Claim No: ARB 024/2025

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN

OLYMPIO

Claimant/Applicant

and

OLWIN

Defendant/Respondent

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. CHIEF JUSTICE WAYNE MARTIN

UPON the Arbitration Claim dated 26 June 2025, seeking recognition and enforcement of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Arbitral Award (the “Award”) (the “Claim”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 9 July 2025, recognizing and enforcing the Award (the “R&E Order”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 21 July 2025, granting the Claimant’s Urgent Application No. ARB-024-2025/1 dated 17 July 2025 (the “WFO”)

AND UPON considering the Decision of the Conflict of Jurisdiction Tribunal dated 2 September 2025 (the “CJT decision”)

AND UPON Order of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 23 September 2025 dismissing the Claim for lack of jurisdiction, staying and discharging all orders previously made in the proceedings, including the WFO, and dismissing all pending applications (the “the 23 September Order”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application dated 29 September 2025 seeking permission to appeal against the 23 September Order (the “the Initial Application”)

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 14 January 2026, dismissing the Initial Application

AND UPON the Claimant’s Appeal Notice dated 5 February 2026, seeking renewed permission to appeal the 23 September Order (the “Renewed Application”)

AND UPON review of the Defendant’s submissions in opposition dated 25 February 2026

AND UPON the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Renewed Application is granted on all grounds.

2. The costs of the Renewed Application are reserved to the Court of Appeal.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 24 March 2026
At: 2pm

Summary

1. The Claimant Olympio (“Olympio”) has applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal from the decision of the Judge at first instance (the “Judge”) on 23 September 2025 in which the Judge set aside a Worldwide Freezing Order (“WFO”) which had been issued against the Defendant, Olwin (“Olwin”) on 21 July 2025, and dismissed various applications related to the WFO for lack of jurisdiction. The Renewed Application is made to the Court of Appeal because the Judge dismissed the Initial Application by Olympio for permission to appeal.

2. For the reasons which follow Olympio has established that the proposed appeal has a real prospect of success and permission to appeal will be granted.

Context

3. The following matters are provided in order to provide context for the consideration of the dispute between the parties and the issues raised in the proposed appeal. Obviously, nothing in what follows should be taken as a finding by the Court of Appeal.

4. In January 2003 Olwin, as sellers and Olympio as buyers entered into two contracts for the sale and purchase of gasoline which the parties have described as the “1st Deal” and the “2nd Deal”. Both contracts were subject to English law. The contract relating to the 1st Deal contained an arbitration agreement providing for arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”). The contract relating to the 2nd Deal contained an arbitration agreement providing for disputes to be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”).

5. Disputes arose between the parties which resulted in separate arbitration proceedings. The dispute relating to the 1st Deal resulted in an Award in the DIAC arbitration proceedings issued on 3 March 2025 in which Olympio was ordered to pay OlwinUSD 6,287,561.17 plus interest (the “DIAC Award”). The dispute relating to the 2nd Deal resulted in an Award in SIAC proceedings issued on 11 June 2025 in which Olwinwas ordered to pay Olympio USD 6,515,638.58 plus interest (the “SIAC Award”).

The legal proceedings

6. After the issue of the arbitral awards the parties have commenced proceedings in these Courts and in the Courts of greater Dubai. As those proceedings are at the heart of the proposed appeal, it is desirable to set them out in some detail and in approximate chronological order.

7. On 24 March 2025 Olwinfiled an application in these Courts for the recognition and enforcement of the DIAC Award.¹ An order for recognition and enforcement of that Award was granted on 26 March 2025.

8. On 8 May 2025 Olwincommenced enforcement proceedings in these Courts and requested the issue of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of the Dubai Court of First Instance in order to enforce the orders of this Court recognizing and enforcing the DIAC Award in greater Dubai.

9. On or about 8 July 2025 Olwinsuccessfully enforced the judgment of this Court in greater Dubai by obtaining an order for attachment of the amount of AED 26,511,080.13 which was transferred from the bank account of Olympio to the Dubai Judicial Department. On the same day those funds were transferred to lawyers representing Serene.

