Claim No: CFI 011/2026

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

PAUL

Claimant

and

PEYTON

Defendant

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ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE

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UPON the Part 7 Claim Form and the Particulars of Claim dated 25 February 2026

AND UPON the Defendant’s Defence without counterclaim dated 13 April 2026 (the “Defence”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. CFI-011-2026/1 dated 27 April 2026 seeking to strike out paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.3.1 of the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim, and seeking permission to amend its Defence within 28 days of the determination of this application (the “Application No. CFI-011-2026/1”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. CFI-011-2026/2 dated 22 May 2026 seeking to strike out the Claimant’s allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 15 (b) so far as they relate to a failure to make reasonable adjustments (the “Application No. CFI-011-2026/2)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-011-2026/3 dated 16 June 2026 seeking permission to amend the Particulars of Claim (the “Application No. CFI-011-2026/3”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Application No. CFI-011-2026/1 is granted.

2. Pursuant to RDC 4.16, paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.3.1 of the Particulars of Claim are struck out.

3. Application No. CFI-011-2026/2 is dismissed.

4. Application No. CFI-011-2026/3 is granted.

5. The Claimant is granted permission to amend the Particulars of Claim substantially in the form of the draft Amended Particulars of Claim exhibited to the Application Notice dated 16 June 2026, provided that a revised Amended Particulars of Claim

6. The Claimant shall file and serve the revised Amended Particulars of Claim within 7 days of the date of this Order.

7. Upon service of the Amended Particulars of Claim, the Reply dated 7 May 2026 shall cease to have effect.

8. The Defendant shall file and serve any Amended Defence within 14 days after service of the Amended Particulars of Claim.

9. The Claimant may file and serve a Reply to the Amended Defence, if so advised, within 14 days after service of the Amended Defence.

10. If either party seeks an order as to costs, that party shall, within 14 days of the date of this Order:

11. Any responding submissions and evidence shall be filed and served within 14 days thereafter.

12. If either or both parties serve a request for costs, the question of costs shall be determined on the papers.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 20 July 2026
At: 2pm

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

A. Introduction

1. These reasons determine three interlocutory applications heard together:

(together the “Applications”)

2. Collectively, the three applications raise issues concerning both the interpretation and operation of provisions of DIFC Law No. 2 of 2019 (the “Employment Law”) and the scope of the Claimant's pleaded case. They require consideration of the proper construction of Articles 59, 61, 62 and 66 of the Employment Law; whether the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and annexed documents served on 25 February 2026 advanced, expressly or in substance, the claims now relied upon by the Claimant; whether aspects of the Claimant's current pleaded case should be struck out; and whether the Claimant should be permitted to amend his case by the proposed amendments.

3. The Applications therefore involve questions of statutory interpretation, pleading, limitation and amendment, all of which bear upon the future conduct of the proceedings

B. Factual background

4. For present purposes, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make findings as to the truth of the matters alleged by the Claimant. The following summary is drawn from the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and annexed documents and is intended only to identify the factual context in which the Applications arise.

5. The Claimant was employed by the Defendant from 2007 until his employment was terminated in 2025. He alleges that, despite changes in location and contractual arrangements, his employment remained continuous throughout that period.

6. In 2022, following the Defendant's suspension of operations outside UAE, he was relocated elsewhere and then to Dubai, where he commenced employment under a DIFC employment contract. The Claimant alleges that various documents issued by the Defendant continued to record February 2007 as the commencement date of his employment.

7. The Claimant further alleges that, after relocating to Dubai, the scope of his reporting responsibilities was reduced and that, from early 2024, he developed a depressive illness which he disclosed to the Defendant's management. He alleges that he underwent medical treatment, was ultimately diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, sought flexible working arrangements, and pursued an internal grievance process concerning workplace matters and his health.

8. The parties' relationship subsequently deteriorated, and the Claimant resigned in September 2025. The Defendant treated his employment as ending in October 2025.

C. Procedural history

C1. The Claimant’s Causes of Action and the Relief Sought

9. The Claimant commenced these proceedings on 25 February 2026 by filing a Claim Form with Particulars of Claim and Annexures A-W.

10. The Claimant contends that the Defendant failed to recognise his service prior to August 2022 for statutory purposes and further alleges that the Defendant's treatment of him during his employment caused or materially contributed to psychiatric injury and other loss.

11. The Claimant advances several causes of action under the Employment Law together with claims for compensation and damages said to arise from the matters complained of. Although the precise legal basis for some heads of loss is not always clearly articulated, the essence of the claim may be summarised as follows.

12. First, the Claimant challenges clause 1.4 of his DIFC employment contract, which excluded his pre-August 2022 service from the calculation of statutory end-of-service benefits. He alleges that the clause constitutes an impermissible waiver of statutory rights and is void pursuant to Article 11 of the Employment Law. On that basis, he seeks a declaration that the clause is unenforceable and that his continuous period of employment commenced in February 2007 rather than August 2022.

13. Secondly, relying principally on Article 66 of the Employment Law, the Claimant claims statutory end-of-service benefits calculated by reference to his alleged continuous service from 2007. He seeks payment of pre-Qualifying Scheme gratuity in respect of service before February 2020 and payment of outstanding Core Benefits or DEWS contributions thereafter. He alleges that the Defendant has failed to pay the statutory entitlements required by Articles 19 and 66 of the Employment Law because it wrongly treated his service as commencing only in 2022.

14. Thirdly, the Claimant claims compensation for accrued but untaken annual leave pursuant to Article 28 of the Employment Law. He alleges that, at the termination of his employment, he had accrued annual leave for which he had not been paid.

15. Fourthly, the Claimant alleges that the Defendant failed to afford him the notice entitlement for which he contends he qualified by reason of his length of service. He relies on Article 62 of the Employment Law and contends that, because his continuous employment exceeded five years, he was entitled to a minimum notice period of 90 days. He further alleges that his mental health condition constituted a disability within the meaning of Article 59(8)(a) of the Employment Law and seeks compensation equivalent to twelve months' remuneration.

16. Fifthly, the Claimant alleges that the Defendant breached the statutory duties imposed by Articles 43 and 44 of the Employment Law to safeguard the health, safety and welfare of employees and to maintain a workplace free from risks to health and safety. He alleges, among other things, that the Defendant subjected him to sustained workplace stress, reduced the scope of his role, failed adequately to address known concerns regarding his mental health and failed to provide appropriate support or accommodation after his condition was disclosed.

17. Sixthly, the Claimant alleges disability discrimination and unfavourable treatment contrary to Article 59 of the Employment Law. He contends that his depression and anxiety constituted a disability within the meaning of Article 59 of the Employment Law, that the Defendant had actual knowledge of that condition through repeated disclosures, that it nevertheless subjected him to unfavourable treatment, and that it failed adequately to support or accommodate him after becoming aware of his condition.

18. Seventhly, the Claimant alleges that he suffered a psychiatric illness arising out of and in the course of his employment. He pleads that the illness was caused or materially contributed to by the Defendant's acts and omissions, including excessive workplace stress, adverse treatment and failures to safeguard his wellbeing. In support of that contention, he relies upon Articles 43 and 44 of the Employment Law and refers to medical evidence diagnosing major depressive disorder and certifying him unfit for work.

19. Finally, the Claimant seeks substantial compensatory relief for the consequences of the matters alleged. In addition to the statutory employment entitlements already described, he seeks compensation for psychiatric injury, stress and anxiety, compensation said to be payable as a consequence of what he describes as unfair or detrimental termination, and damages for future loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity.

20. Those claims are pleaded as flowing from the Defendant's alleged statutory breaches and the psychiatric injury said to have been caused by its conduct. While the Claimant refers to Article 63 of the Employment Law in support of certain of those claims, the pleadings do not always clearly identify the juridical basis upon which the more substantial damages claims are advanced.

C2. The defence

21. On 13 April 2026, the Defendant served its Defence.

22. The Defendant admits certain matters concerning the Claimant's employment history, relocation from outside UAE and then Dubai, and aspects of the Claimant's role, medical disclosures and work-from-home requests.

23. However, the Defendant disputes the Claimant's central contention that his service prior to August 2022 may be taken into account for the purposes of the Employment Law and contends that the Claimant's rights under the Employment Law are confined to his employment within the DIFC from August 2022 onwards.

24. The Defendant further denies that it failed to support the Claimant, disputes the allegations of disability discrimination and psychiatric injury, and contends that significant aspects of the claim are inadequately pleaded, misconceived in law or unsupported by sufficient particulars.

25. In particular, the Defendant contends that the claims concerning end-of-service benefits and notice entitlements are legally unsustainable because the Employment Law does not recognise service performed outside the DIFC for those purposes.

26. The Defendant further contends that the allegations concerning breaches of Articles 43, 44 and 59 are vague and inadequately particularised, denies that it knew or ought to have known that the Claimant had a disability within the meaning of the Employment Law, and disputes the existence, causation and extent of any psychiatric injury.

27. The Defendant also disputes the amount of accrued leave claimed and contends that any disability discrimination claim was not brought within the period prescribed by Article 61(2).

C3. Application No. CFI-011-2026/1 to strike out paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim

28. On 27 April 2026, the Defendant filed Application No. CFI-011-2026/1 to strike out paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, and 4.3.1 of the Particulars of Claim which relate to the Claimant’s claims:

C4. The Reply

29. On 7 May 2026, the Claimant served a Reply.

30. The Claimant maintains that the Defendant's records and conduct recognised his employment as continuous from 2007 and that the Defendant is not entitled to disregard his pre-August 2022 service.

31. The Claimant further disputes the Defendant's characterisation of his role, performance, medical condition and treatment during his employment, and contends that the Defence selectively relies on individual events while failing to address the broader course of conduct alleged in the Particulars of Claim.

32. The Reply also asserts that the Defendant was aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware, of the Claimant's mental health condition through repeated disclosures, medical information and workplace interactions, and that the Defendant failed adequately to respond to that condition.

33. The Claimant maintains that the pleaded facts disclose claims concerning disability discrimination, failures to make reasonable adjustments and breaches of the Defendant's statutory obligations.

34. The Claimant denies that the claim is inadequately pleaded, contends that the issues raised by the Defence involve factual disputes unsuitable for summary determination, and maintains that the claims advanced in the Particulars of Claim are properly brought and should proceed to trial.

C5. Application No. CFI-011-2026/2 to strike out paragraphs 1 and 15(b) of the Reply

35. On 22 May 2026, the Defendant filed Application No. CFI-011-2026/2 seeking to strike out paragraphs 1 and 15(b) of the Reply, which assert that the Defendant failed to make reasonable adjustments despite knowledge of the Claimant’s mental health condition.

C6. Application No. CFI-011-2026/3 for permission to amend the Particulars of Claim

36. On 16 June 2026, the Claimant filed Application No. CFI-011-2026/3 seeking permission to amend the Particulars of Claim to plead allegations concerning disability discrimination and the Defendant’s failure to make reasonable adjustments in relation to the Claimant’s mental health condition.

D. Issues

37. The Applications raise six principal issues.

D1. Issue 1: Application No. CFI-011-2026/1 — Article 66 and End-of-Service Entitlements

38. Do paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.3.1 of the Particulars of Claim disclose a legally sustainable claim under the Employment Law?

39. In particular, regarding the proper construction of Articles 62 and 66 of the Employment Law, may periods of employment performed outside the DIFC under foreign-law employment contracts be counted as part of the Claimant's continuous employment or service for the purpose of calculating statutory gratuity and notice-related entitlements?

40. If the Defendant's construction of the Employment Law is correct, a further issue arises as to whether the impugned paragraphs should be struck out pursuant to RDC 4.16.

D2. Issue 2: The Scope of the Original Disability Discrimination Case

41. Did the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and Annexures A–W served on 25 February 2026 allege, expressly or in substance, that the Defendant failed to make reasonable adjustments for the Claimant's disability within the meaning of Article 59(8)(b) of the Employment Law?

42. In determining that issue, it is necessary to consider what a reasonable reader of the original pleadings and annexed documents would have understood to be the case the Defendant was required to meet.

D3. Issue 3: Application No. CFI-011-2026/2 — Strike Out of the Reply

43. Do paragraphs 1 and 15(b) of the Reply merely respond to matters raised in the Defence and elaborate on an existing claim?

44. Alternatively, do those paragraphs seek to advance a new claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments that was not pleaded in the Particulars of Claim and cannot properly be introduced by way of Reply?

D4. Issue 4: Application No. CFI-011-2026/3 — Limitation

45. Do the amendments proposed in the draft Amended Particulars of Claim introduce a new Part 9 claim under the Employment Law?

46. If so, was that claim brought before the Court within the period prescribed by Article 61(2) of the Employment Law?

47. If not, do circumstances exist that justify disapplying the limitation period pursuant to Article 61(2)(b)?

D5. Issue 5: Application No. CFI-011-2026/3 — Sufficiency of the Proposed Pleading

48. Do the draft Amended Particulars of Claim adequately plead the constituent elements of a claim under Article 59(8)(b)?

49. In particular, does the proposed pleading sufficiently identify:

D6. Issue 6: Application No. CFI-011-2026/3 — Procedural Validity and Case Management Discretion

50. Is the amendment application procedurally defective for failing to comply with the RDC requirements regarding statements of truth and the manner in which amendments must be identified?

51. Subject to the resolution of the preceding issues, should the Court exercise its discretion to permit the proposed amendments, having regard to the overriding objective, prejudice to the parties, and the efficient determination of the real issues in dispute.

E. Applicable Legal Principles

E1. Principles Applicable to Strike-Out Applications

52. RDC 4.16 empowers the Court to strike out a statement of case where, amongst other things, it discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending a claim, or where it amounts to an abuse of the Court's process.

53. The jurisdiction is to be exercised consistently with the overriding objective and with due regard to the importance of determining disputes on their merits where that can properly be done.

54. The Court's task on a strike-out application is not to conduct a trial of disputed facts. Ordinarily, the Court proceeds on the basis that the facts properly pleaded by the respondent are capable of being established and determines whether, assuming those facts to be true, the impugned claim is legally sustainable.

55. Where an application turns upon a pure question of law, including the proper construction of a statute, the Court may determine that issue on a strike-out application if the legal question is capable of resolving the claim or part of the claim.

56. The Court must distinguish between a pleading which is defective in form and one which is incapable of disclosing a legally recognisable cause of action. A strike-out order is not ordinarily made merely because a claim could have been pleaded more clearly or with greater precision.

E2. Pleadings and Fair Notice

57. The purpose of pleadings is to identify the issues in dispute and to give fair notice of the case which the opposing party must meet.

58. A claimant is required to plead the material facts upon which the claim is based. The pleading must identify the essential factual ingredients of the cause of action relied upon, although it is not ordinarily necessary to plead evidence.

59. In considering the scope of a pleaded case, the Court examines the statement of case as a whole and in its procedural context. The Court is concerned with substance rather than form and does not determine the scope of a claim solely by reference to the legal labels used by the parties.

60. It is necessary to distinguish between:

61. Whether a pleading advances a particular claim is ultimately determined by what a reasonable reader of the pleading would understand the party to be alleging.

E3. Replies

62. A reply is a responsive pleading. Its function is to answer matters raised in the defence that require a response.

63. A reply is not ordinarily the vehicle by which a claimant introduces a new cause of action or advances a materially different case from that pleaded in the particulars of claim.

64. Where a party seeks to advance a new claim after service of the original pleading, that course will ordinarily require amendment of the statement of case and any necessary permission from the Court.

E4. Amendments to Statements of Case

65. The Court has a broad discretion to permit amendments to statements of case.

66. In exercising that discretion, the Court seeks to ensure that the real issues in controversy between the parties are determined, while also having regard to the overriding objective, procedural fairness and the efficient conduct of litigation.

67. Relevant considerations may include:

68. A proposed amendment that is legally unsustainable or bound to fail will ordinarily not be permitted.

69. Equally, where a proposed amendment merely clarifies, particularises or better articulates an existing case, the Court will generally approach the application more liberally, subject to considerations of prejudice and procedural fairness.

E5. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

70. The issues raised by Application No. CFI-011-2026/1 require the construction of Articles 62 and 66 of the Employment Law.

71. The task of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the meaning conveyed by the language of the statute considered in its context and having regard to its purpose.

72. The starting point is the text enacted by the legislature. Where the language used is clear and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to that language.

73. A statutory provision must be read in the context of the statute as a whole. Related provisions should, so far as possible, be interpreted harmoniously and consistently.

74. The Court should not read words into legislation unless the requirements for doing so are clearly established. The judicial function is to interpret legislation, not to rewrite it.

75. The statutory interpretation issues in the present case concern, among other matters, the meaning of the expressions "Employee", "continuous employment" and "service" as used in Articles 62 and 66 of the Employment Law.

E6. Disability Discrimination and Reasonable Adjustments

76. Part 9 of the Employment Law prohibits discrimination on specified grounds, including disability.

77. Article 59(8)(b) provides, in substance, that an employer discriminates against an employee with a disability if the employer fails to make reasonable adjustments to a physical feature of the workplace or to an applicable provision, criterion or practice which would, if adjusted, enable the employee to meet the relevant genuine occupational requirement.

78. Whether a claim under Article 59(8)(b) has been sufficiently pleaded depends upon the facts of the particular case. However, the pleading must ordinarily identify the factual basis upon which it is alleged:

79. The Court's present task is not to determine the ultimate merits of any reasonable- adjustments claim, but to determine whether such a claim was pleaded, whether it is properly arguable, and whether it may properly be pursued in these proceedings.

E7. Limitation Under Article 61

80. Article 61(2) of the Employment Law provides that the Court shall not consider a claim under Part 9 unless it is brought before the Court within six months of the relevant act or omission, subject to the power conferred by Article 61(2)(b).

81. A central issue in the present case is the meaning of the expression "brought to the Court" in Article 61(2). The question is whether the complaint sought to be relied upon was sufficiently advanced in the proceedings before expiry of the statutory period.

82. If a complaint was already before the Court within the limitation period, a subsequent amendment which merely clarifies or particularises that complaint may not engage the limitation issue in the same way as an amendment introducing a wholly new cause of action.

83. If, however, the proposed amendment advances a new claim not previously brought before the Court, the Court must consider the effect of Article 61(2)(a) and, where relied upon, whether circumstances exist which justify the exercise of the discretion conferred by Article 61(2)(b).

84. The burden of establishing circumstances which justify disapplication of the primary limitation period rests upon the claimant seeking such relief.

F. Application No. CFI-011-2026/1: Articles 62 and 66 and the Claimant's End-of- Service Entitlement Claims

F1. The Issue

85. By Application No. CFI-011-2026/1, the Defendant seeks orders striking out paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.3.1 of the Particulars of Claim pursuant to RDC 4.16. Those paragraphs proceed on the basis that, for the purposes of Articles 62 and 66 of the Employment Law, the Claimant's periods of employment outside UAE before August 2022 are capable of being taken into account in calculating notice entitlements, gratuity and Qualifying Scheme benefits.

86. The issue raised by the application is whether, assuming the facts pleaded by the Claimant to be true, the Employment Law is capable of bearing that construction. If the Defendant's construction is clearly correct and the Claimant's construction has no real prospect of success, the impugned paragraphs should be struck out. If, on the other hand, the Claimant's construction is reasonably arguable, the claims should proceed to trial.

F2. The Parties' Contentions

87. The Defendant submits that the issue is one of pure statutory interpretation and does not depend upon disputed questions of fact. It relies upon Article 4 and the definitions of "Employee" and "Employer" in Schedule 1 and contends that the concepts of "continuous employment" in Article 62 and "service" in Article 66 refer only to periods when an individual falls within the statutory definition of an Employee under the Employment Law.

88. On that construction, service performed outside UAE pursuant to a contract and pursuant to an English contract cannot be taken into account.

89. The Defendant further submits that clause 1.4 of the DIFC employment contract reflects, rather than modifies, that statutory position.

90. The Claimant submits that the application cannot properly be determined as a pure question of law. He relies on the factual circumstances surrounding his relocation from outside UAE and then Dubai, his contention that he remained continuously employed by Peyton throughout, and Peyton documents issued after August 2022 which recorded February 2007 as his employment commencement date.

91. The Claimant submits that the interaction between those matters, clause 1.4 and Articles 11, 62 and 66 raises issues that should not be summarily determined.

F3. Analysis

F3.1 Is the issue capable of determination on a strike-out application?

92. I do not accept the Claimant's submission that the application depends upon disputed questions of fact. The facts material to this issue may be assumed in the Claimant's favour.

93. On that basis, the Claimant was employed within the Peyton group or organisation from 2007; he worked first outside UAE under an employment arrangement, then under an English employment arrangement, and from 1 August 2022 under a DIFC employment contract.

94. It may also be assumed, for present purposes, that Peyton documents issued after August 2022 recorded February 2007 as the commencement date of his employment.

95. Those assumed facts do not, however, answer the legal question raised by the application. The question is not whether the Claimant worked for Peyton continuously since 2007. Nor is it whether Peyton may, for some internal administrative purposes, have treated his Peyton service as continuous.

96. The question is whether Articles 62 and 66 of the Employment Law confer statutory entitlements by reference to periods of employment performed outside the DIFC, under foreign-law employment arrangements, at a time when the Employment Law did not apply to the Claimant's employment.

97. That is a question of statutory construction. It does not turn upon contested evidence. If the Employment Law is not reasonably capable of bearing the construction for which the Claimant contends, there is no utility in permitting the impugned claims to proceed to trial.

98. Conversely, if the Claimant's construction is reasonably arguable, the claims should not be struck out merely because the Defendant's construction appears stronger. The Court must therefore decide whether the Claimant's construction has a real prospect of success as a matter of law.

F3.2 The statutory scheme

99. The starting point is Article 4, which defines the scope of application of the Employment Law. Schedule 1 defines "Employee" by reference to Article 4. The Employment Law is therefore not a free-standing code governing all employment relationships with an employer that employs persons in the DIFC. It applies to employment relationships falling within the scope identified by Article 4.

100. Articles 62 and 66 must be read in that statutory context. They are not expressed in general terms applicable to any employment relationship, wherever performed and under whatever governing law. They form part of a DIFC statutory employment regime and confer rights upon persons who are Employees within that regime.

101. The recurring statutory language is important. Article 62 concerns the notice entitlement of an Employee. Article 66 concerns an Employee's entitlement to gratuity or Qualifying Scheme benefits by reference to that Employee's continuous employment or service. Those expressions take their meaning from the statutory scheme in which they appear.

102. In that context, the words "continuous employment" and "service" are not used at large. They are used to measure statutory entitlements created by the Employment Law for Employees to whom the Employment Law applies. The natural reading is that the relevant continuity or service is continuity or service as an Employee within the meaning of the Law.

103. Nothing in Articles 62 or 66 expressly directs prior non-DIFC employment to be counted. Conversely, nothing in the language of those provisions indicates that service performed outside the scope of Article 4 is nevertheless to be treated as employment under the Law. When read with Article 4 and the definition of Employee, the statutory language points consistently to service performed as an Employee to whom the Employment Law applies.

104. The statute does not say that employment performed outside the DIFC, under a foreign- law contract and outside the scope of Article 4, is to be aggregated with DIFC employment for the purpose of calculating statutory notice, gratuity or Qualifying Scheme benefits.

105. That omission is significant. The inclusion of extra-territorial or pre-DIFC service for statutory benefit purposes would be a substantial extension of the statutory scheme. It would expose employers to statutory liabilities calculated by reference to periods during which the employment relationship was governed by another law and during which the DIFC Employment Law did not regulate the parties' rights or obligations. If the legislature had intended such a result, clear language would be expected. No such language appears in Articles 62 or 66.

F3.3 Articles 62 and 66

106. Article 62 establishes minimum notice entitlements by reference to the duration of an Employee's continuous employment. The statutory purpose is to prescribe minimum notice periods within the DIFC employment relationship. It does not purport to regulate notice entitlements accrued under earlier foreign-law employment contracts. Nor does it provide that periods of foreign employment are to be deemed periods of continuous employment for the purpose of Article 62.

107. Similarly, Article 66 provides for end-of-service entitlements within the statutory scheme established by the Employment Law. It operates by reference to an Employee's service and continuous employment. It is concerned with gratuity and Qualifying Scheme benefits payable under the DIFC regime.

108. Nothing in Article 66 suggests that service performed outside the DIFC before the person became an Employee within the meaning of the Law is to be treated as service for the purpose of calculating those statutory entitlements.

109. The Claimant's construction would require the Court to treat the word "service", and the expression "continuous employment", as including periods when the Claimant was not an Employee within the statutory meaning of the Employment Law.

110. That construction is not supported by the text. It would detach the calculation of statutory entitlements from the statutory status which gives rise to those entitlements. It would also require the Court to import into Articles 62 and 66 a deeming provision which the Law does not contain.

111. The difficulty is not merely that the Defendant's construction is preferable. It is that the Claimant's construction has no sufficient foothold in the statutory text, structure or purpose.

112. The Employment Law identifies the employment relationships to which it applies, defines Employees by reference to that scope, and then confers entitlements on Employees. It does not provide that prior employment outside the DIFC is retrospectively converted into service under the DIFC statutory regime.

F3.4 Business continuity and statutory continuity

113. The Claimant relies upon the fact that his employment relationship with Peyton may, for some purposes, have been continuous from 2007. He also relies upon documents after August 2022 which allegedly recorded February 2007 as his commencement date. I am prepared to assume those matters in his favour.

114. However, there is an important distinction between continuity of association with an employer or corporate group, on the one hand, and continuity of employment for the purpose of a particular statutory regime, on the other.

115. The former is a factual or commercial concept. The latter depends upon the language and operation of the statute. A document recording a commencement date may be relevant to many matters, including internal seniority, benefits conferred by contract, or factual continuity. It does not follow that it alters the statutory meaning of "Employee", "continuous employment" or "service" under the Employment Law.

116. Nor does the fact that the Claimant may have moved between Peyton locations assist him on the statutory point. The Employment Law does not contain a general rule that service with the same employer, or within the same international organisation, is to be aggregated for all statutory purposes regardless of where the service was performed or what law governed it. In the absence of such a rule, the Court cannot supply one by interpretation.

F3.5 Article 11 and clause 1.4

117. The Claimant also relies upon Article 11 and contends that clause 1.4 of the DIFC employment contract is void because it purports to exclude service before 1 August 2022 from the calculation of statutory entitlements.

118. That submission depends upon the premise that Articles 62 and 66 confer statutory rights calculated by reference to the Claimant's employment from 2007. Unless that premise is correct, Article 11 is not engaged.

119. Article 11 provides that the requirements of the Employment Law are minimum requirements and that a provision in an agreement to waive any of those requirements, except where expressly permitted by the Law, is void.

120. It prevents contractual waiver of statutory rights conferred by the Employment Law. It does not itself create the statutory right said to have been waived. The anterior question remains whether the Employment Law required Peyton to calculate the Claimant's notice, gratuity or Qualifying Scheme entitlements by reference to his outside UAE and English employment.

121. For the reasons already given, Articles 62 and 66 do not impose such a requirement. On the construction of Articles 62 and 66 adopted above, clause 1.4 does not operate to exclude any statutory entitlement conferred by the Employment Law. It reflected the statutory position that only employment falling within the scope of the DIFC Employment Law counted for the relevant statutory purposes.

122. That conclusion does not determine whether the Claimant may have any separate contractual claim founded upon an express agreement, representation or other contractual obligation to recognise his pre-August 2022 service. No such claim is presently pleaded in the impugned paragraphs. The present application concerns the statutory claims advanced under Articles 62, 66 and Article 11. Those claims cannot succeed if the Employment Law does not confer the asserted statutory entitlement.

F3.6 Is the Claimant's construction reasonably arguable?

123. The Court must be cautious before striking out a claim on a point of law. The question is not whether the Defendant's construction is merely the better construction. The question is whether the Claimant's construction is reasonably arguable.

124. In my judgment, it is not. The statutory scheme is coherent and clear. Article 4 identifies the scope of the Law. Schedule 1 defines Employee by reference to that scope. Articles 62 and 66 confer entitlements on Employees under that statutory regime. The expressions "continuous employment" and "service" are used within that framework. There is no textual basis for treating periods of employment outside the DIFC and outside the scope of the Employment Law as periods of statutory service for the purpose of Articles 62 and 66.

125. The Claimant's construction would require the Court to add a substantive rule of aggregation which the Law does not contain. It would also extend statutory liabilities under the DIFC Employment Law to periods of employment governed by foreign law and performed before the Claimant became an Employee within the meaning of the Law. That would not be interpretation of the statutory language. It would be an impermissible enlargement of it.

126. I therefore conclude that the Claimant's pleaded case under Articles 62 and 66 has no real prospect of success. The point is one of law, suitable for determination on this application. The impugned paragraphs should accordingly be struck out.

F4. Conclusion on Application No. CFI-011-2026/1

127. Application No. CFI-011-2026/1 is therefore granted. Paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.3.1 of the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claims pleaded and will be struck out pursuant to RDC 4.16(1).

G. Scope of the Original Claim Documents

128. The parties disagree as to whether the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and Annexures A-W served on 25 February 2026 alleged, expressly or in substance, that the Defendant had failed to make reasonable adjustments for the Claimant's disability within the meaning of Article 59(8)(b) of the Employment Law.

129. That question is central to both the Defendant's application to strike out paragraphs 1 and 15(b) of the Reply and the Claimant's application to amend the Particulars of Claim. If such a complaint was already before the Court, different considerations arise from those that would arise if the Claimant is seeking to advance an entirely new claim.

130. The Defendant submits that the original proceedings did not contain a reasonable- adjustments claim. It contends that the Particulars of Claim pleaded claims concerning disability discrimination under Article 59(8)(d), breaches of Articles 43 and 44, and psychiatric injury, but did not plead the constituent elements of a claim under Article 59(8)(b).

131. The Defendant submits that references in the Particulars of Claim to workplace support, accommodation or adjustments were merely part of the factual background and did not communicate that the Claimant was advancing a separate statutory complaint based on a failure to make reasonable adjustments. According to the Defendant, such a claim first appeared in paragraphs 1 and 15(b) of the Reply and was then developed further in the draft Amended Particulars of Claim.

132. The Claimant submits that the original proceedings, read as a whole and together with the annexed documents, sufficiently advanced that complaint. He relies in particular upon allegations that he suffered from depression and anxiety, that those conditions were disclosed to management, that the Defendant knew of his condition, that he sought support and flexible working arrangements, that no meaningful assessment, accommodation or support process was implemented, and that the Defendant failed to provide appropriate workplace support after becoming aware of his condition.

133. The Claimant submits that the Reply did not introduce a new factual case but merely articulated more expressly a complaint already advanced in the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and annexed documents.

134. The question is not whether the original pleadings employed the language of Article 59(8)(b) or expressly referred to a "failure to make reasonable adjustments". Nor is the question whether the original pleadings contained every factual particular that might ultimately be required to establish such a claim. The question is what a reasonable reader of the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and annexed documents would have understood to be the case that the Defendant was required to meet.

135. The Court must therefore examine the original claim documents as a whole. Pleadings are not construed with undue technicality. A claim is identified by its substance rather than by the labels attached to it.

136. It is necessary to distinguish between a genuinely new cause of action founded on materially different facts and a different legal characterisation or further articulation of facts that have already been pleaded. The Court is concerned with substance and fair notice, not form.

137. The original Particulars of Claim alleged that from early 2024, the Claimant suffered from depression and later Major Depressive Disorder; that he disclosed his condition to senior management; that the Defendant became aware of his mental health difficulties; that no meaningful HR intervention, occupational health referral or structured support process was implemented; that no adequate accommodation or support was provided; that he requested flexible working arrangements on medical advice; and that discussions concerning his performance proceeded without any assessment, accommodation or adjustment in light of his disclosed condition.

138. The Claimant further alleged that the Defendant failed to provide timely or appropriate support after his condition had been disclosed and relied upon those matters in connection with his disability discrimination and health and safety claims.

139. Those allegations were supported by annexed documents including medical reports, correspondence concerning disclosures to management, requests for flexible working arrangements and grievance materials.

140. The documents were served with the Particulars of Claim and formed part of the material available to the Defendant when preparing its Defence. The Claimant relies on those documents as further demonstrating that the original proceedings advanced a complaint that, after becoming aware of his condition, the Defendant failed adequately to respond to it.

141. The original Particulars of Claim did not, however, expressly identify any physical feature of the workplace, provision, criterion or practice relied upon for the purposes of Article 59(8)(b). Nor did they expressly identify a reasonable adjustment that ought to have been made or the genuine occupational requirement which any adjustment would have enabled the Claimant to satisfy. Those omissions form the basis of the Defendant's contention that no Article 59(8)(b) claim was pleaded.

142. In my view, that submission conflates two distinct questions. The first is whether the original proceedings conveyed, in substance, a complaint that the Defendant had failed to accommodate or appropriately respond to the Claimant's disability after becoming aware of it. The second is whether the original proceedings pleaded with sufficient precision every factual element necessary ultimately to establish a claim under Article 59(8)(b). The former concerns the scope of the claim brought before the Court; the latter concerns the adequacy of the pleading.

143. The threshold for bringing a complaint before the Court under Article 61 is not identical to the threshold required for a properly particularised pleading. Article 61 is directed to whether the complaint has been brought before the Court, not whether every constituent element of the cause of action has been pleaded with forensic precision. Pleading deficiencies may require amendment, particulars or case-management directions. They do not necessarily mean that the underlying complaint was never brought before the Court at all.

144. Having regard to the Claim Form, the Particulars of Claim and Annexures A-W as a whole, I consider that a reasonable reader would have understood the Claimant to be alleging that he suffered from a disability, that the Defendant knew of that disability, that he sought support and workplace accommodations, including flexible working arrangements, and that the Defendant failed adequately to respond to those matters. The original proceedings therefore conveyed, at least in substance, a complaint that the Defendant failed to make appropriate adjustments or accommodations after becoming aware of the Claimant's condition.

145. That conclusion does not determine whether the original pleading adequately pleaded a cause of action under Article 59(8)(b), nor whether the proposed amended pleading does so. Those are separate questions. The fact that the original proceedings gave notice of the complaint does not mean they pleaded all statutory elements of an Article 59(8)(b) claim. Whether the constituent elements of that statutory cause of action have been pleaded with sufficient precision is a matter of pleading adequacy and particularisation rather than the anterior question whether the complaint itself was brought before the Court.

146. It is sufficient for present purposes to conclude that the original claim documents placed before the Court gave the Defendant fair notice of a complaint founded upon the Defendant's alleged failure properly to respond to and accommodate the Claimant's disability.

147. Whether that complaint was pleaded with sufficient precision, and whether further amendment is required, is considered later in this judgment.

H. Application No. CFI-011-2026/2: Strike Out of the Reply

H1. The Issue

148. By Application No. CFI-011-2026/2, the Defendant seeks orders striking out paragraphs 1 and 15(b) of the Reply. The Defendant contends that those paragraphs advance, for the first time, a claim that the Defendant failed to make reasonable adjustments within the meaning of Article 59(8)(b) of the Employment Law and that such a claim cannot properly be introduced by way of Reply.

149. The Claimant contends that the impugned paragraphs do not introduce a new claim. Rather, they are said to respond to matters raised in the Defence and to elaborate upon allegations already advanced in the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and Annexures A– W.

H2. Applicable Principles

150. A Reply is a responsive pleading. Its purpose is to answer matters raised in the Defence that require a response. It is not ordinarily the vehicle by which a claimant introduces a new cause of action or advances a materially different case from that pleaded in the Particulars of Claim.

151. Where a party seeks to advance a new claim after service of the original pleading, that course will ordinarily require amendment of the statement of case and any necessary permission from the Court.

152. Whether a Reply introduces a new claim is a question of substance rather than form. The Court must determine whether the impugned allegations merely respond to matters raised in the Defence or whether they seek to advance a new basis of liability founded upon materially different allegations. In making that assessment, the Reply must be read in the context of the statement of case as a whole.

H3. Analysis

153. In Section G above, I concluded that the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and Annexures A–W conveyed, in substance, a complaint that the Claimant suffered from a disability, that the Defendant was aware of that disability, that the Claimant sought support and accommodations in the workplace, and that the Defendant failed adequately to respond to those matters.

154. I further concluded that the original proceedings gave the Defendant fair notice of that complaint, albeit without deciding whether the original pleading adequately pleaded every element of a claim under Article 59(8)(b).

155. Against that background, I do not accept the Defendant's submission that the impugned paragraphs of the Reply introduce an entirely new factual case. The matters relied upon in those paragraphs arise from the same factual allegations relied upon throughout the Particulars of Claim: the Claimant's condition, the Defendant's knowledge of that condition, requests for support and flexible working arrangements, alleged failures to address those requests, and the consequences said to have followed.

156. The Reply does not rely upon new events, new documents or a materially different course of conduct.

157. Nor do I consider that the mere use in the Reply of the expression "failure to make reasonable adjustments" necessarily transforms the pleading into a new cause of action.

158. The Defendant's Defence positively asserted that the Defendant had provided appropriate support, had offered assistance, had approved work-from-home arrangements and had not been required to take additional steps.

159. The Reply was entitled to respond to those matters and to explain why the Claimant contends that the Defendant's response to his condition was inadequate.

160. The Defendant submits that a claim under Article 59(8)(b) requires identification of the relevant physical feature, provision, criterion or practice and the relevant genuine occupational requirement, and that none of those matters were pleaded in the original proceedings.

161. That submission may bear upon the adequacy of the pleading and the viability of the amendment application. It does not follow, however, that every reference in the Reply to a failure to make reasonable adjustments necessarily constitutes a new claim that must be struck out.

162. As discussed during the hearing, there is a distinction between the question whether a pleading gives fair notice of the nature of the complaint being advanced and the separate question whether the pleading contains sufficient particulars of every element of the statutory cause of action.

163. In substance, the Reply elaborates upon and responds to matters already in issue between the parties. It does not alter the factual foundation of the case, nor does it require the Defendant to meet a materially different factual allegation from that advanced in the original proceedings. The Defendant was already required to address allegations that it knew of the Claimant's disability, that support and accommodations were sought, and that its response was inadequate.

H4. Conclusion on Application CFI-011-2026/2

164. I am not satisfied that paragraphs 1 and 15(b) of the Reply disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim or constitute an abuse of process within the meaning of RDC 4.16.

165. Properly understood, those paragraphs respond to matters raised in the Defence and elaborate upon complaints that were already advanced, in substance, in the original claim documents.

166. Whether the Claimant's case is pleaded with sufficient precision, and whether the proposed amendments should be permitted, falls to be determined in the context of Application No. CFI-011-2026/3. Those questions do not provide a basis for striking out paragraphs 1 and 15(b) of the Reply.

167. Accordingly, Application No. CFI-011-2026/2 is dismissed.

I. Application No. CFI-011-2026/3: Amendment Application

I1. The Application

168. By Application No. CFI-011-2026/3, the Claimant seeks permission to amend the Particulars of Claim to plead more specifically allegations concerning disability discrimination and an alleged failure by the Defendant to make reasonable adjustments.

169. The substantive amendments appear principally in paragraphs 2.17, 2.18, 3.3.2 and the proposed new paragraph 3.4A of the draft Amended Particulars of Claim.

170. The Defendant opposes the application on three grounds. First, it submits that the proposed amendments introduce a new claim under Article 59(8)(b) of the Employment Law that was not brought before the Court within the period prescribed by Article 61(2). Secondly, it submits that the proposed amendments do not adequately plead the constituent elements of such a claim and have no real prospect of success. Thirdly, it submits that the application is procedurally defective because the draft pleading does not comply with the RDC requirements relating to amendments and statements of truth.

I2. Limitation

171. Article 61(2)(a) provides that the Court shall not consider a claim under Part 9 of the Employment Law unless it is brought before the Court within six months of the relevant act or failure to do something to which the complaint relates.

172. The Defendant submits that the proposed reasonable-adjustments claim was not advanced until the Reply, and in substance not until the amendment application itself, by which time the limitation period had expired.

173. That submission depends upon acceptance of the proposition that no complaint of that nature was before the Court when proceedings were commenced.

174. For the reasons already given in Section G, I do not accept that proposition. The Claim Form, Particulars of Claim and Annexures A–W advanced, in substance, a complaint that the Claimant suffered from a disability, that the Defendant was aware of that disability, that he sought accommodation and support in the workplace, and that the Defendant failed adequately to respond. That complaint was therefore before the Court when proceedings were commenced on 25 February 2026.

175. The proposed amendments do not introduce a new factual controversy. They arise from the same alleged disability, the same disclosures, the same requests for support and flexibility, and the same course of conduct relied upon in the original proceedings. In substance, they seek to articulate more expressly a complaint that was already advanced rather than to introduce a wholly distinct claim founded on materially different facts.

176. In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that the amendment application is defeated by Article 61(2). It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether circumstances exist that would justify the exercise of the discretion conferred by Article 61(2)(b).

I3. Sufficiency of the Proposed Pleading

177. The Defendant submits that the proposed amendments fail properly to plead the constituent elements of a claim under Article 59(8)(b). It submits that the proposed pleading does not identify with sufficient precision the relevant physical feature, provision, criterion or practice relied upon, the adjustments alleged to have been required, or the genuine occupational requirement which those adjustments would have enabled the Claimant to satisfy.

178. There is force in that criticism. While the proposed amendments identify the disability relied upon and allege failures by the Defendant to assess, consider, discuss and implement workplace adjustments, they do not presently identify with the degree of precision ordinarily expected in a final statement of case the particular provision, criterion or practice said to have placed the Claimant at a disadvantage, the adjustments said to have been reasonably required, or the occupational requirements to which those adjustments are said to relate.

179. The proposed pleading is framed principally by reference to alleged failures to engage with the Claimant's circumstances rather than by reference to clearly identified workplace provisions, criteria or practices and the adjustments said to have been required in response to them.

180. However, the Court is not presently determining whether the proposed claim should succeed at trial. Nor is the question whether the proposed pleading is in its final and ideal form. The present question is whether the proposed claim is so deficient that it has no real prospect of success and permission to amend should therefore be refused.

181. In my view, that threshold is not met. The proposed amendments identify the disability relied upon, allege knowledge on the part of the Defendant, identify requests for workplace flexibility and support, and allege failures by the Defendant to respond appropriately after becoming aware of the Claimant's condition.

182. The proposed claim is intelligible, legally recognisable and cannot properly be characterised as bound to fail.

183. Moreover, any remaining deficiency is one of particularisation rather than substance. The Court's case-management powers are sufficient to address such deficiencies without refusing permission to amend.

184. The issue is not whether the Defendant has fair notice of the nature of the complaint being advanced. For the reasons given in Section G, I am satisfied that the Defendant has had such notice. The issue is whether the claim should now be articulated with greater precision so that the matters in dispute may be identified more clearly.

185. The appropriate course is to permit the amendment while requiring further particularisation of the matters necessary to define the scope of the Article 59(8)(b) claim and to give the Defendant proper notice of the case it is required to meet. Permission to amend will therefore be granted subject to the amended pleading identifying the disability relied upon, the workplace provision, criterion or practice alleged to have caused disadvantage, the adjustment or adjustments alleged to have been reasonably required, when and how such adjustments were requested or ought reasonably to have been considered, and the genuine occupational requirement to which the alleged adjustments are said to relate.

I4. Procedural Objections

186. The Defendant relies upon a number of procedural deficiencies in the draft Amended Particulars of Claim, including the absence of a statement of truth and non-compliance with the RDC requirements concerning the identification of amendments.

187. I accept that the draft pleading does not fully comply with the procedural requirements identified by the Defendant.

188. However, those deficiencies are matters of form rather than substance. They are readily correctable and do not bear on the underlying merits of the proposed amendments. In the ordinary course, such defects would be remedied before the amended statement of case is filed, pursuant to an order granting permission to amend. I do not regard them as a sufficient basis to refuse the application.

I5. Discretion

189. The Court's overriding objective requires the Court, so far as practicable, to determine the real issues in dispute between the parties. The proposed amendments concern matters that have been in issue between the parties since the commencement of the proceedings and that have already been the subject of substantial evidence and submissions. The Defendant has been aware of the underlying factual allegations from the outset and cannot claim to be taken by surprise by them.

190. While the amendments may require a consequential amendment to the Defence and some additional procedural steps, any resulting prejudice can be adequately addressed by case-management directions and, if appropriate, costs. By contrast, refusal of the application would risk determining the dispute by reference to pleading form rather than substance.

I6. Conclusion on Application No. CFI-011-2026/3

191. I am satisfied that the proposed amendments arise from the same factual matrix as the existing proceedings, are not defeated by Article 61(2), and are not so deficient or unsustainable as to justify refusing permission to amend.

192. Subject to the filing of a revised Amended Particulars of Claim that complies with the RDC requirements concerning statements of truth and the identification of amendments, permission to amend will therefore be granted.

193. The Defendant will have liberty to amend its Defence in response within such period as the Court directs.

J. Disposition

194. For the reasons given above:

K. Costs

195. Practice Direction No. 1 of 2025: Access to Justice in Employment Disputes provides that, in employment disputes, the general rule is that each party bears its own legal costs. The Practice Direction further provides that the Court may depart from that position and make an adverse costs order where:

196. The outcome of the present Applications was mixed. The Defendant succeeded on Application No. CFI-011-2026/1. However, the Defendant was unsuccessful on Application No. CFI-011-2026/2. The Claimant was successful on Application No. CFI- 011-2026/3, although the permission granted is subject to further particularisation and compliance with the RDC requirements identified in these reasons.

197. The Applications raised genuine questions concerning the construction of the Employment Law, pleading, limitation and amendment. None of the Applications can properly be characterised as unreasonable, vexatious or pursued in bad faith. Nor am I presently satisfied that the interests of justice require an immediate departure from the general position contemplated by the Practice Direction.

198. In those circumstances, I do not consider it appropriate to make an immediate order as to costs. Rather, the preferable course is to reserve the question of costs and afford the parties an opportunity to make submissions should either party contend that a different order is warranted.

199. Accordingly, no order is made at this stage as to the costs of the Applications. If either party seeks an order as to costs, that party shall apply in accordance with the directions set out in Section L of these reasons.

L. Orders

200. The Court orders that: