Claim No: CA 012/2026

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

BEFORE H.E. JUSTICE ROBERT FRENCH, H.E. JUSTICE THOMAS BATHURST AND H.E. JUSTICE ROGER STEWART

BETWEEN

ZUZANA KAPOVA

Claimant/Appellant

and

(1) MILOSLAV MAKOVINI
(2) PHARM TRADE HOLDING LTD

Defendants/Respondents

and

SEBASTIAN KAPA

Third Party

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

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UPON the settlement agreement between the parties (the “Settlement Agreement”) executed on 13 January 2026 providing, among other things, for the Claimant to pay the First Defendant the sum of EUR 1,000,000 (the “Settlement Sum”) in three instalments of EUR 400,000, (the “First Instalment”) EUR 300,000 and EUR 300,000 respectively, with the First Instalment falling due within fourteen days of the date of the execution of the Settlement Agreement, and, in the event of default in payment of the First Instalment, for the Settlement Sum to fall due at the election of the non-defaulting party (the “Accelerated Settlement Sum”) and for the stay of existing proceedings to be lifted in that event

AND UPON the Consent Order dated 14 January 2026 staying all further proceedings in this action with immediate effect and granting the parties liberty to apply (the “Consent Order”)

AND UPON the Defendants’ Application No. CFI-004-2023/20 dated 3 February 2026 (the “Application”), to lift the stay of proceedings due to the failure of the Claimant to pay the First Instalment and for an order that the Claimant pay the First Defendant the Accelerated Settlement Sum forthwith (the latter being the “Immediate Judgment Application”)

AND UPON hearing counsel for the Claimant and counsel for the Defendants at the Application Hearing held before H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke on 14 April 2026

AND UPON H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke providing an ex tempore decision in favour of the Defendants (the “Decision”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s oral application for permission to appeal the Decision (the “Initial PTA Application”)

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke dated 29 April 2026: (i) granting the Immediate Judgment Application; (ii) entering judgment for the First Defendant against the Claimant at paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6; and (iii) dismissing the Claimant’s Initial PTA Application (the “29 April Order”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Appeal Notice dated 20 May 2026 seeking renewed permission to appeal the Decision (the “Renewed PTA Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-004-2023/21 dated 20 May 2026 seeking a stay of execution of paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the 29 April Order pending determination of the Renewed PTA Application (the “Stay Application”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin dated 23 June 2026 granting the Stay Application (the “Stay Order”)

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin dated 20 July 2026 (the “20 July Order”) granting the Renewed PTA Application and continuing the Stay Order (the “Appeal”)

AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Appeal is dismissed.

2. The stay of execution granted by the Stay Order and the 20 July Order is lifted.

3. The Claimant is to pay the Defendants’ costs of the Appeal, including the Initial PTA Application, the Renewed PTA Application, and the Stay Application which will be assessed on a summary basis by the Court.

4. The Defendants are to provide a statement of the costs claimed within 7 days of this Order

5. The Claimant is to respond to the statement of the costs and make any submissions as to the appropriate basis for assessment within 7 days thereafter.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 14 October 2026
At: 3pm

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

Introduction and Summary

1. It is almost a century since Tomlin J issued a Practice Note¹ in the English Chancery Division which led to use of the form of order bearing his name when parties, who have settled a dispute, wish to be able to return to the same court in order to enforce the settlement. Many common law jurisdictions contain within their rules, provisions, descended from the original Practice Note, setting out the appropriate form of order.

2. The relevant DIFC Courts’ Rules are at RDC 36.28 and 36.29. RDC 36.28 requires an application for an agreed order to include a draft of the proposed order signed on behalf of all parties to whom it relates. RDC 36.29 provides that where proceedings are to be stayed on agreed terms

3. The central issue in the Appeal is whether the Judge, H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke (the “Judge”), was correct to find that he had jurisdiction, within the settled action, to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered into in order to settle that action notwithstanding that the form of the Consent Order made following the settlement did not follow the recommended Tomlin form. It is accordingly necessary to consider both the Consent Order and Settlement Agreement and the nature and basis of the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce a settlement in existing proceedings.

