Claim No. ARB 050/2025

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

OMANAND

Claimant

and

ONDREI

Defendant

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE ROGER STEWART KC

UPON the Claimant’s Arbitration Claim dated 19 December 2025

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Roger Stewart KC dated 19 December 2025 (the “Freezing Order”)

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Roger Stewart dated 31 December 2025 extending time for compliance with paragraphs 9(a) and 10 of the Freezing Order

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. ARB-050-2025/3 dated 2 January 2026, seeking continuation of the WFO (the “Continuation Application”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. ARB-050-2025/4 dated 5 January 2026, seeking to set aside the Freezing Order (the “Set Aside Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. ARB-050-2025/5 dated 6 January 2026, seeking to adjourn the Return Date Hearing listed on 7 January 2026 (the “Adjournment Application”) (the “Return Date”)

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Roger Stewart KC dated 7 January 2026, adjourning the Return Date to 9 January 2026 and making further directions

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. ARB-050-2025/6 dated 8 January 2026, seeking to vary paragraph 2 of Schedule B of the Freezing Order so as to fortify the cross-undertaking as to damages by the payment of USD 5 million into the DIFC Courts Escrow account and seeking a declaration that such payment constitutes full compliance with the Claimant’s security obligations under the Order (the “Declaration Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant filing an updated skeleton argument on 8 January 2026

AND UPON the Defendant filing the third witness statement of Zarghona Fasal in opposition to the Declaration Application

AND UPON review of the parties’ statements of costs dated 9 January 2026

AND UPON hearing counsel for the Claimant and counsel for the Defendant at the Return Date held before H.E. Justice Roger Stewart on 9 January 2026 to determine the Continuation Application, the Set Aside Application and the Declaration Application (together, the “Applications”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Freezing Order be varied so that it has application only in the DIFC and in the United Arab Emirates but is otherwise continued until further order.

2. The Declaration Application is granted.

3. The Set Aside Application is otherwise dismissed.

4. The costs of the Applications and of the application for the Freezing Order are reserved pending determination as to the issue as to the enforceability of the Final Award.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 22 January 2026
At: 3pm

Introduction

1. There are three relevant applications before the Court:

2. The Applications together raise the following issues:

The Material Underlying Facts

3. The Claimant, which is a Hong Kong company, alleges that the Defendant is liable to it on the basis of a Final Arbitral Award dated 16 December 2025 issued by the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (the “Final Award”). The Tribunal found the Respondent liable for RUB 50,129,616, 964.31, equivalent to about USD 628,114,074.64, on the basis of personal guarantees which it found the Defendant had executed in favour of Osric as security for two loan agreements entered into in 2023 with Onnjelo (“Onnjelo”), a Turkish company involved in the wholesale trade of liquid fuels and ores. The Defendant was, at the material time, the sole director of Onnjelo and a shareholder in it.

4. The Claimant’s claims arise as a result of a series of assignment agreements entered into in 2024 whereby Osric assigned its rights and claims against Onnjelo and the Defendant to the Claimant. The assignments were formalised by an Additional Agreement dated 23 April 2024.

5. The Defendant denies and denied that the loans were made to Onnjelo and further denies that he personally guaranteed such loans. He asserts that the documents relied on by the Claimant were forged and, in particular, that his signatures were forged. He did not, himself, attend the arbitral proceedings although did instruct a lawyer in Russia who appears to have played some part, at least to the extent of observing some of the proceedings.

6. Prior to the Final Award, the Claimant sought and obtained a Commercial Precautionary Seizure from the Dubai Courts to secure the Respondent’s assets in the UAE. This was granted on 7 November 2024. The Defendant sought, initially unsuccessfully, to set aside the attachment.

7. On 17 December 2025, the day after the Arbitration Award and in ignorance of it, the Court of Appeal in Dubai set aside the precautionary attachment in Grievance Appeal No. XX. The precise basis and reasoning of the Court of Appeal’s decision are in dispute between the parties and is considered further below.

