Claim No: CFI 040/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

(1) TRAFIGURA PTE LTD
(2) TRAFIGURA INDIA PVT LTD

Claimants

and

(1) MR PRATEEK GUPTA
(2) MS GINNI GUPTA

Defendants

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ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE ROBERT FRENCH

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UPON the Court of Appeal’s Order in CA-001-2025, dated 26 April 2025, granting the Claimants’ without notice application for a freezing injunction and ancillary orders against the Defendants (the “DIFC FO”), as continued by the Order of the Court of Appeal dated 22 September 2025

AND UPON the Claimants’ Application No. CFI-040-2025/3 dated 21 October 2025 (the “Variation Application”), seeking (1) additional disclosure by the Defendants relating to the assets in Schedule D of the DIFC FO (the “Schedule D Assets”) (the “Additional Disclosure Application”); (2) variation of the terms of Schedule D of the DIFC FO (the “Schedule D Variation Application”); and (3) disclosure by the Defendants as to the source of their legal funding (the “Source of Legal Funding Application”)

AND UPON the Claimants’ Application No. CFI-040-2024/4 dated 31 October 2025 for interim relief pending the determination of the Variation Application (the “Interim Relief Application”)

AND UPON hearing counsel for the Claimants at the Interim Relief Application hearing before H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke on 5 November 2025, with the Defendants not attending

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke dated 5 November 2025 in relation to the Interim Relief Application (the “5 November Order”) and the same being served on the Defendants by email on 5 November 2025

AND UPON the Second Defendant serving her third witness statement on 18 February 2026 (“Gupta 3”)

AND UPON the Claimants amending the order sought pursuant to the Additional Disclosure Application in the light of the matters set out in Gupta 3 by an amended draft order provided with their Skeleton Argument dated 19 February 2026

AND UPON the Defendants by their Skeleton Argument dated 19 February 2026 arguing that the 5 November Order should be discharged

AND UPON hearing counsel for the Claimants and counsel for the Defendants at the Application Hearing before H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin on 23 February 2026 (the “23 February 2026 Hearing”)

AND UPON the Applicants not pursuing the Source of Legal Funding Application at the 23 February 2026 Hearing on the basis that it was a matter which was going to go before the Court in London on 26 February 2026

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin dated 24 February 2026

AND UPON the Application Hearing listed before H.E. Justice Robert French on 18 and 19 June 2026 (the “Adjourned Variation Application Hearing”)

AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

A. On the Variation Application dated 21 October 2025:

B. 1. The reference to the Applicants and the Respondents in the Varied Order is a reference to the Claimants and the Defendants in this proceeding.

C. On the Second Defendant’s Discharge Application:

D. 1. Costs are to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

E. The Parties are at liberty to agree a revised Minute of the DIFC FO as varied by these Orders omitting provisions which have become redundant.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 9 September 2026
At: 10am

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

The Applications before the Court

1. There are three applications for decision before the Court. The first two are sought by an application filed by the Claimants on 21 October 2025.

Further context to these Applications is provided by reference to the procedural history including the origins of the litigation in English proceedings which have resulted in a substantial money judgment against the First Defendant and a freezing order against assets of the Second Defendant in the nature of a Chabra Order on the basis that they were arguably assets which could be subject to the enforcement of the money judgment against the First Defendant.

Procedural history

2. The Applications before the Court have their origins in proceedings in the High Court in England (the “English Proceedings”) against the First Defendant and seven others who are not defendants in proceedings in this Court. The First and Second Defendants in the proceedings in this Court are husband and wife. The Second Defendant is not a defendant in the English Proceedings. Both reside in onshore Dubai but not in the Dubai International Financial Centre (“DIFC”).

3. The English Proceedings, which were commenced in 2023, sought substantive relief in relation to a fraud allegedly perpetrated on the Claimants by the First Defendant and his companies. Worldwide freezing orders and proprietary injunctions were obtained in the English court in support of those proceedings.

4. On 30 January 2026, the English Commercial Court awarded the Claimants relief including orders requiring the First Defendant and his companies to pay sums totalling more than USD 700 million — an amount which included damages, interest and indemnity costs.

5. When they issued the English Proceedings, the Claimants applied for a Worldwide Freezing Order (“English WFO”) from the English court against the defendants in those proceedings, including the First Defendant in this matter.

6. On 8 February 2023, Mr Justice Foxton granted the English WFO sought following an ex parte hearing (the “Foxton Order”). The English WFO was continued at the on-notice return date hearing before Justice Bright on 24 February 2023 (the “Bright Order”). There was an unsuccessful application to discharge the English WFO for alleged breach by the Claimants of the duty of full and frank disclosure.

7. On 21 April 2023, the Claimants applied in the English Proceedings for a worldwide freezing order against the Second Defendant in these proceedings on the basis that they had reason to believe that she was holding assets on behalf of the First Defendant which could be available for enforcement if the Claimants were successful in England. The application was based on the Court’s ‘Chabra jurisdiction’ in respect of certain of her assets. An ex parte order was granted initially on 25 April 2023 (the “Chabra Order”), continued on 19 May 2023 and thereafter on 6 June 2023. The so-called ‘Chabra jurisdiction’ is in truth a power — enunciated in TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra (1992) 1 WLR 231. Disclosure orders were made in October 2023. The assets disclosure process was said to have shown that the Defendants have a significant asset base in Dubai but that the assets are likely to be held by the Second Defendant in her name.

8. The Claimants then sought a UAE-wide freezing order against the Defendants in the DIFC Court of First Instance (“DIFC CFI”) along with an ancillary disclosure order which they intended to enforce before the Onshore Dubai Courts. This relief was said to be in support of the English Proceedings. In making their application the Claimants relied on disclosures provided by the Defendants in the English Proceedings.

9. The ex parte application for a freezing order and associated disclosure orders was rejected by H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani on 17 April 2025.

10. Permission to appeal against that order was granted by His Excellency on 21 April 2025.

11. The Court of Appeal on 26 April 2025, allowed the Claimants’ appeal in relation to the ex parte application. It made the orders sought ex parte in the first instance and then adjourned the appeal to a hearing on notice. On the adjourned appeal on 2 September 2025, the Court ordered that the freezing orders which it had originally made on 26 April 2025 (the “DIFC FO”) after the ex parte hearing, should be continued.

12. In addition to the freezing and disclosure orders, the Court of Appeal ordered that:

13. Paragraph 18 of the DIFC FO provided:

14. The Claimants lodged an application on 21 October 2025 seeking additional disclosure by the Second Defendant in connection with the potential sale of units at Platinum Tower and a specified villa. They also sought variation of the terms of the Chabra Order.

15. A further application was made by the Claimants on 31 October 2025 for an interim order requiring that the Second Defendant not dispose of or otherwise deal with or diminish the value of the villa. They also sought an order requiring the Second Defendant to serve on their legal representatives copies of any agreement entered into in relation to that villa.

16. On 5 November 2025, the Claimants’ Variation Application was heard by H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke. The Defendants did not appear at that hearing.

17. At the hearing the Claimants sought permission to amend their Variation Application so that the Second Defendant would be restrained from disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of any assets referred to in paragraph 10 of the DIFC FO, including those referred to in Confidential Schedule D of the DIFC FO on an interim basis pending the determination of that application.

18. His Excellency Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke made an interim injunction order restraining the Second Defendant from disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of any of the assets referred to in paragraph 10 of the DIFC FO, including the Confidential Schedule D assets.

19. The Second Defendant was required, within six days of service of the Interim Injunction Order to provide further specified information and documentation to the Claimants. The deadline for them to serve evidence in answer to the application was extended on 19 December 2025 until 4pm on 5 January 2026.

20. In February 2026, the Defendants had a change of legal representation.

21. On 24 February 2026, the Chief Justice made orders in relation to various aspects of the Variation Application and providing for the Second Defendant to make and an application for a discharge of the Interim Order made by H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke.

22. On 16 March 2026, the Claimants filed a Further Notice of Application for an order for further information in relation to Schedule D assets and for an amendment to the Variation Application as follows:

23. On 9 April 2026, H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin made a number of orders extending the timetable. The adjourned Variation Application hearing which had been listed for 14 April 2026 was relisted to be heard over two days, on the first dates convenient to the parties and any judge of the Court after 6 May 2026. In the meantime, the Order of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke dated 5 November 2025 was continued. The Claimants were to take no further steps to enforce the 5 November Order in the Dubai Courts.

24. In the event, Applications for Variation of the Freezing Order, for its discharge and for disclosure of information relating to the funding of the Second Defendant’s legal representation came before the Court for hearing on 18 and 19 June 2026.

25. By the time the Applications came before the Court, a substantial body of evidence and other materials had been filed, including a number of witness statements, expert evidence on UAE Law and two forensic accountancy reports. The Court was assisted by comprehensive and thoughtful submissions put by Counsel for both parties at the hearing of the Applications which extended over two full hearing days.

The English Proceedings — the Chabra Order

26. The Application by the Claimants for a worldwide freezing order and related relief against the Second Defendant was made in the English Proceedings in April 2023. It was supported by an affidavit of Joseph Francis O’Keeffe, a partner in the firm of Stephenson Harwood LLP, representing the Claimants and annexing various documents.¹

27. The affidavit set out a history of the alleged fraud the subject of the proceedings — the allegation being that the defendants in those proceedings had procured the Claimants to pay in excess of $534 million for multiple consignments of containerised cargoes that were represented in contractual and shipping documents as LME-grade nickel, but which turned out to be consignments of less valuable commodities.²

28. The affidavit stated the Claimants’ belief that the First Defendant was the controlling mind of the other defendants in the English Proceedings.

29. A worldwide freezing order and proprietary injunctions in respect of payments made by the Claimants to the third to eighth defendants in the English Proceedings had been made by the Foxton Order and continued by the Bright Order subject to minor amendments.

30. Various other freezing orders against various of the defendants in other jurisdictions had been obtained and orders directed to the defendants’ bankers.

31. The defendants provided asset disclosure and proprietary disclosure pursuant to the Foxton Order.

32. The Claimants did not accept the adequacy of those disclosures provided by the defendants which were said to demonstrate that they claimed not to have assets worth anything like the value of the Proprietary Payments, which totalled some $350 million.³ The affidavit then stated that it was the Claimants’ position that there was good reason to suppose that the Second Defendant, Mrs Gupta, held assets “that may be beneficially the property of the First Defendant, and that those assets may therefore be available to satisfy Trafigura’s claims against the First Defendant if established at trial.”⁴

33. The affidavit then set out the results of investigations undertaken by the Claimants. In summary they involved the following contentions:

34. The deponent offered the inference that the Second Defendant’s investment in Silver Star SP2 represented a substantial investment and referred to press statements from the Central Bank of Mauritius and reports in the Mauritian Press which suggested that the Second Defendant owns 75% of Silver Bank.⁸

35. The affidavit referred to payment of the first to fifth defendants’ legal fees by the Second Defendant. It was said to be apparent that the Second Defendant had sufficient cash or other liquid assets available to spend considerable sums on the legal fees of the defendants in the English Proceedings. A letter from the First Defendant’s representatives on 18 April 2023 confirmed that the Second Defendant’s funds had effectively been provided as an interest free loan by her to her husband who would repay the loan when he was able to do so.⁹

36. The affidavit then considered the First Defendant’s assertions concerning his wife’s affairs and his statement that she is independently wealthy. The deponent contended that it was not likely that the Second Defendant was the beneficiary of sufficient family wealth to account for her ownership of the assets described in the affidavit. Nor was it likely that her salary as Head of Human Resources with the UD Group would be sufficient to explain her independent ownership of assets of such high value. On that basis, the Claimants contended that “there is good reason to suppose that [the Second Defendant] has acquired these assets using the First Defendant’s wealth, such that these assets are beneficially the property of the First Defendant.”¹⁰

37. Reference was made to “substantial assets” owned by the Second Defendant against which a freezing order could take effect, including Villa K-01 referred to above and her shares in a company which is a limited partner shareholder.¹¹ The affidavit sought permission to serve the application on the Second Defendant out of the jurisdiction, the existence of a risk of dissipation of her assets was said to be inextricably connected with the proposition that she was holding them for the First Defendant. The Claimants ultimate parent company, Trafigura Group Pte Ltd offered the normal undertaking in damages.

38. On 25 April 2023, His Honour Judge Pelling KC read the affidavit and accepted the undertakings and made a freezing order against the Second Defendant in respect of:

39. The Order required that the Second Defendant, within four working days of service of the Order, inform the Claimants’ solicitors of all of her assets worldwide exceeding £50,000 in value and any assets falling within that which she had disposed of since the date of the Order. Provision was made for any party served or notified of the Order to be able to apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge the Order or so much of it as affected that person. The Claimants were given permission to join the Second Defendant as a defendant in the English Proceedings solely for the purpose of their Application for Chabra relief.

40. In his Judgment published on 25 April 2023, Justice Pelling KC identified the application before him as an application for a ‘Chabra Order’:

41. Initially the Judge took the view that it was appropriate to deal with the matter on a without notice basis subject to the usual protections. The applicable principles for the grant of a Chabra Order were identified in the following terms:

42. His Honour identified the applicable test as:

Lord Justice Millett was also quoted for the observation that:

43. His Honour referred to a primary submission made that there should be a maximum sum order made against the Second Defendant on the basis that the two assets identified satisfied the Chabra test and that it followed that the Court should infer that all assets held by her were to be treated as having satisfied that test. Justice Pelling said:

44. In the event having reviewed the evidence, Justice Pelling was satisfied that “there is a good reason to suppose that [the Second Defendant] is holding relevant assets, being the villa and being the shares.” (sic)¹⁷ He was less convinced about the cash used to fund legal expenses. He was satisfied that there was a real risk of dissipation in relation to the villa and Silver Star for the simple reason that the First Defendant had already been found to pose a real risk of dissipation.¹⁸

45. He was not satisfied that it would be just or convenient to make a maximum sum order up to the full value of the claim still then pending in the English Court.¹⁹

46. His Honour accepted that the Claimants were in a position where they could not know what they do not know and therefore there was a risk that the Second Defendant held assets other than the assets which the Judge had identified and which were capable of coming within the scope of a Chabra order. His Honour said “[h]owever, there is no evidence that is so.”²⁰

47. The Order was amended by Justice Picken on 9 May 2023 and further by Justice Foxton on 12 May 2023.

48. On 19 May 2023, the first return date of the ex parte order, Cockerill J issued an injunction prohibiting the Second Defendant from disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the same properties as were covered by the freezing order made by Justice Pelling.

