Claim No: CFI 092/2024

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

MAG DEVELOPMENT SERVICES LIMITED

Claimant

and

(1) THE COLLECTION CLUB RESTAURANT LIMITED
(2) LAURENT BUISINE
(3) HUGO VALAT

Defendants

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE ALI AL MADHANI

UPON the Case Management Order of H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani dated 11 September 2025

AND UPON the Defendants’ Application No. CFI-092-2024/3 dated 8 October 2025, seeking permission to rely upon expert evidence (the “Defendant’s Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-092-2024/4 dated 8 October 2025, seeking permission to rely upon expert evidence (the “Claimant’s Application”)

AND UPON the Pre-Trial Review listed on 19 February 2026 and the Trial listed on 30 March 2026 before H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT

1. The Defendant’s Application is rejected.

2. The Claimant’s Application is rejected.

3. There shall be no order as to costs.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 7 November 2025
At: 11am

1. These Applications are brought by both parties seeking permission to rely on their own expert evidence. I note that the Claimant’s Application has been uncontested, as confirmed by the Defendant via email to the Registry dated 28 October 2025, and so that Application will be assessed strictly on the merits of the Claim

2. To note, I will dispense with a reiteration of the background and procedural history, and only recount facts of the case as relevant to the Applications.

Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

3. Pursuant to RDC 31.13, both parties seek permission of the Court to call an expert and/or put an expert’s report into evidence. It has been a long standing principle that the Court will only permit expert evidence if the proposed expert clearly has the requisite expertise and experience to express expert opinions on the relevant issues, and so the applicant is required to identify the field in which it wishes to rely on expert evidence and where practicable the expert in that field on whose evidence he wishes to rely.

4. In its Application, the Claimant also seeks to rely on the equivalent English Civil Procedure (“CPR”) on appointing experts, being CPR 35.1 and 35.3(1) respectively. These rules read:

Further guidance on the application of these rules is found in British Airways Plc v Paul Spencer and 11 Others (Present Trustees of the Airways Pension Scheme) ("British Airways") [2015] EWHC 2477 (Ch) [68], confirmed by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] UKSC 6, which provides a three stage test to determine whether expert evidence can be relied on:

5. The assumed applicability of the English authorities is stated in the third witness statement of Gerard Moore at paragraph 12. It is a common misconception that English law may be imported into the DIFC Courts. Article 8(2) of DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004, commonly know as the “waterfall provision”, provides that the law of England and Wales can be applied in the event that no DIFC Law or provision exists. The RDC is clear and complete in its guidance as to how expert evidence and experts are handled in the DIFC Courts. Therefore, any reference to or reliance on English principles will be overlooked in favour of the relevant DIFC provision.

6. It is the duty of the expert to independently assist the Court in making decisions (RDC 31.3) and be restricted only to what is reasonably required to resolve proceedings (RC 31.12). what is “reasonably required” includes regard to the Overriding Objective (RDC 1.6) in balancing relevant considerations, which involves a deliberation on whether the issue on which expert evidence is sought would be decisive. Only these rules will govern my determination in giving or withholding permission for either proposed expert.

7. For reference, RDC 1.6 reads:

The Claimant’s Application

8. The Claimant’s Application seeks permission to rely on the expert evidence of Mr Conor Given, and for the costs of the application and the expert fees to be costs in the case.

9. Mr. Given is a Director at Alvarez & Marsal’s Disputes and Investigations practice in Dubai with 18 years of experience in forensic investigations and expert accounting disputes. Among his listed relevant experience, Mr. Given accounts that he has provided expert reports and acted as an expert witness across a range of commercial disputes in the Dubai Courts and UK Courts. I have read the relevant passages in British Airways Plc v Paul Spencer and 11 Others (Present Trustees of the Airways Pension Scheme) [2015] EWHC 2477 (Ch) and Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] UKSC 6, as provided in support of the application, as to Mr. Given’s expertise.

