June 17, 2026 court of first instance - Orders
Claim No. CFI 077/2025
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
(1) KOREAN REINSURANCE COMPANY (DIFC BRANCH)
(2) SAMSUNG REINSURANCE PTE LIMITED
(3) SUKOON INSURANCE P.J.S.C
(4) LIVA INSURANCE B.S.C (C) – DUBAI BRANCH
(5) BARENTS RE REINSURANCE COMPANY INC
Claimants
and
DUBAI NATIONAL INSURANCE & REINSURANCE PSC
Defendant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE SAPNA JHANGIANI
UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani dated 12 February 2026 (the “Discontinuance Order”)
AND UPON the Claimants’ costs submissions dated 3 April 2026
AND UPON the Defendant’s reply submissions dated 24 April 2026
AND UPON reviewing the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Claimants are entitled to their costs of the Application (as defined below) on a standard basis, to be submitted to detailed assessment.
2. In relation to the parties’ negotiations seeking to agree the costs of the Application, and their submissions on the costs of the Application, each side shall bear its own costs.
3. The costs of the detailed assessment proceedings shall be determined once those proceedings are concluded.
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 17 June 2026
At: 3pm
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
Background
1. I set out the background to this decision in some detail, as it is relevant to the parties’ positions on costs.
2. These proceedings concern the Defendant’s entitlement to an indemnity for claims under various reinsurance contracts. The Claimants deny that the Defendant is entitled to any indemnity, and by way of a claim form issued on 6 August 2025 and amended on 15 September 2025 (the “Claim Form”), the Claimants seek a negative declaration of liability before this Court. The Claim Form was served on the Defendant on 31 October 2025.
3. The Claimants have always maintained the position that the DIFC Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute.
4. Upon the Defendant being notified by the Claimants of the Claim Form issued in the DIFC Courts, the Defendant informed the Claimants that it considered the non-DIFC Dubai Courts to be the appropriate jurisdiction. The Defendant then filed a claim before the non-DIFC Dubai Courts on 20 October 2025 seeking monetary relief against the Claimants for its reinsured losses (the “Dubai Court Claim”). On 14 November 2025, the Defendant filed an acknowledgement of service in this Court indicating the Defendant’s intention to contest the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction.
5. On 18 November 2025, the Defendant filed an application (the “CJT Referral”) to the Judicial Tribunal for Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the DIFC Courts and the other Judicial authorities in the Emirate of Dubai (the “Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal” or “CJT”). The CJT Referral was filed pursuant to Article 7 of Decree No. 9 of 2024 (the “CJT Decree”), read together with Article 4 of Resolution No. 11 of 2024 setting out the rules and procedures for the CJT (the “CJT Rules”).
6. On 28 November 2026, the Defendant filed Application No. CFI-077-2025/1 in these proceedings challenging the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts, and seeking a stay of these proceedings pending the decision of the CJT (the “Application”). One of the grounds of the Application was that pursuant to Article 7 of the CJT Decree, read with Article 4 of the CJT Rules, these proceedings were automatically stayed upon the registration of the CJT Referral. The Claimants disagree with this proposition, relying on the decision of this Court in Olympio v Olwin [2025] DIFC ARB 024 (7 August 2025) as authority for the proposition that CJT proceedings do not necessitate a stay of DIFC Court proceedings.
7. On 16 December 2025, the Defendant invited the Claimants to agree to a stay of these proceedings and the Dubai Court Claim pending the decision of the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal, stating:
“…our client maintains its position that the DIFC proceedings and the Dubai onshore proceedings ought to be automatically suspended (i.e., stayed) pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Decree, pending the CJT’s decision. Irrespective of our differing positions on this point, we consider this to be the most sensible and cost-efficient approach, avoiding unnecessary costs and duplicative steps in both sets of proceedings.”
8. The Claimants did not agree to a stay of these proceedings and the Dubai Court Claim pending the decision of the CJT. The Claimants’ position in correspondence was that it would not have been appropriate or cost-effective for the Claimants to agree to a stay because:
(a) This would have the effect of suspending proceedings in the forum ultimately confirmed as having jurisdiction (the DIFC Courts), while allowing the Defendant to continue in the non-DIFC Dubai Courts. (This argument appears to ignore that the Defendant proposed staying both sets of proceedings); and
(b) It was not for the Claimants to waive their rights under the RDC in situations that had been created by the Defendant’s conduct and failure to follow the procedures detailed in the RDC.