49. On the second return date of the injunction, 6 June 2023, Cockerill J accepted undertakings given by the Claimants which were set out in Schedule B at the end of her Order and undertakings given by the Second Defendant, set out in Confidential Schedule C at the end of the Order. The undertakings given by the Claimants included an undertaking that they would not without the permission of the Court seek to enforce the order in any country outside England and Wales or seek an order of a similar nature, save that nothing in the undertaking would prevent the Claimants from seeking interim relief against the Second Defendant before the Courts of the UAE and/or the DIFC and/or the Cayman Islands.

50. The wording of the Chabra Order and the exclusion of certain assets from the main body of the Order — which were subject instead to undertakings by the Second Defendant regarding the use of those assets — were ultimately agreed between the parties. Those parts of the Order were settled by consent.

51. In an affidavit dated 24 May 2023²¹ which was before the Court, the Second Defendant referred to a letter dated 19 May 2023 from her solicitors Mishcon de Reya LLP. She attached a copy of the Asset Disclosure Schedule and offered some supplementation and corrections. In the affidavit she referred to Vision Investments Ltd (“Vision”), holding a number of property investments with a market value of approximately USD 3 million.

52. On 15 December 2023, Bright J dismissed an application for discharge of the worldwide freezing order against the defendants in the English Proceedings.²²

53. In March 2025, the Claimants applied to the English Court for permission to use certain documents filed in those proceedings for the purposes of:

54. The Second Defendant’s disclosure of assets based in Dubai showed that she owned Villa K-01 and Villa K-03 in Frond K, Palm Jumeirah, Dubai. She estimated them to be worth USD 8 million and USD 3 million respectively. She also owned 1,000 shares in a UAE company, Vision, the book value of which was calculated at USD 37 million. The company’s assets include a participating interest in a Cayman Islands portfolio company, Silver Star SPC, and 15 properties in Dubai. The operative part of the existing Chabra freezing order against the Second Defendant applied to Villa K-01 and her shareholding in Vision. A Confidential Schedule C to the Order excluded Villa K-03 and the Dubai properties. The Second Defendant was free to deal with those assets subject to various undertakings including undertakings to only use/dispose of the assets for certain purposes and subject to notifying the Claimants in advance.²³

55. Should the English Court grant the collateral use application, the Claimants would instruct Stephenson Harwood Dubai to prepare the DIFC Application to be heard initially on an ex parte basis in April 2025.

56. The affidavit repeated the grounds upon which the Claimants asserted that there was good reason to suppose that the Second Defendant’s assets were beneficially owned by the First Defendant. The application for permission to make use of the documents was made ex parte. Permission was granted by Justice Foxton.

57. On 30 January 2026, Justice Saini issued a judgment in favour of the Claimants on the principal cause of action.²⁴ The Judge held that the Claimants had established an entitlement to proprietary relief for sums of about USD 500 million together with substantial damages. They were the victim of fraud on a grand scale, devised and implemented by the First Defendant, using the corporate defendants.

Application for a Freezing Order before the DIFC CFI — 11 April 2025

58. On 11 April 2025, the Claimants filed an application in the DIFC CFI against the First and Second Defendants seeking a UAE-wide freezing order and ancillary orders, including disclosure orders. The application as against the Second Defendant was based on the ground that “there is reason to believe that assets held by the Second Defendant belong to the First Defendant or will otherwise be amenable to enforcement of any judgment in the English Claims.”²⁵

59. The Application was supported by an affidavit of Mark David Lakin, sworn 11 April 2025. In his affidavit Mr Lakin referred to the nature and history of the English Proceedings and the Chabra Order which had been made against the Second Defendant. He referred to the collateral use application made in the English Proceedings and the permission granted by Mr Justice Foxton to the Claimants to use the relevant documents in order to bring the Dubai applications.

60. The affidavit referred to the Chabra application against the Second Defendant in the English Proceedings and the order made by His Honour Judge Pelling KC. The affidavit stated:

61. The affidavit referred to the Second Defendant’s disclosure provided on 24 May 2023 in relation to Villa K-01 and Villa K-03 and her 1,000 shares in the UAE company, Vision. The affidavit acknowledged that the Chabra Order did not provide freezing relief over all assets in which the Second Defendant has an interest. Assets other than those the subject of the Order were set out in a Confidential Schedule C to the Order. Schedule C set out excluded assets comprising Villa K-03 and the Dubai properties. The Second Defendant was free to deal with those properties subject to various undertakings as to the purposes of use or disposal and subject to notifying the Claimants in advance.²⁷

62. In asserting that there was “[g]ood reason to suppose Mrs Gupta’s assets are beneficially owned by Mr Gupta”, the Claimants contended:

63. The obvious inference was said to be that her assets were acquired with funds emanating from the First Defendant given to her for little or no consideration. It was likely that she was acting as a shield for her husband’s assets or that (as a married, non-estranged couple) they had pooled their assets together but had kept them in her name to insulate them from his creditors. These arguments were made to the English Court on the ex parte hearing of the Claimants’ application for the Chabra Order there. Although the Second Defendant had indicated an intention to apply to discharge that Order, no such application had been made and the Chabra Order remains intact.²⁹

64. The affidavit then referred to advice received that if successful in UAE-wide freezing orders against the Defendants, the Claimants would seek to enforce them before the Onshore Dubai Courts. The advantages of enforcement in the Dubai Courts were set out in the affidavit.

Freezing Order refused ex parte – 17 April 2025

65. The ex parte application was refused by H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani.³⁰

66. His Excellency held that treating the Application as a fresh claim and not as a claim in aid of enforcement of an English order, the application failed for want of jurisdiction on the basis that the Claimants failed to satisfy any of the gateways in Article 14 of the New Law.

67. In an introductory paragraph dealing with the merits of the Application, His Excellency said:

68. That finding on an ex parte application decided on other grounds cannot be regarded as determinative. On an ex parte application it would be at best a provisional finding of arguability sufficient to warrant a grant of a Chabra Order. A finding that it is arguable that the criteria for a Chabra Order have been established, does not necessarily import a finding that the criteria for the grant of a Chabra Order have been established. In a case such as this, it would be prudent for a judge hearing an ex parte application for a Chabra Order and being satisfied that the order should be made on an ex parte basis, to expressly indicate that the finding is provisional and subject to a determination after argument from the affected party. The threshold for the grant of a Chabra Order on an ex parte application may be lower than the threshold for the grant of a Chabra Order following an application on notice.

69. To put the matter beyond doubt, I hold that the finding made by H.E. the Deputy Chief Justice in his judgment on the ex parte application, could not constitute a determination that the Claimants had satisfied the criteria for the grant of a Chabra Order against the Second Defendant.

Grant of permission to appeal — 21 April 2025

70. The Deputy Chief Justice granted permission to appeal on 21 April 2025 on the ground that the Claimants had demonstrated that there was a compelling reason as to why the appeal should be heard. The Application for Permission to Appeal was, like the original application, ex parte.³²

71. On 10 June 2025, the Defendants applied for an adjournment of the return date of the ex parte injunction listed to be heard before H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin on 11 June 2025. The Chief Justice ordered, for reasons given ex tempore, that the injunction should continue until further order of the Court and made directions for filing of submissions in opposition to the appeal and in reply. The Defendants were to serve on the Claimants a copy of all documents filed by them in enforcement proceedings before the Onshore Courts of Dubai.

72. It is notable that the Defendants’ written submissions in the appeal focussed entirely on the question of jurisdiction and did not raise any issue concerning the merits of a Chabra injunction.

Court of Appeal Orders maintaining freezing order — 26 April 2025 (ex parte) and 22 September 2025 (after hearing)

73. The Court of Appeal heard the initial part of the appeal ex parte and allowed the appeal in relation to the refusal of the ex parte application on the basis that the Court of First Instance arguably had the jurisdiction and power to make an order of the kind sought against both Defendants. The Court declared that both Defendants had the right to apply to the Court to vary or discharge the ex parte order. The appeal was otherwise adjourned. Following a contested hearing on 2 September 2025, the Court issued its judgment on 22 September 2025 allowing the appeal and continuing the freezing orders originally made by the Court on 26 April 2025. In so providing the Court ordered:

74. Within the framework of the compelling reasons ground, the Court of Appeal had before it two grounds of appeal. The first was that His Excellency had erred in finding that the CFI lacked jurisdiction to make the orders sought. The second was that the existence of the jurisdiction was reasonably arguable warranting the grant of the relief sought. The Court of Appeal would not, in the absence of the Defendants, make a final decision on jurisdiction. It was sufficient to say that the existence of the jurisdiction and of the powers to grant the interim orders sought was strongly arguable. The CFI order refusing the grant of the interim relief was set aside. As appears from the ultimate Reasons of the Court of Appeal:

75. In the event, the Court found that the CFI had the jurisdiction and power to issue the freezing order sought. This was by reference to the text of the 2025 Court Law (Dubai Law No. (2) of 2025).

76. As appears from this narrative, the question in issue before the Court of Appeal was the jurisdiction and power of the Court to grant the freezing orders which had been sought. In the event, the Court having made freezing orders on an ex parte basis on 26 April 2025, continued those orders with the qualification set out in paragraph 11 above.

77. It is apparent from the record that the Court of Appeal was not asked to and did not determine the question whether the criteria for a Chabra Order were established.

78. The order made by the Court of Appeal on 26 April 2025 was ex parte and, in the ordinary course, would have been the subject of a return date at which the question would be determined on a contested basis, whether the grounds for a freezing order were made out. That usual process was displaced by the debate about jurisdiction which was the focus of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal.

The Freezing Order of the Court of Appeal made on 26 April 2025

79. The relevant provisions of the Order made by the Court of Appeal on 26 April 2025 are set out in Appendix A to these Reasons.

Variation Application filed 21 October 2025

80. On 21 October 2025, the Claimants filed the Variation Application seeking additional disclosure to be provided by the Second Defendant in connection with the potential sale of Platinum Tower units and in connection with Villa K-03. They also sought a more restrictive order in relation to any dealing with or disposing of any of the assets set out in Schedule D to the Order. They sought variations to the term of Schedule D of the DIFC FO and disclosure by the Defendants as to the source of their legal funding. The draft order originally sought by the Variation Application is set out at Annexure B.

81. In the meantime, on 22 October 2025 the Defendants applied to the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction between DIFC Courts and other judicial entities in the Emirate of Dubai.

Order of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke for coverage of additional assets by Chabra order and requirement for additional disclosure — 5 November 2025

82. The Claimants made an urgent application on Friday, 31 October 2025 which originally sought a Chabra injunction restraining dealings with Villa K-03 and “disclosure of any agreement (including but not limited to any Form F) entered into in relation to Villa K-03 within one day of this order”.

83. On 3 or 4 November 2025, the Claimants amended their Application Notice to seek additional relief in the form of a freezing order in respect of the Vision properties. The Amended Application was not served on the Second Defendant. In the course of the hearing the Claimants made an oral application for additional relief and produced a revised draft order. That additional relief was sought and granted in the Second Defendant’s absence and without notice to her. It involved a freezing order in respect of the proceeds of sale of Villa K-03, an order that the Second Defendant pay the proceeds of the sale of Villa K-03 “and any traceable proceeds thereof” into the DIFC Court Registry within 24 hours and disclosure orders which reduced the time to provide information from one day to 6 hours and expanded the disclosure required.

84. On 5 November 2025, His Excellency made orders which included a declaration that the filing of the application to the Judicial Committee for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction did not affect the Defendants’ obligations under the DIFC FO which would remain in full force and effect subject to paragraph 3 of the Order. His Excellency directed that until further order of the Court:

The terms of the Interim Order made by H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke are set out at Annexure C to these Reasons.

85. The Claimants asserted that the Second Defendant was represented by a firm called ‘Hilal’ and that she had filed witness evidence and a skeleton statement and had made a deliberate decision not to attend the 5 November hearing. This appeared from the First Witness Statement of Mr Willn. On 29 October 2025, Hilal had indicated that they would come off the record and they applied to do so on 5 November 2025. The Second Defendant denies that she filed a “skeleton argument”. She filed what her legal representatives called “a haphazard document entitled ‘Respondent’s Submission’ which ran across two and a half pages”. The ‘witness statements’ were similarly short and materially identical. The Second Defendant contended that the Court depended upon the Claimants to give a fair presentation of the complex procedural history, the precise basis upon which serious allegations of contempt were made and the implications of the relief which the Claimants were seeking. These contentions were subsumed in the Second Defendant’s argument that the Claimants failed to discharge their duty of full and frank disclosure or fair presentation anywhere in the supporting witness statement of Mr Lakin or the skeleton argument filed in support of the urgent application. The question of full and frank disclosure is addressed later in these Reasons.

86. It was also ordered that within six hours of service of the Order, the Second Defendant was to provide information and documentation to the Claimants confirming whether Villa K-03 had been sold and if it had, the date it was sold, the identity of the purchaser and the sale price and the recipient of the proceeds of sale. The Defendants were also to state the actual and/or intended use of the sale proceeds and not dispose of, deal with or diminish them or any traceable proceeds of them.

87. His Excellency found that the Defendants’ contention that they had fully complied with the freezing orders was unsustainable.

88. Referring to various failings on the part of the Defendants, His Excellency said:

His Excellency went further:

Onshore Proceedings

89. Reference should be made to proceedings in the Dubai Courts following the Court of Appeal decision of 26 April 2025.

90. An application was made to the Execution Judge in Dubai seeking approval for an approach to the Land Department in relation to Villa K-03, for provisional information concerning “all actions carried out in respect of it in the period 15 May 2021 to 11 November 2025”.

91. In the English translation of the application and in subsequent applications, the Second Defendant was referred to as “the Judgment Debtor”. It may be that something was lost in translation. It is, however, a matter of concern that she was so described in the English translation of the applications for it misdescribes the effect of the DIFC FO. The DIFC FO was put in place to protect, against dissipation, assets which were arguably held by the Second Defendant on some basis for the First Defendant and arguably amenable to enforcement action in the Dubai courts.

92. On 13 November 2025, an application was made for execution of a DIFC Judgment, being “…the judgment rendered by the DIFC Courts in Case No. 040-2025 on 05/11/2025 by imposing precautionary attachment against the funds of the Respondents up to the amount of USD 625,000,000, equivalent to AED 2,293,750,000”. The application recited that the execution creditors were in the process of executing the judgment rendered by the DIFC Courts on 5 November 2025.

93. On 14 November 2025, the Execution Judge authorised the address to the Land Department sought by the Claimants. An Order issued to the Dubai Land Department on 17 November 2025 referring to both the First and Second Defendants as ‘judgment debtors’.

