November 20, 2025 court of first instance - Orders
Claim No. CFI 005/2016
IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
MS GEORGINA MARIE EASON
(in her capacity as Official Liquidator of Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Limited)
Applicant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE
UPON the Application Notice filed by the Applicant on 26 August 2025 seeking sanction of the Liquidator’s decision to enter into and cause BSA to enter into a settlement agreement dated 11 August 2025 (the “Application”)
AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Applicant and Counsel for the Defendant in a hearing held on 16 October 2025 before H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere (the “Hearing”)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Pursuant to Article 102 of the Insolvency Law, the Court sanctions Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Limited (in liquidation) ("BSA") and Ms Georgina Marie Eason in her capacity as Official Liquidator of BSA (the "Liquidator") to enter into and perform the Settlement Agreement dated 11 August 2025, between BSA, the Liquidator, Mr Elie Vivien Sassoon, Mr Stephane Emile Astruc, Mr Edmond Carton, Bank J Safra Sarasin Limited ("BJSS"), and J. Safra Sarasin (Middle East) Limited (previously known as Bank J. Safra Sarasin Asset Management (Middle East) Ltd.
2. The Court sanctions the Settlement Agreement as a reasonable compromise of the claims in CFI-009-2023, BJSS's Proof of Debt in BSA's liquidation, and all the Claims identified in the Settlement Agreement.
3. The Applicant's costs will be costs in the liquidation of BSA.
4. There will be no other order as to costs.
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 20 November 2025
At: 2pm
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
Summary
1. The Applicant is Ms Georgina Marie Eason in her capacity as the liquidator of Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Limited (the “Liquidator” and “BSA”). She has applied under the Insolvency Law for the Court to sanction an agreement she has entered into to compromise claims by and against BSA.
2. No creditor or contributory opposes the application.
3. For the reasons below, the Court will sanction the agreement.
The companies and the BSA liquidation
4. Before its liquidation, BSA was an investment advisory and asset management business registered with the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA). Bank J Safra Sarasin Limited ("BJSS") was the majority shareholder of BSA. The minority shareholder was Alpen Capital.
5. J. Safra Sarasin (Middle East) Limited (previously known as Bank J. Safra Sarasin Asset Management (Middle East) Ltd (“BJSSAM”)) is a financial services advisory business wholly owned by BJSS. It operates in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and is regulated by the DFSA.
6. BSA entered liquidation following a petition presented on 7 February 2014 by Mr Rafed Abdel Mohsen Bader Al Khorafi, Mrs Amrah Ali Abdel Latif Al Hamad, and Mrs Alia Mohamed Sulaiman Al Rifai, members of the Khorafi family. The petition was based on unpaid judgment debts of USD 35,028,474 obtained in the Khorafi Proceedings by the Khorafi family members against BSA and BJSS.
7. The Khorafi Proceedings arose from claims of investment mis-selling. Both BSA and BJSS were found to have breached the DFSA's regulatory regime in their dealings with the Khorafi family. Key findings in the Khorafi Proceedings include:
(a) Joint and several liability: Both BSA and BJSS were held jointly and severally liable for the losses suffered by the Khorafis due to the breaches.
(b) BSA's role: The court found that BSA acted as BJSS's instrument in the DIFC, rather than as an independent agent. BSA's conduct was deemed deliberate and egregious, leading to an award of additional damages under Article 40(2) of the Law of Damages and Remedies.
(c) Costs orders: The court ordered BSA to pay 90% of the Khorafis' costs on an indemnity basis and BJSS to pay 80% of the costs on a standard basis.
8. On 2 May 2016, BSA was put into liquidation by order of the DIFC Court of First Instance, and Mr Shahab Haider was appointed as its Official Liquidator.
9. BJSS has lodged a proof of debt in BSA’s liquidation. The proof of debt against BSA is based on contribution claims under Article 14 of the Law of Obligations that arise from the Khorafi Proceedings. Specifically:
(a) Principal claim: BJSS claims USD 28,978,474, which it paid in relation to the principal judgment debt due in the Khorafi Proceedings.
