Claim No: CFI 053/2024

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

QATAR GENERAL INSURANCE & REINSURANCE COMPANY QSPC

Claimant

and

EMRGENT RISK SOLUTIONS LIMITED

Defendant

---

---

JUDGMENT OF H.E. JUSTICE SAPNA JHANGIANI

---

UPON the Part 7 Claim Form dated 25 July 2024 (the “Claim”)

AND UPON the amended versions of DIFC Law No. 6 of 2004 (the “Contract law”); DIFC Law No. 5 of 2005 (the “Law of Obligations”); DIFC Law No. 6 of 2005 (the “Implied Terms Law”); and DIFC Law. No 7 of 2005 (the “Law of Damages and Remedies”)

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant at the trial before H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani from 26 to 29 January 2026 (the “Trial”)

AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Defendant has breached its obligations to the Claimant under the Contract (as defined below) and is liable for damages as a result thereof.

2. The Defendant is to pay to the Claimant the amount of QAR 6,089,712.00 in respect of HOC1 (as defined below) by way of damages for breach of contract.

3. The Defendant is to pay to the Claimant the amount of QAR 146,724.61 in respect of HOC2 (as defined below) by way of damages for breach of contract. Sums due from the Defendant to the Claimant in respect of HOC2 continue to accrue.

4. If the Claimant pays an invoice in respect of HOC2 or HOC3 (as defined below), it will be entitled to be indemnified by the Defendant for the Defendant’s half share of that invoice, by way of damages for the Defendant’s breach of contract, if either:

5. If there is any dispute about the entitlement of the Claimant under subparagraphs 4(a) or 4(b) above, the parties may return to Court to have the matter determined.

6. Compound interest shall apply to the sum of QAR 6,089,712.00 ordered to be paid to the Claimant by the Defendant at paragraph 2 above at a rate of 9% from 7 December 2020.

7. Within 14 days of today’s date, the Claimant shall file costs submissions, and is invited to file further submissions on the date from which interest should run for the Defendant’s half share of each of the four payments made by the Claimant so far in respect of HOC2.

8. The Defendant shall file reply submissions within 14 days of the Claimant’s submissions referred to at paragraph 7 above.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 3 June 2026
At: 11am

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

A. BACKGROUND

1. The Claimant is an insurance and reinsurance company incorporated in Qatar. The Defendant is in business as a reinsurance and retrocession broker. This dispute arises from a contract between the Claimant and the Defendant (the “Contract”) by which the Defendant agreed to place retrocession coverage for reinsurance cover provided by the Claimant (the “Reinsurance”).

The Underlying Insurance

2. The underlying insurance (“Underlying Insurance”) comprised excess liability insurance underwritten by Doha Insurance Group QPSC (“Doha”). The Underlying Insurance was provided in respect of the Nakilat Damen Shipyard in Qatar (the “Shipyard”), which contained a superyacht facility (the “Superyacht Facility”).

3. The Superyacht Facility was owned by Qatar Petroleum (“QP”) (now Qatar Energy) which granted a licence to Qatar Gas Transport Company Ltd (“Nakilat”) to access, occupy and use certain areas within the Shipyard, including the Superyacht Facility. The licence was granted under an “Access and Indemnification Agreement” dated 1 June 2011 (and amended on 1 March 2014). Nakilat Damen Shipyards Qatar (“NDSQ”, a JV of Nakilat and Damen Shipyards Qatar Holding BV) was a “Permitted Sublicensee” under the Access and Indemnification Agreement, and was licensed to conduct, amongst other things, superyacht repairs in the Shipyard.

4. The Underlying Insurance was issued to the following co-assureds (the “Underlying Insureds”), together with their contractors, subcontractors and consultants to the extent performing work for NDSQ, as well as their officers, directors and employees etc.:

5. The Underlying Insureds entered into the Underlying Insurance on around 1 June 2018. The Underlying Insurance was valid from 1 June 2018 to 31 May 2020 and, among other terms, was governed by the laws of Qatar and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Qatar. It contained three sections of cover:

6. The specific policy wording under Sections 1 and 2 of the Underlying Insurance is relevant to the dispute between the parties and is addressed further below.

The Reinsurance

7. Doha elected to reinsure its exposure with three different markets: one brokered by AON to the extent of 40% of the risk assumed (the “AON Reinsurance”); the Reinsurance with the Claimant to the extent of 10% of Doha’s risk; and the remaining 50% of the risk was placed with other reinsurers. On the face of it, Doha Insurance did not retain any of the risk itself.

8. The Claimant entered into the Reinsurance with Doha for a 10% share of 100% of the Underlying Insurance by a contract of reinsurance entered into on or about 16 July 2018. The Reinsurance contained the same clauses as the Underlying Insurance, and was also governed by Qatar law and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Qatar.

9. Under the AON Reinsurance (bearing Policy Number MALIA1800254):

10. In the AON slip (the “AON Slip”), “QBE Syndicate 1036” (i.e. QBE) were designated as ‘Slip Leader’. The AON Slip is also subject to Qatar law and the jurisdiction of the Qatari courts.

11. The AON Reinsurance was governed by materially the same clauses as the Underlying Insurance, save for one exception argued for by the Defendant. The Defendant contends that a general cross-liability clause (providing coverage for claims between the Underlying Insureds) was excluded under Section 1 of the Underlying Insurance, but wrongly referred to in the AON Slip as being included under Section 1. This is addressed further below.

The Contract and Retrocession Coverage

12. The Claimant and the Defendant entered into the Contract on or around 18 July 2018. By the Contract, the Defendant agreed to place retrocession coverage for the Reinsurance.

13. It is not disputed that the Contract:

14. On 15 July 2018, Mr Alterhi of the Claimant emailed Mr Reichardt of the Defendant, attaching the 2-year Reinsurance in respect of which the Defendant was instructed to seek retrocession. The Claimant offered a 10% share with total deduction of 20% to the Defendant. The AON Slip was forwarded by Mr Alterhi to Mr Reichardt and Mr Tommy of the Defendant on 17 July 2018.

15. On 18 July 2018, Mr Tommy of the Defendant confirmed that MS Amlin Lloyd’s Syndicate No. 2001 (“Amlin”) had offered a 5% line and asked Mr Alterhi to confirm whether the Defendant could proceed to bind them, and also to confirm that the slip and premium were to mirror the AON Slip led by QBE in London. Mr Alterhi provided his confirmation by response of the same day.

16. The Amlin slip (“Amlin Slip”) provides that the “Lead Reinsurer” is “Syndicate 1036 managed by QBE at Lloyds of London” even though QBE do not underwrite any of the risk under the Amlin slip. The Amlin Slip is scratched (i.e. has a manuscript annotation) which provides “RE Reference at 2019. Renewal if required”. Nothing appears to turn on this.

17. On 18 July 2018, the Defendant contacted Lochain Patrick Insurance Brokers (“LPIB”) for the purpose of placing the final half (5%) of the Claimant’s share of risk under the Reinsurance.

18. On 23 July 2018, Mr Tommy of the Defendant confirmed to Mr Alterhi of the Claimant that there was support from “Liberty” (ie. Liberty Speciality Markets Lloyd’s Syndicate No. 4472) for writing the balance 5% retrocession, on the terms of the AON Slip. Mr Alterhi asked Mr Tommy on 24 July to bind Liberty, and the Defendant in turn confirmed this to LPIB.

19. The Liberty slip with reference B06111MR1812138 (the “Liberty Slip”) was sent to Mr Tommy of the Defendant by LPIB on 27 July 2018 and included the following “Notice of Cancellation Clause” which was “scratched” (i.e. written by hand):

20. The same manuscript wording was included in the “Risk Details” section of the Liberty Slip:

21. I shall refer to the Notices referred to at paragraphs 19 and 20 above collectively as the “Cancellation Notice”.

22. The Liberty Slip was again sent by LPIB to the Defendant on 14 August 2018 as part of the “formal documentation for your file”.

23. On 28 October 2018, Mr Alterhi of the Claimant queried in an email to Mr Tommy of the Defendant the amount of premium being charged on the account. In reply, Mr Tommy confirmed that the coverage was for 2 years and explained that the reason for the tax invoice showing a single-year period was due to the Defendant’s internal IT systems:

24. On 30 October 2018, Mr Reichardt of the Defendant asked Mr Alterhi to confirm that 100% of the premium would be paid in two equal annual instalments, and asked for confirmation of the annual instalment dates.

25. The Defendant’s helpful diagram of the insurance scheme referred to in these proceedings (with the Claimant referred to as “QGIRC” and the Defendant referred to as “ARB Re”, reflecting its previous name “Arab European Reinsurance Brokers Ltd”), is as follows:

26. The “claims control clauses” in the AON Reinsurance referred to in the above diagram are in relevant part as follows:

The Loss and Insurance Claims

27. On Sunday 11 August 2019, a fire in Super Yacht Hall 11 (the “Superyacht Hall”) caused the total loss of three yachts housed inside the hall at the time, as well as damage to the Superyacht Hall itself (the “Loss”). (There are references in the record to both Halls 10 and 11 being damaged, but nothing appears to turn on this, and I shall refer to “Superyacht Hall” in the singular).

28. Following the Loss, the following heads of claim have been made against the Underlying Insurance:

29. On 1 September 2019, Mr Reichardt of the Defendant sent the following email to Mr Retheeshkumar Rajappan of the Claimant:

30. On 5 September 2019, Mr Tommy of the Defendant sent the Cancellation Notice to the Claimant, attached to the following email to Mr Alterhi:

31. On 21 November 2019, Mr Alterhi wrote to Mr Tommy in the following terms:

32. On 23 November 2019, Mr Alterhi requested that Mr Tommy: “Please forward the email you sent that shows Liberty’s slip [containing the Cancellation Notice] at inception”. The same request was made again by Mr Alterhi on 4 December 2019. There are no documents on the record evidencing that the Liberty Slip was sent to the Claimant prior to 5 September 2019.

33. Liberty has taken the position that it is not liable to indemnify the Claimant for the Loss on the basis that there was no retrocession cover in place under the Liberty Slip during the period of the Loss on account of the Cancellation Notice.

34. The Claimant brings the current claim against the Defendant, arguing that the Defendant breached its duty of care to the Claimant (both in tort and contract) by failing to procure back-to-back retrocession cover for the Claimant, and failing to inform the Claimant of Liberty’s Cancellation Notice prior to the expiry of Liberty’s retrocession cover (the “Liberty Retrocession Cover”). The Claimant contends that but for the Defendant’s breaches, it would have been indemnified by Liberty. It claims against the Defendant for the current and future amounts it contends Liberty would have been liable to pay – and would have paid - under the Liberty Retrocession Cover, but for the Cancellation Notice.

35. Although the Claimant’s Claim in these proceedings was pursued in both contract and in tort, remedies have been awarded to the Claimant in contract. It was not suggested by either party that the remedies in tort would have been different.

B. THE TRIAL

36. Based on the issues addressed in the Defendant’s skeleton argument, the Claimant invited the Defendant prior to the Trial to confirm that several issues which had previously been in contention were no longer disputed. A significant narrowing of the issues by Trial resulted, and the issues narrowed even further during Trial.

37. The day before the Trial commenced, the Defendant indicated that it would no longer be relying on the evidence of Mr Tommy, and his evidence was therefore withdrawn. The Defendant further indicated that it would not need to cross-examine the Claimant’s witnesses Mr Ameer Muhasin and Mr Kumar Vivek Rai, who were already on their journey from Qatar to Dubai for the Trial. Their evidence went to the following:

38. The Trial took place over 4 days with factual evidence tendered by the following:

39. Each side appointed an expert in Qatar law:

40. The scope of evidence given by the experts was wide-ranging. They generally agreed on the core principles and provisions of Qatari law, but disagreed on their application to this case.

41. The Claimant submitted at the conclusion of the Trial that, where Mr Muhannadi’s evidence was inconsistent with that of Mr Al-Ansari, it should be rejected for a number of reasons, including the following:

42. Based on the points set out above, there is a lack of certainty as to: (i) how much Mr Muhannadi actually contributed to each report; and (ii) the extent to which the reports reflected his views on Qatar law relevant to this case, based on his experience and the relevant facts and documents provided to him. On this basis, I find the evidence of Mr Al-Ansari to be more reliable than that of Mr Muhannadi.

43. However, and in any event, as set out below, there were ultimately not many determinative issues in this case which turned on disputed areas of Qatar law. Further, on a number of issues on which Mr Al-Ansari provided evidence, the Defendant did not adduce any Qatar law evidence in reply.

C. THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

44. It is common ground between the parties that:

45. It is also common ground that the Defendant was under a number of regulatory obligations pursuant to the DFSA Rulebook, but the Defendant contests the relevance of these obligations. It is not necessary for me to make any findings about the relevance of these obligations.

46. By Trial, the Defendant no longer relied on any evidence (including witness evidence) to suggest that the Defendant had informed the Claimant of the Cancellation Notice in the Liberty Slip prior to 5 September 2019, having pleaded that the Cancellation Notice “would have been sent” to the Claimant on, or shortly after, 27 July 2018.

47. For the avoidance of doubt, I find that the Cancellation Notice was not sent to the Claimant by the Defendant until 5 September 2019, given:

48. In relation to the standard of care and particulars of breach of duty, the Defendant does not admit the Claimant’s categorisation of the standard of care or the particulars of breach alleged against the Defendant, but it does not deny those particulars, nor did it advance any alternative case at Trial.

49. By Trial, the Claimant’s principal case on breach of duty was encapsulated in the pithy summary that the Defendant breached its Contractual Duty and Tortious Duty to the Claimant by:

50. The Claimant’s case rests on the assumption that the Cancellation Notice in the Liberty Slip was effective. This is not admitted by the Defendant, and I address this issue first below, before addressing the standard of care and alleged breach of duty.

51. On causation and loss, the Defendant’s position is that, even if breach is established, it is not liable to the Claimant for any loss because:

52. An overarching argument raised by the Claimant is that all the points raised at paragraph 51 above are “ambitiously novel” defences which no other party involved in the insurance scheme has taken, given that all the other insurers have paid out on identically worded policies, which are also governed by Qatar law.

53. Critically, the Claimant relies on the fact that Liberty itself participated in – and paid out under – another part of the insurance scheme, namely the AON Reinsurance. The Claimant submits that the Defendant’s defences therefore have a fundamental flaw: even if Liberty had a defence under the Liberty Retrocession Cover as a matter of Qatar law, that is irrelevant, because as a matter of causation, Liberty was 100% likely to pay an indemnity in any event, because Liberty did so on the materially identically worded AON Reinsurance that it participated in.

54. The Defendant denies that the Claimant’s loss of chance analysis is correct as a matter of law.

55. The Claimant also claims that, where QBE exercised claims control, then pursuant to Qatar law, QBE became the legal decision maker on documentation sufficiency, and all parties in the chain are bound by those determinations under good faith principles, absent fraud or manifest error. The Defendant disagrees with the Claimant’s analysis under Qatar law, and this issue is a key area of contention between the parties’ experts.

II. STANDARD OF CARE AND BREACH OF DUTY

56. The only issue actively contested by the Defendant at Trial on standard of care and breach of the Contractual Duty and the Tortious Duty was whether the Cancellation Notice in the Liberty Slip was effective. I address that issue first.

I. Was the Cancellation Notice in the Liberty Slip effective?

57. There is no dispute as to the applicable principles of contractual construction under Qatar law, as follows (in translation):

58. The Defendant submits that the Cancellation Notice is premised on:

59. The Defendant argues that the purpose of the clause is to enable the parties, underwriters and assured to assess the performance of the contract during the first 11 months, and see whether they are prepared to continue and on what terms. It is for that reason that the clause envisages a 30-day notice period, and not a 365-day notice period.

60. The Defendant further argues that by the use of the word “deemed”, meaning “to be treated as”, the Cancellation Notice does not purport to be an actual notice.

61. In response, the Claimant:

62. In relation to the use of the word “deemed”, the Claimant submits that “deemed” refers to the date the Notice was given (in other words, it was deemed to be given at inception of the risk).

63. The Defendant submits that there is no conceivable way in which a retroactive notice of that nature could be said to be a proper notice under LSW196A, as it could not take effect from a retroactive date.

64. The Court’s decision on this issue is that the Cancellation Notice is valid. For ease of reference, the operative part of the clause is set out here:

65. The purely literal construction of the clause is that 30 days notice must be given of cancellation. However, I do not accept a literal meaning that exactly 30 days notice must be given, and reject it as implausible and unworkable. For the same reasons, I reject the Defendant’s argument that the clause must mean “approximately 30 days” with “a reasonable tolerance”.

66. Pursuant to Article 169(2) of the Qatar Civil Code (as translated), I must construe the clause by interpreting “the common intention of the parties, taking into account the nature of the transaction and the required good faith and trust between the parties, in accordance with customary practices in transactions”. Adopting this approach, I have no doubt that the clause requires “at least” 30 days notice, with there being no bar on notice being provided at inception, approximately a year in advance of the intended cancellation. With this construction in mind, I accept the evidence of the Claimant’s expert Mr AlAnsari that the “…Cancellation Notice is valid and effective under Qatari law”.

67. The Defendant’s argument that the Cancellation Notice could not have been deemed to be given at inception was not persuasive, and I am mindful that Mr Tommy of the Defendant wrote to the Claimant’s Mr Alterhi on 17 September 2019 stating, “the notice of cancellation is deemed to have been given at inception of reinsurance irrespective of change in terms and rates”.

II. What is the Standard of Care for the Contractual Duty and Tortious Duty?

68. It was not clear at Trial whether the Defendant disputed or even continued to “not admit” the particulars advanced by the Claimant on the standard of care, with the Defendant’s lead Counsel submitting “I don’t think it is likely to be a live issue”.

69. For the avoidance of doubt, I accept, as submitted by the Claimant, that the relevant principles and authorities on the standard of care for the Contractual Duty and Tortious Duty are as follows:

III. Did the Defendant breach the Standard of Care?

70. The principal breaches alleged against the Defendant are as set out at paragraph 49 above. The Claimant pleaded several other particulars of breach, but submitted at Trial that these would be unlikely to add materially to the principal allegation concerning the Defendant’s failure to procure back-to-back retrocession coverage. The Claimant’s additional breaches of duty alleged can be summarised as follows:

71. I have no hesitation in finding that the Defendant breached its Contractual Duty and Tortious Duty to the Claimant as alleged at paragraphs 49 and 70 above for the following reasons:

E. CAUSATION AND LOSS

72. The Defendant’s position is that, on any basis, the insurance claims in this matter are large, with the cost of repairing the Superyacht Hall alone - before a decision was taken to indemnify the loss on an unrepaired basis - having been estimated at a cost in excess of USD 100 million. The Defendant submits that the claims would have merited “the fullest scrutiny and loss adjustment”, but the Claimant, as cedant, instead appears to have performed nothing more than “a box ticking exercise” by relying on the loss adjustment carried out by QBE as the leading underwriter on the AON Reinsurance, which was a different contract of reinsurance.

73. It should be noted that the Defendant sought disclosure of the loss adjuster files in this case, but QBE was not forthcoming with these files, such that disclosure of the underlying claim and loss adjustment documents, including settlement agreements, was piecemeal. One tranche of documents was disclosed on 19 March 2025, and two tranches of the disclosure took place on 15 August 2025 and 17 November 2025 – after the Defendant’s Amended Defence of 18 July 2025.

I. Is there prima facie cover under the Underlying Insurance?

74. The Defendant admits that HOC1 – the loss of the yachts – is prima facie covered under Section 1 of the Underlying Insurance. The Defendant does not accept that HOC2 (relating to the costs of dismantling and removing the damaged superyachts, and costs associated with the claim), and HOC3 (the claim for unrepaired damage to the Superyacht Hall) are prima facie covered by Section 1 of the Underlying Insurance. The Defendant also denies that HOC2 and HOC3 are covered by Section 2 (although, in fact, the Claimant does not assert that HOC2 is covered under Section 2).

75. The Claimant submits that the HOC2 losses are covered under Section 1 of the Underlying Insurance, and that the HOC3 losses are covered under both Section 1 and Section 2. It relies on the evidence of its Qatar law expert, Mr Al-Ansari, to support its position, pointing out that there is no Qatar law evidence relied upon by the Defendant to substantiate the points it advances.

Section 1 of the Underlying Insurance

76. Section 1 includes the following at Clause 6 of the LSW169A wording:

77. Section 1 was amended with respect to the following exclusion at Clause 9(i) under the LSW169A wording:

78. The relevant amendment provides “Amended to remove Exclusion 9(i) in respect of Qatar Petroleum’s property which is leased, occupied or in the care, custody and control of NDSQ”.

79. The Defendant argues that the following cross-liabilities clause (the “General Cross-Liability Clause”) is included in Section 2 of the Underlying Insurance but not Section 1, because it is mentioned in the summary of original conditions (“Summary”) provided at the beginning of the policy in relation to Section 2, but not in the Summary for Section 1:

80. The Defendant points out that the definition of “third party” in the Underlying Insurance excludes an Underlying Insured or its subsidiary, but the General Cross-Liability Clause enables property of a co-assured to be treated as being property of a “third party”.

81. In relation to HOC3, the Defendant submits that if one co-assured has a claim against another co-assured, then absent the General Cross-Liability Clause, both fall within the definition of “insured” under the policy, and damage to the Superyacht Facility would not comprise damage to third property under clause 6(vi). The Defendant submits that the General Cross-Liability Clause is not included in Section 1 of the Underlying Insurance, although the AON Slip mistakenly refers to Section 1 including a cross-liabilities clause.

82. The Defendant’s submission on HOC2 is that HOC2 concerns damages to the yachts which were in the “care, custody or control of the assured”, and therefore caught by the exclusion under Clause 9(i). The Defendant also relies on the absence of a General Cross-Liability Clause for HOC2, and although not specifically articulated, the Defendant presumably argues that any damage to QE’s property would in any event not be covered under Section 1 because such property would not be considered that of a “third party” in the absence of a General Cross-Liability Clause.

83. The Claimant’s response to these arguments under Section 1 is to rely on the following points, which were referred to in Mr Al Ansari’s reports and oral evidence:

84. In relation to the General Cross-Liability Clause, the Claimant accepts that in the Summary of Section 1 in the Underlying Insurance, there is no reference to any crossliabilities clause, whilst there is such a reference in relation to Section 2. The Claimant submits, however, that one needs to read the policy as a whole, and the specific policy clauses are appended to the policy in a section entitled “Wording & Clauses” (the “Policy Wording”). The Claimant submits that the General Cross-Liability Clause appears at the end of the Section 1 Policy Wording, and the Section 2 Policy Wording includes another cross-liabilities clause.

Court’s Decision on Section 1

85. I accept the Claimant’s submission that Section 1 includes the General Cross-Liability Clause, even though it is not included in the Section 1 Summary, for the following reason:

86. I also accept that the wreck removal costs claimed under HOC2 are explicitly covered under Clause 6(v) of Section 1 of the Underlying Insurance which states that the Underwriters agree to indemnify for “Removal of Wreck”.

87. This is so notwithstanding Exclusion 9(i)(b) which excludes liability in respect of property in the care, custody or control of the assured (other than property referred to in Clause 6(i), (iii) or (iv) above, or QE property leased, occupied or in the care, custody and control of NDSQ). I find that “removal of wreck” is a separate head of damage to liability for the yachts (which is separately covered under Clause 6(i)), and reject the Defendant’s argument that removal of the wreck concerns damage to the yachts and is therefore caught by the exclusion. I accept Mr Al-Ansari’s evidence that Clause 6(v) expressly covers wreck removal and therefore covers HOC2.

88. I also accept the Claimant’s submission, based on the oral evidence of Mr Al-Ansari and the 2019 Sedgwick report, that the removal of the wrecked yachts was “inextricably linked” to the damage to the Superyacht Facility and would therefore, in any event, fall within the exception for QE’s property.

Section 2 of the Underlying Insurance

89. The Section 2 Summary includes the following (with emphasis added):

(I shall refer to the second paragraph above as the “QE Property Provision”).

90. The Defendant submits that liability arising under HOC3 for unrepaired damage to the Superyacht Facility would be covered under the provisions referred to above, provided the liability arose under the Access and Indemnification Agreement, which includes a lease indemnity.

91. The Defendant refers to the “curious” Settlement Agreement disclosed in draft between QE, Nakilat and NDSQ, which refers to wreck removal to be carried out by QE pursuant to an “Agency Agreement” between QE and Nakilat. The Defendant submits that it would have to be proved that the Agency Agreement was a “similar contract entered into by NDSQ” and it would almost certainly have to be disclosed to underwriters. This submission appears to be directed towards HOC2 not being covered under Section 2. Since this is not part of the Claimant’s case, I do not address it further.

92. I should mention that the Section 2 Summary refers to “Cross Liability Clause as attached”. The cross liabilities clause which is included in the Section 2 part of the Policy Wording is different from the General Cross-Liability Clause, as it is specifically directed at personal injury claims. The clause included in the Section 2 Policy Wording (the “Personal Injury Cross Liability Clause”) provides as follows:

93. Similarly, the “Primary Insurance Clause” is included in the Section 2 Summary but not included in the Section 2 part of the Policy Wording. I consider it likely that Section 2 includes both the Primary Insurance Clause and the General Cross-Liability Clause from the Section 1 part of the Policy Wording, even though they are not specifically set out in the Section 2 part of the Policy Wording.

94. Section 2 likely includes the General Cross-Liability Clause because of the express QE Property Provision included in the Section 2 Summary providing that it includes liability for “loss and/or damage to the property of Qatar Petroleum, under the Access and Indemnification Agreement…”

95. Even if I am wrong about the General Cross-Liability Clause being included in Section 2, it is clear from the QE Property Provision that damage to the Superyacht Facility owned by QE would in any event be specifically covered under Section 2, and I accept Mr Al-Ansari’s evidence that the provision “provides clear coverage for damage to QE’s property”.

96. In any event, I find that HOC3 would be covered under either Section 1 or Section 2 of the Underlying Insurance.

II. Would Liberty’s obligation to indemnify have arisen by reference to Article 790 of the Qatar Civil Code?

The Law

97. The parties agree that Article 790 of the Qatar Civil Code, which provides as follows (in translation), is the starting point when considering an insurer’s obligations:

98. The parties further agree that there is a general evidential burden on an insured to submit documents in support of its claim, and that insurers are required to make payment within 30 days from the date on which the beneficiary provides the required statements and documents in support of his right.

99. Article 172 of the Qatar Civil Code provides in translation that all contracts (including insurance and reinsurance contracts) must be performed “consistent with the requirements of good faith”. The parties agree that, at the post-loss stage, good faith requires the insured to submit all relevant and truthful documentation necessary to establish the claim, as required by Article 790.

100. The Defendant sought to persuade the Court that only certain specific documents would satisfy the requirement under Article 790, although there were no specific authorities setting out prescribed documents, and the experts agree that the Qatar Civil Code does not address the nature or form of the evidence that must be submitted to substantiate a loss. The Claimant argues that what is required to satisfy Article 790 is fact-sensitive and not capable of general definition, and I accept this.

101. I also accept the evidence of Mr Al-Ansari that, if documents supporting a claim under Article 790 cannot be produced because they are withheld by a third party, the insured must show reasonable diligence in seeking them and provide notice to the insurer. Further, that the absence of documents alone does not extinguish the insured’s right to a claim unless there is a clear failure to act reasonably and in good faith. This is based on Article 776 of the Qatari Civil Code, which provides that where non-performance is based on an external cause outside of the insured’s control, and provided the insured acts in good faith, forfeiture of rights can be avoided.

102. The Defendant argues that there is no completed cause of action under Article 790 until the required statements and documents are supplied, such that the claim crystallises on the provision of the documents. The Claimant denies this, averring instead that Article 790 stipulates what is deemed to be a reasonable period for the payment of the claim by the insurer, and the policyholder’s cause of action crystallises upon the occurrence of the insured risk. It is not clear what, on the Defendant’s case, turns on this distinction. In any event, the Defendant’s own expert Mr Muhannadi agreed that, under Qatar law, the insured’s cause of action arises upon the loss, and I find this to be position:

103. Both experts agree that good faith governs the insurer’s conduct in claims handling and settlement, and that the insurer must evaluate the claim promptly, communicate any additional information required, and pay the indemnity within the statutory period. Delay or obstruction without legitimate cause would constitute bad-faith performance under Article 172 and may give rise to compensation under Article 256 for delay in contractual performance.

The Facts and The Defendant’s Application to Amend

104. The Defendant’s pleaded position in the Amended Defence was that “[i]n the absence of properly documented claims in respect of damage and cost associated with the alleged fire, there was no cause of action under the Underlying Insurance and/or Reinsurance”. The Defendant had attached to its skeleton argument a 15-page schedule of alleged documentary absences and inconsistencies (the “Schedule”), which the Claimant averred did not reflect the Defendant’s pleaded case. On the third day of the four-day trial, at the close of oral evidence, the Defendant applied to amend the Amended Defence to add in a reference to the Schedule which particularised the absence of properly documented claims.

105. The Schedule set out a number of documents relevant to HOC1, HOC2 and HOC3 and pointed out discrepancies and gaps which the Defendant averred showed a lack of substantiation for the losses claimed. In particular, the Defendant submitted that its points on the following three documents were critical to its case:

106. The Defendant argued that the Claimant would not have any evidence to file in relation to these reports – and therefore no possible prejudice could be caused by the late amendment - because these were documents in the possession of Qatar Energy that the Claimant previously did not have access to in any event. By contrast, if the amendment were not allowed, the real dispute between the parties would not be adjudicated on.

107. The Schedule also included “requests for clarification” on various invoices relating to the insurance claims. The Defendant suggested that the Claimant provide an explanation on the invoices by way of a counter-schedule to be submitted in due course.

108. The Defendant argued as follows:

109. The Claimant submitted that the relevant test for the Court to apply was that set out in the well-known case of Qua Su-Ling v Goldman Sachs [2015] EWHC 759 (Comm) decided by Mrs Justice Carr (as she then was) in which she held:

110. Applying the test, the Claimant submitted that:

Court’s Decision on the Application to Amend

111. Under RDC 18.2, a statement of case may only be amended with the written consent of all other parties, or with the Court’s permission. RDC 18.15 provides that “[l]ate amendments should be avoided and may be disallowed”.

112. There was no dispute as to the applicable principles, with the Court required to conduct a balancing exercise between the injustice to the applicant if the amendment is refused, and injustice to the opposing party and other litigants in general if the amendment is permitted.

113. The Court rejected the application on the basis that it was filed too late. In dismissing the application, the Court considered the following:

Would Liberty have been entitled to deny liability pursuant to Article 790 on the basis of insufficiency of documentation?

114. With the Defendant’s application to amend having been dismissed, the Defendant was left with a fairly bare pleading that, in the absence of properly documented claims in respect of damage and cost associated with the alleged fire, there was no cause of action under the Underlying Insurance and/or Reinsurance. Further, that the Underlying Insurer and Underlying Insureds breached their duty of good faith in making and/or paying a claim on the basis of inadequate evidence, annulling (in whole or in part) the Underlying Insurer’s and Claimant’s obligation to pay an indemnity under the Underlying Insurance and Reinsurance respectively.

115. The only example pleaded of insufficient documentation related to works for demolishing and rebuilding the damaged Superyacht Hall. A decision was eventually taken by QE not to rebuild the Superyacht Hall, such that this element of the claim under HOC3 will be on an unrepaired damage basis. This has rendered the Defendant’s specific example of insufficient documentation irrelevant.

116. The Defendant nevertheless sought to make good its general allegations of insufficient documentation.

117. Ms Perera’s evidence was not especially probative in this regard, which is perhaps not surprising as she essentially passed correspondence and information relating to the Underlying Insurance claims up the chain to the Defendant as she received them, and relayed queries back down the chain (although Ms Kurnetzkova sought to convey in her evidence that she did not do so very actively). QBE was the lead insurer exercising claims control over Doha and handling the claim (along with any second agreement party, which is addressed further below). Ms Perera’s role was therefore limited, although she gave evidence that the Claimant internally checked that payment requests were properly supported.

118. Ms Kurnetzkova’s evidence sought to establish “multiple instances of… lack of information and sporadic reporting” by the Claimant. However, her evidence fell far short of substantiating the Defendant’s general allegation of insufficient documentation for the following reasons:

119. I find that the Defendant has failed to satisfy the Court that Liberty’s obligation to indemnify did not arise pursuant to Article 790 of the Qatar Civil Code due to insufficient documentation being provided to substantiate the claims made under the Underlying Insurance (and then the Reinsurance). Further, to the extent relevant, I have already found above that the Underlying Insured’s (and the Claimant’s) cause of action arose upon the loss and not upon the provision of sufficient documentation.

III. Was Liberty 100% likely to pay an indemnity in any event?

120. Article 11 of the Law of Damages and Remedies (applicable to damages under the Contract Law) and Article 27 (applicable to damages for tortious claims under the Law of Obligations) provide as follows:

121. The Court must determine the probability of Liberty paying on the claims that have already been settled under the Underlying Insurance and Reinsurance. The Claimant contends that the probability of Liberty paying a claim under the Liberty Retrocession Cover (absent the Cancellation Notice) was 100% because Liberty has already paid under the AON Slip at the reinsurance level, on materially identical wording.

122. Part of the Claimant’s case is that Liberty were the second claims agreement party under the AON Slip, suggesting that Liberty’s decisions to pay under that slip were based on their own analysis of, and agreement with, the coverage position.

123. The Claimant’s position is that this issue meets all the Defences put forward by the Defendant:

124. Even if none of the Defendant’s defences are made out, this issue nonetheless has a significant bearing on any declarations which may be issued in the Claimant’s favour for future requests for payment, based on how the proposed declarations were framed by the Claimant at the close of Trial.

125. The Defendant points out that the Claimant’s position is unpleaded and submits as follows:

126. By Trial, the Defendant no longer pursued the point that there were material discrepancies between the AON Reinsurance and the Liberty Retrocession Cover, save for the submission that only the AON Reinsurance contained the General Cross-Liability Clause at Section 1, which I have rejected above.

127. Before determining this issue, I must determine, firstly, whether Liberty were the second leader on the AON Slip.

Was Liberty the second leader on the AON Slip?

128. The Defendant relies on the fact that the AON Slip states “The second Lloyd’s syndicate is N/A”. The Defendant’s position is that, because of this wording, Liberty were not formally entitled to be involved in decisions as to whether to pay under the AON Reinsurance, which were to be made by QBE as the leader identified on the AON Slip. The Defendant contends that Liberty may have become involved in such decisions, but were not formally entitled to do so as the second leader.

129. The Claimant submits that, notwithstanding the reference to the second Lloyd’s syndicate being “N/A”, Liberty were the second claims leader under the AON Slip due to the following:

130. I find that Liberty were the second claims leader on the AON Slip, and accept the Claimant’s submissions that this was the case because of the CLA which superseded the Lloyds’ Claim Scheme (Combined).

131. This is confirmed in an email from AON to the Claimant dated 28 April 2025 which stated:

132. Even if I were wrong that Liberty were the second claims leader on the AON Slip, in any event AON, Liberty and QBE operated as if Liberty were the second claims leader. There are numerous examples on the documentary record of Liberty either giving approval for a claim, or being asked to give approval, following the presentation of a claim by Doha under the AON Slip.

What is the likelihood that Liberty would pay an indemnity?

133. The Claimant relies upon the following:

134. The Defendant submits as follows in relation to the legal principles:

Court’s Decision

135. Although this point is unpleaded, I find that the Defendant was not caused prejudice by its late introduction with the Claimant’s skeleton argument (and the Defendant did not allege any such prejudice). The point was a purely legal point, based on the evidence already on the record, and the Defendant was able to respond to the point during the course of the Trial.

136. I accept the Defendant’s submission that Fraser v Furman must be read in context. The Condition of the putative insurance policy relied on in that case was that the employer was required to take “reasonable precautions”. Diplock LJ, delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal, held that a condition should not be construed in a way that is repugnant to the commercial purpose of the contract, and that, in the circumstances of the case, the Condition was not engaged so as to allow the putative insurer to repudiate liability. It could only be engaged if the employer had been “reckless”.

137. However, in any event, as set out at paragraph 133(a) above, Diplock LJ held that the critical question was not whether the insurer was entitled to repudiate liability as a matter of law, but whether they would, as a matter of business, have done so or not (at p.6555). Taking into account a number of factors, including that the onus of proving that the Condition was breached would lie with the insurer; it was arguable that the Condition would not exempt the insurer from liability; the prospect of success was dubious; and there were no cases brought before the court of insurance companies having successfully relied upon the Condition to defeat a claim under an employers’ indemnity policy, Diplock LJ found that:

138. I accept that the general principles set out at Jackson & Powell at paragraph 133(b) above are applicable, and in particular, that:

139. I accept the Defendant’s submission that the loss of chance analysis only comes into play where there is a valid claim under the putative insurance policy. However, I have already dismissed above the Defendant’s argument that there was no prima facie cover under the Underlying Insurance. Further, to the extent relevant, I have found that under Qatar law, the insured’s (and reinsured’s) cause of action arises upon the loss and not upon presentation of the relevant documents to support payment.

140. I find it is irrelevant that Liberty rejected cover under the Liberty Retrocession Cover due to the Cancellation Notice: the effect of the Cancellation Notice was to prevent any policy coming into being for the second year without further agreement between the parties, rather than affording Liberty the opportunity to rely upon a “technical defence”.

141. I accept the Defendant’s point that the AON Reinsurance may give rise to different commercial considerations than the Liberty Retrocession Cover. However, I find it unrealistic to suggest that such considerations would mean that cover would be rejected under the Liberty Retrocession Cover, where cover was accepted under the AON Reinsurance. In fact, the whole prospect of Liberty rejecting cover under the Liberty Retrocession Cover in circumstances where it had already approved payment or paid under the AON Reinsurance has an air of unreality about it.

142. The Defendant did not expand on its point that Liberty’s outwards reinsurance position on the AON Reinsurance and the Liberty Retrocession Cover is unknown, and on how this impacts this issue. The Defendant would presumably argue that different commercial considerations could arise, but again, this does not defeat my firm view that the prospect of Liberty rejecting cover under the Liberty Retrocession Cover in circumstances where it had already approved or paid under the AON Reinsurance is completely unrealistic.

143. In Fraser v Furman, Diplock LJ referred to Eagle Star as “an insurance company of the highest standing and reputation” and considered it highly improbable that such a “company of high reputation, wishing to obtain business” would take a wholly unmeritorious point to decline cover. Likewise, considering that Liberty is a well-known and reputable insurer, wishing to continue to attract business, I do not consider it likely or even plausible that Liberty would accept cover under the AON Reinsurance yet – entirely inconsistently - decline cover under the Liberty Retrocession Cover (in the same material terms) for any of the reasons advanced by the Defendant (none of which were raised by any of the other insurers involved in the insurance scheme). I assess the commercial likelihood of this as nil, for all practical purposes.

144. In relation to the Defendant’s submission that a loss of chance claim is to be assessed at the date of breach and not by reference to subsequent events, the Court did not have the benefit of any submissions from either the Defendant or the Claimant on how this principle may apply (or not apply) in the present circumstances, beyond the Defendant’s bare submission.

145. The Court observes that the principle that “the court should never speculate where it knows” (per Harman LJ in Curwen v James [1963] 1 WLR 748) has become a cornerstone of the law of damages for breach of contract, not just in England and Wales but in other common law jurisdictions. This principle may displace the general rule that damages are to be assessed on the date of breach, as the latter is not an absolute rule and is subject to the overriding compensatory principle (see, for example, Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha [2007] UKHL 12 per Lord Scott of Foscote at [35]-[36], and iVenture Card Limited & Ors v Big Bus Singapore City Sightseeing Pte Ltd & Ors [2021] SGCA 97 at [137]). Assessing the Claimant’s damages for breach of contract, the Claimant is entitled to be put in the position it would have been in had the Defendant not been in breach, and I find that the Court may take into account subsequent events when assessing the Claimant’s loss of chance.

146. For the reasons set out above, I assess the likelihood of the following at the highest possible level of certainty:

147. For the purposes of an assessment of damages due to the Claimant, this translates to the Claimant being entitled to be indemnified for 100% of the claims that it would have submitted to Liberty under the Liberty Retrocession Cover, where Liberty has already agreed to pay out for those claims under the AON Reinsurance. Where Liberty has already paid out for claims under the AON Reinsurance, this carries an implicit assumption that it has agreed to pay out for those claims.

IV. Would Liberty have been prevented under Qatar law from taking an inconsistent position between the AON Slip and the Liberty Retrocession?

148. The Claimant argues that, under Articles 172 and 776 in conjunction with 790 of the Qatar Civil Code, where QBE exercised claims control, QBE became the legal decisionmaker regarding documentation sufficiency and all parties in the chain are bound by those determinations under good faith principles, absent fraud or manifest error. The Defendant disagrees with the Claimant’s legal analysis under Qatar law, and points out that it fails to see how Liberty could be bound by a claims control clause in a different contract of reinsurance which contained a different contractual chain to that in which it assumed risk.

149. Given my finding at III. above, this issue no longer arises for determination.

V. Would Liberty have been entitled to charge more premium or void the policy based on the previous AC unit fire?

150. The Defendant’s case on material non-disclosure also does not arise based on my finding at III. above. I am mindful that Liberty has not raised the issue of material non-disclosure under the AON Reinsurance, and in fact none of the insurers involved in the insurance scheme in this case have raised this point, even though they have been aware through loss adjuster reports of the previous fire at the Superyacht Hall caused by an AC unit. This may be because, as argued by the Claimant, the fire was minor and extinguished promptly. In any event, I do not need to make a finding on this point.

151. The Defendant accepts that neither QBE nor Liberty have taken this point to date, but asserts that they may well do so going forward, and that they will be informed of this point depending on the outcome of this trial.

152. Should Liberty take the “material non-disclosure” point under the AON Reinsurance at any point, then the parties are at liberty to return to Court to seek relief for any consequences that this may have on how liability has been determined in this case.

However, as matters stand, this issue does not arise.

153. On the basis of the matters set out above, the Court dismisses the Defendant’s application to admit the expert report of its appointed underwriting expert Mr Hanna as to the additional premium that would have been justified on the basis of the alleged material non-disclosure.

F. REMEDIES AND INTEREST

Monetary Award

154. The Claimant claims in these proceedings:

155. The Claimant has helpfully set out in a table references to the underlying quantum documents on the documentary record, which have not been disputed by the Defendant. Each payment has been expressly approved by QBE, or QBE and Liberty, and I accept that where QBE has approved a payment, this has been with (or is subject to) Liberty’s approval (indeed, one of the emails from the QBE Claims Adjuster states “I hereby agree for funds to be released to [Doha], subject to second agreement parties approval”).

156. For HOC2, the Claimant’s claim has increased since the Amended Particulars of Claim was filed, on account of further payments made by the Claimant in respect of HOC2. Having reviewed the credit notes issued by the Claimant to Doha in respect of all payments made in respect of HOC2, the total value of the 4 payments made is QAR 293,449.21. The Defendant’s half share of these payments is USD 146,724.61.

157. I find that the Claimant is entitled to the sums it claims as set out at paragraph 154 above.

Interest

158. In respect of its monetary claims, the Claimant seeks compound interest pursuant to Article 18 of the Law of Damages and Remedies and Articles 118 and 119 of the Contract Law at a rate of 9% from the dates on which the Claimant made payments in respect of HOC1 and HOC2. The dates from which interest is claimed in the Amended Particulars of Claim are as follows:

159. The Defendant only took issue with the interest claimed on the Claimant’s payment in respect of HOC1, arguing that as this was the first claim in respect of the Loss, it would be reasonable for Liberty to have taken some time to consider the claim commercially before paying. The Defendant accordingly submitted that interest should run from 7 December 2020. No submissions were made against this point by the Claimant, and I accept that interest on the sum awarded to the Claimant in respect of HOC1 should run from 7 December 2020.

160. It is difficult for the Court to issue final orders in respect of interest for the Defendant’s half of the first and third sums paid in respect of HOC2 by the Claimant, as the date from which interest should run for those sums remains to be determined. The documentary record includes the credit notes for each payment made by the Claimant to Doha in respect of HOC1 and HOC2. However, the date of the credit note for the Claimant’s HOC1 payment, and that for the Claimant’s payment of the second sum in respect of HOC2, do not tally with the date from which the Claimant claims interest (for example, the date of the credit note for the Claimant’s payment in respect of HOC1 is 31 October 2020, and the Claimant has submitted that the date of payment is 7 October 2020).

161. The Claimant will be invited to make further submissions on the dates from which interest should run for all four of its payments in respect of HOC2, with the Defendant having an opportunity to reply. The interest due for the Defendant’s half of the Claimant’s payments made so far in respect of HOC2 may then be the subject of a further Court order.

Declarations

162. At Trial, the parties made submissions as to the appropriate form of the declarations sought by the Claimant. There was no dispute that under Article 790 of the Qatar Civil Code, payment under the putative Liberty Retrocession Cover would need to be made upon the submission of sufficient documentation, and the original declarations sought by the Claimant did not provide for this step.

163. The only dispute between the parties on the Claimant’s proposal as to the appropriate form of declaration was whether the declaration should provide for the Claimant to be indemnified by the Defendant for payment of an invoice in respect of HOC2 or HOC3 where Liberty “has paid or agreed to pay that invoice” (as argued by the Claimant) or simply where Liberty has paid that invoice (as argued by the Defendant). Given that payment may be made by way of set-off, the Defendant proposed the alternative wording “where Liberty has allocated or transferred funds in respect of that invoice”. I was persuaded by the Claimant that they would not be able to compel documents from Liberty showing funds leaving an account, or any set-off, and that the broader wording proposed by the Claimant provided a greater chance of proving agreement to pay by Liberty.

164. For the avoidance of doubt, where Liberty “has paid or agreed to pay that invoice”, this refers to Liberty’s payment of, or agreement to pay, its share under the AON Reinsurance of the underlying invoice settled by Doha under the Underlying Insurance.

165. The final wording of the declarations which have been ordered provides for the Claimant to be entitled to be indemnified by the Defendant for the Defendant’s half share of any invoice paid by the Claimant in respect of HOC2 or HOC3.