Case No. CFI 038/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

BGC BROKERS LP

Claimant/Applicant

and

ADAM TILLMAN

Defendant/Respondent

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE

UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-038-2025/2 dated 12 February 2026, seeking document production (the “Claimant’s Document Production Application”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere dated 17 July 2026 determining the Claimant's Document Production Application and directing that the issue of costs be determined following written submissions from the parties

AND UPON the parties’ submissions on costs dated 24 and 31 July 2026

AND FURTHER TO DIFC Courts’ Practice Direction No. 1 of 2025 (“PD 1/2025”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT pursuant to paragraph 3.1 of PD 1/2025, each party shall bear its own costs of the Claimant's Document Production Application.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 21 August 2026
At: 2pm

A. Introduction

1. By Order dated 17 July 2026, the Court determined the Claimant's application for document production and directed that the issue of costs be determined following written submissions from the parties.

2. The Claimant seeks an order that the Defendant pay the costs of the application, immediately assessed in the sum of USD 171,332.40 or such other amount as the Court considers appropriate. The Defendant contends that the proceeding is an employment claim within the meaning of Practice Direction No. 1 of 2025 ("PD 1/2025") and that the appropriate order is that each party bear its own costs.

3. The principal issue is whether the Court should depart from the general costs position applicable to employment claims under PD 1/2025. That requires consideration of:

B. Applicable Costs Principles

B1. Practice Direction No. 1 of 2025

4. The parties accept that the proceeding is an employment claim within the meaning of Practice Direction No. 1 of 2025 ("PD 1/2025"). The underlying claim arises out of an alleged breach of an employment contract. The fact that some issues involve contractual principles and the enforceability of a liquidated damages provision does not alter the essential character of the proceeding as an employment claim.

5. Paragraph 3.1 of PD 1/2025 provides that, in employment claims, each party bears its own costs. The Practice Direction therefore departs from the ordinary rule in civil litigation that costs generally follow the event.

6. Paragraph 3.2 confers a discretion on the Court to depart from that position in specified circumstances, including where a party has conducted the proceedings unreasonably or where it is otherwise in the interests of justice to make a costs order.

B2. The relevance of the English Authorities

7. The Defendant relies upon a number of English authorities concerning costs in employment proceedings, including ET Marler Ltd v Robertson [1974] ICR 72, Gee v Shell UK Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1479, Lodwick v Southwark London Borough Council [2004] IRLR 554, Salinas v Bear Stearns International Holdings Inc [2005] ICR 1117, Yerrakalva v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2012] ICR 420; [2011] EWCA Civ 1255, Robinson v Hall Gregory Recruitment Ltd [2014] ICR 1057 and Radia v Jefferies International Ltd UKEAT/0007/18/LA.

8. Those decisions were made under statutory costs regimes governing Employment Tribunals in England and Wales. Although that legislation is not identical to PD 1/2025, both regimes are founded on the proposition that parties to employment disputes will ordinarily bear their own costs and that a costs order requires justification by reference to recognised exceptions.

9. The English authorities therefore provide useful guidance on the policy underlying a specialist employment costs regime. In particular, the observations in Yerrakalva and Lodwick that costs awards in employment proceedings are exceptional rather than routine are consistent with the structure of PD 1/2025.

10. However, those authorities are not binding on the DIFC Courts and cannot displace the language of PD 1/2025. The Court's task is to construe and apply the Practice Direction according to its own terms. English authorities may assist in understanding the rationale of an employment costs regime, but they do not determine the meaning or operation of paragraph 3.2.

11. Accordingly, the English authorities are persuasive but not controlling. They support the proposition that success alone will not ordinarily justify a costs order in an employment dispute. Whether a departure from the general rule is warranted depends on the proper application of paragraph 3.2 of PD 1/2025 to the facts of the present case.

C. The Result of the Application

C1. The Claimant was the more successful party

12. The parties disagree as to the proper characterisation of the outcome of the document production application. The Claimant submits that it was the successful party because it obtained orders for production in relation to most of the categories sought and secured the principal relief sought by the application. The Defendant accepts that the Claimant achieved a measure of success but submits that the result was mixed, emphasising that one request was refused entirely and a number of other requests were substantially narrowed.

13. In my view, the overall outcome of the application favoured the Claimant. The Court ordered production for most of the categories sought. Although a number of requests were narrowed and Request 11 was refused, the Claimant obtained orders requiring the Defendant to produce documents in respect of most of the categories at issue.

14. I do not accept, however, that the Defendant was wholly unsuccessful. The Defendant succeeded in resisting Request 11 in its entirety and succeeded in obtaining limitations to the scope of a number of other requests. The Court accepted aspects of the Defendant's submissions concerning relevance, proportionality and scope and modified several of the requests accordingly. Those outcomes were substantive and not merely cosmetic.

15. Nevertheless, viewed overall, the Claimant obtained the principal relief sought by the application. The application was brought to obtain orders for document production and, in substance, that relief was granted in relation to the overwhelming majority of the categories pursued. The fact that certain requests were narrowed does not alter the essential character of the result.

16. I therefore accept that the Claimant was the more successful party on the application. To the extent that the outcome is relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion on costs, that consideration weighs in the Claimant's favour.

17. However, for the reasons set out above, the Claimant’s greater success does not determine the costs issue. The proceeding is an employment claim to which PD 1/2025 applies. The question remains whether there is a sufficient basis under paragraph 3.2 of the Practice Direction to depart from the general rule that each party bears its own costs.

D. Whether the Defendant conducted the proceedings unreasonably

D1. The Claimant's Submissions

18. The Claimant submits that the Defendant conducted the proceedings unreasonably by opposing most of the requests on grounds of relevance, materiality and proportionality that were ultimately rejected. The Claimant further submits that the Defendant advanced allegations of collateral purpose which were not accepted and thereby caused the Claimant to incur unnecessary costs. The Claimant contends that the extent of its success demonstrates the unreasonableness of the Defendant's opposition.

D2. The Defendant's Submissions

19. The Defendant submits that the objections advanced were reasonably arguable and raised legitimate issues concerning relevance, proportionality, confidentiality and scope. The Defendant relies on the fact that Request 11 was refused and that several other requests were narrowed following acceptance of aspects of the Defendant's submissions. The Defendant contends that lack of success is not synonymous with unreasonable conduct and that PD 1/2025 requires more than identifying which party was ultimately more successful.

D3. Assessment

20. I am not satisfied that the Defendant conducted the proceedings unreasonably within the meaning of paragraph 3.2 of PD 1/2025.

21. The fact that many of the Defendant's objections were unsuccessful does not of itself establish unreasonable conduct. Litigation commonly involves contested questions upon which reasonable minds may differ. A party does not act unreasonably merely because its arguments are ultimately rejected.

22. In the present case, the Defendant's objections were not devoid of merit. Request 11 was refused entirely and a number of other requests were narrowed following acceptance of the Defendant's submissions concerning relevance, proportionality and scope. Those outcomes demonstrate that the Defendant's position was reasonably arguable and achieved a measure of success.

23. Nor am I persuaded that the Defendant acted unreasonably by advancing arguments concerning confidentiality, commercial sensitivity or alleged collateral purpose. Whilst I did not accept all of those submissions, I am not satisfied that it was unreasonable for them to be advanced.

24. The application raised genuine disputes concerning the relevance and scope of production. It was not a case in which the Defendant simply refused production of plainly relevant documents without any arguable basis for doing so.

25. Taking the Defendant's conduct as a whole, I am not satisfied that it acted unreasonably in resisting the application. The Claimant has therefore failed to establish a basis for departing from the general rule under paragraph 3.2 on that ground.

E. Whether it is otherwise in the interests of justice to depart from the default position

E1. The Claimant's Submissions

26. The Claimant submits that, even if the Defendant did not conduct the proceedings unreasonably, the Court should nevertheless depart from the general rule under paragraph 3.1 of PD 1/2025 because it is in the interests of justice to do so.

27. The Claimant relies on the extent of its success on the application, the fact that the Defendant opposed most of the requests, the commercial nature and significance of the dispute, the Defendant's alleged indemnification by JB Drax, and the fact that the application became necessary after attempts to obtain voluntary production proved unsuccessful.

E2. The Defendant's Submissions

28. The Defendant submits that the matters relied upon by the Claimant amount to little more than an assertion that the Claimant was the more successful party. The Defendant contends that success alone is insufficient to justify departure from the costs regime established by PD 1/2025.

29. The Defendant further submits that the commercial significance of the dispute and any indemnification arrangements are not matters identified in PD 1/2025 as a basis for departing from the general rule. The Defendant also submits that the objections raised in the application were reasonably arguable and that genuine disputes existed concerning relevance, proportionality and scope.

E3. Assessment

30. I accept that the Claimant was the more successful party on the application and that the application was brought after attempts to obtain production voluntarily. Those matters weigh in the Claimant's favour.

31. However, I am not persuaded that they justify departure from the general rule established by paragraph 3.1 of PD 1/2025. As noted above, the Practice Direction adopts a specialist costs regime under which parties ordinarily bear their own costs. If substantial success alone were sufficient to engage the interests of justice exception, the general rule would frequently be displaced and its practical effect significantly diminished.

32. Nor do I consider that the commercial significance of the dispute warrants a different conclusion. Although substantial sums may be involved, the proceeding remains an employment claim to which PD 1/2025 applies. The Practice Direction does not distinguish between employment claims according to their value or commercial importance.

33. Likewise, I do not regard the Defendant's alleged indemnification by JB Drax as providing a principled basis for departing from the default position. The source of a party's litigation funding is not a matter identified in PD 1/2025 as relevant to the exercise of the discretion conferred by paragraph 3.2.

34. It is also relevant that the Defendant's opposition was reasonably arguable and achieved some success. The Court refused Request 11 and accepted submissions which resulted in several requests being narrowed. The application therefore involved genuine disputes requiring judicial determination.

35. The Claimant's reliance on Jonathan Lau v Qashio Holding Company Ltd and others helps demonstrate that the Claimant was the more successful party. However, that decision was not concerned with PD 1/2025 and does not determine whether the interests of justice require a departure from the costs regime applicable to employment claims.

36. Considering all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the matters relied upon by the Claimant, whether individually or collectively, justify departing from the general rule in paragraph 3.1 of PD 1/2025.

F. Conclusion on Costs

37. The Claimant was the more successful party on the document production application. The Claimant obtained orders for production in relation to the substantial majority of the categories sought and achieved, in substance, the principal relief for which it applied.

38. However, this proceeding is an employment claim to which PD 1/2025 applies. The starting point under that Practice Direction is that each party bears its own costs. The Court may depart from that position only where a basis for doing so is established under paragraph 3.2.

39. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the Defendant conducted the proceedings unreasonably. The Defendant advanced objections that were reasonably arguable and achieved a measure of success, including the refusal of Request 11 and the narrowing of several categories of production.

40. Nor am I satisfied that the interests of justice require departure from the general rule. While the Claimant's success on the application is a relevant consideration, the other matters relied upon by the Claimant do not, whether individually or collectively, justify displacing the costs regime established by PD 1/2025.

41. Standing back and considering the matter as a whole, I am not persuaded that this is a case in which the Court should depart from the default position applicable to employment claims.

42. The appropriate order is therefore that each party bear its own costs of the Claimant's document production application.

G. Order

43. Pursuant to paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction No. 1 of 2025, each party shall bear its own costs of the Claimant's application for document production determined by the Court's Order and Reasons dated 17 July 2026.