4. If the Judge did have jurisdiction, there are important subsidiary issues as to whether, in the circumstances, such jurisdiction should have been exercised so as to permit summary enforcement. There are also questions relating to the admission of additional evidence.

5. The Appeal is brought with the permission of H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin, granted by an Order with Reasons dated 20 July 2026.

6. For the reasons following the Court considers that the Judge was correct to find that he had jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement and that he was entitled to enter summary judgment.

7. In relation to evidence:

The Material Background

8. The underlying claim was issued by the Claimant (“Ms Kapova”) on 11 January 2023 against the First Defendant (“Mr Makovini”) and the Second Defendant, a DIFC company, Pharm Trade Holding Ltd (“Pharm”) (the “Claim”). Mr Miloslav filed a counterclaim against Ms Kapova and her son (“Mr Kapa”) who was added as a Third Party. Ms Kapova, Mr Makovini and Mr Kapa are all Slovak nationals.

9. There were substantial allegations made by and against all the relevant parties including allegations of misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. Ms Kapova alleged that Mr Makovini had designed, advised and implemented a corporate and tax structure which in fact operated to Ms Kapova’s detriment and enabled Mr Makovini improperly to obtain substantial funds belonging to Ms Kapova. In her witness statement in support of her Renewed PTA Application dated 20 May 2026, Ms Kapova describes her original Claim at paragraph 10 as being “at its core, a claim concerning a sustained course of false statements of fact made by Mr Makovini over time”.

10. The matter came on for trial before the Judge and he heard evidence and submissions between 6 and 9 January 2026. During the course of the trial, the Judge, as set out at paragraph 14 of his Schedule of Reasons, encouraged the parties to enter into settlement discussions. He made an observation to the effect that neither side was likely to be satisfied by his judgment when produced.

11. Between the hearing and 13 January 2026, settlement discussions duly took place between the parties which led to the Settlement Agreement being signed on 13 January and the Consent Order was issued on the following day.

12. The Settlement Agreement was in writing headed “Full and Final Settlement Agreement” and was said to be dated 12 January 2026 although it is common ground that it was not signed until the following day as recorded against the signatures of each of the four parties to the action, including Mr Kapa, at the end of the document.

13. The Settlement Agreement:

14. The Consent Order:

15. The Consent Order thus departed from the Tomlin form set out in RDC 36.29 in that:

16. On 3 February 2026, Mr Makovini issued the Application seeking:

17. The Application was supported by a witness statement of Mr Makovini which set out the relevant terms of the Settlement Agreement and asserted:

18. On 10 February 2026, Ms Kapova issued a document entitled “Defendant’s response to the Applicant’s Application Notice” and a witness statement of the same date. A witness statement was also served by Mr Kapa. The response:

19. On 17 February 2026, Mr Makovini served a witness statement responding to the two witness statements of Ms Kapova and Mr Kapa. That witness statement:

20. Notwithstanding that Mr Makovini had applied for the Application to be dealt with without a hearing, it was listed for a half day hearing before the Judge on 14 April 2026.

21. The skeleton argument put forward on behalf of Ms Kapova dated 10 April 2026:

22. Mr Makovini’s skeleton argument:

The Judgment

23. The Judge acceded to the Application to lift the stay and enter judgment for Mr Makovini for 1 million Euros plus interest by a judgment given orally on 14 April 2026. The reasons were then set out in a Schedule of Reasons in the 29 April Order.

24. The Judge:

The Grounds of Appeal and Post Judgment Evidence

25. Ms Kapova seeks to appeal on four grounds as set out in her Appeal Notice:

26. The Grounds of Appeal were supported by a witness statement of Ms Kapova which she said was made “to clarify the findings” in identified paragraphs of the Schedule of Reasons “to set out clearly what Mr Makovini said to me and my son during the three-day negotiation period between 9 and 12 January 2026”. She said that her case “properly understood” had always been one of fraudulent misrepresentation. She also exhibited what was said to be an independent legal analysis of the Slovak criminal proceedings by Mgr Sonderlich a Slovak lawyer. She asserted that there had been misrepresentations to the effect that criminal proceedings were still ongoing when they had, in fact, been closed in January 2025 and Mr Makovini had been trying to have them re-opened by applications made in September and October 2025 to the Slovak authorities.