8. The Freezing Order was sought and obtained on the essential basis:

9. The application for the Freezing Order was sought on the basis that no fortification of the cross-undertaking in damages was required on the basis that the existence of the debt which was the subject of the Final Award provided sufficient security. The Court, however, insisted on the provision of fortification by means of a bank guarantee for USD 5 million.

10. The Freezing Order was granted on the afternoon of Friday 19 December 2025. Its existence was notified to the firm of lawyers acting for the Defendant on Tuesday 23 December 2025. There was a dispute as to when service was validly effected of the Freezing Order and the proceedings but an acknowledgement of service was filed on 26 December 2025 – thus indicating that service is accepted to have taken place by then.

11. The Defendant sought an extension to the time for compliance with the disclosure orders contained within the Freezing Order which was opposed by the Claimant but an extension of time was granted by the Court on 31 December for the reasons set out in the Order with Reasons of that date.

12. The Defendant provided initial disclosure of his assets on 31 December 2025 disclosing just under AED 200 million in identified accounts as well as shareholdings in several corporate vehicles which he said that he was unable to value.

13. On 6 January 2026, the Claimant issued proceedings under Claim No ARB-003-2026 for the recognition and enforcement of the Final Award. Notice of those proceedings was provided to the Defendant at the direction of the Court.

14. At the initial return date of the Freezing Order on 7 January, the lead advocate instructed by the Claimant was, unfortunately, ill with the result that a short adjournment was granted until 9 January in order to allow the instruction of an alternative advocate. The Court also ordered the Claimant to provide a copy of its note of the hearing on 19 December which had not, until then, been provided. A transcript of that hearing was provided to the parties on 8 January.

Jurisdiction

15. The first point taken by the Defendant is that there was no jurisdiction to make the Freezing Order.

16. The Freezing Order was applied for on the basis of RDC Part 25 and Articles 14(7), 15(4), 24(C) and 24(D) of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 concerning the DIFC.

17. The Defendant submitted that:

18. In response the Claimant submitted:

19. The point taken by the Defendant relies on a narrow interpretation of Article 15(4) with:

20. Viewed simply as a matter of language, I do not consider that this narrow interpretation is well founded. Thus:

21. When wider considerations are taken into account, the narrow interpretation becomes still more untenable. In Carmon Reestrutura – engenharia E Servicos Tecnios Especiais (SU) LDA v Antonio Joao Catete Lopes Cuenda [2024] DIFC CA 003 at [155], the Court of Appeal stated

“The DIFC Courts are part of a growing network of international commercial courts in a number of jurisdictions around the world. Where their jurisdiction and powers are amenable to constructions supporting the rule of law in transnational trade and commerce, such constructions should be preferred”.

22. If there was doubt as to the correct interpretation of Article 15(4), I consider that a narrow construction would run contrary to that supporting the rule of law in transnational trade. It would make no sense to have a power available to provide ancillary support in relation to an arbitration which was continuing (or had not even been commenced) but not in relation to one which had concluded.

23. Further, a similarly limited interpretation of the Article was considered by the Court of Appeal in Trafigura v Gupta, [2025] DIFC CA 001, where the focus was on the words “seeking suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC” (although it was accepted that a more correct translation of the word “seeking” from the Arabic would be “providing that”). The suggestion was that those words narrowed the scope of the Article.

24. The Court of Appeal rejected the submission holding at [134] and [135]

25. I consider that the same essential reasoning applies to the Defendant’s argument in this case. The words “current or future” do not limit the scope of the ancillary jurisdiction which is granted to the DIFC Courts in relation to arbitral proceedings.

26. It follows that I reject the Defendant’s submission that there was no jurisdiction to grant the Freezing Order.

Risk of Dissipation of Assets

27. The Claimant based its submission that there was a real risk of dissipation of assets on:

28. The Defendant summarised the relevant principles in a manner with which the Claimant did not take substantive issue as follows:

29. The Defendant further asserted that there was and is no evidence that the Defendant had sought to dissipate his assets or that he had put forward his defence in the arbitration dishonestly. He further relied on a series of facts which he said demonstrated the bona fides of his defence in the arbitration including:

30. At the return date, the Claimant relied:

31. At the core of this dispute is a fundamental issue – namely whether the Defendant did or did not enter into the personal guarantees upon which the Claimant’s claims against him, and the Final Award are based.