(b) Costs claim: BJSS claims USD 1 million paid under an interim costs order dated 30 October 2014, for which BJSS and BSA were also jointly and severally liable.
10. Additionally, BJSS claims unparticularized interest and costs of at least USD 4 million, though the Liquidator has not considered them in detail due to their lack of specificity.
DIFC Proceedings
11. On 1 February 2023, BSA and its liquidator commenced case CFI-009-2023 in the DIFC Courts against BJSS, BJSSAM, BSA's former CEO, Mr Carton, and two former directors, Mr Sassoon and Mr Astruc (the "DIFC Proceedings"). At the time, Mr Carton was also employed by BJSS. Following their departure from BSA, Mr Sassoon and Mr Astruc became officers of BJSS's parent company, J. Safra Sarasin Holding Limited. Collectively, Mr Carton, Mr Sassoon, and Mr Astruc are referred to as the "Individual Defendants".
12. The Claimants allege that the Defendants orchestrated a fraudulent scheme to transfer BSA's business to BJSSAM without consideration, intending to relaunch private banking operations in the Middle East without Alpen Capital's involvement and to shield the business from a significant contingent liability arising from the judgment debt owed by BSA to the Khorafi family.
13. The DIFC Proceedings are complex, involve allegations of commercial fraud, and are still in the early stages, with a trial scheduled for September 2026.
The Swiss Proceedings
14. On 19 January 2023, in anticipation of the DIFC Proceedings, the Defendants in those proceedings filed a conciliation request before the Geneva First Instance Tribunal (the "Swiss Proceedings"). The parties in the Swiss Proceedings are the same as those in the DIFC Proceedings. The Defendants seek negative declaratory relief against BSA and its liquidator. Specifically, they aim to refute the allegations made against them in letters before action from BSA's solicitors dated 1 February 2022. At the time of the Settlement Agreement's execution, the Swiss Proceedings were at a very preliminary stage.
Current Liquidator appointed
15. The Liquidator, Ms Georgina Marie Eason, was appointed by the creditors as liquidator of BSA on 29 April 2024. Her appointment followed the Court's removal of the previous liquidator on BJSS's application.
Settlement Agreement
16. The Liquidator negotiated an agreement dated 11 August 2025, between BSA, the Liquidator, and the Defendants (the “Settlement Agreement”).
17. The main terms of the deed constituting the Settlement Agreement are set out in Confidential Annexure A.
18. The Liquidator has provided an estimate of the financial outcomes in the liquidation based on various assumptions which is set out in Confidential Annex A.
The application
19. The Applicant, the Liquidator, has applied to the Court for the Court to sanction her (as liquidator of BSA) and for BSA to enter into and perform the Settlement Agreement. She also seeks an order releasing the Liquidator from any liability arising from or related to her and BSA entering into and performing the Settlement Agreement.
20. The application is supported by Ms Eason’s First Witness Statement. The statement outlines the background of the legal proceedings, procedural history, and the terms of the Settlement Agreement. It highlights the confidential nature of the agreement and the Liquidator’s intention to seek Court directions for notifying creditors without disclosing the agreement. Ms Eason asserts that the settlement is in the best interests of BSA and its creditors and confirms no conflict of interest in her decision-making.
21. On 11 September 2025, the Court made procedural orders to the following effect:
1. Notice to Creditors: Sending Sanction Materials to the address in a creditor’s proof of debt or by agreed means is sufficient notice.
2. Notice to Contributories: Sending Sanction Materials to the address in BSA’s member register or by agreed means is sufficient notice.
3. No Need to Join Creditors/Contributories: They don’t need to be parties to the Sanction Application.
4. Evidence Sharing: No need to send further evidence unless a creditor or contributory wants to participate. If they do, relevant materials must be shared, subject to Orders 7 and 8.