10. In his third witness statement dated 8 October 2025, Gerard Moore submits that the expert evidence is necessary, of the assistance to the Court, and reasonably required to resolve the proceedings. The Claimant wishes to rely on Mr. Given in the capacity of a quantum expert to resolve the following issues:

The Claimant’s justification for the necessity of Mr. Given’s report is that the fundamental dispute relates to the Defendant’s contractual breaches, and subsequently the Claimant’s damages entitlement which should be calculated by him, particularly regarding the heads of quantum that have only been provisionally quantified.

11. Further, the Claimant submits that quantum cannot be calculated without Mr. Given’s expertise, as quantum must be calculated and independently verified by detailed review of invoices, purchase orders, payment slips, contracts and bank statements. Mr. Given is also intended to be tasked with confirming what costs will be incurred and providing a valuation of said costs. Therefore, his evidence goes beyond merely helpful and actively assists the Court in resolving the dispute.

12. Finally, it is submitted that Mr. Given’s evidence is reasonably required to resolve proceedings as per the value of the claim, the effect of the judgment on both parties, costs, and delay on the trial date that the production of the evidence may incur.

13. The value of the Claim has been provisionally quantified as in excess of AED 13,000,000, with no counterclaim. As the Defendants have objected to this value, it is essential that Mr. Given’s quantum expertise should be used to independently verify the claim value.

14. As there is no counterclaim, the Claimant contends that it stands to lose the most should the judgment be made against it, hence the importance of verifying the claim value at this stage of proceedings. In the event of a favourable judgment, the Court will be assured that the claim value has been independently confirmed by an expert.

15. On costs, the Clamant only submits that such costs will be borne by the Claimant in the first instance on the basis of costs in the case, with an appropriate costs award to be made by the Court at the conclusion of these proceedings.

16. The Claimant further submits that allowing the Claimant to adduce expert evidence will not cause delay as exchange of expert evidence has been factored into the agreed procedural timetable in the Order of H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani dated 11 September 2025. The inclusion of this evidence exchange in the aforementioned order also acts as prima facie consent between the parties for expert evidence, as well as the fact that the Defendant have not raised any objection to the Claimant’s request for permission to use expert evidence.

17. I am not satisfied that expert evidence is either necessary or appropriate in this matter. I recognise that this Application has gone uncontested, however consent of the parties is insufficient to secure the Court’s permission in these circumstances. Under RDC 31.10, permission to rely on expert evidence will only be granted where such evidence is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings. This is a straightforward claim in contract, and the matters for determination are well within the Court’s competence. It is for the Court, not an expert, to determine questions of law or to apply settled contractual principles to the facts.

18. The Claimant’s justification for the proposed expert, Mr. Given, is not persuasive. The issues raised do not involve any niche or technical subject matter requiring specialist understanding. This is not a case involving a highly complex contractual framework or an industry-specific standard of care. The alleged breaches are matters of ordinary contractual interpretation and factual assessment. As to quantum, the heads of loss identified as (a) to (d) and (f) can be assessed by reference to market evidence or standard valuation sources such as RERA, while head (e) may be estimated by a contractor. The remaining heads, (g) and (h), involve straightforward calculations that the Court will shoulder.

19. The role of an expert is to assist the Court on matters requiring expertise beyond its ordinary knowledge. What the Claimant seeks is, in substance, to delegate to an expert the Court’s own evaluative function which is impermissible. To appoint an expert in these circumstances would serve only to increase cost and delay, contrary to RDC 1.6(2), (3a) and (4). Therefore, the Claimant’s Application does not meet the threshold under RDC 31 and permission to adduce expert evidence is refused.

The Defendants’ Application

20. The Defendants similarly apply for permission to adduce expert evidence pursuant to RDC 31 on the basis that the Claim involves complex issues beyond the ordinary expertise of the Court relating to the technical nature of water damage to high value vehicles, the associated restoration cost, the pre and post-damage vehicle value, the treatment of such losses under industry-standard insurance policies, and the reasonable risk management standards applicable to high-value vehicle storage facilities.