9. On 22 December 2025, the Defendant wrote to the Claimants to request an extension of time of 14 days to serve its evidence in reply, in light of the Christmas holiday period and other factors. The Claimants replied by an email of over 20 paragraphs on 24 December 2025 to indicate that the extension was not agreed. The Defendant ultimately issued an application for an extension of time (the “EOT Application”), which was granted by order dated 16 January 2026, with no order as to costs (the “16 January Order”). The Claimants confirm that they do not claim the costs of the EOT Application as part of their costs of the Application.
10. On 8 January 2026, the Defendant applied to the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal seeking “urgent” interim relief suspending the proceedings before this Court.
11. On 14 January 2026, the DIFC Court Registry listed the Application for hearing on 20 February 2026.
12. On 26 January 2026, the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal determined:
(a) “The Dubai Courts shall refrain from hearing [the Dubai Court Claim] due to lack of jurisdiction”; and
(b) “The DIFC Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine Case No. CFI-077-2025.”
13. On 28 January 2026, following the CJT’s decision (the “CJT Decision”), the Claimants invited the Defendant to withdraw the Application, inviting a response by 30 January. The Claimants again invited the Defendant to withdraw the Application by letters of 2 and 4 February 2026, indicating in their 2 February letter that the Claimants had already commenced drafting a brief to King’s Counsel for the Hearing, which would be provided to Counsel on 5 February. In response to each letter, the Defendant’s legal representatives stated they were awaiting instructions. In response to the 4 February 2026 letter, the Defendant responded, “we are taking client instructions…we strongly recommend you do not incur any brief fees in relation to this matter whilst we await instructions”.
14. Also on 4 February 2026, the Claimants emailed the DIFC Court Registry advising the Court of the CJT Decision and seeking that the Application be heard on the papers. The Court invited the Defendant’s views on that proposal. The Defendant sought to withdraw the Application by letter to the DIFC Court Registry on 5 February 2026. The Claimants subsequently proposed a draft discontinuance order which was agreed to in part by the Defendant.
15. The Defendant’s withdrawal of the Application was formalised by the Discontinuance Order dated 12 February 2026. The hearing of the Application listed for 20 February 2026 was vacated.
16. On 23 February and 4 March 2026, the Claimants wrote to the Defendant stating that the Defendant had not written to the Claimants regarding the Claimants’ costs, as they had indicated to the Court Registry that they would. The Defendant’s position is that they had expected and waited for the Claimants to claim their costs “in the normal course”. In the 4 March letter, the Claimants indicated that their costs in connection with the Dubai Court Claim, and the “applications” were approximately AED 2,200,000 (with no breakdown provided), and they invited the Defendant to settle their costs in this amount or a majority portion thereof. Extensive correspondence between the parties followed.
17. The Defendant wrote to the Claimants on 6 March 2026 to reject the Claimants’ proposal that the Defendant pay “the majority of the AED 2,200,000”, highlighting that the costs of the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim should be excluded, and that the costs of the EOT Application were already dealt with in the 16 January Order. The Defendant proposed that the costs of the Application be treated as costs in the case.
18. On 9 March 2026, the Dubai Court Claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court’s judgment included the following: “Regarding fees and expenses, the Court orders the Plaintiff, in its capacity, to pay attorney fees and 10% of the court fees, with the remainder to be refunded…”.
19. By letter of 10 March 2026, the Claimants continued to claim the costs of the EOT Application, the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim, and rejected the Defendants’ proposal that the costs of the Application be costs in the case as lacking any proper legal basis.
20. The Claimants wrote to the Defendant again by letter of 11 March 2026, including a schedule of costs setting out fees of almost AED 2 million, with a proposal to settle at AED 1,800,000. The letter stated that the Claimants “appreciate and accept that costs insured [sic] solely in relating to the Dubai Court Proceedings and CJT Proceedings are not recoverable and have been excluded”. The schedule of costs included a breakdown of “work done on documents”, which appears to include time spent on the EOT Application.
21. On 12 March 2026, the Defendant proposed that the Claimants file a clearly itemised costs schedule showing how time was spent, including in relation to the Application, the EOT Application, the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim.
22. The Claimants proposed by letter of 13 March 2026 that their costs be settled at AED 1,750,000. They stated that the costs schedule provided with their 11 March letter was sufficient, and maintained that the costs of the EOT Application were recoverable.
23. The Defendant wrote to the Claimants on 19 March 2026, reiterating that the costs of the EOT Application, the CJT Referral and Dubai Court Claim were not recoverable. The Defendant estimated that the time required to complete work on the Application would be AED 179,868 (calculated as 15 hours of partner time, 20 hours of senior associate time and 30 hours of junior lawyer time at the indicative hourly rates pursuant to the Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023). They offered 50% of this at AED 89,934 as a “reasonable and fair offer” in settlement of the Claimants’ costs of the Application, with the offer open until 20 March 2026.
24. No agreement was ultimately reached on the costs of the Application.
The Parties’ Positions
25. The Claimants’ position can be summarised as follows:
(a) As the successful party in the Application, the Defendant should pay the Claimants’ costs;
(b) The Defendants’ procedural conduct was unreasonable and constitutes procedural abuse, warranting indemnity costs;
(c) The Claimants are entitled to their reasonable costs for work carried out in responding to the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim simultaneously with the Application (“dual-purpose costs”), as the Defendant placed the CJT Referral and Dubai Court Claim at the heart of its evidence in support of the Application; and
(d) The Claimants are entitled to the sums claimed in their schedule of costs of AED 1,901,501.29.
26. The Defendant denies all of the above points. It submits that the costs of the Application should be costs in the case, and further claims its own costs of the costs negotiations and its costs submissions, pursuant to RDC 40.45.
27. In any event, the Defendant submits that the Claimants’ costs are disproportionate and excessive for reasons set out further below.
Applicable Legal Framework
28. The Court has wide discretion under RDC 38.6 to decide liability and quantum for costs, having regard to all the circumstances set out at RDC 38.8 and 38.9, including the conduct of the parties; whether a party succeeded on its case, even partially; whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; and the manner in which a party has pursued or defended its case or a particular allegation or issue.
29. Pursuant to RDC 1.6, parties must conduct litigation at proportionate cost, and in ways which save expense and are proportionate to the complexity of the issues.
30. The general rule under RDC 38.7 is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party, although the Court may make a different order.RDC 34.15 provides that a Claimant who discontinues a claim should be liable for the other party’s costs.
31. The Claimant contends that a similar approach has been taken in the English and DIFC Courts with respect to applications that are discontinued, relying on Re HLHP Oriental Food Ltd [2023] EWHC 2920 and Bocimar International NV v Emirates Trading Agency [2015] DIFC CFI 008. The Defendant avers that this an incorrect summary of the legal position, and submits that the costs of the Application are simply in the Court’s discretion. The Defendant relies on Re HLHP Oriental Food Ltd for the proposition that an application is not a separate "claim" and does not attract the rules about discontinuance.
32. As provided in RDC 38.17, the Court may award costs on a standard or indemnity basis, within its judicial discretion. Indemnity costs are reserved for cases where the paying party’s conduct takes the case “out of the norm”, as explained by this Court in AES Middle East Insurance Broker LLC & Ors v GSB Capital Ltd [2023] DIFC CFI 060 (28 August 2025):
“For an indemnity costs order to be made, there must be some special or unusual feature in the case justifying the Court exercising its discretion in that way. This can include improper, unreasonable, or delinquent conduct by a party, the making of false allegations (such as fraud), or the pursuit of hopeless claims. The power to order indemnity costs is discretionary and is exercised judicially, considering all relevant circumstances...”
33. Procedural abuse by the paying party may be one of the factors warranting an award of indemnity costs (see eg. Ivankovich v KJM Marine LLC & Others [2024] DIFC CFI 068 (8 May 2025)).
34. As held by H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere in Gulf Petrochem FZC LLC v Petrochina International (Middle East) Company Ltd [2023] DIFC CFI 048 (23 November 2023) at [137], “the threshold for indemnity costs is high”.
The Court’s Decision
35. At the outset, the Court notes that all the parties in this case have missed opportunities to reduce the expense of these proceedings so far.
36. For example, there is some merit in the Defendant’s submission that costs were unnecessarily driven up by the Claimants’ detailed email dated 24 December 2025, rejecting the Defendant’s 22 December request for a consensual extension of time to file reply evidence in respect of the Application. The Claimants’ refusal to agree to any extension of time (even a shorter extension than that sought by the Defendant) made it necessary for the Defendant to issue the EOT Application with supporting evidence, following which both parties filed further evidence, before the Court determined the application. All of this added to the expense of these proceedings.
37. Similarly, the Defendant’s Counsel ought to have sought instructions urgently upon the CJT Decision being issued on 26 January 2026 so as to withdraw the Application and avoid any further costs being expended in relation to it. Instead, steps were only taken by the Defendant to withdraw the Application on 5 February 2026, some 10 days later.
Are the Claimants entitled to their costs of the Application?
38. Taking into account all the circumstances, including the CJT Decision, I consider that the Claimant was the successful party on the Defendant’s withdrawn Application, and is entitled to its reasonable costs of the Application. I reject the Defendants’ submission that the costs of the Application should be costs in the case.
39. Given my finding above, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the principle at RDC 34.15 is engaged for discontinued applications, in addition to discontinued claims.
40. The Defendant argues that the Claimants ought to have agreed to the Defendant’s proposal that these proceedings and the Dubai Court Claim be stayed, pending the decision of the CJT on the CJT Referral, and that the Claimants should therefore not be entitled to their costs of the Application from 16 December 2025 onwards (or from 28 November 2025, when the Application was issued). The Defendant submits that the parties were aligned that the CJT Referral was a determinative step impacting these proceedings, and a stay should have been agreed to avoid unnecessary costs in the these proceedings.
41. The Court notes that, pursuant to Article 5 of the CJT Rules, the CJT will decide any application referred to it within 30 days from the date the Secretary refers the application to the CJT (which will take place shortly after the Respondent’s response to the application, or after the expiry of the time limit for the Respondent’s response). Whilst agreeing to the Defendant’s proposal of 16 December 2026 to agree to a stay of these proceedings and the Dubai Court Claim pending the CJT decision would not have delayed these proceedings beyond a month or so (and indeed, the CJT Decision was issued on 26 January 2026), I do not accept that the Claimants’ refusal to agree to a stay disentitles them to their costs of the Application from 16 December 2025 onwards (or from 28 November 2025).
Are the Claimants entitled to their costs on an indemnity basis?
42. The Claimants’ submission that the Defendants’ procedural conduct was unreasonable and constitutes procedural abuse, warranting indemnity costs, is based on the following:
(a) The Application for a stay had no valid procedural basis under the RDC, and relied exclusively on Article 7 of the CJT Decree, notwithstanding that Olympio v Olwin [2025] DIFC ARB 024 (7 August 2025) had already confirmed that CJT proceedings do not necessitate a stay of DIFC Court proceedings.
(b) The deficiciences in the Application were obvious. The Defendant relied upon provisions of the UAE (Federal) Civil Procedure Code without addressing Article 14(A)(1) of Law No. 2 of 2025, which constituted the primary jurisdictional basis pleaded in the Claim Form. The Defendant was aware that the First Claimant was a DIFC establishment and certain of the reinsurance contracts were entered into and performed in the DIFC. Taken together, those facts placed the DIFC Court’s exclusive jurisdiction beyond any reasonable dispute.
(c) The Defendants made repeated applications to the CJT seeking orders directing this Court to halt its proceedings, whilst it did not bring the CJT Referral to the attention of the Court in the Dubai Court Claim.
(d) The Claimants rely upon Bocimar International NC v Emirates Trading Agency [2015] DIFC CFI 008 (28 January 2016), submitting that the Dubai Court Claim and CJT Referral were invoked “for the tactical purpose of invoking inter-court mechanisms and manufacturing a jurisdictional conflict, rather than resolving any genuine jurisdictional issue”. The Claimants contend that the Defendants multiplied the proceedings and materially increased the Claimants’ costs of responding to the Application, as the Claimants were required to investigate, analyse and address matters arising from both the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim.
(e) The Claimants also rely upon Ivankovich v KJM Marine LLC & Others [2024] DIFC CFI 068 (26 March 2025) which held “where a party commences two claims in relation to the same subject matter in two different jurisdictions, such conduct is likely to be viewed as vexatious, oppressive and unconscionable...”
43. In summary, the Claimants submit that neither the Application, the CJT Referral nor the Dubai Court Claim had any prospect of success, and were “oppressive”, serving “no legitimate purpose”. The Claimants rely upon the fact that indemnity costs may be awarded where a party pursues applications that "lack any proper legal foundation, are misconceived as a matter of law, or are pursued in disregard of settled authority, such that they waste the Court's time". The Claimants rely on Emirates NBD Bank PJSC v KBBO CPG Investment LLC [2020] DIFC CFI 045, where H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke ordered indemnity costs, noting that an argument was "an extremely bad point, way beyond the norm of what this court would consider reasonable".
44. The Defendant's position is that the Application was a legitimate and reasonable response to a real jurisdictional dispute. It says the Dubai Court Claim was filed because the Defendant genuinely considered, based on the wording of the jurisdiction clauses in the Reinsurance contracts and the nexus of the parties and subject matter within non- DIFC Dubai, that the non-DIFC Dubai courts were the appropriate forum.
45. The Defendant relies in particular on the mandatory rule under Article 39 of the UAE Civil Procedures Law, which stipulates that the Court of the jurisdiction in which the insured property is located or in which the domicile of the beneficiary is located has exclusive jurisdiction, a point the CJT Decision did not address.
46. The Defendant denies that the Dubai Court Claim and CJT Referral were designed to "tactically misuse inter-court mechanisms", or that they were part of a strategy to create a jurisdictional conflict. It submits that such a tactic would not make sense as the Defendant is the effective Claimant in the underlying dispute, seeking recovery of its reinsured losses. In the Defendant’s submission, the Application was an attempt to preserve the Defendant's claim for monetary relief in the Dubai Courts or at least hold the ring pending the CJT decision. Further, the Defendant’s conduct was not unreasonable to a high degree, even if it ultimately proved to have been “wrong or misguided in hindsight”.
47. The Defendant rejects the Claimants’ submission that the Application was hopeless and unnecessary in “three jurisdictions”. The Defendant also distinguishes Ivankovich v KJM Marine LLC & Others, pointing out that in that case, the jurisdiction clause clearly stated that the DIFC Courts was the agreed forum, and the parallel claim was filed after service of the DIFC Court Claim and after the filing of a defence and counterclaim in the DIFC Court claim, which is different from the present case.
48. I do not consider the Defendant’s conduct to take the present circumstances “out of the norm” such that an award of indemnity costs is warranted. Despite flaws in the Application – for example, the Defendant’s contention that a CJT referral automatically necessitates a stay – I do not consider that the Defendant’s jurisdictional objection was manufactured and lacking in any proper legal foundation. Unlike in Ivankovich v KJM Marine LLC & Others, the Defendant did not submit a counterclaim to the jurisdiction of this Court alongside pursuing the Dubai Court Claim.
To what costs are the Claimants entitled for the Application?
49. The Defendant submits as follows:
(a) The amount of AED 1,901,501.29 claimed by the Claimants is disproportionate to the work actually required for the Application; the Claimants’ submission that their costs claimed are proportionate to the value of the claim misses the point.
(b) The 100 hours of partner time and more than 210 hours of senior associate time claimed by the Claimants for work on documents in respect of the Application is excessive when all was required was reviewing the Application, filing the Claimants’ evidence in answer, and reviewing partial evidence in reply (since full reply evidence was not filed). There was no hearing of the Application. The Claimants contend that there were “simple legal issues” in the Application, yet deployed four senior associates, two associates, “various” trainees and paralegals and a costs lawyer. The Defendant maintains that its offer to settle at AED 179,868 (15 hours of partner time, 20 hours of senior associate time and 30 hours of junior lawyer time), was an appropriate sum. (The Court notes that the Defendant’s offer to settle in its letter to the Claimants of 19 March 2026 was actually for half the sum of AED 179,868.)
(c) The Claimants’ Schedule of Costs does not identify the time spent on the different sets of proceedings, nor does it identify the work done according to different workstreams.
(d) The hourly rates of the Claimants’ legal team exceed the indicative hourly rates in the Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023, and any award on costs should be aligned with the indicative hourly rates.
(e) The Defendant submits that the Claimants should be awarded a small sum which is equal to or does not exceed the offer made by the Defendant in settlement of the Claimants’ costs of the Application.
50. The Claimants submit that:
(a) The costs claimed for the Application are proportionate to the matters in issue, particularly given the urgency of the proceedings and the amounts at stake in the Claimant’s claim (AED 555 million, before interest and costs).
(b) Relevant to the complexity, multi-lingual and cross-jurisdictional nature of the dispute, the Claimants’ legal team was staffed with a lean team to avoid duplicate attendances, with one partner involved from the outset of the original coverage dispute, and one senior associate and two bilingual associates doing most of the work.
(c) In correspondence with the Defendant, the Claimants state that the hourly rates for members of the Claimants’ legal team are reasonable and align with current market rates, highlighting that the rates referred to in Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023 are average hourly rates as at 9 June 2023 and not a maximum, reflecting the relevant mid-point at that time. The senior associate and partner hourly rates incurred by the Claimants are approximately 10% above those average rates and this small difference can be expected, due to the impact of inflation between 2023 and 2026. The Claimants point out that the hourly rates applied by the Claimants’ law firm have recently been considered and awarded on a 100% basis by this Court.
51. During negotiations following the Discontinuance Order, a dispute emerged as to whether the Claimants are entitled to seek “dual-purpose costs” incurred by the Claimants in responding to the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim.
52. The Claimants' position is that such costs are recoverable as costs of the Application to the extent they were reasonably incurred, as the Defendant itself placed the CJT Referral and Dubai Court Claim at the heart of its Application evidence. The Claimants' case is that:
(a) The “dual-purpose” costs claimed are for work that was relevant and necessary to the issues and procedural steps in the Application, which simultaneously assisted the CJT Referral or Dubai Court Claim.
(b) The work would have been required even if the Claimants did not have the same representation in these proceedings and in relation to the CJT Referral and Dubai Court Claim.
53. The Claimants submit that they have been careful to exclude from their claim costs relating to:
(a) costs incurred in defending the Dubai Court Claim;
(b) costs of UAE-licensed advocates in the Dubai Court Claim; and
(c) costs solely relating to the CJT Referral outside the context of the Application.
54. The Defendant submits that the Claimants’ claim for "dual-purpose costs" is hopeless and not rooted in any legal rule or principle. Further, that the costs are unparticularised and unexplained. The Defendant highlights that the Claimants' position has evolved:
(a) Initially, the Claimants claimed these costs in correspondence as "incidental to" the Application under a common law principle analogous to Section 51(1) of the English Senior Courts Act 1981. However, the Defendant informed the Claimants that Section 51(1) does not apply in the DIFC and there is no equivalent statutory provision. The Claimants did not pursue this point in the costs submissions filed with the Court.
(b) The Claimants then relied in correspondence on RDC 38.2(2), which provides that a costs order may include the cost of proceedings “before a tribunal or other statutory body”. The Defendant’s position in correspondence was that “tribunal” under RDC 38.2(2) is defined in the RDC as a “Tribunal established by the Chief Justice of the DIFC Courts under Article 14(3) of the Courts Law”, and that neither the non-DIFC Dubai Courts, nor the CJT, constitute a statutory body or tribunal.
55. The Defendant submits that the CJT and Dubai Courts have already issued costs decisions relating to the proceedings brought before them:
(a) The CJT ordered the Defendant’s security deposit to be confiscated, and the Defendant was ordered to pay AED 1,000 as advocacy costs. The Defendant submits that the CJT is a self-contained framework, and the Claimants are only entitled to recover the sum of AED 1,000 as legal professional fees for proceedings before the CJT.
(b) In the Dubai Court Claim, the Court ordered a refund of 90% of the Court fees incurred in the Dubai Court proceedings to the Defendant on the basis that the Defendant voluntarily abandoned the Dubai Court Claim in light of the CJT Decision. The Court also ordered unquantified fees and expenses. The Claimants have not appealed the decision in the Dubai Court Claim nor sought clarity on quantum. The Defendant contends that the Claimants cannot circumvent the rules, practices and final decisions of the non-DIFC Dubai Courts by seeking to recover the costs of those proceedings through the “back door” in the DIFC Courts.
56. The Defendant points out that the Claimants have conceded (eg. in their letter of 11 March 2026) that costs incurred solely in relation to the CJT Referral and Dubai Dubai Court Claim are not recoverable, submitting that the pursuit of "dual-purpose" costs for the Application is irreconcilable with the Claimants’ own position.
57. The Court accepts that costs incurred in relation to the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim should not be recovered in these proceedings. The CJT and the non-DIFC Dubai Courts have their own procedures for the recovery of costs and have already determined how the costs of the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim should be allocated.
58. In any event, there is no dispute between the parties that costs incurred solely in relation to the CJT Referral and Dubai Dubai Court Claim are not recoverable by the Claimants in respect of the Application.
59. What the Claimants seek to recover is “dual-purpose” costs that relate to work that was “relevant and necessary” to the issues and procedural steps in the Application, and also simultaneously assisted the CJT Referral or Dubai Court Claim. The Claimants contend that the work would have been required even if the Claimants did not have the same representation in these proceedings and in relation to the CJT Referral and Dubai Court Claim.
60. The Court is in some difficulty in understanding what costs are being claimed by the Claimants for “dual-purpose” work i.e., what kind of work carried out by the Claimants simultaneously assisted the Claimants in relation to the Application and the CJT Referral or the Dubai Court Claim. There is some force in the Defendant’s argument that the Claimants’ claim for “dual-purpose” costs is unparticularised and unexplained.
61. The Court appreciates the Claimants’ submission that the claim in these proceedings is high-value, and that their costs claimed for the Application are proportionate to the value of the claim. Neverthless, taking into account all the parties’ submissions, as well as the relatively high sum of costs claimed by the Claimants for an Application which did not proceed to a hearing, the Court considers that the most appropriate and just way to proceed is for the Claimants’ costs to be assessed on a standard basis by way of detailed assessment, rather than immediate assessment.
How should the Court address the costs of the costs negotiations and submissions?
62. The Defendant requests that it be awarded its costs of the costs negotiations and its costs submissions, pursuant to RDC 40.45. Under that provision, read with RDC 40.44, the receiving party is generally entitled to its costs of the detailed assessment proceedings, but the Court may make some other order, having regard to all circumstances including the conduct of the parties, the amount by which the bill of costs has been reduced, and whether it was reasonable to claim or dispute particular items.
63. The Defendant states that the Claimants' approach throughout has been unreasonable and obstructive, alleging the following by the Claimants (set out verbatim):
(a) Maintaining weak points throughout negotiations and submissions, such as the entitlement to the costs of the EOT Application and costs incurred in the CJT Referral and the Dubai Court Claim costs;
(b) The reduction of costs claimed from AED 2,200,000 to AED 1,901,501 through the course of the negotiations and upon filing the Schedule of Costs;
(c) The failure to properly itemise the costs incurred and preventing the Defendant from conducting a detailed assessment; and
(d) The unreasonable and uncompromising nature of the Claimants’ offers to settle the costs, including the grossly inflated and disproportionate sum being claimed for the Application which comprised very limited work; and
(e) The failure to respond substantively to the Defendant’s Offer to Settle Costs before filing the Costs Submissions.
64. The Court notes that RDC 40.45 relates to the costs of detailed assessment proceedings, of which the parties’ costs negotiations and submissions up to this point do not form part.
65. The Court further notes that the Claimants have not had an opportunity to respond to the Defendant’s submission that it should be entitled to its costs of the costs negotiations and submissions.
66. In any event, having carefully considered the extensive correspondence between the parties seeking to agree how the costs of the Application should be allocated, and taking into account the conduct of the parties and the reasonabless of the positions adopted and settlement offers made, as well as the evolution of the parties’ positions, I consider that the most appropriate allocation of the costs of the costs negotiations and submissions is for each side to bear its own costs of the costs negotiations and submissions.
67. The costs of the detailed assessment proceedings shall be determined according to RDC 40.44 and 40.45.