32. The Claimant relies very heavily on the validity of those guarantees and prays in aid the existence of the Final Award as determining their existence and the consequent liability of the Defendant in a very large sum.

33. If the guarantees were, indeed, entered into, it seems plain that the Defendant has sought to take every possible step to avoid fulfilling obligations which he voluntarily assumed. He has disputed the existence of the guarantees and the underlying obligations, refused to take a substantive part in the arbitration proceedings which, again, he voluntarily entered into and has put forward a positive case as to the non-existence of the guarantees which he must know to be false.

34. Although this case is factually very different from that in Lakatamia Shipping, I consider that it can fairly be said that a Defendant who denies that he signed guarantees when he did in fact sign them is very likely to dissipate assets if given a chance. The case is wholly different from one where a Defendant puts forward a case disputing liability on the basis, for example, of the extent or application of instruments which he accepts that he signed.

35. This is not a case where the Defendant can realistically have forgotten or been in any doubt as to whether or not he signed the instruments. It is incredible to suggest such a thing given the extent of liabilities said to have been assumed.

36. On the other hand if the Defendant did not sign the guarantees, I do not consider that there is any material to suggest that he has acted otherwise than an honest man would:

37. It can, in such circumstances, fairly be said that the Defendant himself would be the victim of a very substantial fraud to which the Claimant would, in all likelihood, be a party.

38. I do not consider that this is a case where there is other material evidence pointing to a real risk of dissipation of assets:

39. This is not a case where it is possible or desirable on this application for the Court itself to investigate the issue as to whether the Defendant’s signature on the relevant instruments was forged. Given that the forgeries would also go to the arbitration agreements which the Defendant is alleged to have entered into, this issue is likely to lead to a trial in the event that the Claimant seeks to enforce the Final Award. At such a trial, there would be a full opportunity to consider all of the relevant evidence.

40. This is, however, a case where I consider that there is a good arguable case that the Defendant signed the guarantees. If he did so, it follows that he has subsequently engaged in conduct that has sought to deny the undeniable. On that basis I consider that the Claimant has justified, to the requisite standard, the assertion that there is a real risk of unjustified dissipation of assets

Alleged Breach of Fair Presentation and Full and Frank Disclosure

41. The law in relation to the provision of full and frank disclosure is not in doubt. The principles applicable to such applications are set out in the useful judgment of Justice Carr, as she then was, in the case of Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Courts in common law jurisdictions, the grant of a Freezing Order is an extraordinary measure and is one which has to be undertaken with considerable care, including by claimants who seek it and who do so at their own risk.

42. The relevant principles are summarised at paragraph 7 of the judgment. The following are of particular relevance:

43. It is an unfortunate fact in the present case that no note or transcript of the hearing was provided by the Claimant to the Defendant until after the initial return date of 7 January. The availability of a transcript was dependent on obtaining the same from the Court but I am in no doubt that the Claimant should have provided its own note of the hearing to the Defendant when the Freezing Order was served.

44. Upon receipt of the Claimant’s note and transcript on 8 January 2026, the Defendant relied upon 9 alleged breaches of the duty of full and frank disclosure or fair presentation. Each of them is considered below.

45. First, the Defendant alleged that the Court was not properly addressed on the jurisdictional basis of the order and should have been told that an order could only be made if satisfied that the matter was urgent or that such an order was in the interest of justice.

46. There is nothing in this point. I have already held that jurisdiction was available under Article 15(4) which has no such restrictions. Further, even if there were limitations as alleged it is difficult to see how they were material here. If the Claimant’s case was otherwise accepted the matter plainly was urgent and an order would not be made if it were not in the interests of justice.

47. Secondly, the Defendant alleged that the Claimant misled the Court or failed to give proper disclosure of the reasons for the Dubai Court of Appeal discharging the attachment in that it was said that the basis of the decision was that the debt was not sufficiently clear on the papers whereas the Court had found that the file demonstrated no evidence of a fear of loss of security or other circumstances permitting precautionary attachment.