21. For the assistance in the resolution of these issues, the Defendants seek to appoint Mr Thibault Ruchon. Mr Ruchon is an entrepreneur and automotive expert with over 15 years of experience in Dubai, particularly with technical inspections, valuations and vehicle restoration. It is suggested in his Curriculum Vitae (“CV”) that Mr Ruchon has experience in dispute resolution, though no evidence that he has been appointed as an expert witness in similar cases has been filed.

22. The Defendants rely on the fact that Mr Ruchon was in Dubai during the April 2024 Floods and through his activities witnessed the exact issues many of the First Defendant’s clients might have faced. The Defendants intend to request Mr Ruchon to prepare an expert report addressing the scope of damage that could have been caused to the vehicles in issue due to the April 2024 flooding, the likely diminution of value and the restoration cost, which losses would be recoverable, and the industry standard or practices relevant to risk mitigation when storing high value vehicles.

23. The Defendants rely on Hexagon Holdings (Cayman) Limited v (1) Dubai International Financial Centre Authority (2) Dubai International Financial Centre Investments LLC [2019] 013 CFI and Rafed Abdel Mohsen Bader Al Khorafi (2) Amrah Ali Abdel Latif Al Hamad (3) Alia Mohamed Sulaiman Al Rifai v (1) Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Limited (2) Bank Sarasin & Co. Ltd [2009] 026 CFI to apply that the Court has allowed expert evidence where the issues are technical or valuation-based and therefore outside the ordinary knowledge of the Court. It is submitted that the technical issues that the Defendants intend for Mr Ruchon to comment on are included in the scope of RDC 31, and so his expertise is reasonably required for the resolution of the dispute.

24. The Claimant objects to the Defendants’ Application for three reasons; failure to satisfy the relevant legal test to grant permission, Mr Ruchon is not suited to give expert evidence, and his evidence is irrelevant. The Defendants’ response by way of the fifth witness statement of Jordana Dray (“Dray 5”) will be addressed alongside the Claimant’s three grounds of objection.

25. As a matter of housekeeping, the Claimants object to the format of the Defendant’s Application pursuant to RDC Part 23 and its excessive length. In obiter I agree with the Claimant’s points, however in this instance I see no reason to defeat the Application on a procedural basis alone and so will allow it to stand and address its merits instead.

26. The Claimant’s first objection is that the Defendants failed to acknowledge the British Airways test, let alone meet it. As stated previously in this Order, English precedent does not apply. However, I will concede with the objections submitted as relevant to the DIFC Courts rules of expert evidence needing to assist the Court as reasonably required to resolve proceedings with reference to the Overriding Objective. Therefore, I do not consider that the Defendants’ ‘failure’ to observe the British Airways test is a failure at all.

27. The Claimant’s position is that the Defendants have not demonstrated to any extent that Mr Ruchon’s evidence is reasonably required pursuant to RDC 31.1, as there are no submissions related to the experts’ necessity or assistance except to address technical questions.

28. The Claimant also rejects the Defendants’ reliance on the two DIFC cases, as there is no reference to a particular paragraph or point of precedence, as the exhibited Case Management Order in CFI 013/2019 is not an order from which authority can be extracted, and the CFI 026-2009 order relates to costs, not granting permission for expert evidence.

29. In my Case Management Order dated 8 September 2025, the Claimant relies on my instruction for a compelling and convincing case before the Court as to why expert evidence is needed, such that without it, the Court would be unable to decide on the issues in question, to submit that the Defendants have not come close to making a substantiated case in that regard.

30. The Claimant also objects to the alleged expertise of Mr Ruchon, as his profile is non- compliant with the Protocol for the Instruction of Experts to Give Evidence in Civil Claims (the "Protocol").

31. Under paragraph 7.1 of the Protocol, the DIFC Court expressly requires that, the intended expert has the appropriate expertise and experience, and that they are familiar with the general duties of an expert. The Claimant submits that Mr Ruchon is an experienced businessman, not a court expert, and his businesses have no bearing on the live issues in the dispute. His ‘dispute resolution’ experience is between buyers, sellers and insurers according to his CV, not in relation to litigation. Therefore, it is submitted that Mr Ruchon has no familiarity with the general duties of an expert contrary to RDC 31.7(1)(b).

32. The Claimant further uses Mr Given’s profile as a standard to which Mr Ruchon does not meet. As should be expected by the Court in an expert’s profile, Mr Given has 18 years of experience acting in forensic investigations and expert accounting disputes, having been appointed as independent quantum expert on high value disputes, which is evidenced. In comparison, the Defendants only submit that Mr Ruchon’s local industry experience in luxury cars and hospitality is sufficient to appoint him as an expert in litigation, despite no affiliation with an established, credible independent expert service provider and no litigation history.

33. Finally, the Claimant submits that irrespective of Mr Ruchon’s history and experience, his expert evidence is irrelevant to the issues in dispute. The core issue is the Defendants’ non- payment of rent and associated contractual breaches. The defence is that the Dubai floods, which took place on 16 April 2024, rendered their project unviable as a result of the withdrawal of investors. This is the alleged basis of the Defendants' termination of the Lease, however the Claimant combats that the Defendants began defaulting on their rental payment obligations as early as March 2025. Therefore, any report that could be rendered by Mr Ruchon has no bearing on the merits of the Claim. Further, Mr Ruchon’s evidence cannot carry the defence forward as the agreed List of Issues does not relate to what the Defendants intend for Mr Ruchon's evidence to show, Mr Ruchon’s evidence fails to consider the legal reality of the obligations the Parties owed to one another, and Mr Ruchon's evidence is purely hypothetical.

34. I concede with the Claimant that the Defendants’ Application is but a shambles.

35. I am not satisfied that Mr Ruchon meets the standard required under the RDC 31 or that the evidence sought is necessary to resolve any issue in dispute. Under RDC 31.2, expert evidence will be restricted to that which is “reasonably required to resolve the proceedings,” and RDC 31.5 provides that an expert must have “appropriate qualifications, experience and expertise” in the field upon which they are giving evidence. Further, RDC 31.6, 31.7(1) and 31.8 are clear that an expert must be familiar with and adhere to their overriding duty to the Court, which takes precedence over any duty owed to the party instructing them. The expert nominated by the Defendants lacks any demonstrated experience in litigation and therefore does not meet the requisite standard of familiarity with these duties or with the procedural and evidentiary requirements expected in DIFC proceedings.

36. In any event, the proposed scope of the expert’s evidence, including (i) the extent of damage that could have been caused to the vehicles by the April 2024 flooding, (ii) the likely diminution in their value, (iii) the potential restoration costs, (iv) which losses might have been recoverable, and (v) the industry standards for risk mitigation when storing high-value vehicles, is not reasonably required for the determination of this case. The defence that this evidence seeks to support is wholly hypothetical, based on the premise of “what would have happened if the cars were there.” It is factually agreed that the vehicles were not in the basement at the time of the flooding. Accordingly, the proposed expert evidence does not relate to any live factual issue or technical matter requiring expert assistance in the deconstruction of the Lease or the standard of care owed by the Claimant.

37. As stated, expert evidence is intended to assist the Court on matters requiring specialised knowledge beyond its own expertise. It is not to advance speculative arguments or to assess hypothetical scenarios. Allowing this evidence would add unnecessary expense and complexity, contrary to the same principles in RDC 1.6 as with the Claimant’s Application. As the proposed expert does not meet the competency or procedural standards set by RDC 31 and the evidence is not reasonably required for the fair resolution of the proceedings, the Defendants’ Application is refused.

Conclusion

38. In my view, neither Application meet the threshold required by RDC 31 or RDC 1.6 to give permission to adduce expert evidence. Both parties have failed to demonstrate that their proposed expert could assist the Court as reasonably required to resolve proceedings relating to a claim of a breach of duty of care that goes beyond the Court’s legal competencies or advance a particular claim or defence that is technical in nature. Therefore, both Applications are dismissed.

39. There shall be no order as to costs.