Claim No. CFI 018/2026

DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURT

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

PERNELLA

Claimant/Applicant

and

PEARSON

Defendant/Respondent

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE MARK PELLING

UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Mark Pelling dated 19 May 2026 by which the Claimant was ordered to pay the Defendant USD 47,807.51 by 4pm GST on 21 May 2026 (the “Costs Order”)

UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-018-2026/6 dated 20 May 2026 for a stay of, or an extension of time in which to comply with, the Costs Order (the “Application”)

UPON reading (i) the Claimant’s second and third witness statements dated 20 May 2026, (ii) the witness statement of Paisley filed by the Defendant in answer to the Application, (iii) the Claimant's Written Submissions in Reply; (iv) Quinn Emmanuel’s letter to Eversheds Sutherland dated 24 July 2026 (the “QE Letter”) and (v) Evershed Sutherland’s email to the Registry dated 31 July 2026

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The time for the Claimant to pay the Defendant USD 47,807.51 is extended until the earlier of either (i) 4pm (GST) 7 days after completion of the sale of the Claimant’s London property being that referred to in Paragraph 3 of the QE Letter or 4pm (GST) on 17 October 2026.

2. The costs of and occasioned by the Application shall be reserved to be determined at the earlier of the next attended hearing or the first Case management Conference in these proceedings, whichever be sooner.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 8 September 2026
At: 1pm

1. This is an Application for an extension of time in which to pay the Costs Order made as long ago as 19 May 2026. It is common ground that I have a discretion whether to grant the Application. The starting point is that costs orders are made in this jurisdiction on a “pay as you go” basis, just as they are in England and Wales, for the salutary purpose of discouraging unmeritorious applications and defences to applications and mitigating the adverse cost and cash flow effects caused by such applications or defences on successful parties. The other general point that applies is that a defaulting party cannot simply assert financial hardship and provide bank statements but must provide a full and frank disclosure of their entire financial position, including the ability of the defaulting party to raise money from third parties.

2. The evidence that has been filed by the Claimant does not fully satisfy the evidential requirements referred to above essentially for the reasons identified the witness statement of Paisley at paragraph 10-13. It is also apparent that the Claimant has access to money because in paragraph 3 of the QE Letter it is stated on her behalf that if it “… proves necessary for our client to acquire additional liquid funds prior to 15 December 2026, we are instructed that she anticipates being able to do so”. That said, it is clear that (a) she is unemployed; (b) her partner was made redundant by the Defendant; and (c) she has significant childcare responsibilities. It is for those reasons that her preferred method of raising cash is the sale of her London property. In principle that is a reasonable position for her to adopt in the circumstances.

3. However, whilst I accept that it is appropriate for the Claimant to be given a limited opportunity to raise cash by the sale of her property I do not consider that a delay until December is appropriate in light of what her solicitors have said in the QE Letter. For that reason, I have extended time for payment of the Costs Order until the earlier of either the sale of the property or 4pm or 17 October 2026. This will have given the Claimant up to 4 months in which to raise what is a relatively modest sum. In my judgment this strikes a fair balance between the parties competing interests.