27. Mr Makovini filed a Respondent’s Notice with six grounds additional grounds for upholding the Judge’s Order:

28. On 1 September 2026, Ms Kapova made an application seeking to adduce fresh evidence being a further witness statement from her and an Order of the Regional Court in Kosice dated 29 May 2026. The evidence went to non-compliance by Mr Makovini and Pharma with the requirement in clause 5 of the Settlement Agreement to withdraw one of the sets of proceedings identified in Clause 8.2 within 2 months of execution.

Was there jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement in the present action?

29. It is convenient to deal with this issue, which comprises Ground 3 of the Appeal, first. If Ms Kapova is correct in relation to this issue, the other Grounds of Appeal do not arise.

30. Ms Kapova submitted:

31. In argument, Ms Kapova accepted that the stay could be lifted to resume the original proceedings but maintained that the enforcement of the Settlement Agreement was not possible.

32. Mr Makovini submitted:

33. Given Ms Kapova’s submission that there was no jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement summarily, it is important to distinguish between:

34. It is only the first issue which properly falls within Ground 3 although, given the submissions made by Ms Kapova as to the effect of the Settlement Agreement, it is appropriate to consider the second under this head as well.

35. The third issue properly governs matters covered within Grounds 1, 2 and 4. This is because the Court making a Tomlin order in conventional form providing for a stay with liberty to apply for the purpose of enforcing the terms identified in a schedule, never binds itself to make such an order if, in due course, an application is made to it. The Court retains full power to enforce or not to enforce such an agreement or to enforce only part of it and it also retains the power to decide the procedure appropriate to decide whether to order such enforcement.

36. At the stage of the making of an agreed order in Tomlin form, the Court is not required to and generally does not consider the enforceability or appropriateness of the settlement which the parties have agreed. As Warby J explained in Zenith Logistics v Coury¹¹ when deciding that the principle of open justice did not require that the terms of a settlement agreement referred to in a confidential schedule to a Tomlin order be open to public inspection (as would be the case for the operative parts of an order of the Court):

37. So far as the second issue is concerned, it is appropriate to consider:

38. A stay of an action, unlike a discontinuance, withdrawal, dismissal or judgment in the action does not bring an action to an end. It still continues, albeit that before any substantive steps can be taken in it, the stay must be lifted.

39. The Court imposes a stay of an action in a variety of different circumstances including, by way of example, until security for costs is provided or in order to allow negotiations for settlement to take place or for case management reasons (such as important legal issues being decided in another action).

40. The form of the order being made will, if properly drafted, identify the purpose for which a stay is made and, accordingly, the circumstances when it may be lifted.

41. In the present case, the reference to the Settlement Agreement in the recital and the express liberty to apply provision could only contemplate that there at least might be circumstances in which the stay would be lifted for purposes connected with the Settlement Agreement.

42. Ms Kapova accepted that the stay could be lifted to continue the original action. This acceptance was correct. If a party was contending that the Settlement Agreement was inapplicable (because, for example it had been avoided), the proper forum in which to seek relief was the existing action. Indeed, it seems likely that raising fresh proceedings traversing the same ground as the original action might well be abusive.

43. However, once such acceptance takes place, it will be impossible to avoid the possibility that it will be necessary to consider the Settlement Agreement. If valid and existing, the Settlement Agreement will provide a defence to a party resisting a claim made in reliance on the original allegations in the action. Furthermore, such a party is likely not merely to defend the original allegations but defend on the basis of its own entitlement under the Settlement Agreement.

44. It follows that it is not possible to restrict the lifting of the stay for the purposes of enforcing the original obligations to consideration only of such original obligations. The existence and enforceability of the Settlement Agreement is inevitably likely to affect whether the original obligations are enforceable.

45. The decision of Slade J in Green v Rosen does not provide support for the proposition that the Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement in this case. In that case no order at all was made when the case was settled. There was, however, a separate later order by which costs were taxed (which taxation was made pursuant to one of the agreed terms of the settlement). The judge emphasised that he was dealing with a case where no order at all was made following the settlement. Having considered various possible methods of settling a case his finding is set out in the last paragraph of the judgment:

46. It is clear that the ratio of the case is limited to one where there was no order at all following the settlement. Further the passage set out is supportive of the position that if there had been a stay, the Plaintiff might have been entitled to seek that it be lifted.

47. It is also clear that Slade J was not entirely happy with the conclusion that he had reached – for the simple reason that it meant that fresh proceedings had to be issued.

48. It is not necessary to consider whether this Court, faced with the same factual position as faced by Slade J, would today come to the same conclusion. It appears at least arguable that as no order had been made by the Court, the action had not come to an end. If, for example, the validity of the settlement were in question, it is difficult to see why the Court would not have had jurisdiction to consider whether or not the settlement was valid and, in such circumstances, to enforce the settlement if appropriate to do so.

49. What is, however, clear is that in this case the Consent Order expressly contemplated the continuation of the action. Furthermore, it expressly, albeit in the Recitals, referred to the Settlement Agreement. In such circumstances we consider that the Court had jurisdiction, if it considered it appropriate, to lift the stay for the purposes of enforcing the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

50. The suggestion that the terms of the Settlement Agreement itself constituted an agreement not to seek to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement in the existing proceedings, is rejected. It is true that the second sentence of clause 4.1 of the Settlement Agreement as set out above is not entirely felicitous. On the face of it, it appears to contemplate by the use of the phrase “and/or” that a non-defaulting party shall be entitled both to proceed with the Claim and counterclaim in the existing proceedings and to seek enforcement of the Settlement Agreement before the courts of the DIFC or any other court. Those remedies are, of course, alternative and could not be pursued simultaneously. It appears that one of two constructions is possible:

51. Either of those constructions appears possible and either expressly contemplates the lifting of the stay which is likely to have been understood to be the easiest and most straightforward method of enforcing the Settlement Agreement. Neither provides support for a proposition that the parties had agreed not to lift the stay for the purposes of enforcing the Settlement Agreement. Furthermore, as set out above, once the lifting of the stay was contemplated for any purposes, consideration of the Settlement Agreement would be very likely to be required.

52. The parties could come to an agreement which had the practical effect of precluding issues relating to the Settlement Agreement being raised in the original action – most obviously by providing for binding arbitration or the exclusive jurisdiction of another Court. However, there would seem to be no practical purpose in requiring issues relating to the Settlement Agreement to be raised by way of separate proceedings in the same court. In any event that is not what was agreed in this case.

53. For all of the above reasons, the Court considers that the Judge was right to find that he had jurisdiction, if appropriate, to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Should the Judge have exercised his jurisdiction in the way that he did?

54. This question involves consideration of each of the remaining Grounds of Appeal, numbers 1, 2 and 4. Grounds 1 and 2 concern alleged misrepresentation whilst Ground 4 concerns alleged economic duress.

55. Having found that he had jurisdiction, the Judge proceeded on the basis that he could and should enforce it if the Claim was valid on the face of the Settlement Agreement and there were no material issues of fact to be determined.¹² He then found that there were no triable issues and no real prospect of success in any defence that could be put forward or had been put forward.¹³ In making such findings he was clearly applying the appropriate test for immediate judgment. We do not understand this to be in dispute. The central question is, accordingly, whether the Judge was wrong in the application of the test.

56. Ms Kapova submits:

57. In support of her case under Grounds 1 and 2, Ms Kapova:

58. In the Chief Justice’s reasons for granting the Renewed PTA Application in the 20 July Order he observed, in relation to her witness statement filed in support of the Renewed PTA Application, that as there had been no application to adduce additional evidence in support of Ms Kapova’s appeal he would disregard that part of her statement which contain assertions of fact¹⁶.

