Claim No: CFI 013/2026

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

GREEN COMMUNITY HOLDINGS LIMITED

Claimant

and

(1) MITCHELL WHITE
(2) GRACE ALEXANDRA WHITE

Defendants

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE MARK PELLING

UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Mark Pelling dated 11 May 2026 (the “Order”)

AND UPON the Defendants’ Appeal Notice dated 18 May 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Order (the “PTA Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s submissions in answer dated 2 June 2026;

AND UPON the Defendants’ submission in reply filed without notice on 9 June 2026;

AND UPON the Defendants having failed to comply with r. 44.3(2)(c) and 44.68(2)(a) of the Rules of the DIFC Courts by obtaining a transcript of the ex tempore judgment delivered before making the Order or the earlier ex tempore judgment given when adjourning the claim in order to permit the parties to attempt settlement by negotiation, part of which was incorporated into the judgment leading to the Order.

AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The PTA Application is refused.

2. Before renewing their application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Defendants must first comply with RDC 44.3(2)(c) and 44.68(2)(a).

3. Liberty to the Claimant to apply for an order permitting it to recover its costs of opposing the PTA Application after final determination of any renewed application to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 11 June 2026
At: 11am

1. Permission to appeal is refused on the ground that the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success. Although the Defendants filed a submission in reply to the Claimant’s submissions in answer to the application without permission, I have taken account of the points made in that document.

2. The fundamental point is a short one. The Property the subject of the Claim is owned by the Claimant. By a sale and Purchase agreement made in May 2025 between the Claimant and the Defendants (“SPA”), the Defendants were permitted to occupy the Property pending a series of payments that together were to constitute the purchase price of the Property. It was expressly agreed that the SPA was not a lease. It provided for a series of payments to be made following which the Property would be transferred by the Claimant to the Defendants. The Defendants failed to make the third instalment payment either on time or at all and made no subsequently due payments either. The Claimant served notice in accordance with the terms of the SPA which terminated the SPA. The SPA provided that on termination, the Defendants were to give vacant possession to the Claimant. The Defendants failed to do so.

3. The SPA (Clause 4.3) provided that it was agreed between the parties that the SPA did not constitute a tenancy. The SPA was subject to an entire agreement provision. The Defendants did not suggest otherwise.. There was no contractual entitlement not to pay what was required to be paid under the SPA. There was no obligation to produce the NOC or Liability Letter because those were required only at completion. Completion was never reached because the Defendants ceased paying and the SPA was terminated in accordance with its terms on 17 February 2026. There is no basis on which it could sensibly be contended that the Defendants were entitled to occupy the Property thereafter.

4. The document that the Defendants rely on as a lease (“Purported Lease”) was not relied on at any stage prior to the commencement of proceedings. Given the terms of the SPA and in particular clause 4.3, it is inherently improbable that the Claimant would have intended to create a tenancy that defeated the carefully formulated SPA. The uncontradicted evidence is that the Purported Lease was a sham document produced for the purpose of enabling the First Defendant to obtain a trade licence. That it was obviously sham was apparent from (i) the communications leading to it; (ii) the fact that it provided for a rent of AED 1m that was never paid, tendered for payment or sought to be paid; (iii) the fact that it referred to payment of the supposed rent by 4 cheques that were never provided or chased for by the Claimant, much less presented or paid; (v) the fact that it provided for the payment of a security deposit that was never paid or tender or chased for by the Claimant; and (vi) the payment record the Defendants produced at the hearing, which described the payments that had been made (totalling AED 4,920,000, not the rent supposedly due under Purported Lease) as being for the purchase of the Property and not as rent. In those circumstances, the points made at E2-5 of the Submission in Reply lack all force. At no stage was it suggested that even if the Purported Lease had legal effect, it entitled the Defendants to occupy the Property without paying any sum for its occupation. The points made in Section F of the Submissions in Reply do not assist the Defendants. Aside from the communications there referred to being probably privileged as communications made in an attempt to settle and so are be treated as being without prejudice, it is plain on any fair reading that they are a proposal on behalf of the Claimant that the sums paid under the SPA would be returned subject to the deduction of any sum found due from the Defendants to the Claimant by way of Mesne Profits for occupation by the Defendants of the property down to and/or after termination of the SPA until delivery up of vacant possession. It has nothing to do with whether (as the Defendants assert) the Purported Lease was intended to take effect in accordance with its terms. Section G of the Submission in Reply too is entirely immaterial. The Defendant’s case that they are entitled to continue in occupation notwithstanding the termination of the SPA for non-payment because to order possession was disproportionate is entirely unarguable. Once the SPA was terminated in accordance with its terms the Defendants ceased to have any entitlement to remain in the property without payment. Whether they are entitled to recover any money following termination of the SPA is immaterial to that question. Section H is also entirely immaterial to the issue that arose. The Claimant had to be ready will and able to complete only as and when the purchase price had been paid. The SPA required the Perchance price to be paid in instalments and for termination in the event of nonpayment. As I said earlier, the SPA was terminated before the obligation to complete arose or could haver arisen.

5. In those circumstances, the Claimant demonstrated to the summary judgment standard that the Defendants’ case advanced by reference to the Purported Lease was opportunistic and no more than fanciful and that their occupation of the Property was exclusively pursuant to the SPA.

6. At the hearing, the Defendants (i) admitted failing to pay the third Instalment due under the SPA either as and when it fell due or at all, or any subsequent payment; (ii) the validity of the termination of the SPA; and (iii) that it was expressly agreed that the SPA was not a lease. Following termination of the SPA, the Defendants had no right to occupy the property as a matter of contract nor under any statutory or other rule of general law. The Claimant was entitled to enforce the SPA in accordance with its express terms.

7. There is no statutory or other power available to the DIFC Courts that enables them to determine claims for the possession of residential property other than in accordance with the terms of the agreement the parties have chosen to enter into. In any event, it is difficult to see how any discretion would entitle the court to refuse possession when nothing was being paid for the continued occupation of the Property.

8. Accordingly:

9. The case law referred to by the Defendants is irrelevant to the issues that arose and in any event were not cited to me in the course of the hearing. It is not open to a party that has lost a claim then to seek to reargue it on appeal by reference to points not argued before the CFI.

10. I consider that there is merit in the point that the Defendant should not be permitted to seek permission to appeal without complying with the Order they are seeking permission to appeal from. They are in plain breach of the costs Order I made in circumstances where there was no application for a stay of that part of my order. However, I consider it best that the application for permission be determined on its merits. I also consider there is some merit in the point made by the Claimant concerning the way in which the Appeal Notice has been formulated. However, as I say above, the fundamental point is whether the Defendants have a better than fanciful case that they are entitled to occupy the property by reference to the Purported lease when it is common ground that the SPA has been terminated. That such was the issue is apparent from the Appeal Notice. Permission to appeal is refused because the Defendants have no better than a fanciful case on that issue.

11. I have included the direction at Paragraph 2 of this Order since it would be plainly unfair to the Claimant for the Defendants to seek permission to appeal from the Court of Appeal without placing before that Court the transcripts of the judgment leading to the Order. It will waste time and cause yet further delay if this issue is left to be addressed by the Court of Appeal judge asked to consider giving permission.