94. On 20 November 2025, the Land Department responded attaching a Sale Contract dated 3 November 2025 concluded between the Second Defendant and named purchasers for a contract price of AED 22,250,000. A title deed issued in the name of the “Enforcement Debtor” and the most recent ownership certificate for the property was also provided.

95. On 16 December 2025, a further application was made requesting that the Execution Judge issue an order to address and instruct the Land Department to place precautionary attachment on the properties listed in Appendix (d), “registered in the name of the Second Judgment Debtor’s company, Vision Investment Ltd”.

96. A further application was made on 17 December 2025 seeking an order that the “Judgment Debtor” comply “with the following, under penalty of arrest and summon” (sic):

97. On 19 December 2025, the Execution Judge authorised “addressing the Land Department to place and impose precautionary attachment on the properties listed in Appendix (d) – attached to the application – registered in the name of the Second Judgment Debtor’s company, Vision Investments Ltd”.

98. On the same day, the Execution Judge directed that the Second Defendant be notified of the content of the preceding application for her response.

99. A decision on the same day authorised an address to the Land Department to place and impose precautionary attachment on the properties listed in Appendix (d) – attached to the application — registered in the name of the Second Judgment Debtor’s company, Vision Investments Ltd.”

100. By a letter dated 8 January 2026, the Dubai Land Department informed the Dubai Courts that the requested attachment had been executed. Precautionary attachment had also been levied against 12 units belonging to Vision. The Second Defendant was notified by email of the Execution Judge’s decision on 2 February 2026.

101. On 11 February 2026, the Claimants filed an application for arrest and summons of the Second Defendant “for her intentional refusal to comply with the execution judgment”. The allegation was that she intentionally refused to comply with the Court’s orders to disclose the details of the sale value of Villa K-03 and to deposit the amount in the Court’s Treasury.

102. On 12 February 2026, a Dubai Judge rejected the application stating in his decision that:

Proceedings before Martin CJ — 23 February 2026

103. In the proceedings before H.E. Chief Justice Martin on 23 February 2026, the Claimants sought to argue that in obtaining the DIFC FO they had already established the basis for Chabra injunctive relief in relation to Villa K-03 and other properties. The Chief Justice made clear in an exchange with counsel that the Order of the Court of Appeal was made on the basis that it mirrored the relief that had been granted in England, albeit it was an undertaking which had been converted into an order of the Court. It was put to counsel for the Claimants that he was asking for a restraining order without establishing the basis for making that order.

104. The Chief Justice said:

The Chief Justice asked counsel for the Claimants whether that had ever been determined. Counsel responded:

Pressed by the Chief Justice, counsel said “[i]t hasn’t. No, it hasn’t been determined.”³⁷ It was submitted in the present applications that the Court should disregard those observations as made in exchanges on submissions between the Court and counsel. Whether or not counsel’s response to the Chief Justice could be treated as a formal concession, the statement made by counsel in response to questions from the Court are to be taken seriously and at face value. Responses given by counsel to questions put by the Court will ordinarily be treated seriously as reflective of the position adopted by the party they represent.

The Order made by H.E. Chief Justice Martin

105. For ease of reference, the Order made by H.E. Chief Justice Martin is set out at Annexure D to these Reasons.

106. In his Order, the Chief Justice identified the “Variation Application” as that filed by the Claimants on 21 October 2025 and the following elements of the orders sought in the Variation Application, which His Excellency designated as discrete applications within the Variation Application. They were as follows:

His Excellency also referred to an oral application made by the Claimants at the 23 February 2026 hearing pursuant to RDC 28.5(2) for an order requiring the Second Defendant to produce certain additional documents.

107. His Excellency adjourned the variation hearing and continued the Interim Relief Order made on 5 November 2025 by H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke. He also directed that until the adjourned variation hearing, the Claimants were to take no further steps to enforce the 5 November Order in the Dubai Courts. His Excellency dismissed the Additional Disclosure Application and adjourned the RDC 28.5 Application for determination on the papers. His Excellency ordered that any application to discharge the 5 November Order be issued by the Second Defendant by 9 March 2026. This was designated the ‘Discharge Application’. The parties were given liberty to serve further evidence on the question whether the Schedule D Assets are assets in respect of which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they would be amenable to execution of a judgment against the First Defendant.

108. The Adjourned Variation Hearing was then listed before the Chief Justice for 14 April 2026.

Submissions on whether the Chabra criteria have already been determined for the purposes of the Variation Application

109. The Claimants submitted that it is not necessary for the Court at this hearing to address the question whether the DIFC FO assets are amenable to the Court’s Chabra jurisdiction. The Claimants submit that it would be inappropriate for the Court to allow the Variation Application to become a vehicle for a collateral attack on matters resolved by the Court of Appeal’s orders.

110. The Second Defendant in her submissions contended that the Claimants had conceded that the application of the Chabra jurisdiction to the DIFC FO had not been determined.

111. At the hearing on 23 February 2026 before the Chief Justice, the Claimants were given an opportunity to adjourn their Variation Application in order to bring additional evidence in support of the proposition that the relevant assets were subject to the power of the Court to make a Chabra Order. The Variation Application was adjourned and directions were given to enable the Claimants to adduce additional evidence. The Interim Order was continued. In making those directions the Chief Justice accepted that the Claimants were not conceding that the evidence they had already put on was insufficient to support a Chabra Order. That was, of course, quite a different question from the question whether the Court had already determined and, in effect, made a Chabra Order.

Conclusion on whether the Chabra criteria have already been determined

112. Having regard to the history of the proceedings and the exchanges which occurred at the Variation Application hearing on 23 February 2026, I find that the question whether a final Chabra Order should be made has not been determined. It falls to the Court now to determine whether the criteria for the grant of a Chabra Order are made out in order to justify the continuance of the DIFC FO and its variation.

The Discharge Application — the Second Defendant’s contentions on the Claimants’ failure to make full and frank disclosure.

113. The Second Defendant asserted that before arriving at the question whether the Interim Order should be regranted and varied, there was an issue as to whether the Claimants breached their duty of full and frank disclosure in obtaining the interim order in the first place and whether relevant parts of the order should be discharged ab initio. It may be noted that the Court is concerned with the variation and continuation of the Order made by the Court of Appeal on 26 April 2025. The Interim Order continued that Order and made variations. The Order made by the Chief Justice on 24 February 2026 continued the Interim Order until the Adjourned Variation Hearing. No question of its further continuation arises. Nevertheless, it seems that the continuation of the DIFC FO as made by the Court of Appeal is seen by the Second Defendant as affected by the alleged failure of the Claimants’ duty to make full and frank disclosure before H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke. The merits of the arguments as to the alleged failure of the Claimants to make full and frank disclosure before H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke in the proceedings in November 2025, are discussed below.

114. The Second Defendant said that the Court depended on the Claimants to give a fair presentation of the complex procedural history, the precise basis on which their serious allegations of contempt had been made and the implication of the relief which they were seeking. The Claimants were said to have failed to mention that they needed to establish a basis for Chabra relief in respect of the Schedule C assets. They failed to disclose that their allegation that the Second Defendant’s assets were all held on behalf of the First Defendant had been rejected by the English Court as “extravagant”.

115. The Claimants, it was said, had failed fairly to present the allegations that the Second Defendant had breached the DIFC FO. They had relied upon the level of the Defendants’ legal expenditure to suggest there must be undisclosed assets, but failed to disclose that of which they were aware, namely that the First Defendant was receiving litigation funding and it was likely that the Second Defendant was as well. The Claimants’ evidence was drafted to give the misleading impression that they first learnt of the proposed sale of Villa K-03 upon the Second Defendant’s asset disclosure and failed to draw attention to a notice given on 1 May 2025. They had made allegations that the Second Defendant had breached the DIFC FO based on alleged requirements which were simply not contained in the order.

116. The Claimants had allegedly failed to draw the Judge’s attention to the fact he was being invited to make an impossible order in respect of the proceeds of Villa K-03 which would be used in the Onshore Courts to attempt to arrest the Second Defendant. They failed fairly to present the prejudice to the Second Defendant of the Order.

117. The Second Defendant said that the material non-disclosures were serious and substantial and had not been adequately explained by the Claimants. She submitted that the only available inference was that the non-disclosures and misleading presentation of the Claimants’ case was deliberate. It was submitted that there was only one appropriate response on the part of the Court and that was to discharge the Interim Order and refuse to regrant relief.

118. The allegations of the breaches of the duty of full and frank disclosure were set out in the First Witness Statement of Carlo Fedrigoli, a legal practitioner representing the Second Defendant and having the conduct of these proceedings on her behalf. The alleged breaches of the duty were also set out in a Table annexed to the Second Defendant’s Skeleton Argument. It is unnecessary for present purposes to traverse the detail of those allegations, which are covered generally in the Second Defendant’s Skeleton Argument summarised above and the Table to which reference has been made. The Table is Annexure E to these Reasons.

Claimants’ contentions on failure to make full and frank disclosure

119. In Mr Willn’s First Witness Statement he set out the Claimants’ position that the Discharge Application is without merit and referred to the Claimants’ Skeleton Argument, evidence set out in Mr Lakin’s witness statements and evidence set out in the remainder of his witness statement.

120. In their Skeleton Argument, the Claimants set out the relevant legal principles acknowledging the duty of an applicant in a without notice application to “make full and accurate disclosure of all material facts and to draw the court’s attention to significant factual, legal and procedural aspects of the case.” It was accepted that the duty is fundamental to the proper functioning of the Court’s process on any application without notice. It did not apply to points which the applicant could not reasonably have anticipated would be raised by the respondent. Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1269 at [180] was cited.

121. Having regard to the strictness of the duty, it was said to be not uncommon for respondents to make a litany of allegations of failure to give full and frank disclosure, none of which would have affected the outcome. Deprecation of this approach in the English courts was cited by reference to Mex Group Worldwide Ltd v Ford [2024] EWCA Civ 959 at [128] where it was said:

122. The Claimants drew attention to the following features of the 5 November hearing:

123. The submissions then referred to the specific criticisms made by the Second Defendant against the Claimants’ presentation of the case on 5 November as set out in Mr Fedrigoli’s First Statement.

124. As to the allegation that the Claimants wrongfully failed to explain to H.E. Justice Cooke, that it was open to the Second Defendant to argue that the Claimants had never established a basis for Chabra relief in relation to the DIFC FO assets, the criticism was said to be misguided:

125. The Claimants then turned to the Second Defendant’s allegations that they failed fairly to present the case that she had breached the DIFC FO. Six sub-categories of criticisms were identified:

126. The exchanges between Mr Fedrigoli and Mr Willn on this point seem to have been largely argumentative. Mr Willn said that at the time of the 5 November hearing, the Claimants were not in possession of information concerning the funding of the defendants’ legal fees in the DIFC proceedings and would not come into possession of such information until 18 February 2026, over three months later. This was said to be an example of the Second Defendant intermingling the English proceedings and the DIFC proceedings. The First Defendant’s litigation fund was disclosed in the English proceedings but not in the DIFC proceedings. It was not proper to treat the information conveyed in one set of proceedings as sufficient to convey the same information in relation to a different individual in a different set of proceedings, particularly with regard to the collateral use restrictions in place in England.

127. The fourth category of complaint made by the Second Defendant was that the Claimants had made improper criticisms of the notice provided by the Second Defendant in respect of the sale of Villa K-03 on 1 May 2025. The relevant notice itself was said by the Claimants to have not provided any reasonable summary of the commercial purpose of the proposed disposition of Villa K-03. In any event, that was all irrelevant. The alleged deficiencies in the particular notice had nothing to do with the basis on which the Claimants sought the urgent interim relief, which were developments after 21 October.

128. The fifth class of criticism was that the Claimants had unfairly presented alleged defects in the 27 August notice relating to the proposed sale of the Platinum Tower units. The Claimants contended that the notice was in such generic terms as to be completely incapable of serving its intended purpose, namely, to enable the Claimants to police compliance with the DIFC FO. This, in any event, was said to be irrelevant to the outcome of the application. The Second Defendant’s complaint suffered from the same materiality issue as the complaints made by the Second Defendant about the Claimants’ criticisms of the 1 May Villa K-03 notice.

129. The final and sixth category, was the Second Villa K-03 Notice. The Second Defendant had complained about the Claimants’ criticisms of the second notice of proposed sale in relation to Villa K-03, which was provided on 26 October. The complaint was said to go nowhere in the circumstances where the notice was obviously not compliant with the DIFC FO.

Principles concerning the duty to make full and frank disclosure

130. The Second Defendant cited authorities relevant to an applicant’s obligation of full and frank disclosure when applying for interim relief on an ex parte basis or on short notice. They were Lloyds Bowmaker v Britannia Arrow Holdings [1988] 1 WLR 1337 (Clydewell J); Tugushev v Orlov (No 2) [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm) at 7 (“Tugushev”) and its application by this Court in EFG (Middle East) Ltd v Marj Holding Ltd [2025] DIFC CFI 029 (H.E. Justice Roger Stewart). In the latter case Justice Stewart set out the relevant principles as summarised in Justice Carr’s judgment in Tugushev including the following which are paraphrased:

As to the approach of a defendant asserting failure to make full and frank disclosure, and the function of the Court where such a failure is shown, the following additional principles were set out in the judgment of Justice Stewart, taken from Justice Carr’s judgment in Tugushev:

131. A leading Australian authority on the scope of the duty, albeit of some antiquity, is Thomas A Edison Ltd v Bullock (1912) 15 CLR 697 at 681–82, in which Isaacs J cited Dalglish v Jarvie 2 Mac & G 231 and said:

132. Leeming JA, a Judge of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, in a paper published in the Australian Law Journal in 2013,³⁹ characterised the modern formulation, regularly repeated, as an obligation to disclose “all material including that which might lead the court to refuse the application”.i⁴⁰

133. Justice Leeming identified a difference in approach in the United Kingdom where he characterised the obligation as diluted depending upon the seriousness of the application and the risk of prejudice, citing Payabi v Armstel Shipping Corp (The Jaya Bola) [1992] QB 907 at [67] where it was said:

Darl Al Arkan Real Estate Development Company v Al Refai [2012] EWHC 3539 (Comm) at [149] and Cecil v Bayat [2010] EWHC 641 (Comm) at [172]-[176] were also cited after which Leeming J observed:

134. As Leeming J observed, the better approach is to err on the side of disclosure.

Conclusions on failure to make full and frank disclosure

135. The allegations as to the Claimants’ breach of the duty to make full and frank disclosure were wide-ranging and various, as appears from Mr Fedrigoli’s First Witness Statement and the table prepared for the Second Defendant. The caution expressed by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Mex Group Worldwide that “quality not quantity should be the watchword” seems appropriate.

