Claim No. CFI 086/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURT

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

WATSON FARLEY & WILLIAMS (MIDDLE EAST) LLP

Claimant/Respondent

and

BIN OTAIBA INVESTMENT GROUP

Defendant/Appellant

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ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE

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UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere dated 9 June 2026 (the “Order”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 23 June 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Order (the “Application for Permission to Appeal”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s submissions dated 20 July 2026

AND PURSUANT TO Part 44 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Application for Permission to Appeal is dismissed.

2. The Defendant shall pay the Claimant's costs of and occasioned by the Application for Permission to Appeal to be assessed if not agreed.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 14 August 2026
At: 3pm

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

A. Introduction

1. This is an application by the Defendant/Appellant (the “Appellant") for permission to appeal pursuant to RDC 44.5 and RDC 44.6 against the Order with Reasons dated 9 June 2026 granting immediate judgment in favour of the Claimant/Respondent (the “Respondent"). The Order granted immediate judgment in the sum of USD 184,471.33 together with interest, dismissed the Appellant’s Counterclaim, and ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent’s costs.

2. The Appellant filed an Appeal Notice and Grounds of Appeal on 23 June 2026 seeking permission to appeal and orders setting aside the judgment, dismissing the immediate judgment application, reinstating the Defence and Counterclaim, and directing that the proceedings continue to trial. The proposed appeal advances six grounds which may be summarised as follows: (i) the Court erred in concluding that the Defence and Counterclaim had no real prospect of success; (ii) and (v) the proceedings were procedurally unfair because the Appellant lacked a fair opportunity to secure representation and present its case; (iii) the Court failed to take into account the Appellant's skeleton argument and supporting material; (iv) the Counterclaim should not have been summarily dismissed; and (vi) the Court failed properly to have regard to the overriding objective and the interests of justice.

3. The Respondent opposes the application. It submits, first, that the proposed appeal is affected by procedural deficiencies, including alleged defects in service and non- compliance with certain requirements of RDC Part 44. Secondly, it contends that none of the proposed grounds of appeal has a real prospect of success and that there is no other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.

4. The application for permission to appeal falls to be determined in accordance with RDC Part 44. The Court must decide whether the proposed appeal would have a real prospect of success or whether there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. The Court's task is not to conduct a rehearing of the immediate judgment application, but to determine whether the Appellant has identified any properly arguable error in the judgment or any other basis upon which permission should be granted.

5. Before considering the individual grounds advanced by the Appellant, it is convenient to summarise the procedural history giving rise to the application.

B. Procedural Background

B1. Proceedings Prior to the Immediate Judgment Application

6. The Respondent commenced these proceedings by Part 7 Claim Form dated 8 October 2025 seeking recovery of unpaid legal fees allegedly due under a Letter of Engagement pursuant to which it had provided legal services to the Appellant. The Appellant subsequently filed an Acknowledgment of Service indicating an intention to defend the claim and thereafter filed a Defence and Counterclaim alleging, among other things, professional negligence, breach of contract and unreasonable billing.

7. On 3 February 2026, the Respondent filed an application for immediate judgment pursuant to RDC Part 24. The application sought judgment for the outstanding invoiced fees together with interest, dismissal of the Counterclaim and costs. The application was supported by witness evidence and documentary exhibits.

B2. The Adjournment Application and the 15 May 2026 Order

8. The immediate judgment application was initially listed for hearing on 15 May 2026. On 13 May 2026, the Appellant applied for an adjournment of that hearing. The application was considered by the Court on 15 May 2026. Although the Appellant did not attend, the Court granted the adjournment sought and vacated the hearing date.

9. By order dated 15 May 2026, the Court adjourned the hearing of the immediate judgment application to 3 June 2026 and made directions designed to afford the Appellant a further opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Relevantly, the Court required the Appellant, by 22 May 2026, to identify the Part II Registered Practitioner who would represent it at the adjourned hearing and to file and serve any evidence and skeleton argument upon which it intended to rely in answer to the application. The Respondent was given liberty to file any reply evidence and submissions thereafter.