5. Privacy of Submissions: All submissions are private and may only be used for the Sanction Application.
6. Private Hearing: The hearing is private, but creditors and contributories may attend, subject to Orders 7 and 8.
7. Confidential Settlement Details: Only the Court, Applicant, and BJSS may view the full Settlement Agreement and related confidential submissions. Others are excluded when details beyond the First Witness Statement are discussed.
8. Privileged Materials: Confidential, privileged materials may be shared with the Court and creditors/contributories (excluding BJSS) under limited waiver, if they agree in writing to use them only for the application. BJSS and others who don’t agree are excluded from related discussions.
The Defendants support the application
22. Jodie Alice Martyndale-Howard, a solicitor representing BJSS, provides detailed arguments in her First Witness Statement that highlight the legal and commercial risks of the Claimants continuing with the DIFC Proceedings, which are summarised in Confidential Annexure A.
23. The Court has received and considered a confidential witness statement provided by the Liquidator. While the contents of the statement are not disclosed in this judgment due to their confidential nature, the statement addresses in detail a range of matters relevant to the application before the Court. The matters covered are set out in Confidential Annexure A.
24. The Court is satisfied that the matters addressed in the statement are of direct relevance to the application and has taken them into account in reaching its decision.
Position of creditors and contributories
25. The Liquidator received an objection from Mr Khorafi in a letter dated 14 August 2025. No other creditor has expressed a view on the Settlement Agreement.
26. Mr Khorafi’s letter objects:
“… the proposed settlement does not represent a true or fair reflection of the underlying claims as set out in the Particulars of Claim. We categorically reject that the Defendants have not intentionally committed fraud or acted negligently in the circumstances that led to the insolvency of the estate,” and
“[the settlement is] at a discount rate that is not adequate in our view”.
27. Since filing the sanction application, Mr Nicholas Braganza, a partner of HFW, has spoken with Mr Mohammed Nour, an advisor to the Khorafi family and Mr Sammy Nanneh, a senior associate at Pinsent Masons, the legal representatives for the Khorafi family, on several occasions regarding the sanction application. Mr Braganza has asked both Mr Nour and Mr Nanneh whether the position of the Khorafis remains the same as stated in their letter and whether they continue to object to the Settlement Agreement and the sanction application.
28. On 9 October 2025, Mr. Braganza spoke with Mr. Nour. Mr Nour confirmed that he had received instructions and was speaking on behalf of the Khorafis, and the conversation was being conducted on an open basis. Mr. Nour confirmed that the Khorafis did not object to the sanction application, without making any concessions to the Defendants’ position. Mr Nour did not wish to elaborate further on these points but confirmed that the Khorafis were happy for him to convey this to the court in respect of the sanction application.
29. The Court interprets this communication as a procedural withdrawal of objection to the Liquidator’s application for sanction. It does not amount to an endorsement of the Settlement Agreement or its terms, nor does it reflect any concession by the Khorafis as to the propriety of the Defendants’ conduct. Instead, the Khorafis have elected not to oppose the Liquidator’s decision to compromise the claims, notwithstanding their previously stated concerns.
30. Accordingly, the Court proceeds on the basis that the Khorafis do not oppose the granting of the sanction sought but maintain their reservations regarding the adequacy of the settlement and the underlying allegations.
31. The Liquidator states, and I accept, that there is no significant prospect of recovery for contributories, and entering into the Settlement Agreement does not cause them any prejudice.
Statutory framework
32. The application is made pursuant to Article 102(3) of the DIFC Insolvency Law (Law No. 1 of 2019), which provides:
“The Court may make such order on an application under this Article as it thinks just, including where appropriate an order enforcing or setting aside any direction given or requirement made by the Liquidator to a person.”
33. This provision confers a broad discretionary power on the Court to make orders it considers just in relation to the conduct of a liquidation.
34. Further, Article 8A of the DIFC Law on the Application of Civil and Commercial Laws (Law No. 3 of 2004, as amended) provides that DIFC Law is primarily determined by reference to DIFC statutes and judgments, but may, where appropriate, be supplemented by common law principles and rules of equity. In determining applicable common law, the Court may have regard to the common law of England and Wales and other common law jurisdictions.
35. Pursuant to Article 53(1) of the DIFC Insolvency Law No. 1 of 2019, a liquidator is authorised to exercise the functions set out in Schedule 3 to the Insolvency Law, subject to any limitations imposed by the Court or the creditors. Schedule 3 expressly authorises the liquidator to compromise, settle, or otherwise deal with claims by or against the company, including proofs of debt submitted by alleged creditors.
36. These powers are sufficiently broad to encompass the settlement of both claims asserted by the company and claims made against it, provided the liquidator acts in good faith and in accordance with their statutory duties.
Legal principles
37. Whilst Article 102 confers a discretion on the Court, the Court must exercise that discretion judicially, in accordance with relevant principles.
Common law principles
38. In common law jurisdictions such as England and Australia, it is well established that courts may approve settlement agreements made by liquidators, particularly when these involve compromises of claims or affect creditors' interests. This reflects the court’s supervisory role in ensuring that the liquidator’s actions align with their duties and serve the best interests of the liquidation estate.
39. Article 102(3) of the Insolvency Law provides that “the Court may make such order on an application under this Article as it thinks just.” This discretionary wording allows the Court to refuse an order if the matter falls within the liquidator’s commercial judgment and lacks sufficient grounds for judicial intervention.
40. Where a settlement involves litigation, substantial assets, or contentious claims, the Court may decide to sanction the liquidator’s decision. This is not to substitute the Court’s own commercial judgment for that of the liquidator, but to ensure that the liquidator has acted reasonably, prudently, and in accordance with their duties. Judicial approval in such circumstances promotes transparency and provides the liquidator with protection from subsequent liability.
41. These principles are reflected in case law from England (e.g., Re T&N Ltd [2006] EWHC 1447; Re MF Global UK Ltd (No 5) [2014] EWHC 2222 (Ch); HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 732; Re Nortel Networks (UK) Ltd [2016] EWHC 2769 (Ch)) and Australia (e.g., Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 112; Re One Tel Ltd (in liq) [2014] NSWSC 457; Re Great Southern Managers Australia (in liq) [2014] WASC 312; McDermott & Potts v Lonnex Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2021] VSCA 245).
Momentous decisions and judicial oversight
42. The Applicant submits that the Court should approve the Settlement Agreement because the proposed decision is “momentous.”
43. The concept of a “momentous decision” originates from Public Trustee v Cooper [2001] WTLR 901, where Hart J recognised that trustees may seek court approval for decisions of such significance that judicial oversight is prudent. Though not a legal standard, “momentous” has become a term of art in English trust and insolvency law, describing decisions involving substantial complexity, risk, or consequence.
44. Indicators of a momentous decision include:
(a) Significant financial implications for the trust or estate;
(b) Novel or complex legal or factual issues;
(c) Potential exposure of the fiduciary to liability or challenge;
(d) Possible conflict of interest; and
(e) Long-term or irreversible effects.
45. This framework has been applied beyond trusts, including insolvency proceedings. For instance, in Re Nortel Networks (UK) Ltd [2016] EWHC 2769 (Ch), the court approved a global settlement proposed by administrators, recognising its complexity and impact on creditors as “momentous.”
46. The Court’s jurisdiction under Article 102 is interpreted broadly to support the liquidator’s functions. Directions can be sought on any question arising during windingup. However, the Court will not intervene merely because the liquidator seeks reassurance. Judicial intervention is reserved for decisions of such importance—due to legal complexity, financial implications, or potential disputes—that they warrant oversight.