10. On 25 June 2025 Olympio commenced proceedings in these Courts for the recognition and enforcement of the SIAC Award in its favour.²

11. On 9 July 2025 the Judge issued an order recognizing and enforcing the SIAC Award.

12. On 16 July 2025 Olympio applied to these Courts for a WFO against Olwinin respect of the funds which had been transferred to its lawyers as a result of the execution proceedings which had taken place with respect to the DIAC Award.

13. On 21 July 2025 the Judge granted the WFO which included orders requiring Olwinto return the funds which it had received to the Courts of greater Dubai.

14. On 24 July 2025 the DIFC Courts issued a letter addressed to the President of the Dubai Courts of First Instance enclosing a translated copy of the WFO and requesting urgent implementation.

15. Olympio asserts that Olwindid not comply with the terms of the WFO and sought an order in the execution proceedings before the Dubai Courts attaching an amount of AED26,472,404.15 in Olwin’s account.

16. In the meantime, on 16 July 2025 Olwinhad commenced proceedings in the Dubai Courts seeking an order nullifying the SIAC Award. On 28 July 2025 Olwinapplied to the DIFC Courts requesting the adjournment of the proceedings in which the Judge had ordered recognition and enforcement of the SIAC Award pending determination of its application for annulment in the Dubai Courts.

17. Also on 28 July 2025, Olympio made an application which it asserted was urgent seeking various orders with respect to the enforcement of the WFO.

18. On 31 July 2025 Olwinfiled an application in the DIFC Courts to discharge the WFO. At around the same time, Olwincommenced proceedings in the Conflict of Jurisdiction Tribunal (the “CJT”) challenging the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts with respect to both the order for recognition and WFO granted with respect to the SIAC Award.

19. On 1 August 2025 Olwinfiled an application in these Courts for an order suspending all proceedings pending final determination of its application to the CJT.

20. On 7 August 2025 the Judge made Orders dismissing Olwin’s application for a stay of proceedings and granting Olympio’s application for orders with respect to the WFO. Olympio contends that Olwincontinued to fail to comply with the WFO and associated orders. On that basis, on 25 August 2025 Olympio applied for an order that Olwin’s lawyers confirm the location of the funds which they had received from the Dubai Court and, to the extent that the lawyers retained those funds, an order that they be returned to the Dubai Court.

21. On 27 August 2025 Olwinmade another application requesting the stay of all proceedings in these Courts pending final determination of the application before the CJT.

22. On 17 September 2025 the parties received the CJT Decision dated 2 September 2025, the terms of which are central to the proposed appeal.

The CJT Decision

23. The CJT Decision commences with a review of the orders sought by Olwin which included:

24. The Tribunal then referred to the parallel proceedings in the two Courts relating to the SIAC Award. The Tribunal also noted that on 15 July 2025 the Dubai Courts rejected Olympio’s application for attachment of Olwin’s assets, which resulted in an appeal against that decision which was later abandoned.

25. The Tribunal considered that the proceedings in both Courts relating to the ratification and enforcement of the SIAC Award gave rise to a conflict between the jurisdiction of those Courts, which brought the matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

26. The Tribunal then assessed the jurisdictional bases for the proceedings in both Courts and concluded that each Court had jurisdiction. The Tribunal considered that Olwin’s application for nullification of the SIAC Award was, in effect, the other side of the coin to Olympio’s proceedings in the DIFC Courts seeking recognition and enforcement of that Award. The Tribunal noted that neither party had any connection or affiliation with the DIFC, nor was there any agreement conferring jurisdiction on the DIFC Courts.

27. Given its earlier ruling that both Courts had jurisdiction, it seems that the Tribunal took these matters into account not for the purpose of assessing whether either Court lacked jurisdiction, but rather for the purpose of assessing which Court should exercise jurisdiction in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

28. In relation to that question the Tribunal considered that the Dubai Courts were the most suitable court to hear proceedings in the recognition and enforcement of the SIAC Award.

29. In this context the Tribunal observed:

30. The formal orders made by the Tribunal were (relevantly) as follows:

The decision under appeal

31. On 23 December 2025 the Judge made the orders which Olympio seeks permission to appeal, in the following terms:

32. It seems that the Judge made the Orders without inviting the parties to provide submissions or attend a hearing. The Judge gave no reasons for the orders which he made. When Olympio requested the provision of reasons for the orders made, the Judge declined.

33. Olympio’s complaint is directed to the orders setting aside the WFO and dismissing the ancillary applications which it had made with respect to the enforcement of the WFO.