59. Mr Makovini objects to any evidence adduced on this Appeal which was not before the Judge and relies on the fact that there has been no application to adduce fresh evidence on the Appeal. His skeleton argument was filed before the limited application to adduce evidence referred to in paragraph 25 above. With the exception of that limited application, there has still been no application to adduce additional evidence. There is, accordingly, no basis upon which to consider or take into account fresh evidence, not before the Judge.

60. Even if that evidence were to be allowed we consider that it discloses no basis for a finding that there was any form of misrepresentation contained within the Settlement Agreement itself. In particular:

61. The Settlement Agreement contained valid and operative requirements in relation to the identified Slovak criminal proceedings, once they had been issued, whether they were still being pursued by the Slovak authorities (as Ms Kapova states that she understood the position to be) or in circumstances where they had been terminated by the Slovak authorities but Mr Makovini was seeking their resuscitation (as appears to have been the actual position).

62. The same position applies to the first draft settlement agreement submitted during the course of negotiations (which was not, in any event, before the Judge). It was in materially the same terms as the final version and did not contain any written misrepresentations.

63. It follows that any case on behalf of Ms Kapova in relation to misrepresentation required both:

64. Settlement Agreements such as the present will very commonly contain restrictions which are designed to minimise the scope for argument as to the enforceability of the relevant agreement. There are good commercial reasons for such restrictions. Parties in cases such as the present will have been litigating, often at considerable expense and with considerable hostility, for substantial periods of time. If a settlement agreement is reached a well advised party may well consider that it is in their interests that the other party is not easily able to circumvent the provisions of the agreement. Otherwise they face the real prospect that the litigation which have accepted will be brought to an end (often with some reluctance) may re start.

65. We consider, in agreement with the Judge, that the provisions of clauses 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 15 of the Agreement precluded Ms Kapova from relying on alleged misrepresentations, save in respect of a viable case of fraudulent misrepresentation. The relevant clauses would not prevent the existence of such a viable case as:

66. As with other common law systems, there are specific requirements relating to the pleading of fraud in the DIFC:

67. There was not before the Judge:

68. Neither Ms Kapova’s first witness statement nor that of Mr Kapa nor her initial response to the application made any allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation. The only reference to fraudulent misrepresentation before the Judge was that contained in Ms Kapova’s skeleton argument as set out in paragraph 18 above “[a]lternatively, the evidence supports a case of fraudulent misrepresentation or deliberate non-disclosure”¹⁷.

69. It was not correct to say that the evidence supported a case of fraudulent misrepresentation and no particulars at all were provided of any basis for such an allegation. On that basis we consider it clear that the Judge was fully entitled not to consider any possible allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation.

70. Furthermore, since the hearing before the Judge there are still no clear allegations of fraud or proper particulars of the same. The highest the matter is put is:

71. No document identifying the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation with proper particulars of the same has, accordingly, been provided either to the Judge or this Court. It should particularly be noted that there is no identification as to the grounds upon which it is said that any statement made by Mr Makovini was one which he intended to mislead Ms Kapova or made not caring whether it was true or false. On the facts, it is clear that Mr Makovini was trying to persuade the Slovak authorities to reinstitute the identified Slovak criminal proceedings. Given the necessarily rather vague and imprecise nature of the alleged oral statements (which have changed over time), it is unsurprising that there is no statement as to the basis for any alleged fraud.

72. This consideration is sufficient to dispose of Grounds 1 and 2. If there was a document setting out clearly the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations, it would be necessary to consider it very carefully against the known facts. It is plain that there are numerous features which point against the existence of any fraudulent misrepresentations including:

73. If there really had been a fraudulent misrepresentation to the effect which Ms Kapova may be putting forward, that the Slovak criminal proceedings were extant, it is hardly likely that Mr Makovini would have immediately forwarded the document showing the statement to be untrue. Further if Ms Kapova had understood there to have been such a misrepresentation, an immediate reaction could have been expected but there was none.

74. The final ground of appeal is Ground 4 which seeks to maintain that there is a triable case of economic duress pursuant to Article 41 of the DIFC Contract Law.

75. Article 41 provides

76. There are accordingly three required elements namely:

77. The Article distinguishes between lawful and unlawful threats. It follows that it is necessary to consider with some care both the nature of any alleged threat and whether such threat was wrongful in itself.

78. In the context of Article 41, it is plain that the requirement for a threat requires the identification of an act or omission which will adversely affect the threatened party if he does not conclude the contract which is sought to be avoided. This is clear from the fact that the requirement for a threat to be unjustified requires an act or omission with which a party has been threatened.

79. The material before the Judge did not disclose anything which was identified as a threat. There is no evidence or submission of a statement by Mr Makovini to the effect “Unless you enter into the settlement agreement and give me “x” I will do or not do “y”. The highest that Ms Kapova’s first witness statement puts the matter is that there was pressure to enter into settlement discussions. The 10-page reply to the Application to lift the stay did not refer to Article 41 or economic duress at all.

80. The suggestion of duress was first introduced by two rather confused paragraphs of the skeleton argument before the Judge where it was stated that:

81. There was no attempt to identify with any precision the nature of the alleged threat which is simply referred to as “the threat of criminal proceedings that had already been closed.” Furthermore, the evidence of Ms Kapova demonstrates:

82. Thus, not only was there no suggestion that Mr Makovini insisted on any particular figure by way of settlement but positive evidence that Mr Makovini was prepared to and did negotiate the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In the circumstances the “pressure” which is said to have been exerted can only have been to enter into a negotiated settlement agreement. The very terms in which the matter is put forward demonstrate that Ms Kapova had alternatives:

83. The only suggestion in respect of which it is said that any pressure was illegitimate is that it is said that Mr Makovini suggested that criminal proceedings were ongoing. However for the reasons already found, there is no basis for any finding of fraudulent misrepresentation. Further and most materially there is no clear statement of what Mr Makovini would or would not do if a settlement was not concluded. In the circumstances we do not consider that there is any basis to find that the act or omission said to constitute the duress was wrongful in itself.

84. Mr Makovini referred to the decision of H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere in Alumatawa v Al Mutawa [2025] CFI 17/11/2025 in which:

85. We consider that it is plain that there is no basis in this case for any finding that there was lawful act duress. Ms Kapova had access, at all times, to lawyers and legal advice before she entered into the settlement. There was no imminent danger to her or her son – indeed it is plain that her dispute with Mr Makovini had been underway for a considerable time. It follows that the Judge was right to find that there was no arguable case of economic duress.

86. Finally, although we agree with the Judge that it is possible for a party to force another party to enter into a contract which purports to restrict the right to assert duress in a way which the Courts will set aside, the contractual restriction obliges any court considering duress to focus on the agreement in the form in which it is entered into. Someone who enters into a contract with a gun to their head will not be held to a provision which says that they were not forced to enter it. However, the contractual restriction forces focus on the question as to whether the party was really forced to enter into the contract in the form in question including with the contractual restriction.

87. In the present case where Ms Kapova had full access to lawyers, it is impossible to suppose that she had no realistic alternative but to enter into the contract in the form in which it was entered into if she really was being forced in the way in which she now maintains. The very fact of successful negotiation shows that she was capable of and did explore alternatives to entering into the Settlement Agreement.

88. In her witness statement issued for the purposes of the Appeal, Ms Kapova did seek to put forward fresh evidence which was materially different from that she had submitted before the Judge. There is, however, no application to adduce the fresh evidence with the result that it is unnecessary to consider it.

89. The above matters are sufficient to dispose of the Grounds of Appeal without reference to the Respondent’s Notice. However we consider that the Respondent is correct to point out:

90. For all of these reasons the Grounds of Appeal fail.

The Application to Adduce Fresh Evidence

91. The final matter in relation to liability is the application to adduce fresh evidence of an alleged failure to withdraw proceedings. The relevance of this was not positively asserted at the hearing and was only dealt with in outline terms in the written submissions. This is unsurprising. Even if Mr Makovini has not complied with a provision of the terms of the Settlement Agreement (and that has not been investigated), it cannot affect the liability for summary judgment in respect of the 1 million Euros which occurred much earlier. It is irrelevant to the issues under appeal.

Costs

92. So far as costs are concerned: