(a) the principal sums of EUR 4,218,152.130, USD 135,904.91 and GBP 11,107.90;

(b) Interest at the contractual rates on the principal sums of EUR 107,198.48, USD 3,855,78 and GBP 323.86 from 21 February 2024 until 10 March 2025; and

(c) Interest at a rate of 9% on the principal sums of EUR 379,633.69, USD 16,721,89 and GBP 1,366.73 from 10 March 2025 to the date of this Order.

(a) A Client Agreement (the “DIFC Agreement”) between EFG DIFC and MARJ under which terms were agreed for EFG DIFC to act as an arranger for loan or credit facilities from EFG to MARJ.

(b) A Lombard Credit Agreement (the “Framework Agreement”) between EFG and MARJ arranged by EFG DIFC which:

(i) By clause 3 provided for MARJ to pledge all assets held by EFG pursuant to the Pledge agreement referred to below together with any additional assets securing a Credit Exposure to serve as collateral for any existing or future Credit Exposure including any related interest, commission, fees or costs;

(ii) By clause 7.6 provided for default interest of 10% above EFG’s cost of funding in addition to contractual interest on any amount not paid as they fall due;

(iii) By Clause 11 for it to be an event of default if MARJ violates any terms of the Framework Agreement or the Pledge Agreement and, in particular, fails to honour a margin call with the consequence that EFG’s claims would automatically fall due and entitle EFG to realise the collateral; and

(iv) By Clause 16 that EFG’s core documents included in the account opening forms supplemented the Framework Agreement including EFG’s general terms and conditions

(c) A Pledge agreement (the “Pledge”) under which MARJ pledged to EFG all its existing and future assets under which:

(a) The EUR 12m being reinvested in two identified portfolios with a minimum loan to value ratio of 75%; and

(b) Part of the security to be provided under the Pledge including a bond of Oman Coast Marketing Enterprises LLC with a commitment as set out in clause 7 for the annual coupon to be retained by the Bank and a minimum of a further EUR 5m of liquid and diversified assets to be provided under management within 6 months.

(a) The credit limit being set at EUR 97,500,000 until 7 December 2023 and EUR 90,000,000 thereafter;

(b) Clause 4 providing for two conditions subsequent; and

(c) Clause 6 identifying assets under the Pledge to stand as security but also identifying particular security including UK Gilts with a nominal value of GBP 75m.

(a) The worldwide freezing order was discharged for nondisclosure;

(b) The Respondents were found to be in contempt of Court with Mr Juma being liable for a fine of USD 25,000; and

(c) The Claimants were given liberty to serve and rely on an Amended Particulars of Claim with the Defendants required to file a Defence thereto;

(a) There was no clear case as to the parties and locus standi of EFG given its various corporate names;

(b) EFG DIFC had suffered no loss;

(c) There is no mention of MARJ in the Framework Agreement or Pledge;

(d) No admissions are made as to the enforceability of the Framework Agreement or Pledge under the relevant applicable laws;

(e) The Claimants’ case as to the commencement of the facilities, the sufficiency and nature of the collateral is unparticularized and not admitted;

(f) The Corporate Guarantee is unparticularized and not admitted to be enforceable under the relevant law; and

(g) There was said to be inadequate identification of the alleged credit position, deficiencies in collateral and make up of loss.

(a) Clarified the status and name of EFG;

(b) Corrected certain minor errors in the Amended Particulars of Claim; and

(c) Provided some further details as to how the claim was made up.

(a) The expert opinion of Frederique Bensahel, a Geneva based Swiss lawyer dated 21 May 2025 who gave evidence as to Swiss law supporting the enforceability of the relevant provisions of the Framework Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement under Swiss law; and

(b) The expert opinion of Frances Lok, a senior counsel at the Hong Kong bar, dated 15 May 2025 who gave expert evidence as to Hong Kong law supporting the validity and enforceability of the Corporate Guarantee dated 24 May 2023.

(a) In the event of dispute, this is a case where I would have been inclined to deal with issues of foreign law by way of submission;

(b) There is, in any event, no specific challenge to any particular aspect of the foreign law evidence which seems sensible and straightforward; and

(c) In the circumstances, I accept the matters set out in each of the two identified reports.

(a) That the matter is unsuitable for summary determination as there are a series of complex issues going to:

(b) That in relation to the test for immediate judgment, citing well known authorities:

(c) That, as set out in the Defence, there is no clear or coherent case as to the relationship between EFG, EFG DIFC, EFG Bank SA, EFG Bank Ltd, EFG Bank AG and “the Bank” as set out in the contractual documents;

(d) That there is no clear statement as to the role of EFG DIFC and the alleged agreements were entered into by different entities;

(e) That there is a dispute as to the ambit of the personal guarantee of Mr Juma;

(f) That the case on the Corporate Guarantee is unparticularized with enforceability under Hong Kong law contested including the requirement for demand and the validity of service;

(g) That the case on the alleged shortfall is contested with a particular point being taken about an alleged USD 13.5m receipt which is said not to be identified in EFG’s calculations and nothing suggesting a specific cause of the alleged shortfall;

(h) That the Claimants’ own Swiss law evidence demonstrates the need for a trial given that it relies on assumptions and that it demonstrates the requirement for EFG not to breach its duty of good faith or act in a way which constitutes an abuse of law or power;

(i) That the account transactions and details are all within EFG’s knowledge and power and require to be produced;

(j) That there is a triable issue as to Hong Kong law where a relevant envelope was returned undelivered;

(k) That the fraud allegations require trial;

(l) That the procedural history whereby the Worldwide Freezing Order was set aside means that the Court should exercise caution; and

(m) That the Defendants should be able to respond to the expert evidence of foreign law

“In GFH Capital Limited v Haigh [2014] DIFC CFI 020 at [9] [I/10/3739], Justice Giles referred to a series of well-established principles restated in JSC v VTB Bank v Shuurkbin [2014] EWHC 271 at [15] [I/6/3665], for the Court to consider when determining an application for immediate judgment. The principles relevant to this application are:

13.1 The Court must consider whether the defendant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success. A realistic prospect of success is one that carries some degree of conviction and not one that is merely arguable, but the must avoid conducting a mini-trial without disclosure and oral evidence.

13.2 The Court need not take everything a party says at face value and without analysis. In some cases, it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if they are contradicted by contemporaneous documents and contemporary activity: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [10] [I/2/2900]; Nest Investments Holding Lebanon SAL v Deloitte & Touche (M.E.) [2018] DIFC CFI 027 (12 February 2018) at [22 (v)-(vi)] [I/12/3756].

13.3 The Court must also consider not only the evidence placed before it, but also all the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial. There will usually be a compelling reason for trial when there are circumstances that ought to be investigated.

13.4 A defence must be supported by evidence. It is not sufficient for a defendant to just advance assertions or speculative arguments (Bank of Singapore at [86] [I/20/3932]). A defence which is wholly unsupported, speculative or contradicted by incontrovertible documents should be characterised as fanciful and therefore cannot meet the required threshold to resist immediate judgment5 [I/27/4159]

14 Where an application for immediate judgment is based on a point of law (including a question of construction of a document), “if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it”: Nest Investments at [22] (vii)”

(a) The fact that EFG DIFC claims no relief in respect of the Application for Immediate Judgment is irrelevant to the application made by EFG;CommentHighlight

(b) It does, at first sight, seem strange that the same corporate entity should call itself variously EFG SA, EFG AG and EFG Limited;

(c) Once, however, the Zurich commercial registry (which is public) and the articles of association of EFG are examined (also public), it is apparent that EFG is entitled to entitle itself by any of those names;

(d) Read with that knowledge, there is no doubt as to the identity of “the Bank” in the contractual documents. It is EFG.

(e) There is equally little doubt as to how the various commercial documents to which I have referred “fit together" once the common identity of EFG under its various different names is established;

(f) The Defendants made no attempt, after the identification of the relevant documents by EFG, to identify how this analysis is incorrect or what remaining doubt there was said to be.

(a) It has been produced in the evidence;

(b) A Hong Kong law opinion has been produced identifying and dealing with its validity and any issues as to service even in circumstances where the demand was returned;

(c) No positive case is put forward whether by way of evidence or submission as to why the Opinion is wrong;

(d) The Defendants have had a full opportunity to put in such evidence or submissions setting out why it is said that the guarantee is ineffective but have not done so; and

(e) I consider it plain that it is valid up to its stated amount which exceeds the sums claimed under it.

(a) Full details of the relevant account transactions have been produced and are available to the Defendants;

(b) The Defendants are in a position where they could identify, if they wished, any specific matters or issues with the calculations but, with one exception which I deal with below, have not done so;

(c) It is entirely unclear what further documents, if any, could possibly be produced which would assist with further identification of the sums claimed; and

(d) Mr Sandila’s seventh witness statement dealt with the circumstances and events identifying the make-up of the claim and produced the appropriate documents but has not been replied to.

(a) A very large number of documents including account transactions and statements have been produced;

(b) The Defendants have not identified anything of substance which is missing, and which could reasonably be expected to be produced; and

(c) The Defendants can be expected, from the documents which have been produced, to identify any specific matters which cast doubt upon the case against them but have not done so.

(a) I do not accept that the Defendants have been denied any opportunity put forward any evidence or submissions as to any relevant foreign law;

(b) It is true that the fraud allegations would require a trial but they are not relied on in support of this Application for Immediate Judgment; and

(c) The Court is aware of the relevant procedural history of this matter but does not consider that it has any material impact on the substance of the Application for Immediate Judgment.

(a) The sums claimed are very large and it is realistically impossible to assess what hours are being claimed for what tasks;

(b) Although it would be preferable to do a summary assessment, there is too great a risk of injustice to one or other party in undertaking such a task; and

(c) Given the limited nature of this Application, the remaining issues and the previous procedural history, there are likely to be real issues as to what hours relate to what sums.

(a) In relation to the disbursements, the only question is, I consider as to filing fees which may not relate in whole or part to this Application;

(b) As to lawyer’s hours:

(c) The Application itself took substantially less than half a day;

(d) In the circumstances I do not consider that it is safe to award more than 40% of the claimed lawyers’ costs by way of an interim payment; and

(e) Rounding down slightly, I consider the appropriate interim payment to be USD 240,000.