48. As to this ground:

49. The third ground was that the Court was misled as the ability to go back to the Dubai Court on the basis that it was told that the decision was final, that no urgent hearing could be obtained and that the final Award could not be used until it was attested and completely translated. This was said to be misleading on the basis that the Court was not sure that the other grounds for an attachment were made out. As to this, I have no evidence as to the likely attitude of the Dubai Court if faced with an attested award. The true position does seem to be that it would not have been possible to proceed on the basis of the final Award without attestation. It follows that I am not satisfied that there was any misleading.

50. Fourth, it is said that the presentation of the forgery defence of the Defendant was not fairly presented with full details not being presented. I do not consider that there is anything material in this allegation. It was obvious to the Court that there was a sustained and material challenge to allegation. It was also obvious that it could not be determined finally on an interlocutory basis. The Court was fully aware that it might be that the Defendant would turn out to be the victim of a fraud – which was why substantial security for the cross-undertaking was required.

51. Fifth, it is said that the Court was misled as to the views of the Dubai Courts on the forgery allegations. I do not consider any such misleading to have been material. It is far from clear as to precisely those views were. What mattered however, was that there was a sustained dispute about the allegations which was fully apparent to the Court.

52. Sixth, a further respect is relied upon namely that in other Dubai proceedings, the Defendant’s defence of forgery had been remitted for trial and was supported by expert evidence. Again, I do not consider the court was misled. It was plain that there was a real dispute as to the forgery allegations.

53. Seventh, it is averred that there was no specific consideration of the suitability of a worldwide order in circumstances where:

54. As to this, the above facts were fully made clear to the Court. I consider further the question as to the appropriateness of a worldwide injunction below.

55. Eighth, it is said that the Claimant put its case too high and in a sweeping fashion in relation to the risk of dissipation. I would accept that some of the language used by the Claimant was somewhat florid. I would also observe that the use of such language is unlikely to assist the Court and may well cause difficulties at a without notice hearing. Nonetheless the real matters relied on by the Claimant were made known to the Court and assessed by it.

56. Ninth, in permitting the Court to enforce the Freezing Order outside of the DIFC, the Claimant failed to draw the Court’s attention to the guidelines in Dadourian Group v Simms [2006] EWCA Civ 399. As to this:

57. In the circumstances, I dismiss the allegations of a failure to comply with the duty of full and frank disclosure with the exception of consideration of the appropriateness of a worldwide order to which I return below.

Alleged Breach of Undertakings

58. The Defendant relies on the following alleged failures:

59. As to these matters:

The Worldwide Nature of the Freezing Injunction

60. The Defendant argues that it was and is not appropriate to grant a worldwide freezing order on the basis:

61. On consideration of these points, I consider that there is considerable force in them and particularly the second point. The Defendant was free to use his assets as he saw fit outside the UAE. As previously indicated, there is no indication as to any dissipation of any assets he may have outside the UAE. The justification for the urgent nature of the relief sought was the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal. If and to the extent that assets elsewhere were dissipated, such is likely to have occurred in any event.

62. In the circumstances, I consider that it is appropriate to limit the scope of the Freezing Order to assets within the DIFC and the UAE. I do not consider that there is any separate failure in relation to any duty of full and frank disclosure. The factual basis upon which I have come to the decision was made known to the Court. The changed order reflects not a failure of disclosure but rather a reconsideration upon hearing both parties.

The Change in the Form of the Fortification

63. I consider it is appropriate to permit the change in the form of fortification from the provision of a guarantee to the payment of money into the DIFC Courts escrow account which has taken place. I consider this gives greater security than the provision of a guarantee. At one point it was suggested that there might be a claim by a third party on the funds but it now seems clear that there can be no such claim. Accordingly, I grant the Claimant’s application to vary the form of security. I do not grant the declaration requested as to compliance with the original security requirements as I consider these were not originally complied with.

Costs

64. I consider that the appropriate order as to costs is that they should be reserved pending the determination of the enforceability of the Final Award. This is because: