from work on Wednesday 25 September. As noted above and in the Judgment, there was a clear misunderstanding between the Claimant and the Defendant as to whether he was due to be at work on Wednesday 25 September.
29. Article 63 of the DIFC Employment Law provides as follows:
“An Employer or an Employee may terminate an Employee’s employment with immediate effect for cause in circumstances where the conduct of one (1) party warrants termination and where a reasonable Employer or Employee would have terminated the employment as a consequence thereof.”
30. Taking all the circumstances into account, I consider the finding in the Judgment that the Defendant’s wrongful termination of the Claimant was justified to be wrong.
31. I find that the Defendant’s termination of the Claimant for cause was not in accordance with Article 63 of DIFC Employment Law for the following reasons:
(a) Although the Defendant has not disclosed a record of its disciplinary procedures in these proceedings, it is clear that it had disciplinary procedures in place, to which the Claimant was subject. Moreover, that a written record of any disciplinary procedures applied to an employee was maintained on the “Workday” app for each employee. Disciplinary procedures can have serious consequences for employees, and it is therefore important that proper written records are maintained so as to leave no room for doubt or misunderstanding as to the disciplinary measures applied to an employee, and the potential consequences of those measures.
(b) It is further clear that the Defendant’s decision to terminate the Claimant’s employment was taken because:
(a) The Claimant was subject to a “Final Warning” on 25 September, issued after previous warnings were issued to the Claimant for conduct.
(b) The Claimant’s failure to turn up for work on 25 September constituted “the last straw”, triggering the Defendant’s decision to terminate the Claimant immediately for cause, as provided under Article 63 and in the Contract.
(c) I find that the Final Warning issued to the Claimant ought to have been (i) communicated to him as soon as possible after the management decided to issue it on or around 10 August 2024; and (ii) thereafter immediately uploaded to the Workday app, so that the Claimant’s status as being on a Final Warning was on formal written record and beyond doubt. The Defendant has not countered with evidence the Claimant’s suggestion that the Workday App was only uploaded with his Final Warning on 27 September 2024, after he had been issued his termination letter.
(d) Critically, the trigger for the Claimant’s termination on 27 September appears to have been based on a genuine misunderstanding between the Claimant and the Defendant as to when he was expected to return to work after the 23 September meeting. This scenario could have been avoided if a written communication had been shared with the Claimant at or shortly after the meeting on 23 September, setting out the Defendant’s expectations going forward, including the Defendant’s expectation that the Claimant would return to work on 25 September, having reflected and made a decision as to how to proceed.
(e) I consider that a reasonable Employer would not have terminated the Claimant’s employment in the circumstances.
32. In conclusion, I find that the Claimant’s termination for cause was wrongful and that the Claimant is entitled to compensation for one month’s notice, as if he had been terminated without cause under DIFC Employment law.
33. The Claimant was paid a basic monthly salary of AED 1,854.00. On top of this sum, he received his tips, and also a share of the service charges collected by the hotel. The Claimant has produced a spreadsheet to illustrate that, on average, dividing his income received from the hotel of AED 160,091 over a period of 29 months into a monthly average, he was paid an average of AED 5,520.37 monthly. This monthly average includes service charge and tips.
34. Given that the Claimant was deprived of the opportunity to earn his monthly income (including tips and service charge) on account of his wrongful termination for cause by the Defendant, I find that he is entitled to be compensated in an amount equal to his average monthly income, as per the calculations provided by him.
35. This finding is consistent with Article 62(4) of the Employment Law, which provides that an Employer may make a payment of Wages in lieu of an Employee’s notice period. “Wages” is defined as “any payment made to an Employee in return for work done or services provided under an Employment Contract, including any Allowance but excluding any Additional Payment”. An Additional Payment comprises a bonus, incentive, grant, commission, drawing, distribution or other payment made by an Employer which is discretionary (i.e. within the Employer’s discretion). An Allowance comprises an allowance for a category of expense such as housing, travel, education, social and entertainment.
36. I find that the only compensation due to the Claimant as a direct result of his wrongful termination is one month’s average Wages of 5,520.37. I find that the Claimant has failed to establish that he is entitled to AED 27,810 for career loss, reputational damage and emotional harm, as claimed before the Small Claims Tribunal.
37. If the Defendant’s termination is treated as a termination without cause by the Defendant, it would follow that the Claimant’s employment record with the Defendant, and any reference provided for the Claimant, would indicate this. I do not consider it necessary to issue any order in this regard.
38. In relation to the Claimant’s holiday pay, the Defendant’s records show that the Claimant took 78 days of annual leave for the 3 years he worked for the Defendant. The Claimant submits that he was entitled to 30 calendar days leave according to his employment contract, and is therefore owed an additional 12 days. The Defendant accepts that the Claimant was entitled to 30 calendar days leave, and that its records show the Claimant as having taken 78 days of annual leave. However, the Defendant explained at the 2nd Appeal Hearing that in the Defendant’s records, 30 calendar days of leave is reflected as 26 days of annual leave per year. The Defendant’s explanation of this is as follows. The Claimant worked for 6 days every week, with 1 day off (“Off Day”). For 30 calendar days of leave, the Defendant’s records would show 26 days of annual leave, and 4 Off Days, to make up 30 calendar days of leave. This is how the Defendant’s records are maintained for all its employees, and the records correspond with how employees apply for leave. I accept the Defendant’s computerised record of the Claimant’s leave, along with the Defendant’s explanation, and reject the Claimant’s claim for 12 days of annual leave.
39. I also accept as accurate the Defendant’s computerised records as to any leave of absence or overtime of the Claimant. There is no evidence on the record to refute the Defendant’s records.
40. In the Bundle, the Claimant included a number of new, additional claims which had not been raised before. The Court does not address these claims, as they do not form part of the Claimant’s claim. However, for the avoidance of doubt, the Court rejects the Claimant’s claim for a penalty under Article 19(2) of the Employment Law in respect of amounts due to him which were not paid by the Defendant within 14 days of the termination of his Employment. It was accepted by the Claimant at the 2nd Appeal Hearing that, pursuant to Article 19(4) of the Employment Law, a penalty under Article 19(2) will be waived by a Court in respect of any period during which a dispute is pending in the Court regarding any amount due to an Employee under Article 19. The Claimant’s claim was filed within 14 days of his termination date, and this aspect of the Claimant’s claim therefore fails.
41. In relation to the Claimant’s Emirates ID and Visa, it was agreed by the Claimant and Defendant that these two documents are linked. The Defendant claims that it could not get in touch with the Claimant and was compelled to mark his immigration status as “absconded”. Government fines have been accruing since the Claimant was marked as absconded. Those fines would need to be paid in order for the Claimant’s “abscond” status to be removed, and for him to obtain a new visa. The Defendant denies that it has any responsibility for such fines. However, I find that the complete breakdown of the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant was triggered by his termination for cause, which I find was wrongful in the circumstances. The Defendant is therefore ordered to withdraw the Claimant’s “abscond” status, cancel the Claimant’s Visa and pay any related accrued fines (including, for the avoidance of doubt, any fines accrued because of the non-renewal of the Claimant’s Emirates ID).
42. I find that the Claimant’s compensation for the non-renewal of his Emirates ID and his Visa-related issues is limited to any outstanding accrued fines which, as set out above, the Defendant has been ordered to pay.
43. I do not have the calculation of the Claimant’s DEWS entitlement for one month’s notice, and in any event find that this amount would be de minimis. It appears that the Claimant has not yet claimed his DEWS entitlement arising from his employment with the Defendant. At the Appeal Hearing, the Defendant’s representative emphasised her willingness to assist the Claimant to file for his DEWS entitlement, and also claim his outstanding tips from his employment with the Defendant (in the period leading up to 27 September 2024). The Claimant is encouraged to take up any assistance required, so as to claim all his entitlements.
44. It is very much hoped that this chapter can now be closed for both the Claimant and the Defendant, with the Claimant free to obtain new employment and a new visa.