47. Typically, this involves:
(a) Substantive or procedural legal questions;
(b) Issues concerning the scope of the liquidator’s powers;
(c) The propriety or reasonableness of the proposed action.
48. These categories are not exhaustive; other circumstances may also justify judicial consideration.
Judicial discretion and commercial judgment
49. The principles articulated in Re Greenhaven Motors Ltd [1999] EWCA Civ 3046, 1 BCLC 635, remain authoritative in England and Wales and have been endorsed in subsequent decisions such as Re Longmeade Ltd (in liquidation) [2016] EWHC 356 (Ch). These cases affirm that while the court exercises its own discretion in sanctioning a compromise, it gives significant weight to the commercial judgment of a properly advised and impartial liquidator. The court need not assess the full merits of the underlying claims but must be satisfied that the compromise is reasonable and in the estate’s best interests. Creditors’ views may be considered, but objections based on irrelevant or extraneous matters may be discounted.
50. Similar principles apply in Australia under sections 90-15 and 90-20 of Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In McDermott & Potts v Lonnex Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2021] VSCA 245, the Victorian Court of Appeal emphasised that where creditors oppose a settlement, the court must scrutinise the merits more closely, including the legal and factual basis of the claims being compromised.
51. Given this consistent approach across common law jurisdictions, the DIFC Courts should apply the same principles when assessing liquidators' applications for approval or sanction of compromises.
Court should consider the Settlement Agreement
52. The decision to enter into the Settlement Agreement is sufficiently significant to merit the Court’s consideration because:
(a) The claims in the DIFC Proceedings are the estate’s only substantive asset.
(b) The settlement would end contentious and legally complex litigation, advance the winding-up process, and lead to a final distribution to creditors.
(c) The settlement involves inherent tensions, as the DIFC Proceedings are brought against a creditor, BJSS.
(d) The settlement involves a proof of debt submitted by BJSS.
(e) The Liquidator must consider funding issues.
(f) The Khorafis initially opposed the Settlement Agreement, thereby increasing the risk of future claims against the Liquidator. The Khorafis no longer oppose the granting of the sanction but maintain their reservations regarding the adequacy of the Settlement Agreement and the underlying allegations against the Defendants. In the absence of Court sanction of the Settlement Agreement, there remains a risk of claims by the Khorafis against the Liquidator arising from it.
Liquidator is acting in good faith
53. The evidence discloses that the Liquidator is acting in accordance with her statutory duties and in good faith in entering into the Settlement Agreement. The following points support this conclusion:
54. First, the Liquidator has the statutory power to settle the DIFC Proceedings under Article 53(1) of the Insolvency Law.
55. Secondly, the Liquidator has carefully considered the merits of the claims, the financial and practical consequences of the settlement versus continuing litigation, and the views of creditors. She has weighed these factors rationally and properly, as required under the test established in Re Nortel Networks (UK) Ltd [2016] EWHC 2769 Ch and other English and Australian authorities.
56. Thirdly, the Liquidator has relied on detailed legal advice from appropriately qualified professionals regarding the merits, risks, and potential outcomes of the litigation. This advice has been disclosed to the Court, demonstrating transparency and adherence to her duty of full and fair disclosure.
57. Fourthly, the Liquidator has concluded that the Settlement Agreement is in the creditors' best interests. This conclusion is based on a pragmatic assessment of the estate’s financial position, the risks of litigation, and the potential for a timely distribution to creditors.
58. Fifthly, the Liquidator has considered and addressed the objections initially raised by the Khorafis, the largest creditors, but has determined that their views do not outweigh the overall benefits of the settlement for the estate.
59. Sixthly, the Liquidator has acted without any apparent conflict of interest and has made her decision based on the best available information and advice. Her decision-making process aligns with the principles of rationality, honesty, and prudence expected of a reasonable liquidator.
60. The Court concludes that the Liquidator is acting in accordance with her statutory duties and in good faith by entering into the Settlement Agreement. Her actions are aimed at achieving the best possible outcome for the creditors while minimising risks and delays.
Merits of BSA’s case - strengths
61. BSA has a prima facie good case on liability based on the documentary evidence in the Liquidator’s possession. The claims are based on well-established causes of action, including breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent trading under the Insolvency Law.
62. The claims allege that the Defendants, primarily through the Individual Defendants, conspired to transfer BSA’s relationship managers and clients to BJSSAM, thereby diverting BSA’s business. These kinds of business-diversion claims are recognised under English law, which is persuasive in the DIFC.
63. The Liquidator has obtained detailed legal advice from counsel on the merits of the claims.
64. The Defendants’ arguments regarding limitation and the identification of relevant property have been rejected at earlier stages of the proceedings, including during a strike-out application.
Weaknesses of the Claimants’ case
65. The Liquidator’s legal advice has considered the challenges to BSA’s case.
66. The Liquidator’s legal advice considers the Defendants’ case. That advice is privileged and has not been disclosed in public. I will not elaborate upon it except to say that I have considered and scrutinised the advice. I am satisfied that the substance of the Defendants’ arguments has been considered by the Liquidator and is addressed in the legal advice she has received.
67. I am satisfied that the Liquidator and her advisers have properly and adequately considered the general litigation risks and enforcement risks, particularly the potential legal impediment caused by the Swiss Proceedings.
68. While the Court does not express a view on the likely outcome of the DIFC Proceedings, I am satisfied that the Liquidator has correctly identified the relevant risks as set out in Confidential Annexure B.
Practical and financial consequences of the settlement compared with continuing with the DIFC Proceedings
69. The Liquidator has compared the practical and financial consequences of the Settlement Agreement with continuing the DIFC Proceedings.
70. I am satisfied the Liquidator has considered the following matters.
(a) Settlement Benefits;
(b) Litigation Risks; and
(c) BJSS Proof of Debt.
Other relevant considerations
71. I am satisfied that the Liquidator has adequately considered the funding requirements for continuing the DIFC Proceedings, including the Claimants’ litigation costs and potential adverse cost liabilities.
72. The Liquidator has considered the views of creditors regarding the Settlement Agreement:
(a) The Khorafis, the largest creditors, initially objected to the settlement. However, their views carry limited weight because they do not have access to all litigation materials and have not provided an alternative damages valuation supported by evidence and reasoning.
(b) BJSS supports the Settlement Agreement.
(c) Other creditors have not expressed any views, and since the estate is insolvent, the opinions of contributories are irrelevant.
73. I find that the Liquidator has rationally prioritised the commercial interests of the creditors, and the Khorafis’ initial objections do not outweigh the benefits of the settlement
Court assessment
74. The Court has considered the evidence presented in support of the Liquidator’s application for approval of the Settlement Agreement. This includes the legal advice obtained by the Liquidator, the Liquidator’s evaluation of the strengths of the claims and the challenges associated with obtaining and enforcing a judgment, the financial and practical requirements of funding continued litigation, and other matters relevant to the interests of the creditors.
75. Having reviewed these materials and the submissions made, the Court is satisfied that the Liquidator has undertaken a careful and reasonable assessment of the merits of the Settlement Agreement when weighed against the risks, costs, and uncertainties of continuing the litigation.
76. The settlement is a pragmatic resolution that avoids further expense and uncertainty.
77. The Court is satisfied that the Settlement Agreement is a reasonable settlement and the decision to enter into the Settlement Agreement falls within the range of reasonable and prudent decisions available to the Liquidator in the proper discharge of her duties.
78. The Court will sanction the Settlement Agreement.
Form of order
79. The Applicant seeks orders:
1. The Applicant have the Court’s sanction for her and BSA to enter into and perform the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
2. The Applicant is released from any liability arising from or out of the entry by her and BSA into and performance of the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
80. I have determined that the Court will sanction the Settlement Agreement.
81. I will not issue an order releasing the Liquidator from any liability arising from or out of her entry into and performance of the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
82. Under Article 102 of the DIFC Insolvency Law, the Court has the power to make orders in relation to the exercise of the powers or functions of a liquidator. However, the scope of Article 102 does not extend to granting a release from liability to the liquidator in respect of the exercise of her powers or functions.
83. A release from liability is a substantive legal protection that must be expressly provided for by statute or arise under a separate legal mechanism.
84. Article 102 is supervisory in nature and does not confer upon the Court the power to extinguish or preclude claims that may arise against the liquidator, whether from creditors, contributories, or other stakeholders. Accordingly, while the Court may sanction the Liquidator’s entry into the settlement as a proper exercise of her powers, it cannot, under Article 102, grant a general release from liability in respect of that decision or the performance of the settlement.
85. The Applicant has not referred to any authority from England or other common law jurisdictions in which a court, when sanctioning a settlement, has included in its order a release of the liquidator from liabilities arising from the entry into or performance of the settlement agreement.
86. The Applicant referred to Jackson v Phoenix, BVIHCMAP2020/0019, a 2020 decision of the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The primary judge, at paragraph 2(ii) of the sanction order, released the joint liquidators from any liability arising from or out of their entry into and performance of the terms of a settlement agreement. While the Court of Appeal upheld the sanction order and dismissed the appeal against paragraph 5, which permitted the joint liquidators to implement the settlement agreement during the appeal period and released them from liability for actions taken during that time, the Court of Appeal did not consider or rule upon the release from liability granted in paragraph 2(ii). This was because no appeal was brought against that aspect of the order. Accordingly, while the Court of Appeal did not overturn the release from liability, its judgment is of limited, if any, precedential value on that point, as the issue was not the subject of appellate scrutiny or determination.
87. Nevertheless, whilst the Court’s sanction may not confer immunity from future scrutiny, the Court’s sanction of the Liquidator’s entry into and performance of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Article 102 serves to validate the Liquidator’s authority and decision-making process.
88. While the Court has not substituted its own commercial judgment for that of the Liquidator, it has determined that the Liquidator has acted prudently, in good faith, and without legal error and that the settlement is reasonable
89. Such approval provides a measure of protection against subsequent challenges, particularly from creditors, by confirming that the Liquidator’s conduct was reasonable in the circumstances.
Costs
90. The Applicant seeks that her costs be costs in the Application.
91. The Defendants do not seek their costs of the Application.
Conclusion
92. The Court will order:
1. Pursuant to Article 102 of the Insolvency Law, the Court sanctions Bank SarasinAlpen (ME) Limited (in liquidation) ("BSA") and Ms Georgina Marie Eason in her capacity as Official Liquidator of BSA (the "Liquidator") to enter into and perform the Settlement Agreement dated 11 August 2025, between BSA, the Liquidator, Mr Elie Vivien Sassoon, Mr Stephane Emile Astruc, Mr Edmond Carton, Bank J Safra Sarasin Limited ("BJSS"), and J. Safra Sarasin (Middle East) Limited (previously known as Bank J. Safra Sarasin Asset Management (Middle East) Ltd.
2. The Court sanctions the Settlement Agreement as a reasonable compromise of the claims in CFI-009-2023, BJSS's Proof of Debt in BSA's liquidation, and all the Claims identified in the Settlement Agreement.
3. The Applicant's costs will be costs in the liquidation of BSA.
4. There will be no other order as to costs
Confidential Annexure A
This is a Confidential Annexure to the Court’s ruling dated 6 November 2025. This Confidential Annex is to be provided only to the Applicant, BJSS and their respective legal advisers and, subject to any order of the Court, is to remain confidential.
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXURE B
This is a Confidential Annexure to the Court’s ruling dated 6 November 2025. This Confidential Annex is to be provided only to the Applicant and her legal advisers and, subject to order of the Court, is to remain confidential
