July 02, 2026 court of first instance - Orders
Claim No. CFI 036/2025
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
STEPHAN KARL MORGENSTERN
Claimant
and
SAIF SULTAN AL MEHRZI LAWYERS & LEGAL CONSULTANCY
Defendant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE ROGER STEWART
UPON the Part 7 Claim Form filed on 2 April 2025 and the Amended Claim Form filed on 23 April 2025 (the “Claim”)
AND UPON the Judgment of H.E. Justice Roger Stewart dated 20 May 2026 (the “Judgment”)
AND UPON the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 10 June 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “PTA Application”) and a stay of enforcement of the entire Judgment pursuant to Rule 44.4 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) (the “Stay Application”, together the “Application”)
AND UPON the Claimant’s submissions in opposition dated 30 June 2026
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The PTA Application is dismissed.
2. The Stay Application is dismissed.
3. If the Claimant wishes to seek his costs of the Application, he is to identify the sums sought with a brief schedule and submissions not exceeding 2 pages, by no later than 7 days from the date of this Order.
4. The Defendant may respond to the above within 7 days of service of the costs submissions
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 2 July 2026
At: 9am
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
1. This is an Application for permission to appeal and for a stay of my Judgment dated 20 May 2026.
2. The PTA Application is said to be made pursuant to RDC 44.8. This Rule permits the lower Court to refer an application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
3. Where, as is the case here for reasons which I set out below, a lower Court is minded to dismiss an application for permission to appeal, it may well be appropriate to exercise the power under RDC 44.8 so as to limit costs.
4. In this case, I consider it appropriate to give brief reasons for dismissing this Application, as it seems to me that it is at least possible that the reasons may be of assistance to the Court of Appeal if a renewed application for permission is made.
5. So far as permission to appeal is concerned, the Application is brought on the basis that the proposed appeal has a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, “namely to prevent a manifest injustice arising from the sanctioning of double recovery”.
6. In the Application, the Defendant:
(a) asserts in paragraph 11 that, on 29 January 2026, “The Sharjah Execution Judge issues a definitive order in the onshore proceedings, approving the disbursement of the full deposited amount of AED 385,350 to the respondent’s attorney. This effectively satisfies and extinguishes the debt related to the cheque”
(b) says in paragraph 12 that the Judgment was for the full amount claimed, “including the AED 385,350 that had already been recovered in Sharjah”
(c) claims in paragraph 13 that the Court “was presented with evidence regarding the onshore execution proceedings. However, the Judge misapprehended the finality and effect of those proceedings”;
(d) asserts in paragraph 15 that the sum of AED 385,350 had already been paid and disbursed via a competent court order in another jurisdiction”; and
(e) produces as exhibits to the Application certified and translated copies of the Sharjah Execution File and what is said to be the “Final Disbursement Order from the Sharjah Execution Judge dated 29 January 2026”.
7. I consider that the Application is being brought on a fundamentally false basis.
8. First, the Defendant is contending that it was its case below that there had been a partial discharge of the sum claimed. That was not its case. To the contrary, it was its case that enforcement of the cheque had been cancelled. Thus, paragraph 20 of the Defence at page 51 of the trial bundle stated:
“The amount AED 385,350 was issued/held as a security cheque, not a fee paid absolutely. This is evidenced by the Defendants’ receipt/correspondence and by a Dubai Courts order in Case No. 2475/2025 cancelling enforcement of that cheque. While a non-DIFC decision, it is persuasive factual evidence of the cheque’s nature”
9. Whilst the Defence was dated 17 September 2025, there was no application to amend the Defence. Further:
(a) The list of issues agreed by the Defendant did not suggest that the cheque’s proceeds had been disbursed;
(b) The Defendant’s skeleton argument for trial made no such suggestion; and
(c) There was no oral submission that the cheque’s proceeds had been disbursed.
10. Secondly, the Application suggests that the Sharjah Execution file was misunderstood by the Court. However, that material was not provided to the Court and was not contained in the Court bundle. No application to introduce new evidence has been made.
11. Thirdly, the documents now attached to the PTA Application do not support the assertion that the proceeds of the cheque have been disbursed. In fact, those documents appear to show:
(a) that there was a freeze on execution on 22 September 2025 (page 22) – although the amount shown as frozen was described as “0.00”;
(b) that there was an authorization for disbursement on 29 January 2026 (page 19);
(c) that, for whatever reason, this authorization was not complied with, so that a further application was made on 12 February 2026 (page 17);
(d) that that application was rejected on 17 February 2026 (page 18).
12. The documents thus strongly support the fact that the Claimant had not received the proceeds of the cheque. This was entirely consistent with the discussion which took place at trial and is reflected in the transcript which the Claimant has produced. As the transcript made clear, the discussion took place not on the basis that the proceeds of the cheque had already been recovered, but rather on the basis that there were two actions – the present one and the claim on the cheque, with the Claimant having received money from neither.
13. If, as the Defendant now suggests, the proceeds of the cheque had already been disbursed, it is inconceivable that the Defendant’s counsel would not have made that clear to the Court if those had been her instructions.
14. The Claimant accepted (as it had to) that it was not entitled to double recovery. That does not, however, preclude the issue of a judgment for the entire underlying amount – as the Judgment makes clear.
15. The above matters demonstrate that the proposed appeal has no prospect of success. Further, there is no basis for a stay. Even if there was some arguable ground as to AED 385,350, there would be no basis for a stay of the entire sum.
16. I regret to say that I consider this Application appears to bear the hallmarks of a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court.
17. I have not been addressed on costs. My present view is that the Claimant is entitled to its costs on an indemnity basis. I have accordingly made an order for the determination of any issues as to costs on the basis of written submissions.