136. It is arguable that the submissions made by the Claimants before Sir Jeremy Cooke could have been more careful and fulsome. It is notable, however, that much of the complaint of alleged non-disclosure rests upon evaluative propositions about the sufficiency of what was being said before H.E. Justice Cooke and its materiality. Acknowledging the untidiness of the procedure before His Excellency, I am not satisfied that there was a substantial or deliberate failure to disclose to the Court what should have been disclosed.

137. As Justice Carr observed in Tugushev, while there is a discretion to continue an ex parte order, even where non-disclosure has been made out, the discretion should be exercised sparingly. The overriding consideration will always be the interests of justice.

138. In this case the merits of the order sought by the Claimants, which is really a continuation and variation of the DIFC FO made by the Court of Appeal in April 2025, have been fully argued with the support of expert evidence and witness statements on both sides. Whatever arguable reservations there may be about the way in which the case was presented before H.E. Justice Cooke, I do not consider that there was a failure to meet the duty of disclosure that would warrant, in the circumstances of this case, discharging the Interim Order ab initio, including its continuation of the DIFC FO. The Discharge Application is dismissed.

The Variation Application

139. Under the DIFC FO the Second Defendant’s dealings with certain of her assets are restricted as follows:

140. The modified order set out in Schedule D to the DIFC FO, as explained in the Claimants’ Skeleton, operates broadly as follows:

141. Under the Variation Application, the Second Defendant would be prohibited from undertaking any dealing with the DIFC FO assets other than with the Claimants’ consent or the Court’s permission.

142. The Variation Application necessarily involves the continuation of the DIFC FO with the changes sought by the Claimants. That Order being in the nature of a Chabra Order, now requires consideration of whether the criteria for the grant of the Chabra Order have been met.

Criteria for the grant of a Chabra Order

143. The Claimants contended that the evidence before the Court justifies the continuance and variation of the Chabra Order against the Second Defendant.

144. In TSB Private Bank International S.A. v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231, Mummery J held that the High Court of Justice had power to grant an injunction against a co-defendant against whom no cause of action lay provided the claim for the injunction was ancillary and incidental to the plaintiff’s cause of action against the other co-defendant.

145. Mummery J was of the view that there was “a good arguable case that there are assets, apparently vested in the company, which may be beneficially the property of Mr Chabra and therefore available to satisfy the plaintiff’s claims against him if established and true.” It was open to the plaintiff in that case to argue that the corporate co-defendant was the alter-ego of Mr Chabra, the individual against whom the cause of action in the case was asserted.

146. The criteria for the grant of a Chabra injunction are not confined to cases in which the non- cause of action defendant holds assets subject to a proprietary interest on the part of the cause of action defendant.

147. The leading Australian case on freezing orders against third parties is Cardile v LED Builders Pty Limited (1999) 198 CLR 380 (“Cardile”). The question whether a freezing order will be made against a third party involves the following considerations:

148. The Court set out a principle to guide courts in determining whether to grant freezing order relief where the activities of third parties are the object of the proposed restraint. Such an order may be appropriate assuming the existence of other relevant criteria and discretionary factors in circumstances in which:

149. These principles were usefully summarised in the judgment of Stewart J in Viterra v Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co Limited [2022] FCA 215; 291 FCR 640.

150. In Broad Idea International Ltd v Convoy Collateral Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, the Privy Council considered the history and development of freezing orders and identified as one such development that a freezing injunction could be granted against a third party, being a person against whom the applicant had no right to claim substantive relief — on the basis that the third party holds or controls assets against which a judgment against the primary defendant could potentially be enforced. This was the so-called Chabra jurisdiction.

151. Identified circumstances in which such an injunction could be granted included the following:

In each case it was said by Lord Leggatt, “the key question is whether the assets are or would be available to satisfy a judgment through some process of enforcement.”⁴⁵

UAE Civil Code — processes of enforcement

152. Both parties referred to the provisions of the UAE Civil Code on the question whether they would provide mechanisms in the Dubai Courts for the enforcement of a judgment against assets subject to a Chabra Order. The relevant provisions fall under three headings:

Legal opinions related to the UAE Law — the Claimants’ case

153. The Claimants relied upon a letter dated 13 March 2026 from Mr Mohamed Elhawawy, a Partner at Stephenson Harwood Middle East LLP, Legal Representatives for the Claimants. He referred to the enforcement options available to the Claimants under the UAE Civil Code. In summary his characterisations of the options in the Articles set out above were as follows:

(1) The Indirect Claim — Articles 392 and 393.

154. Mr Elhawawy said that the effect of those provisions is that a creditor may exercise, in the name of their debtor, all of the rights of that debtor (even if they are currently not due and owing), in circumstances in which the debtor had not exercised those rights and that their failure to do so might lead to or aggravate the debtor’s bankruptcy. The creditor was regarded as acting on behalf of the debtor in exercising those rights and any benefit arising out of their exercise would be brought into the debtor’s property and stand as security for all the debtor’s creditors.⁴⁶

155. Reference was made to a judgment before the Dubai Cassation Court in which the principle of the indirect claim was applied in relation to a claim filed against a company which was being declared bankrupt. Mr Elhawawy said:

(2) The action in simulation — Articles 394 and 395

156. The second option under Articles 394 and 395 was referred to by Mr Elhawawy as a sham contract claim or, alternatively, an action in simulation. He advised that pursuant to Articles 394 and 395 if a sham contract is made, the bona fide creditor of the contracting parties may seek to disapply the sham contract and invoke the terms of the hidden contract and prove by all means the sham nature of the contract by which they are prejudiced. If the contracting parties conceal the true contract by virtue of the sham contract, the true contract will be the effective one as between the contracting parties vis-a-vis the creditor.⁴⁷

157. Mr Elhawawy contended that Trafigura may file a case against the First and Second Defendants contending that the sale contracts entered into in respect of the assets between Vision (in which the Second Defendant is a shareholder) and Pprime (in which the First Defendant is a shareholder) are a sham, while the real hidden contracts were entered into between the First Defendant and the developer/original owner of the properties pursuant to which the First Defendant is the real contractual counter-party in the sale contracts who is the de facto owner of the assets. If Trafigura was successful on this claim, it could request that the onshore Dubai Court rule to transfer the ownership of the properties into the name of the First Defendant and to remove the Second Defendant/Vision from the title deeds/sale contracts and to transfer title to the First Defendant instead.⁴⁸

Legal opinions relating to UAE Law — the Second Defendant’s case

158. The Second Defendant relied upon a letter from Mr Ahmad Subhi Ahmad a partner in Salt & Associates, which referred to the Eighth Witness Statement of Mark Lakin and Mr Elhawawy’s letter.⁴⁹

(1) The indirect claim — Articles 392 and 393

159. In the letter, Mr Ahmad sought to explain why the indirect claim and the action in simulation would not be appropriate remedies for the enforcement actions envisaged by Mr Lakin and Mr Elhawawy against the Second Defendant.

160. Mr Ahmad made the point that civil law systems modelled upon the Napoleonic Code or the Egyptian legal system (such as the onshore laws of the UAE) do not have a direct equivalent to a Chabra injunction or similar in personam third party restrictions. In the UAE Precautionary Attachments in rem are available as an interim remedy and are regulated under Articles 329 and 330 of the Updated Federal Decree Law No. 42 of 2022. He went on to refer to the way in which civil law systems deal with property ownership — traditionally considered a unitary and absolute right defined by law and characterised by codification, strict registration of rights and a primary distinction between immovable and movable property. The registered owner is the one that holds the right to an asset. There is no distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘equitable’ title as found in common law systems.⁵⁰ He referred to the treatment of gifts in Articles 614, 615, 632 and 636 of the Civil Code, which treat a gift as the ownership of property or a right in property for the rest of the owner’s life without consideration.⁵¹

161. Referring to the so-called ‘indirect action’, he described it as:

162. After referring to Articles 392 and 393, Mr Ahmad referred to a Ministry of Justice Commentary which identified two conditions to be satisfied for such an action:

163. Mr Ahmad did not agree with Mr Elhawawy that this route would be open to Trafigura against the Second Defendant. While Trafigura was a creditor of the First Defendant, it was not a creditor of Pprime, the company which sold the properties to Vision. Mr Elhawawy did not identify any right in the name of the First Defendant which could be exercised to recover the properties from Vision. Mr Elhawawy had not identified any acts or transactions between the First and Second Defendants that could give rise to a credit or a claim. The only transaction identified between them was the transfer of Villa K-01. There was no explanation as to why the First Defendant should have a claim against the Second Defendant arising from that transfer.⁵⁴

164. It followed that the purported rights or credits that Trafigura would seek to advance as a surrogate/claim on behalf of the First Defendant in a hypothetical indirect action against the Second Defendant had not been identified.

165. Further, the First Defendant had not been declared bankrupt. Even if he were to be declared bankrupt in the future, Villa K-01 would not be considered part of his estate.

(2) The action in simulation — Articles 394 and 395

166. In relation to the action in simulation, Mr Ahmad described it as a legal remedy available to certain third parties affected by the alleged simulation, which aimed to establish the discrepancy between the simulating parties actual intentions and those expressed in the simulated contract and to declare the simulated contract invalid and ineffective.⁵⁵

167. Reference was made to a decision of the UAE Supreme Court in a case in which the Court held that the fictitious contract had no effect between the contracting parties given that they intended to refute the fictitious contract and adhere to the concealed contract.⁵⁶

168. Another decision of the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation held that the burden of proof lies with the party alleging simulation who must present written evidence or rely on alternative proofs as allowed by law unless fraud or deceit is involved, which may permit broader evidentiary methods. Clear and explicit contractual terms could not be overridden by ambiguous or unsupported allegations.⁵⁷

169. Mr Ahmad disputed Mr Elhawawy’s proposition that there were two possible actions in simulation, noting:

(3) The Paulian Action — Articles 391 and 396-400

170. Mr Ahmad went on to refer to the action for non-enforceability of dispositions known as the Paulian Action, which was described as allowing creditors to challenge the validity of and revoke actions or dispositions that diminish or prejudice a debtor’s estate. Mr Ahmad referred to Articles 391 and 396 to 400 of the Civil Code. He pointed out that in his letter, Mr Elhawawy had not indicated that the Paulian Action was one of the remedies available to Trafigura. If there were a remedy available to Trafigura, this would be it. However, it was subject to strict requirements under UAE Law which would not assist Trafigura. The threshold test for a successful Paulian Action was:

171. Reference was made to the Dubai Court of Cassation in Case 769/2025 (Commercial) which confirmed the above approach, being the general applicability of Articles 396 to 400 of the Civil Code, while providing a judicial exception to the same in respect of payment of the attorney’s professional fees.

172. The UAE Ministry of Justice Commentary had explained that the action carried severe consequences and could only apply where, in accordance with the express terms of Article 397, the disposition was made by the debtor after the creditor had brought its claim.

173. Mr Ahmad cited the Dubai Court of Cassation decision in Case 151/2021 and in Case 535/2024. Such an action would not be available in relation to the properties transferred by Pprime to Vision for any of the following reasons:

174. As to the transfer of Villa K-01, Mr Ahmad pointed out that the First Defendant was previously the owner of that villa. To succeed in the hypothetical Paulian Action challenging the gift, Trafigura would be required to demonstrate that the gift transfer completed in 2017 was intended to defraud Trafigura. At that time, however, Trafigura was not a creditor of the First Defendant and there was no significant commercial relationship between the First Defendant and Trafigura. This would constitute an insurmountable obstacle for a Paulian Action challenging the transfer.

The Claimants’ legal advice on onshore action — 31 March 2026

175. A further letter from a firm M&Co dated 31 March 2026, was directed to whether the enforcement steps undertaken before the Onshore Courts were, on their face, consistent with the legal framework governing the enforcement of the DIFC Interim Orders in UAE Onshore Courts.

176. An application had been made to the Dubai Courts dated 13 November 2025 for an order enforcing provisions of the Order of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke dated 5 November 2025 and requiring that the Second Defendant transfer the sale proceeds of Villa K-03 into the DIFC Court Treasury within 24 hours. The letter referred to various steps taken by the Claimants against the Second Defendant in the Onshore Dubai Courts. These included an application for the enforcement of the Order made by Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke on 5 November 2025, an onshore attachment application filed on 16 December 2025 and granted on 19 December 2025 by the Onshore Execution Court and a second disclosure application filed on 28 January 2026 requesting the Execution Judge to renotify the Defendants of the Onshore Disclosure Application. The application also sought an order that the Second Defendant disclose the entity that received the Villa K-03 sale proceeds and how they were used and to transfer the full sale proceeds to the DIFC Court Treasury.

177. The letter referred to relevant provisions of the UAE Civil Procedures Law, particularly Article 207 concerning the competence of the Onshore Execution Judge. This was to be read in conjunction with Article 32(B) of the DIFC Court Law, which was said to make it clear that both provisions adopt the same legal mechanism of judicial delegation for the purposes of enforcement across jurisdictions within the UAE.

178. Then it was opined that a harmonious reading of Article 207 of the Civil Procedures Law and Article 32 of the DIFC Court Law confirm that DIFC Courts acting through their Execution Judge could delegate enforcement of an order or judgment already issued by the DIFC Execution Judge to the Dubai Courts where the assets are located onshore.

179. In light of the above, it was said that the actions taken by the Claimants before the Onshore Courts were properly grounded in and directly derived from the Court Order. The legal threshold for the imposition of coercive measures was said to be satisfied.

Further legal advice to the Claimants — 22 April 2026

180. M&Co Legal wrote a further letter to Reed Smith on 22 April 2026⁶¹ addressing arguments raised by Mr Ahmad and expressing views based on UAE Law as it stood at the date of the letter. They discussed the indirect action covered by Articles 392 and 393, the simulation action covered by Articles 394 and 395 and the Paulian Action covered by Articles 391 and 396 to 400.

181. On the indirect action, they asserted that the First Claimant on the materials that they had seen, is a creditor of the First Defendant by virtue of the English Judgment. The question on the indirect action was whether the right being asserted in the Obligor’s name is a right of the obligor, the First Defendant holds against the third party. The question whether the First Defendant holds and has failed to exercise recoverable rights against the Second Defendant or against the corporate vehicles concerned, is a matter of fact. There must be an identifiable right that the debtor has failed to exercise.

182. They differed from Mr Ahmad in the following respects:

183. As to the simulation action, it was agreed that the action is plainly available to creditors of a contracting party. However, the contention in Mr Ahmad’s letter that the remedy was confined to creditors and in particular (special) successors in title of a contracting party required qualification.

184. Reference was made to a decision of the Egyptian Court of Cassation which had affirmed in numerous judgments that a third party for the purposes of simulation is any person having an interest even if no contractual relationship existed between that person and the contracting parties. Such third party could establish simulation by all means of proof, including presumptions.

185. Accepting that those sources were not binding under UAE Law, they were said to be consistent with the underlying purposes of Articles 394 and 395 to protect persons whose rights are prejudiced by an artificial appearance created by contracting parties. There was a respectable basis upon which a UAE Court could conclude that an interested party with a sufficient legal interest in the disposition may invoke the simulation irrespective of whether that party is a direct creditor of the parties to the apparent contract.

186. The UAE Federal Supreme Court was said to have adopted a broad approach in relation to parties entitled to invoke the simulation of a contract — a right not limited to creditors but extending to “any party against whose interests the fraud or circumvention of the law is directed.”

187. As to the question of beneficial ownership, Articles 394 and 395 did not require recognition of that class of ownership. They required proof by any admissible means that an apparent contract conceals a different real contract.⁶²

188. Citing the decision of the General Assembly of the Dubai Court of Cassation in Appeal No. 8 of 2025 (Commercial) the letter concluded that the entitlement to bring an action in simulation under UAE Law was not confined to creditors or successors in title. Any interested party who demonstrates that a simulated contract has affected their rights may challenge that contract and prove the simulation by all available means of evidence.

189. It was accepted that the simulation of a written contract may be established only in writing subject to recognised exceptions for material or moral impossibility. However, it operated differently in respect of a third party seeking to establish that the apparent contract is a sham. Such a party could in principle prove the simulation by all means including presumptions.

190. The letter contended that on the materials available to the writers, an action in simulation under Articles 394 to 395 was arguable on the bases that:

191. On the Paulian Action, the letter stated that subject to findings of fact:

192. A limitation period of three years, provided by Article 4, was discussed but said to run from the date that the creditor learned of the cause rendering the impugned disposition ineffective.

Conclusion on the legal advices

193. The legal letters proffered to the Court by the parties offer arguments for and against the application of the UAE Civil Procedure Code to three possible modes of enforcement in relation to the contested assets in UAE Onshore Courts. They establish that, dependent upon the facts found by the Court, there is at least, with respect to each mode, an argument that it could be applied. It is neither possible nor appropriate in these proceedings to express a concluded view about those propositions. They depend upon factual assumptions which would no doubt be contested in a substantive hearing. For the purposes of the Chabra Order, little more can be said than that on certain factual hypotheses it is arguable that enforcement proceedings may be available in the UAE Onshore Courts against the Second Defendant in respect of the contested assets. Much depends upon the question whether there is an arguable basis for the proposition that the Second Defendant holds various assets for the First Defendant so as to make them amenable to enforcement in the Dubai Courts. The existence of an arguable factual case about the Second Defendant’s assets was the subject of expert forensic accounting evidence adduced by both parties.

The Claimants’ Expert Report — Berkley Research Group

194. In support of their contention that there was an arguable case for the making of a Chabra Order, the Claimants obtained a report from Berkley Research Group (“BRG”) dated 22 April 2026.⁶³ BRG had been asked to comment on:

195. The Report set out a summary of key findings as follows:

The Second Defendant’s Expert Report — Ahmad Obaid and Subhi Bakr

196. The Second Defendant relied upon an ‘Independent Expert Review and Accounting Technical Response to the BRG Expert Report’, produced by Ahmad Obaid and dated 13 May 2026. The report was based entirely upon documents provided to the experts. The persons providing the report were Ahmad Mahmoud Ahmad Obaid and Subhi Bakr. They criticised the BRG Expert Report for:

197. The overall professional conclusion of the Obaid Report, set out in Part 10 of that Report, may be summarised as follows:

198. At paragraph 124 of the Report, Mr Obaid set out a table said to summarise the principal technical, accounting, evidentiary and methodological deficiencies identified during the review of the BRG Expert Report. These were said to be the principal matters materially affecting the reliability and evidentiary weight of the conclusions advanced by BRG.

Claimants’ contentions in support of Continuation and Variation of the Freezing Order

199. The Claimants contended that the evidence discloses a good arguable case that the Second Defendant is holding and/or controlling assets as a nominee for the First Defendant. As a matter of UAE Law there was said to be a good arguable basis for contending that those assets can and should be treated as assets of the First Defendant for the purposes of the Claimants’ attempts to enforce the substantial judgment that they have against him.

200. As a general proposition the Claimants contended that the First Defendant had all the business interests capable of generating substantial assets, while the Second Defendant appeared to have all the substantial assets. The natural inference was said to be that the First Defendant’s business activities — including the perpetration of the fraud on the Claimants, were generating substantial assets which were then carefully placed in the Second Defendant’s name in an attempt to insulate them from the First Defendant’s creditors.

201. The Claimants then referred to currently available evidence of the Second Defendant’s assets and financial position.

202. The Second Defendant’s own evidence as to the source of her assets was said not to be capable of explaining how she acquired the assets which she now holds, both directly and indirectly.

203. There were a number of companies associated with the Second Defendant and her family. Financial statements for the periods 2018–2021 indicated that those companies made profits ranging from USD 87,997.25 to USD 685,361.46. The Kamal Family, of which the Second Defendant is part, controlled between 17% and 28.5% of the three companies in the period 2009–2022.⁶⁷

204. Between 2005 and 2006, the Second Defendant was a trainee at Madison Media, a production company. Following that time her only employment had been as Head of Human Resources at the UD Group of Companies which, in Dubai, would appear to command a monthly salary of USD 9,527–USD 12,249. The UD Group is a group of companies owned by the First Defendant.⁶⁸

205. The Second Defendant pointed out that she had been given “substantial gifts before and after her marriage to the First Defendant in 2005”. As to that, the Claimants noted that she ascribed the receipt of those gifts to the Hindu law concept of Streedhan. She said she had received a significant number of gifts of different value and of different types but was unable to specify for any one of those gifts when it was received, from whom and how much it was or is worth.⁶⁹

206. In relation to Villa K-01, it was said to be common ground that the First Defendant gifted that property to the Second Defendant in January 2017.⁷⁰ The Second Defendant had also exhibited documents said to evidence the gift including a receipt from the Government of Dubai “registering a gift of real property”.

207. The Second Defendant had also said that she had set up her first business in India in 2008 — a metal trading business called ‘GG Corporation’. She said it was able to generate revenue of about USD 15 million between 2000 and 2010. The Claimants made the point that the only evidence she had adduced to support that story was a one page profit and loss account over a 4.5 month period showing a profit of around USD 18,000.⁷¹

208. As to Vision, the Second Defendant had said she had incorporated it in 2016 as GG Property Holdings Limited. It had changed its name to Vision in 2018. The Second Defendant was said to have exhibited no documents to support the proposition that the company actually carried on any business.

209. Documents exhibited comprised Articles and Memorandum of Association and amendments, a Certificate of Good Standing and a Certificate of Incumbency. These were said to be generic. Vision, as an offshore company in the Jebel-Ali Free Zone, had no onshore trading licence or commercial agent.⁷²

210. The Claimants said they had been unable to find any information about Vision from publicly available sources despite conducting a wide range of searches.⁷³

211. The Second Defendant had contended that she provided initial seed capital at incorporation and later loaned Vision its working capital as and when required.⁷⁴ She did not say how much she had contributed or loaned or when she did so. No documents were provided. She asserted that the funds came from her “past business ventures and business income and my Streedhan”.⁷⁵ Those income sources were undocumented. The Second Defendant had exhibited documents said to be Vision’s financial statements for the periods 2019 to 2022 and interim statements up to April 2023.

212. The Claimants referred to the documents exhibited by the Second Defendant. They cited the BRG Expert Report which had identified numerous flaws, concerns and inadequacies in relation to the statements including lack of detail in the notes, an unexplained decline in operating profits as revenue increased, low cash retention and an absence of expected assets and liabilities for a cross-border metal trading business. They had also referred to sudden and unexplained changes in the net working capital position from year to year. The Claimants contended that the financial statements could not be relied upon as a reliable indicator of the true nature and scope of Vision’s business.

213. Vision’s assets had been said by the Second Defendant to comprise quoted shares, unquoted shares, properties and trade receivables. The quoted shares referred to minority interests in two listed companies, Hangji and Crytel. The 2019 accounts had referred to a 32% shareholding in Hangji valued at USD 164,467,000. The Second Defendant had stated that she contributed her interest in Hangji to Vision but did not explain how she acquired her interest in Hangji in the first place. No interest in Hangji was separately identified in the accounts after September 2019. The Crytel interest was not identified at all. Hangji was in fact owned by First Defendant-related entities until June 2018. Crytel was not incorporated until September 2020 — two and four years respectively after Vision’s incorporation.

214. As to the unquoted shares, these were said to relate to a participating interest in the Silver Star SP2 Fund. Based on the accounts, that interest appeared to have been acquired between September 2020 and September 2021, albeit there was no reference to Silver Star in the accounts. The Second Defendant had suggested it was acquired in late 2020 following an approach by one of Silver Star’s fund managers, but claimed that the investment was acquired “solely from the profits of Vision”.⁷⁶ Based on the September 2020 accounts those profits appeared to arise from growth in the value of Vision’s holding of “quoted shares”, i.e. the shareholding in Hangji. The Second Defendant did not explain how that growth came about. Nor did she explain how a paper profit did or could have released the cash necessary to acquire any other investment.

215. As to properties, Vision was said to own or have owned 15 properties set out in Schedule D to the DIFC FO. These were 10 properties located in Platinum Tower, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, three apartments located on Discovery Gardens, Dubai and two properties located in the Concorde Tower, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai. As to trade receivables, the Second Defendant ascribed to them the value of USD 72.4 million based on the April 2023 interim accounts, but did not explain what that item comprised. The Claimants also referred to the Second Defendant’s allegation that Vision had trade debts exceeding 48 million. She did not explain what those debts comprised or why Vision was “in some difficulty realizing assets in order to pay them”.⁷⁷

216. The Claimants contended that there was no credible independently corroborated information showing that the Second Defendant had sufficient funds at her disposal to purchase the DIFC FO assets. The only possible source of such assets, apart from unspecified gifts from third parties, would have been profits generated by Vision’s business. However, there were strong reasons for doubting the existence and/or scale of that business.

217. The Claimants referred to the acquisition of the DIFC FO assets and in summary made the following comments:

218. In relation to the Concorde Tower Units, Vision had acquired them from Pprime on 3 September 2020 and 7 January 2021. They also appear to have been acquired at a significant discount compared to comparable transactions.⁸³

219. As to Vision’s interest in Silver Star, the Second Defendant’s position was that the interest was acquired using Vision’s own profits. That explanation was said not to work. Even if Vision’s account could safely be taken at face value, they do not show it generating profits in an amount, or of a type, which would have enabled them to be used to fund the acquisition of the interest.⁸⁴

220. The Claimant contended that the proposition that the Second Defendant may arguably be holding the DIFC FO assets for the First Defendant is supported by connections between those assets and the First Defendant.

221. 1101 Platinum Towers was the correspondence address for the First Defendant on Companies House in relation to TMT Metals. It was the correspondence address pertaining to UIL Commodities, a UAE company ultimately owned by the First Defendant and the Dubai address for UIL Commodities on UD Group’s website. It was the First Defendant’s personal address on ADCB bank statements and the address given on Emirates NBD bank statements relating to the Defendants’ joint account.⁸⁵

222. 1102 Platinum Towers was the correspondence address of UIL Commodities on the DMCC Public Register.

223. 3406 Concorde Tower was the contact address for the First Defendant, an officer of Metal Mining Pte Ltd in archived Singapore corporate filings.

224. No evidence had been produced to support the Second Defendant’s contention that 1101 Platinum Towers was “’leased’ to UIL Commodities”.

225. On the basis of the evidence disclosed by the Second Defendant, the only investment made by Silver Star was in a Mauritian bank (Silver Bank) with very close connections with the First Defendant. Although the Second Defendant had denied that she knew that Vision’s investment in the Silver Star Fund would be so applied, this denial was said to ring hollow not least because she had not produced any documents recording her alleged “several conversations” with the Fund Manager before deciding to invest. If true, her professed ignorance of so important an aspect of Vision’s financial affairs was said to be consistent with her acting as a nominee for someone else, i.e. the First Defendant.⁸⁶

226. The Second Defendant had not denied the truth of press reports set out in the Eighth Witness Statement of Mr Lakin stating that the First Defendant had used Silver Bank as his own personal “piggy bank” or that he obtained the majority of the loans made by Silver Bank. Further, on 7 April 2026 the Mauritian Prime Minister confirmed that the First Defendant had received 7.9 billion rupees (USD 168 million) from Silver Bank.⁸⁷

227. The Claimants said that there was evidence that funds from the First Defendant’s companies were regularly transferred to accounts in the name of or made available to the Second Defendant to use. The Claimants referred to the Defendants’ joint account at Emirates NBD which received inward remittances from UIL Commodities between 7 December 2021 and 18 January 2023 and the unexplained transfers made by the First Defendant to the Second Defendant in the sums of USD 100,000 and USD 200,000 into an unknown bank account on 31 January 2023.⁸⁸

228. Further, there was no evidence to support the Second Defendant’s claim that payments made to the First Defendant were in fact paid into a joint account used for living expenses.

229. The Claimants referred to UAE Law and the effect of the UAE Civil Code. They referred to the legal letters already summarised. They relied upon a further letter, dated 22 April 2026 from M&Co Legal, which supported Mr Elhawawy’s analysis and responded to points made by the Second Defendant’s UAE lawyer.⁸⁹

230. The Claimants went on to say that regardless of whether UAE Law adopts the nomenclature of legal and beneficial ownership, it recognises the possibility that one person may hold assets as the nominee for another and it provides a remedy to enable the creditors of the “real” owner to recover against the assets held by the nominee.⁹⁰

231. A similar approach was said to be available under Articles 392–393 which entitle a creditor to exercise, in the name of the debtor, all of the rights of the debtor. If it were to be established that the Second Defendant is holding assets, including the shares in Vision, as a nominee for the First Defendant, those rights would encompass the First Defendant’s right to demand that the relevant assets be delivered up to him. Accordingly, the Claimants could seek orders requiring this to happen.⁹¹

232. The Claimants went on to contend that once they had established an arguable case that the Second Defendant is holding assets for the First Defendant, the question arises whether the DIFC FO should be varied.⁹²

233. The Second Defendant’s conduct in relation to assets which are subject to the DIFC FO and equivalent orders of the English Court, mean that the regime for which that order provides is not sufficient to mitigate the risk of unjustified asset dissipation by the Second Defendant.⁹³

234. The Claimants also made submissions relating to dealings by the Second Defendant with Villa K-03 and the Discovery Gardens apartments.

235. The sale of Villa K-03 was said to have been conducted in a manner which flouted the terms of the DIFC FO. It was said that there were powerful reasons for disbelieving the Second Defendant’s current explanation for the sale. The sale of Villa K-03 was agreed a few days after 21 October 2025 when the Claimants filed and served the Variation Application. A purported notification of a “proposed sale” was provided by the Second Defendant’s English solicitors by a letter dated Sunday, 26 October 2025.⁹⁴

236. The letter was said to have failed to comply with the notification requirements contained in the DIFC FO.

237. It appears from a document ‘Form F’, filed with the relevant Dubai authorities recording the facts of the sale, that a binding contract to sell had been concluded on Tuesday, 28 October 2025 and the deposit paid by cheque on that date. This was said by the Claimants to have been a disposition of the property which took place less than 72 hours after the relevant notification.⁹⁵

238. The Second Defendant’s representative had said that the proceeds of sale were to be used for a number of different purposes relating to ordinary living expenses, legal costs and/or the costs of maintaining or operating ‘Excluded Assets’ — a reference to 15 properties owned by Vision, identified in Schedule D to the DIFC FO. These statements were said to have been untrue and known to the Second Defendant to have been untrue. Her current evidence is that she was contractually required to remit the whole of the proceeds of the sale to a debt recovery agent (Al Noor), appointed by one of Vision’s trading creditors. If so, there was never any prospect of any part of the sale proceeds being used for the payment of living or legal expenses. Nor could the payment of one of Vision’s trade creditors be regarded as a payment made in prospect of the “maintenance and/or operation of properties” owned by Vision.⁹⁶

239. Then it was said the account which the Second Defendant had provided concerning the completion of the sale of Villa K-03 was inconsistent with the documentary record. The Claimants’ attacked the Second Defendant’s evidence as to the commercial purpose of the payment to Al Noor in satisfaction of a trade debt of Vision. Her evidence was said to be improbable, incoherent and poorly supported by documentation.⁹⁷

240. As to the Discovery Gardens Apartments, it appeared that two of them had been sold on 3 June 2024 and a third on 18 July 2024. Despite the Second Defendant’s assertion to the contrary, the Claimants say that no notice, as required under the Cockerill Order, was given in respect of the two apartments sold on 3 June 2024. An email dated 28 May 2024 from the Second Defendant merely indicated an intention to deal with the relevant apartments at an unspecified future date.⁹⁸

241. The Claimants accepted that none of this strictly amounted to a breach of the DIFC FO. It was said nevertheless to be highly relevant to the question whether the DIFC FO should be varied. The key point was that the Second Defendant had flouted the regime imposed by the Cockerill Order which is materially identical to that imposed by the DIFC FO.

242. By their Variation Application, the Claimants effectively seek a blanket ban on the Second Defendant dealing or causing or permitting Vision to deal with the assets referred to in the DIFC FO unless the Claimants agree or the Court orders otherwise. The assets are:

243. The Claimants put that the Variation Order would not cause any unwarranted prejudice to the Second Defendant and/or to Vision. Villa K-01 is the Second Defendant’s home. It was unlikely that she would want or be able to deal with it on so urgent a basis that she would be prejudiced by the need for the Claimants’ prior consent or a court order. The same was said to be true of Vision’s assets. As to the Second Defendant’s shareholding in Vision, it was her own case that it is an asset with no present value.¹⁰⁰

The Second Defendant’s contentions on the continuation and variation of the Freezing Order

244. The Second Defendant submitted that she was entitled to deal with her assets, namely Villa K-03 and the Vision Properties in accordance with the agreed regime requiring 72 hours’ notice. She had given a full explanation of the circumstances supported by contemporaneous documents. She acknowledged the delay in giving the disclosure required under the Interim Order, but by the 23 February 2026 hearing had complied in full. She sought to characterise the Claimants’ application as jurisdictional arbitrage, designed to seize assets without having to prove a right to do so. They had said in this Court that there was good reason to believe that they would be entitled to enforce against the Vision Properties in the Onshore Courts by certain UAE Law routes. There was no suggestion that they would actually pursue those routes in the UAE Courts and they have never done so.¹⁰¹

245. The Second Defendant pointed to the necessity to identify precisely how the Claimants asserted that they would be entitled to enforce against the Vision Properties. It was not in dispute that Villa K-03 and the Discovery Gardens’ properties were not owned by the Second Defendant or Vision, having been sold in 2024 or 2025. The Platinum and Concorde Tower units were owned by Vision not by the Second Defendant. She is the shareholder of Vision. No application is brought against Vision.¹⁰²

246. Further, it was said the properties are in Dubai and the Claimants would need to enforce against them through an action in the Onshore Dubai Courts under UAE procedure. UAE Law does not recognise separate beneficial ownership in any relevant sense. The Claimants could not obtain a charging order over the Dubai properties on the basis that they are beneficially owned by the First Defendant.

247. The Platinum and Concorde Tower units were purchased by Vision from Pprime on 3 September 2020, 7 January 2021 and 3-4 May 2021. This appears from their title deeds. It was long before Trafigura brought its claim against the First Defendant in February 2023.

248. The Second Defendant referred to the two routes identified by the Claimants for enforcement against the Platinum and Concorde Tower units. Firstly, there was the indirect claim under Articles 392–393 of the UAE Civil Code permitting a form of subrogation by which a creditor may bring a claim in the name of a recalcitrant debtor to exercise his rights against a third party. And second, was the action in simulation under Articles 394–395 of the UAE Civil Code, which allow a creditor to impugn a sham contract. The Claimants said that the sale contracts from Pprime to Vision were shams which might be unwound.

249. The Second Defendant referred to her UAE Law evidence in response which had explained that neither of those options made any sense as a matter of UAE Law even taking the Claimants’ evidence at its highest. If there were a remedy for the Claimants it would lie in the actio pauliana under Articles 396–398 of the Civil Code which are roughly the equivalent to section 423 of the Insolvency Act (UK), although subject to different conditions. The Salt letter, which was the source of evidence about the UAE Law relied upon by the Second Defendant, explained that the action was unavailable to the Claimants.

250. The Second Defendant then set out in more detail arguments identifying what she called “two related and fundamental problems” – the Claimants’ disregard of legal personality and the resort to jurisdictional arbitrage between the DIFC Court and the Onshore Courts. As to the first, it was pointed out the Claimants already have a Chabra injunction against the shares in Vision and now seek a Chabra injunction in respect of certain of Vision’s assets directly. The assets of a company do not, without more, belong beneficially to its shareholder.¹⁰³

251. The Claimants also ignored the separate corporate responsibility of Pprime. All three of the Claimants’ routes involved unwinding or diverting the sale of the Vision Properties from Pprime to Vision. The Claimants are not creditors of Pprime either.

252. The Second Defendant characterised the Claimants’ tactic as reflective of a hope that they could convince the Court that a Chabra injunction could be granted on the basis that it is enough to show reason to believe that one or other of its enforcement routes would work. The Second Defendant submitted that what the Claimants intend to do is to ‘”enforce” the Chabra Order in the Onshore Courts to obtain a provisional attachment against the properties as they have done. They would then seek to convert that provisional attachment into an Executory Attachment and seize and auction the properties.

253. This jurisdictional arbitrage was said to be a reason why it would be wrong in principle or as a matter of discretion to grant Chabra relief at all, when the purpose is simply to circumvent the constraints of the Onshore UAE Courts.

254. As to the indirect action under Articles 392-393 of the UAE Civil Code, the debtor must be shown to have been negligent or fraudulent in failing to exercise its rights and its conduct must entail harm to the creditor as a result of the debtor’s insolvency or the increase in insolvency.

255. The Second Defendant referred to the Claimants’ assertion that they could use these provisions to bring a claim on behalf of the First Defendant asking for the Second Defendant to reimburse the rights owed by the Second Defendant. This was said to be a hopeless proposition as the Claimants are not creditors of Pprime, they are creditors of Mr Gupta. Further, there is no evidence that Pprime had “no genuine commercial purpose” or existed “solely at [the First Defendant’s] discretion to shield assets”, which is what the Claimants say would be required.¹⁰⁴

256. The legal experts had not been able to identify any case in which a UAE Court used the action in simulation to nullify a company’s entire existence rather than correcting its shareholders. It would also be inconsistent with Article 393 as any indirect action would be for the benefit of the creditors of Pprime generally.¹⁰⁵

257. Then it was said that the Claimants had not identified any right that Pprime or the First Defendant would have against Vision to recover the properties. It simply stated that the question of whether the First Defendant held rights against the Second Defendant or against the corporate vehicles concerned was a matter of fact.

258. There was no allegation that the Vision Properties were misappropriated, albeit it was alleged that they were sold at an undervalue. Further, the Claimants had not identified the cause of action which they would assert. Thirdly, their analysis was self-defeating because it depended on treating Pprime as a non-existent sham entity. If that was true, it could not have any rights.¹⁰⁶

259. Given the difficulty of discerning any right that the First Defendant would have had to recover the properties from Vision, it was impossible to see how he had been negligent or fraudulent in failing to exercise it.

260. Even then, the Claimants would have to show that the First Defendant’s failure to exercise any right against Vision increased his insolvency. That would again require the Claimants to show that the transfers were at an undervalue, which they were not.

261. The Second Defendant then made submissions about the action in simulation noting the Claimants’ assertion that the sale contracts from Pprime to Vision were simulations in that the First Defendant was the true purchaser not Vision and that the sale was at an undervalue and to that extent a gift. Neither of these assertions were said to make any sense and there was no evidence to support them.¹⁰⁷

262. The Second Defendant posed the question: “why would Pprime sell properties to Vision, if the true intention was to sell them to [the First Defendant] instead?” Secondly, the gift analysis was incoherent. Even if the sales were at an undervalue, that would not make them a gift and if it were a gift that would not make it reversable.¹⁰⁸

263. Then it was said that the Claimants were not creditors of Pprime and would not be entitled to bring an action in simulation.

264. On the so-called Paulian Action relying upon Articles 396 to 398, the Second Defendant pointed out that a claimant must prove that a debt had arisen by the time of the alleged disposition under Article 396 and that the claim had already been brought by the time of the disposition under Article 397. It was acknowledged that much of the UAE Law in relation to Paulian Action was common ground. It was the obvious remedy for a creditor who wished to impugn a debtor’s disposal of property but it did not work in the Claimants’ case. The Claimants were not creditors of Pprime. The sale of the properties by Pprime in September 2020, January 2021 and May 2021 occurred well before the Claimants’ claims were issued in 2023. Even if the transfers were gratuitous, they predated the Claimants’ rights against the First Defendant. And even if the Claimants had claims against the First Defendant at the time of the transfers there was no evidence of their quantum or that they exceeded the First Defendant’s assets at those dates so as to enliven the prohibition on him making gifts of property.¹⁰⁹

265. Further, it was said to be impossible to discern a fraudulent intention or any prejudice to creditors from the sales.

266. The Second Defendant submitted generally that the Claimants’ proposed routes to enforcement were incoherent as a matter of UAE Law and even if the difficulties common to all of the routes it proposed could be overcome, it had to prove, in any event, that the properties were sold at an undervalue and that Pprime was acting with a fraudulent intention. The Second Defendant then addressed the question of undervalue and fraudulent intention.

267. The submissions addressed the evidence of undervalue in the transfers from Pprime to Vision made by the Claimants, however the only bases for that were estimates given by the Second Defendant’s lawyers of their value in 2024–2025 and a single transaction which the Claimants had identified in Platinum Tower from August 2021. This was said to have been dealt with comprehensively in the Second Defendant’s Fourth Witness Statement. It was pointed out that the Dubai Land Department had a system in place to prevent such sales to underpay Land Registry fees.

268. Despite the Claimants having sought an adjournment of their application following service of the Second Defendant’s Fourth Witness Statement with a view to obtaining expert valuations, they chose not to instruct any relevant expert nor serve any such evidence. The Fourth Witness Statement of Mr Willn asserted that no adequate explanation had been provided as to how Vision came to acquire the Vision properties from Pprime. In place of expert evidence, it was said that the Fourth Witness Statement of Mr Willn simply commented on publicly available data included in the Fourth Witness Statement of the Second Defendant. The tables exhibited to that Statement were said, on analysis, to be seriously misleading. In relation to the two Concorde Tower units it omitted relevant sales said to be at lower values. Similarly, the Platinum Tower table cut off at a date — 13 June 2021 — which excluded a lower cluster of sales following in late 2021 and early 2022. ¹¹⁰

269. As to fraudulent intention, the Claimants were not able to demonstrate that Pprime sold the properties to Vision with a fraudulent intention to put them beyond the reach of creditors. The sales were long before the Claimants’ claims were issued in England in February 2023.¹¹¹

270. The Second Defendant’s submissions then went into some detail about her personal history and the history of transactions involving the properties in issue as set out in her Fourth Witness Statement. In summary, she submitted:

271. The Second Defendant then critiqued various assertions made on behalf of the Claimants over some 35 paragraphs of her Skeleton Argument. It is not necessary for present purposes to traverse those submissions beyond saying that they set out arguments against a number of the Claimants’ contentions.

Contentions on the risk of dissipation

272. The Claimants contended that once they had established a sufficiently arguable case that the Second Defendant was folding assets for the First Defendant, the inference that there was a real risk of dissipation ought naturally to follow. In further support of that inference they referred to alleged misconduct on the part of the Second Defendant. This related to her sale of Villa K-03, the sale of three apartments which were subject to the Cockerill Order, namely the Discovery Gardens Apartments (a sale which did not amount to a breach of the DIFC FO) and other alleged failures by the Second Defendant to comply with the orders of this Court.

273. The Second Defendant made responding submissions as to the risk of dissipation of assets affected by the DIFC FO and the Variation Application.¹¹³

274. She relied upon Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Morimoto [2019] EWCA Civ 2203, in which it was said that a claimant must show “a real risk, judged objectively” that a judgment would go unsatisfied because of asset dissipation. The risk must be “established by solid evidence; mere inference or generalised assertion is not sufficient” and even where general dishonesty was established, it was “necessary to scrutinise the evidence to see whether the dishonesty in question points to the conclusion that assets may be dissipated”. The concept of dissipation as explained in that judgment was as follows:

275. The Second Defendant contended that as the order sought concerns Vision Properties specifically, it was necessary for the Claimants to establish by solid evidence an objective risk that they would be unjustifiably dissipated. The Second Defendant also pointed to the undertakings already embodied in the DIFC FO requiring her to give 72 hours’ notice before any sale of an affected asset takes place.

276. As to the sale of Villa K-03 on which the Claimants relied heavily, the Second Defendant said she did give 72 hours’ notice of the proposed sale and that despite the Claimants’ various attempts to impugn the transaction, there was no basis to suppose that it involved dissipation. Their principal objection was that it involved the Second Defendant using personal assets to satisfy a creditor of Vision. That was wrong, but was not in any event a legitimate objection to a sale of Vision Properties.

277. As the Claimants did not allege that the sale of Villa K-03 was at an undervalue, they would have had to contend that the debt that was repaid was not genuine.

Conclusion on application of Chabra criteria to assets affected by the DIFC FO

278. The onus was always on the Claimants to make a case for the freezing order against the Second Defendant. Suspicion supported by speculation does not make the arguable case required to support the making of a Chabra Order. There needs to be an arguable case that the Second Defendant holds assets in one way or another for the First Defendant and an arguable case for enforcement against such assets in satisfaction of the Claimants’ judgment against the First Defendant. In my opinion, having regard to the forensic accountancy evidence and the respective contentions of the Claimants and the Second Defendant which have been set out above, there is an arguable case for the proposition that the Second Defendant’s asset position cannot be explained by reference to her own economic activity, nor by reference to gifts. An arguable explanation for her asset position is that assets were transferred to her by the First Defendant on some basis. I express no view beyond stating that the proposition is arguable as the question whether the arguable proposition reflects the true position is a matter which can only be determined in enforcement proceedings in relation to those assets.

279. Similarly, while the availability of enforcement mechanisms under the UAE Civil Code against the assets of the First Defendant and against assets of the First Defendant held by the Second Defendant is arguable, I express no concluded view as to the availability of those causes of action.

Conclusion on risk of dissipation

280. As to the risk of dissipation, it is true to say that the existence of an arguable case that assets are held by the Second Defendant for the First Defendant does, in the circumstances of this case, imply a risk of dissipation. All that ‘risk’ means in this context is a non-trivial probability that the First and Second Defendants, absent the freezing orders, would take steps to put some of the affected assets beyond the reach of the judgment creditor. That there is such a risk is a plausible proposition, implicit in the circumstances in which the Chabra criteria in this case are found to have been satisfied.

Conclusion on Variation Application

281. As set out in the Claimants’ Skeleton Argument, by their Variation Application they effectively seek a blanket ban on the Second Defendant dealing (or causing or permitting Vision to deal) with the assets referred to in the DIFC FO — unless the Claimants agree or the Court orders otherwise. Those assets, in summary, comprise:

282. In so far as the Variation Application contemplates the continuance of the DIFC FO, I am of the view that its continuance is justified for the reasons stated above. In so far as the Variation Application would convert the notification requirement into a consent or court order requirement it seeks a level of protection which, in my opinion, is too draconian. It must be borne in mind that the power the Court is asked to exercise in making this order is discretionary. It ultimately rests upon criteria for the grant of the freezing order in the first place, which rise no higher than that there are arguable cases on the question whether the Second Defendant’s assets are held for the First Defendant and on the question whether enforcement action against those assets would be available under the UAE Civil Code. However, given the short-comings in notification to which the Claimants have drawn attention, there is a case for strengthening the notification requirements. To that end, I would be prepared to make an order varying paragraph 7 of Schedule D of the DIFC FO in the following terms which appear as an alternative to the variation to paragraph 7 of Schedule D of the Chabra Order, as set out in the draft Variation Order sought by the Application filed on 21 October 2025.

The conduit issue

283. The Second Defendant made two points relating to the use of the freezing order in Onshore Dubai. First it was submitted that so-called ‘conduit jurisdiction’ is not available for an Interim Order. The second point concerned the use of freezing orders outside the DIFC jurisdiction generally. A standard form freezing order has the conventional undertaking that the claimant will not seek to enforce it outside the DIFC. In relation to the first point, Counsel referred to Articles 29 to 32 of the Judicial Authority Law (Law No. 2 of 2025 Concerning Dubai International Financial Centre Courts).

284. Article 29 provides for enforcement to be carried out under the supervision of the Enforcement Judge who shall be appointed from among the DIFC Courts’ judges. Article 30 provides that compulsory enforcement shall only be permissible under an Enforcement Writ, as defined in the Judicial Authority Law and the Rules of Courts. Article 31 describes the jurisdiction of the Enforcement Judge inside and outside of the DIFC. Relevantly, it provides for what Counsel for the Second Defendant called ‘inbound enforcement’ in Article 31(4):

285. Article 32 concerns what Counsel described as ‘outbound enforcement onto the onshore courts’. It provides as follows:

286. Counsel pointed to the requirement, for onshore enforcement, of a writ of enforcement issued by the DIFC Courts that the judgment, order or decision issued by the DIFC Courts to be enforced shall be final and executory. The short point advanced for the Second Defendant was that a freezing order is not a final and executory order. It is an interim order. Counsel submitted that the requirement that a DIFC Enforcement Judge could seek the assistance of the Dubai Courts Enforcement Judge only where the judgment order or decision issued by the DIFC Courts to be enforced shall be final and executory, did not affect the power of the DIFC Courts to issue a freezing order. It was said, however, to have implications for how the freezing order should be used and that consequential orders would be necessary to ensure that the freezing order, if one were made, is not misused in the same way that H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke’s order was.

287. Counsel referred to Dadourian Group International Inc v Sims [2006] 1 WLR 2499, in which Arden LJ delivering the judgment of the Court, said:

288. The Court set out a number of guidelines which were relied upon by Counsel for the Second Defendant. In summary they were as follows:

289. The remaining Guidelines deal with the evidence in support of the application for permission (Guideline 5); the standard of proof as to the existence of assets covered by the WFO and within the jurisdiction of the foreign court; the applicant must show that there is a real prospect that such assets are located within the jurisdiction of the foreign court in question (Guideline 6); there must be evidence of a risk of dissipation (Guideline 7); the application should be made on notice to the respondent save for cases of urgency where it is just to do so when permission may be given without notice to the party against whom relief will be sought in the foreign proceedings. That party should have the earliest practicable opportunity of having the matter reconsidered by the court at a hearing of which he is given notice (Guideline 8).

290. Counsel emphasised Guideline 2.

291. It was submitted that the grant of permission to enforce onshore should be on terms requiring that the Claimants take the routes which they have said they are going to take by commencing an action in simulation or an indirect action and by doing that in short order. If they are dismissed, the relief should lapse within a certain period thereafter. It was submitted that the term should also require that the Claimants do not take any other route, including to obtain superior relief onshore. They should not be relying on any injunction that this Court grants as establishing any particular fact. They should withdraw attachments against the Second Defendant in the nature of USD 625 million.

292. Counsel for the Claimants said it was not their intention as seemed to be suggested by Counsel for the Second Defendant, that they would get an interim attachment onshore on the strength of the freezing order and be able to auction Vision’s assets or the Second Defendant’s assets. Counsel submitted that the Claimants’ case was presented from the outset as one in which they were getting an order from the DIFC with the intention of enforcing it onshore. It was for that reason that the orders which the Court has actually made and which are not challenged in these proceedings, do not contain the standard form undertaking not to enforce elsewhere. They contain a modified form of that undertaking.

293. It is to be remembered at all times that the purpose of the DIFC FO against the Second Defendant was to protect the assets against dissipation so as to allow the Claimants to seek recognition and enforcement of the English judgment in the Onshore Dubai Courts.

294. In my opinion, the use of the DIFC FO should be limited to the protection of assets which are said to be susceptible to enforcement proceedings onshore. It is for the Claimants to initiate onshore one or more of those enforcement proceedings in order to make good the claim that the assets are susceptible to recovery pursuant to the UAE Law. It may be that it is appropriate for the DIFC FO to be invoked in the onshore courts in support of measures incidental to the enforcement of the order. In my opinion, however, it is appropriate that any such enforcement action be subject to the supervision of this Court. An undertaking to that effect will be required from the Claimants.

295. Under RDC 45.18 conduit enforcement applies to enforce a DIFC judgment outside the DIFC under Article 7(2) or (3) of the Judicial Authority Law. Those provisions provided, among things, that a judgment could only be executed if it is “final and executory”. That requirement is now reflected in Article 32A(1) of the 2025 Court Law and in RDC 45.22(1). A freezing order is an interim remedy; it is not final and executory and does not qualify for execution under those provisions.

296. The Court of Appeal had held in this case that the DIFC Court may grant in personam injunctive relief in respect of assets elsewhere in the UAE. That power ensured the effectiveness of the Court’s power ultimately to enforce a money judgment if one were made. It did not follow that the DIFC Court would act as a conduit for interim relief. The Second Defendant contended that the procedure adopted by the Claimants would facilitate the routine conversion of DIFC freezing orders into Onshore Attachment Orders. Once the executory formula is attached, onshore authorities must “assist in implementing it even forcefully whenever requested to”.

297. The Second Defendant pointed out that the Interim Order was somehow enforced against the Second Defendant on the basis that she was a “judgment debtor” for USD 625 million. The Second Defendant submitted that if the Claimants wished to obtain attachment orders in the Dubai Onshore Courts, they should apply afresh for them there. As to that, there is a question as to whether the term “judgment debtor” was an accurate translation of the words actually used in the onshore proceedings.

298. Further, it was said that enforcement outside the DIFC even by a fresh application in Dubai, would be contrary to the usual undertaking in the standard form freezing order. It would have to be justified by reference to guidelines in Dadourian Group v Sims [2006] 1 WLR 2499. The Claimants had not attempted to do so.

299. Paragraph 7 of Schedule B of the DIFC FO will be amended to require an undertaking from the Claimants in the following terms:

The Funding Disclosure Application

300. By this element of the Variation Application, the Claimants seek an order pursuant to RDC 25.1(7) that the Second Defendant provide information and documentation relating to the source of her funding of legal expenses in the DIFC proceedings. The Claimants did not pursue this application at the hearing before the Chief Justice on 23 February 2026. According to the Claimants, that was because it was a matter which would be, and was in fact, raised in relation to the English Proceedings at a hearing on 26 February 2026 before Mr Justice Saini. The Claimants have now obtained certain Funding Agreements following that hearing which were said to explain how the First Defendant has funded his defence of the English Proceedings since April 2024. They did not explain how the Defendants, and especially the Second Defendant, are funding the DIFC proceedings. It was submitted that there is no longer any reason for this Court to leave the matter to be addressed in the English Proceedings.

301. The terms of RDC 25.1(7) invoked by the Claimants, confer power on the Court to direct a party:

Facts relied upon by the Claimants included the asset disclosure given on 10 June, whereby the Defendants declared that they did not hold more than USD 65,000 in cash in their personal bank accounts. On 2 September 2025 they served a Statement of Costs on the Jurisdiction Hearing which indicated that they had incurred or estimated that they would incur USD 520,650.82. The Second Defendant had disclosed on 18 February 2025 that their source of litigation funding was a funder named Nomas Global Investments LLC. The First Defendant’s English solicitors provided a copy of a Funding Agreement on 24 February 2025, which was said to evidence the means by which Nomas had funded the First Defendant’s legal costs in the English Proceedings. The Second Defendant was not a party to that Agreement. Key points made in the Claimants’ submissions were that:

302. The Application for Disclosure was opposed by Counsel for the Second Defendant who characterised it as an attempt to intermeddle with the Second Defendant’s ability to obtain legal representation. It was submitted that while there is a power to grant ancillary disclosure in order to make a freezing order effective, it was impossible to see how the Disclosure Application was designed for that purpose.

303. In closing oral submissions in reply, Senior Counsel for the Claimants was asked how the proposed disclosure engaged with the question of the protection of the specified assets. Counsel responded saying, inter alia, that if there be money in a bank account somewhere that has not been disclosed by either of the Defendants and should have been, which is the real source of legal expenses and that Nomas had been interposed as a way of providing a veneer of legitimacy to that arrangement, that would be relevant and absolute, and disclosure would be justified.

Conclusion on legal funding disclosure application

304. In my opinion, the application for disclosure in relation to legal funding is not demonstrated to have a sufficient connection to the protection of assets said to be held by the Second Defendant for the First Defendant to warrant the making of the order. The Disclosure Application is dismissed.

Costs

305. In my opinion, the Claimants were partially successful on their Variation Application. They were not successful on the contention that the Chabra criteria had been determined, nor was the application for disclosure of the source of the Second Defendant’s funding for payment of her legal fees. They were successful on the issue of the application of the Chabra criteria, which was the principal issue between the parties. In my opinion, there should be an apportionment of the costs. The Second Defendant should pay 50% of the costs of the Variation Application and of the Application for Interim Relief before His Excellency Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke.

306. The Discharge Application having been dismissed, the Second Defendant should pay the Claimants’ costs of the Discharge Application.

307. The parties will be given fourteen (14) days in which to make brief submissions seeking any variation of the proposed costs orders.

ORDERS

A. On the Variation Application dated 21 October 2025:

B. 1. The reference to the Applicants and the Respondents in the Varied Order is a reference to the Claimants and the Defendants in this proceeding.

C. On the Second Defendant’s Discharge Application:

D. 1. Costs are to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

E. The Parties are at liberty to agree a revised minute of the DIFC FO as varied by these Orders omitting provisions which have become redundant.

ANNEXURE A

The DIFC Freezing Order – as made by the Court of Appeal on 26 April 2025

PENAL NOTICE

IF YOU, PRATEEK GUPTA OR GINNI GUPTA, DISOBEY THIS ORDER YOU MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE REEFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DUBAI, FINED OR HAVE YOUR ASSETS SEIZED.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS THE RESPONDENTS TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY ALSO BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE RFEFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DUBAI, FINED OR HAVE THEIR ASSETS SEIZED.

THIS ORDER

1. This is an Order made against Prateek Gupta (the “First Respondent”) and Ginni Gupta (the “Second Respondent”, together the “Respondents”) by H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin, H.E. Justice Robert French and H.E. Justice Sir Peter Gross on the application of Trafigura PTE Ltd and Trafigura India PVT Ltd (the “Applicants”). The Judges read the Affidavits listed in Schedule A and accepted the undertakings set out in Schedule B of this Order, including the cross-undertaking in damages given by the parent company of the Applicants, Trafigura Group Pte Ltd, in paragraph 1 of Schedule B.

2. This Order was made at a hearing without notice to the Respondents. The Respondents have the right to apply to the Court to vary or discharge this Order – see paragraph 18 below.

3. No copy of Confidential Schedule D shall be supplied from the court records to any non-party without the permission of the Court. For the avoidance of doubt, the Applicants shall be at liberty to give notice of this Order (including Confidential Schedule D) to third parties insofar as it is reasonably necessary to do so for the purposes of seeking to ensure and/or confirm the Respondents’ compliance with (or enforcing) this Order and the Second Respondent’s undertakings set out in Confidential Schedule D.

4. There will be a further hearing in respect of this Order before the Court of First Instance on 11 June 2025, subject to further order of the Court, in respect of which the Respondents have liberty to apply (the “Return Date”).

5. Unless otherwise stated:

FREEZING ORDER AGAINST THE FIRST RESPONDENT

6. Until the Return Date or further order of the Court, the First Respondent must not remove from the UAE or in any way dispose of, or deal with or diminish the value of any of the First Respondent’s assets which are in the UAE up to the value of USD 625,000,000.

7. Paragraph 6 applies to all the First Respondent’s assets whether or not they are in his own name and whether they are solely or jointly owned. For the purpose of this Order, the First Respondent’s assets include any asset which he has the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were his own. The First Respondent is to be regarded as having such power if a third party holds or controls the asset in accordance with his direct or indirect instructions.

8. The prohibition in paragraph 6 applies in particular to the assets identified in Schedule C.

9. If the total value free of charges or other securities (“unencumbered value”) of the First Respondent’s assets in the UAE exceeds USD 625,000,000, the Respondents may remove any of those assets from the UAE or may dispose of or deal with them so long as the total unencumbered value of the First Respondent’s assets still in the UAE remains above USD 625,000,000.

INJUNCTION AGAINST THE SECOND RESPONDENT

10. Until the Return Date or further order of the Court, and save as provided in Confidential Schedule D, the Second Respondent must not dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of –

PROVISION OF INFORMATION BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT

11. Unless paragraph 12 applies:

12. If the provision of any of the information in paragraphs 11(1) or (2) is likely to incriminate the First Respondent, he may be entitled to refuse to provide it, but is recommended to take legal advice before refusing to provide the information. Wrongful refusal to provide the information is contempt of court and may render the First Respondent liable to be imprisoned, fined or have his assets seized.

13 . Within 7 working days of service of this Order, the First Respondent must swear and serve on the Applicants’ legal representatives an affidavit setting out (i) the information referred to in paragraph 11(1) and 11(2) of this Order and (ii) the steps taken by the First Respondent to comply with paragraph 11(2) of this Order.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION BY THE SECOND RESPONDENT

14.

15. Within 7 working days of service of this Order, the Second Respondent must swear and serve on the Applicants’ legal representatives an affidavit setting out the information referred to in paragraph 14(1) of this Order.

EXCEPTIONS TO THIS ORDER

16.

COSTS

17. The costs of this application are reserved to the Judge hearing the application on the Return Date.

VARIATION OR DISCHARGE OF THIS ORDER

18. Anyone served with or notified of this Order may apply to the Court of First Instance at any time to vary or discharge this Order (or so much of it as affects that person), but they must first inform the Applicants’ legal representatives. If any evidence is to be relied upon in support of the application, the substance of it must be communicated in writing to the Applicants’ legal representatives in advance.

INTERPRETATION OF THIS ORDER

19. A Respondent who is an individual who is ordered jot to do something must not do it himself or herself or in any other way. He or she must not do it through others acting on his or her behalf or on his or her instructions or with his or her encouragement.

PARTIES OTHER THAN THE APPLICANTS AND THE RESPONDENTS

Effect of this Order

20. It is a contempt of court for any person notified of this Order knowingly to assist in or permit a breach of this Order. Any person doing so may be referred to the Attorney General of Dubai, fined or have their assets seized.

Set off by banks

21. This injunction does not prevent any bank from exercising any right of set off it may have in respect of any facility which it gave to any Respondent before it was notified of this Order.

Withdrawal by the Respondents

22. No bank need enquire as to the application or proposed application of any money withdrawn by any Respondent if the withdrawal appears to be permitted by this Order.

Persons outside the DIFC

23. Except as provided in paragraph 24 below, the terms of this Order do not affect or concern anyone outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

24. The terms of this Order will affect the following persons in a country or state outside the jurisdiction of this Court:

Assets located outside the DIFC

25. In respect of assets located outside the DIFC, nothing in this Order shall prevent any third party from complying with:

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

26. The Applicants may serve this Order, application notices (including their application for continuation of this Order at the Return Date) and any other documents required to be served in these proceedings:

27. Notwithstanding the undertakings contained in Schedule B of this Order, the Applicants shall be entitled to delay effecting service of this Order and other documentation placed before the Court at the without notice hearing until the earlier of:

28. The Applicants are not required to serve Arabic translations of the claim form or any other documents in these proceedings.

ENFORCEMENT OF THIS ORDER

29. This Order is an Enforcement Order, and the Applicants are granted liberty to enforce this Order before the Dubai Courts. The Registrar of the DIFC Court is directed to issue the appropriate letter to the Chief Justice of the Dubai Courts requesting enforcement of this Order after the filing of the necessary application and ratification pursuant thereto.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF APPLICANTS’ LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES

The Applicants’ legal representatives are: Stephenson Harwood Middle East LLP Burj Daman Building Level 13 Dubai, United Arab Emirates Tel: +971 4 407 3900 Email: Mark.Lakin@stephensonharwood.com

COMMUNICATION WITH THE COURT

All communications to the Court about this Order should be sent electronically to registry@difccourts.ae quoting case number CA-001-2025. DIFC COURTS Level 3, Precinct Building 5 (South) The Gate District Dubai International Financial Centre PO Box 211724 Dubai UAE Tel +971 4 727 3333 Fax +971 4 427 3330 www.difccourts.ae [Signed]

Issued by
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 26 April 2025
At: 10pm

SCHEDULE A

AFFIDAVITS

The Applicants relied on the following affidavits –

1. The Affidavit of Mark David Lakin sworn on 11 April 2025, together with Exhibit MDL1.

2. The Affidavit of Sokratis Oikonomou sworn on 11 April 2025, together with Exhibit SOI1.

SCHEDULE B

UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN TO THE COURT BY THE APPLICANTS

(1) If the Court later finds that this Order has caused loss to the Respondents, and decides that the Respondents should be compensated for that loss, the Applicants’ ultimate parent, Trafigura Group Pte Ltd, will comply with any order the Court may make.

(2) Upon the earlier of (a) two business days after the Dubai Court commences execution of this Order; or (b) 20 May 2025, the Applicants will serve upon the Respondents the following documents as soon as reasonably practicable:

(3) Anyone notified of this Order will be given a copy of it by the Applicants’ legal representatives

(4) The Applicants will pay the reasonable costs of anyone other than the Respondents which have been incurred as a result of this Order including the costs of finding out whether that person holds any of the First Respondent’s assets and if the Court later finds that this Order has caused such person loss, and decides that such person should be compensated for that loss, the Applicants will comply with any order the Court may make.

(5) If this Order ceases to have effect (for example, if the Respondents provide security as provided for above), the Applicants will immediately take all reasonable steps to inform in writing anyone to whom it has given notice of this Order, or who it has reasonable grounds for supposing may act upon this Order, that it has ceased to have effect.

(6) The Applicants will not without the permission of the Court use any information obtained as a result of this Order for the purpose of any civil or criminal proceedings, either in the DIFC or in any other jurisdiction, other than for:

(7) The Applicants will not without the permission of the Court seek to enforce this Order in any country outside the UAE.

SCHEDULE C

THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S ASSETS

Real Estate

1. Villa K-01, Frond K, Palm Jumeirah, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, registered in the name of the Second Respondent.

Bank Accounts

2. Accounts held by the First Respondent with Emirates NBD Bank as follows:

3. Accounts held by the First Respondent with Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank as follows:

Shares or participatory/other interests in companies or other entities

4. 1,000 shares in Pprime Limited, a UAE company.

5. 1,000 shares in Vision, held by the Second Respondent.

6. An interest in UD Trading Group Holding limited, a company with headquarters in Platinum Tower, Jumeriah Lake Towers, Dubai.

7. An interest in UIL Commodities DMCC, a Dubai Company.

SCHEDULE D

Schedule D Assets

1. Villa K-03 Palm Jumeirah, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, registered in the name of the Second Respondent.

2. 15 properties in Dubai owned indirectly through Vision, being:

Schedule D Asset Terms

3. Any such dealings or disposals of the Schedule D Assets will be made at reasonable market value, and not for an undervalue or no consideration.

4. The proceeds of any dealings with or disposals of the Schedule D Assets will only be used by the Second Respondent to pay:

5. Any payments made by or pursuant to loans to the First Respondent in respect of his legal fees or those of the second to fifth defendants in the English Proceedings will be made directly to the Second Respondent’s solicitors’ client account to be held there for that purpose, and not paid via the First Respondent or any of the other defendants in the English Proceedings.

6. Save for the Schedule D Assets, the Second Respondent will not cause, procure or permit Vision to deal with or dispose of any of the assets it owns, including its interest in Silver Star SP2, other than in the ordinary and proper course of business.

7. Prior to any dealings with or disposals of any of the Schedule D Assets, or any dealings or disposals by Vision within paragraph 6 of this Schedule D, the Second Respondent will:

ANNEXURE B

VARIATION ORDER SOUGHT BY APPLICATION FILED 21 OCTOBER 2025

“IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The Application is granted.

2. The Second Respondent must, within 7 working days of the date of this Order, disclose to the Applicants’ legal representatives the following information and documentation concerning the properties itemised at paragraphs 7(2)(vi-(xv) of Schedule D of the Chabra Order (the “Platinum Tower Units”)

3. The Second Respondent must, within 7 working days of the date of this Order, disclose to the Applicants’ legal representatives the following information and documentation concerning Villa K- 03, Palm Jumeirah, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as referenced at paragraph 7(1) of Schedule D of the Chabra Order (“Villa K-03”)’

4 . [The Second Respondent must, within 7 working days of the date of this Order, swear and serve on the Applicants’ legal representatives an affidavit setting out the information referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.]

5 . [Schedule D of the Chabra Order is hereby amended as follows:

[OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE]

6. [Paragraph 7 of Schedule D of the Chabra Order be amended as follows:

7. Within 14 days of the date of this Order, the Respondents are each required to serve on the Applicants’ legal representatives a schedule providing a detailed breakdown of the total legal and other costs incurred in responding to DIFC Court proceedings CA-001-2025 and CFI-040-2025, which confirms the status of payment and discloses the source of funds used to settle the costs or intended to be used to settle the costs (as applicable).

8. The Respondents shall pay the Claimants’ costs of and occasioned by, and in preparation for, the Application on the indemnity basis, to be assessed summarily if not agreed.

ANNEXURE C

Orders of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke, 5 November 2025

ANNEXURE D

Order of H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin, 24 February 2026

UPON the Court of Appeal’s Order in CA-001-2025, dated 26 April 2025, granting the Applicants’ without notice application for a freezing injunction and ancillary orders against the Respondents (the “DIFC FO”), as continued by the Order of the Court of Appeal dated 22 September 2025

AND UPON the Applicants’ Application No. CFI-040-2025-3 dated 21 October 2025 (the “Variation Application”), seeking (1) additional disclosure by the Respondents relating to the assets in Schedule D of the DIFC FO (the “Schedule D Assets”) (the “Additional Disclosure Application”); (2) variation of the terms of Schedule D of the DIFC FO (the “Schedule D Variation Application”); and (3) disclosure by the Respondents as to the source of their legal funding (the “Source of Legal Funding Application”)

AND UPON the Applicants’ Application No. CFI-040/2025/4 dated 31 October 2025 for interim relief pending the determination of the Variation Application (the “Interim Relief Application”)

AND UPON hearing counsel for the Applicants at the Interim Relief Application being before H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke on 5 November 2025, with the Respondents not attending

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke dated 5 November 2025 in relation to the Interim Relief Application (the “5 November Order”) and the same being served on the Respondents by email on 5 November 2025

AND UPON the Second Respondent serving her third witness statement on 18 February 2026 (“Gupta 3”)

AND UPON the Applicants amending the order sought pursuant to the Additional Disclosure Application in the light of the matters set out in Gupta 3 by an amended draft order provided with their Skeleton Argument dated 19 February 2026

AND UPON the Respondents by their Skeleton Argument dated 19 February 2026 arguing that the 5 November Order should be discharged

AND UPON hearing counsel for the Applicants and counsel for the Respondents at the Application Hearing before H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin on 23 February 2026 (the “23 February 2026 Hearing”)

AND UPON the Applicants’ oral application pursuant to RDC 28.5(2) at the 23 February 2026 Hearing for an order requiring the Second Respondent to produce (with contemporaneous metadata intact) (1) the invoice mentioned in paragraph 9 of Gupta 3; and (2) the personal guarantee mentioned in paragraph 10 of Gupta 3 (the “RDC 28.5 Application”)

AND UPON the Applicants not pursuing the Source of Legal Funding Application at the 23 February 2026 Hearing on the basis that it was a matter which was going to go before the Court in London on 26 February 2026

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

Adjournment and Continuation

1. Save as set out in paragraph 3 below, the Variation Application is adjourned in accordance with the directions set out below to a further hearing on 14 April 2026 (The “Adjourned Variation Hearing”).

2. Until the Adjourned Variation Hearing:

Disclosure

3. The Additional Disclosure Application is dismissed.

4. The RDC 28.5 Application is adjourned on the following terms:

Application to discharge the 5 November Order

5. By no later than 4pm (GST) on 9 March 2026, the Second Respondent shall issue any application to discharge the 5 November Order and file and serve any evidence and submissions in support of that application (the “Discharge Application”).

6. By no later than 4pm (GST) on 25 March 2026, the Applicants shall file and serve any evidence inanswer to the Discharge Application.

7. By no later than 4pm (GST) on 2 April 2026, the Second Respondents shall file and serve any evidence in reply on the Discharge Application.

Further Chabra evidence on the Schedule D Variation Application

8. The Applicants have liberty to serve any further evidence that the Schedule D Assets are assets in respect of which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they would be amenable to execution of a judgment against the First Respondent, any such evidence and submissions to be filed and served by no later than 4pm (GST) on 9 March 2026.

9. By no later than 4pm (GST) on 25 March 2026, the Second Respondent shall serve any evidence and submissions in answer.

10. By no later than 4pm (GST) on 2 April 2026, the Applicants shall serve any evidence in and submissions in reply.

Adjourned Variation Hearing

11. The Adjourned Variation Hearing shall be listed before H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin at 8am (GST) on 14 April 2026 with a hearing estimate of 4 hours) for the purposes of determining (1)the Discharge Application; (2) the Schedule D Variation Application; and (3) the Source of Legal Funding Application (if pursued by the Applicants).

Liberty to “Apply

12. The parties shall have liberty to apply.

Costs

13. Costs shall be reserved.

ANNEXURE E

BREACHES OF FULL AND FRANK DISCLOSURE: FEDRIGOLI 1 AND WILLN 1