The Initial Application for Permission

34. As noted, the Judge declined a request for the provision of reasons for the decision which is under appeal. This is regrettable not only because reasons for contested matters are a vital component of the judicial process but also because the failure to provide reasons significantly hampers the work of the Court of Appeal. In the absence of reasons for the decision under appeal, the appellate court is obliged to treat the reasons given by the Judge for refusing the Initial Application for Permission to Appeal as a surrogate for his reasons. However, reasons given in response to grounds of appeal are a somewhat unsatisfactory surrogate for reasons given at the time the decision is made and before any appeal is instituted.

35. The approach taken by the Judge in his reasons for rejecting the Initial Application for Permission to Appeal involved the following observations:

36. In relation to Olympio’s contention that the DIFC Courts had jurisdiction to grant interim relief in support of proceedings pending outside the DIFC as a component of its enforcement jurisdiction, the Judge observed:

“Those provisions operate where the DIFC Courts are exercising jurisdiction consistently with the statutory framework. They do not permit the Court to act in defiance of, or parallel, to a binding CJT determination allocating jurisdiction to another court and directing the DIFC Courts to cease hearing the matter.”

Permission to appeal – legal principles

37. RDC 44.117 provides:

38. RDC 44.5 requires that an appellant obtain permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal except where the appeal is against a committal order.

39. RDC 44.19 provides:

40. RDC 44.19 provides that permission to appeal may only be given where the appeal would have a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

41. In the context of an assessment of the prospects of success “real” means realistic rather than fanciful and involves the same test as is applied in applications for immediate judgment.³

42. A real prospect of success does not mean a probability of success, but more than mere arguability.⁴

43. “Some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard” may include the public interest in clarifying the meaning and scope of relevant practice and provisions of DIFC and wider UAE law.⁵

44. It is established that “real” in the context of an assessment of the prospects of success means realistic rather than fanciful, applying the same test as is applied in an application for immediate judgment.⁶

45. It is also established that a real prospect of success does not mean a probability of success, but more than mere arguability.⁷

46. Accordingly, in order to obtain the grant of permission a prospective appellant needs to establish more than the proposition that the proposed appeal is reasonably arguable – rather, it must be established that there is a real prospect of success.⁸

47. When a renewed application made to the Court of Appeal is refused, it is appropriate for the Court to provide reasons which adequately explain the reasons why permission has been refused. The adequacy and extent of those reasons will be informed by the fact that the refusal of permission is final and conclusive and determines the issues the subject of the appeal.

48. On the other hand, when a renewed application for permission to appeal is granted, the reasons for the grant can and should be expressed more briefly, and any views expressed should be expressed and read as provisional, on the basis that a different view might well be formed following the consideration of the fuller argument which will be presented at the hearing of the appeal. Any views expressed in these reasons should be read and construed on that basis. Further, the reasons for granting permission in respect of grounds of appeal will be expressed economically, not only because the determination of the issue raised by the ground must await the hearing of the appeal but also to limit the prospect that a party might consider that a member of the Court of Appeal does not retain an open mind in relation to any of the issues in the appeal.

The grounds of appeal

Ground 1

49. Ground 1 asserts that the Judge erred in law in finding that the CJT Decision prevented him from continuing the WFO.

50. Olympio submits that the Judge was wrong to conclude that the maintenance of the WFO and associated applications and ancillary orders would involve a contravention of the ruling made by the CJT. It submits that in a context in which Olwinhad specifically sought orders dismissing the WFO, it is clear from the terms of the CJT’s decision that the Tribunal did not intend the WFO to be terminated as a result of its findings. It is contended that when regard is had to the terms of the Tribunal’s decision, there can be no suggestion that the maintenance of the WFO would involve defiance of a binding CJT determination.

51. In opposition to this ground Olwinessentially adopts the Judge’s reasoning, to the effect that the WFO was ancillary to the application for recognition and enforcement and once the Tribunal ruled that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain that claim, it followed that it had no jurisdiction to grant interim measures such as the WFO. It further submits that the CJT made no ruling with respect to the WFO because there was no conflict of jurisdiction with respect to that matter, as Olympio’s application for enforcement of the WFO had failed in the Dubai Courts. Olwinsubmits that the Tribunal made no decision with respect to the WFO because there was no conflict, and that it would be erroneous to construe the Tribunal’s reasons as an endorsement of the maintenance of the WFO.

Analysis

52. There is cogent argument to the effect that the Judge has misconstrued the tenor and effect of the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal was plainly alive to Olwin’s complaint with respect to the WFO and arguably declined to make any order suspending the WFO in the face of Olwin’s explicit request. If that argument were to succeed, it would follow that the Judge’s concern with respect to possible defiance of the Tribunal’s ruling would be misplaced.

53. The Judge’s assertion that the Court’s jurisdiction to grant a WFO necessarily fell with the Tribunal’s ruling in relation to its jurisdiction with respect to recognition and enforcement is the subject of the second ground of appeal and will be considered in that context.

54. Ground 1 has a real prospect of success.

Ground 2

55. Ground 2 asserts that the Judge erred by finding that the DIFC Court lacked jurisdiction to continue the WFO as a result of the decision of the CJT. In support of this ground Olympio submits that it is now well established by recent decisions of the Court of Appeal that provisions of the Courts Law (2005) confer free-standing jurisdiction upon the Court to grant interim measures or relief in aid of its jurisdiction to enforce foreign arbitral awards or judgments.⁹

56. Olympio submits that the Judge was wrong to regard the jurisdiction to grant the WFO as being limited to and ancillary to the order for recognition and enforcement.

57. Olympio further submits that the Judge’s observation that maintaining the relief would be to maintain substantive judicial control over a matter that the DIFC Courts had been directed to relinquish is wrong because the Tribunal expressly held that there was no conflict between the continuation of the WFO and the jurisdiction of the Courts of Greater Dubai.

58. Olwinopposes this ground and maintains that the reasons given by the Judge were correct.

Analysis

59. There is a cogent argument in support of this ground. A series of decisions in the Court of Appeal establish that both under the previous Courts Law and the current Courts Law the Court has freestanding jurisdiction to grant interim measures, such as freezing orders, in support of its jurisdiction to enforce foreign arbitral awards or judgments. That jurisdiction is not ancillary or dependent upon a current or pending application for recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award of judgment, and in many of the cases there has been no award or judgment capable of recognition and enforcement.

60. It is therefore arguable that the Judge erred by considering that the jurisdiction of the Court depended upon the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the application for recognition and enforcement before the Court, and should have concluded that the Court had jurisdiction to protect the Court’s capacity to enforce the SIAC Award after the determination of the nullification proceedings in the Dubai Courts.

61. It might also be argued that the Judge erred by failing to take into account the fact that the Tribunal clearly differentiated between the proceedings for recognition and enforcement on the one hand, and the WFO and other interim measures on the other hand. The orders made by the Tribunal reflected its conclusion that the Dubai Courts were the most appropriate Court to determine questions with respect to the validity of the SIAC Award while leaving the question of interim measures pending that determination to the only Court which was exercising jurisdiction with respect to those matters, namely the DIFC Courts.

62. Ground 2 has a real prospect of success.

Ground 3

63. Ground 3 contends that as it was reasonably arguable that the DIFC Court had jurisdiction with respect to the WFO the Judge should have continued the Order until he had received argument on the question of jurisdiction. In support of this ground Olympio relies upon the authorities which establish that if there is an arguable case with respect to jurisdiction a Court hearing an application for urgent interim measures should determine that application on its merits and reserve the question of jurisdiction for determination after inter partes argument in due course.

64. Olwinopposes this ground on the basis that the Court’s lack of jurisdiction had been conclusively determined by the CJT. However, obviously that proposition will be of no avail if either Ground 1 or Ground 2 succeeds.

65. The last observation supports the view that this ground may be otiose because if either Ground 1 or Ground 2 succeed, it is likely that the appeal will be upheld, and if neither ground succeeds, it is unlikely that Ground 3 would result in the decision being set aside.

66. However, in a context in which the Judge made the orders under appeal without providing either party with the opportunity to present submissions or be heard in relation to the orders which he made, and then declined to give reasons for those orders, the ground is cogently arguable and has a real prospect of success.

Summary and Conclusion

67. Olympio has established that all proposed grounds of appeal have a real prospect of success.

68. The Renewed Application must be granted and the costs of the Application reserved to the Court of Appeal.