B3. Events Following the 15 May 2026 Order

10. Following the making of the 15 May 2026 Order, there were communications between the Appellant and the Registry concerning representation and rights of audience. The Appellant contends that it encountered difficulties in securing representation before the DIFC Courts and relies upon those matters in support of the present application for permission to appeal. The Respondent disputes that any procedural unfairness occurred and contends that the Appellant was afforded a fair and adequate opportunity to comply with the Court’s directions and participate in the proceedings.

11. It is common ground that the Appellant did not file any evidence on the Court’s e-portal in response to the immediate judgment application. The Appellant also did not file a skeleton argument in accordance with the directions contained in the 15 May 2026 Order. However, the Appellant now contends that on or about 11 May 2026 its principal, Mr Mahmoud Ahmed Salim, sent a skeleton argument and supporting material to the Registry by email and that those materials should have been considered when the application was determined. Whether those materials formed part of the record before the Court is one of the issues raised by the proposed appeal.

B4. The Hearing on 3 June 2026 and the Judgment

12. The immediate judgment application proceeded to hearing on 3 June 2026. Counsel appeared on behalf of the Respondent. The Appellant did not appear and did not participate in the hearing. The Court determined the application based on the material before it, namely the documents contained in the case bundle and the submissions advanced on behalf of the Respondent.

13. On 9 June 2026, the Court delivered its Order with Reasons. The Court concluded that the requirements of RDC 24.1 were satisfied, that the Defence and Counterclaim disclosed no real prospect of success, and that there was no other compelling reason for the matter to proceed to trial. Accordingly, the Court granted immediate judgment in favour of the Respondent in the sum of USD 184,471.33, awarded interest, dismissed the Counterclaim, and ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent’s costs assessed in the amount of USD 78,039.74.

B5. The Application for Permission to Appeal

14. On 23 June 2026, the Appellant filed an Appeal Notice seeking permission to appeal the judgment. The Appellant subsequently filed detailed Grounds of Appeal advancing six grounds upon which it contends that permission should be granted and that the judgment should be set aside. Those grounds challenge both the Court’s substantive conclusions under RDC Part 24 and the fairness of the procedures leading to the hearing and determination of the immediate judgment application.

15. The Respondent opposes the application. It submits that the proposed appeal is procedurally defective and, in any event, that none of the grounds advanced by the Appellant has a real prospect of success or discloses any other compelling reason warranting the grant of permission to appeal.

16. It is against that procedural background that the Court must determine whether permission to appeal should be granted.

C. Applicable Legal Principles

C1. Permission to Appeal

17. An appeal does not lie from a decision of the Court of First Instance unless permission to appeal is granted where permission is required by RDC Part 44. The present application is therefore concerned not with the substantive appeal itself but with whether permission should be granted for the proposed appeal to proceed.

18. The applicable test is whether the proposed appeal would have a real prospect of success or whether there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. The burden rests upon the applicant for permission to satisfy the Court that one or other of those criteria is met.

19. A real prospect of success means a prospect that is realistic rather than fanciful. The Court must be satisfied that the proposed appeal has a genuine, as opposed to merely arguable, prospect of succeeding before an appellate court. Mere disagreement with the decision under challenge is insufficient.

20. The alternative limb of the test, namely whether there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard, is directed to exceptional circumstances where the interests of justice require appellate consideration notwithstanding that the appeal may not otherwise have a real prospect of success.

C2. The Function of the Permission Stage

21. The permission stage is not a rehearing of the application that was determined below. Nor is it an occasion for the Court to reconsider the merits of the underlying dispute merely because the unsuccessful party disagrees with the outcome. The Court's task is to determine whether the proposed grounds disclose a realistically arguable error of law, fact or procedure capable of affecting the outcome. In doing so, the Court is not concerned with whether the original decision was necessarily correct, but whether there is a realistic prospect that an appellate court could conclude that it was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.

22. It follows that an appellant must do more than identify findings with which it disagrees. The appellant must identify a basis upon which it is realistically arguable that the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.

C3. Appeals Against Immediate Judgment

23. Where permission is sought to appeal a decision granting immediate judgment, the question for the Court is not whether the appellate court may have reached a different conclusion. Rather, the question is whether there is a realistic prospect that the appellate court would conclude that the judge erred in applying the principles governing immediate judgment to the material before the Court.

24. The judgment under challenge correctly identified the principles governing immediate judgment pursuant to RDC 24.1. In particular, the Court recognised that immediate judgment may be granted where a claimant establishes that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and there is no other compelling reason for a trial. The Court further recognised that it must avoid conducting a mini-trial and should not resolve genuine disputes of fact requiring oral evidence, whilst remaining entitled to conclude that unparticularised assertions or allegations unsupported by evidence do not disclose a realistic prospect of success.

25. Accordingly, in considering whether permission to appeal should be granted, the Court must assess whether the Appellant has identified a realistically arguable error in the application of those principles or whether the proposed appeal amounts only to a challenge to conclusions that were properly open to the Court on the material before it.

C4. Allegations of Procedural Unfairness

26. Several grounds of appeal allege procedural unfairness arising from the Appellant's difficulties in securing representation and participating in the hearing. Where such allegations are advanced, the relevant question is whether the alleged irregularity was sufficiently serious to render the decision unjust.

27. Not every procedural complaint will justify appellate intervention. It is necessary to show a realistic prospect that the alleged irregularity materially affected the fairness of the proceedings or the outcome reached by the Court.

28. In assessing such complaints, the Court is entitled to consider the proceedings as a whole, including the opportunities afforded to a party to comply with directions, present evidence and participate in hearings, and the extent to which any alleged prejudice was caused by the conduct of the party itself rather than any act or omission of the Court or the Registry.

C5. Fresh Material and Material Not Before the Court

29. Ground 3 raises an issue concerning a skeleton argument and documents which the Appellant contends were emailed to the Registry before the hearing but which were not contained in the case bundle before the Court when the immediate judgment application was determined.

30. Where an applicant for permission to appeal contends that the Court failed to consider material that was before it, the relevant issue is whether there is a realistic prospect of establishing that the material formed part of the record before the Court and that the omission to consider it was material to the outcome. Conversely, where material was not properly before the Court, the fact that the Court did not consider it will not ordinarily establish an appealable error.

31. These principles provide the framework within which the Appellant's grounds of appeal must be assessed. The Court therefore turns to consider the individual grounds relied upon in support of the application for permission to appeal.

D. Preliminary Procedural Issues

D1. Alleged Defects in Service

32. The Respondent submits that the application for permission to appeal is procedurally defective because the Appellant failed properly to serve the Appeal Notice and accompanying documents in accordance with RDC Part 44. The Respondent contends that the purported service was directed to a former employee of the Respondent, that there is no evidence that effective service occurred, and that the Appellant subsequently failed to comply with Registry directions concerning service. The Respondent submits that, for those reasons, the application should be struck out or treated as invalid.

33. I do not consider it necessary to determine those procedural objections conclusively. Even assuming in the Appellant’s favour that the application for permission to appeal is properly before the Court and that any defects in service should not result in the application being struck out, the application must nevertheless be determined by reference to the substantive criteria in RDC Part 44. The appeal cannot proceed unless the Appellant demonstrates that the proposed appeal has a real prospect of success or that there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.

34. In those circumstances, and because the parties have made detailed submissions on the merits of the proposed appeal, it is appropriate to determine the application on its merits. I therefore proceed on the assumption, without deciding, that any issues concerning service do not preclude consideration of the Appellant's application. 35. It follows that I express no concluded view as to the Respondent's submissions concerning service. Rather, I assess the application by reference to the substantive grounds of appeal advanced by the Appellant.

D2. Alleged Non-Compliance with RDC Part 44

36. The Respondent further submits that the application is procedurally deficient because the Appellant failed to comply with various requirements of RDC Part 44. In particular, the Respondent contends that the Appellant failed to file a skeleton argument as required by RDC 44.29, failed to comply with RDC 44.31 by identifying for each ground whether it raises a point of law or a challenge to a finding of fact, and failed to file evidence in support of factual matters relied upon in the application.

37. There is force in the Respondent’s submission that the Appellant’s compliance with the requirements of RDC Part 44 has been imperfect. The Grounds of Appeal do not clearly distinguish between alleged errors of law, alleged errors of fact and alleged procedural irregularities. Further, some grounds rely upon factual matters outside the judgment without any supporting witness evidence.

38. However, the existence of procedural deficiencies does not relieve the Court of its obligation to consider whether the application discloses a real prospect of success or some other compelling reason for an appeal. Even if the deficiencies identified by the Respondent are not, in themselves, fatal to the application, they remain relevant circumstances in assessing whether the proposed appeal is properly formulated and whether any of the grounds disclose an arguable basis for appellate intervention.

39. In the present case, I consider it preferable to address the substance of the grounds advanced by the Appellant. If none of the grounds has a real prospect of success and no other compelling reason exists for granting permission to appeal, the application must be refused irrespective of the procedural objections advanced by the Respondent.

40. Accordingly, while I take into account the matters raised by the Respondent concerning compliance with RDC Part 44, I proceed to determine the application principally by reference to the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal.

E. Assessment of the Grounds of Appeal

E1. Ground 1 – No Real Prospect of Successfully Defending the Claim

41. By Ground 1, the Appellant contends that the Court erred in concluding that it had no real prospect of successfully defending the Respondent's claim or pursuing its Counterclaim. The Appellant submits that the Defence and Counterclaim disclosed substantial triable issues concerning, amongst other matters, authority to provide instructions, the circumstances in which the Respondent ceased acting, the quality of the Respondent's performance of its contractual obligations, the reasonableness of the invoices rendered, and the losses allegedly suffered by the Appellant. The Appellant further submits that those matters required a full examination of the evidence and were unsuitable for summary determination.

42. I am not persuaded that Ground 1 has a real prospect of success. Properly analysed, the proposed ground does not identify any arguable error in the legal principles applied by the Court. Nor does it identify any realistic basis upon which an appellate court could conclude that the Court misapplied those principles to the material before it. Rather, the ground amounts substantially to a disagreement with conclusions reached in the judgment. The question at this stage is not whether those conclusions were correct, but whether the Appellant has demonstrated a realistic prospect of persuading an appellate court that they were wrong. In my judgment, Ground 1 does not do so.

43. In the judgment, the Court expressly directed itself as to the applicable principles governing immediate judgment under RDC 24.1. The Court recognised that immediate judgment may only be granted where the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and there is no other compelling reason why the matter should proceed to trial. The Court further recognised that it was not appropriate to conduct a mini-trial or determine genuine factual disputes requiring oral evidence, whilst acknowledging that the Court was not obliged to accept unparticularised assertions or allegations contradicted by the contemporaneous documentary record.

44. Ground 1 does not identify any error in that formulation of the applicable legal test. Indeed, the Appellant's complaint is not that the Court applied the wrong legal principles but that it reached the wrong conclusion when applying the correct principles to the facts. That is not, without more, sufficient to establish a real prospect of success on appeal. A proposed appeal does not have a real prospect of success merely because the unsuccessful party contends that the evidence should have been evaluated differently.

45. Further, the Court's conclusions were rooted in the material that was before it. The judgment records that the Appellant failed to comply with the 15 May 2026 Order requiring it to file evidence and a skeleton argument in response to the immediate judgment application, failed to identify a Part II Registered Practitioner who would appear on its behalf, and failed to attend the hearing on 3 June 2026. In those circumstances, the Court assessed the application based on the Respondent's evidence together with the Defence and Counterclaim as pleaded.

46. The judgment identified several reasons for concluding that the Defence disclosed no real prospect of success. Those reasons included findings that the allegations of professional negligence, breach of contract and unreasonable billing were insufficiently particularised, that important aspects of the contemporaneous documentary record did not support the Appellant's case, and that the Appellant had failed to adduce evidence supporting the allegations advanced. Ground 1 does not demonstrate a realistic prospect that those conclusions were affected by legal error, material factual error, or procedural unfairness.

47. Secondly, the judgment proceeded on the basis that the contemporaneous documentary record supported the Respondent's case that substantial legal work had been performed pursuant to the parties' retainer. Whether that conclusion was ultimately correct is not the question at this stage. The issue is whether Ground 1 identifies a realistic basis upon which an appellate court could conclude that the finding was not reasonably open to the judge on the material before the Court. In my judgment, it does not.

48. Ground 1 does not engage meaningfully with the central reasons in the judgment for concluding that the Defence and Counterclaim had no real prospect of success. It largely repeats the categories of allegations in the Defence and Counterclaim and asserts that they raised triable issues. However, pleaded allegations alone, without more, are not sufficient to demonstrate a realistic prospect of success or to establish that the judge erred in concluding otherwise. The judgment identified a number of deficiencies in the Appellant's case, including lack of particularisation, absence of supporting evidence, and inconsistencies with aspects of the documentary record. Ground 1 does not identify a realistically arguable error in that reasoning.

49. More fundamentally, the proposed ground fails to identify a realistic basis for an appellate court to conclude that the principal findings underpinning the grant of immediate judgment were not reasonably open to the judge on the material before the Court. Rather, the Appellant seeks to revisit the assessment of the strength of the Defence and Counterclaim and invites a different evaluation of the same matters. That is insufficient, without more, to establish a real prospect of success on appeal.

50. For those reasons, I am not satisfied that Ground 1 discloses a real prospect that an appellate court would conclude that the judgment was wrong in finding that the Defence had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim. Nor am I satisfied that Ground 1 identifies any other compelling reason for the proposed appeal to be heard.

51. Accordingly, permission to appeal is refused in respect of Ground 1.

E2. Ground 2 – Procedural Unfairness Arising from Registry Directions

52. By Ground 2, the Appellant contends that the proceedings were procedurally unfair because the Registry's communications concerning rights of audience and the Court's subsequent directions allegedly deprived the Appellant of a realistic opportunity to secure representation and participate effectively in the hearing of the immediate judgment application. The Appellant submits that it appointed Ms Serena Amani on 8 May 2026, that the Registry did not communicate until after 12 May 2026 that she lacked full rights of audience before the DIFC Courts, and that the period subsequently allowed for the appointment of alternative representation was effectively curtailed by intervening public holidays. According to the Appellant, these matters cumulatively resulted in procedural unfairness and deprived it of a meaningful opportunity to present its case.

53. I do not consider that Ground 2 discloses a real prospect of success.

54. I am not persuaded that the procedural history identified by the Appellant gives rise to a realistically arguable case of procedural unfairness. The relevant question is whether there is a realistic prospect that an appellate court could conclude that the Appellant was denied a fair opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

55. The materials before the Court show that the issue of representation and rights of audience arose before the hearing listed for 15 May 2026. More importantly, when the Appellant indicated that it required additional time regarding representation, the Court granted the relief sought. The hearing of the Immediate Judgment Application was adjourned from 15 May 2026 to 3 June 2026, and directions were given to afford the Appellant a further opportunity to secure representation and to place evidence and submissions before the Court.

56. The 15 May 2026 Order required the Appellant, by 22 May 2026, to identify the Part II Registered Practitioner who would represent it at the adjourned hearing and to file and serve any evidence and a skeleton argument on which it intended to rely. The Order therefore afforded a further opportunity to regularise representation and to prepare a response to the application.

57. Against that background, I am not persuaded that Ground 2 identifies a realistic basis upon which an appellate court could conclude that the Appellant was denied a fair opportunity to participate in the proceedings. The complaint proceeds on the premise that the Registry's communications concerning rights of audience effectively prevented meaningful participation. However, the subsequent adjournment and directions require that the contention be assessed in light of the additional opportunity afforded by the Court.

58. The judgment records that, following the adjournment, the Appellant did not identify a Part II Registered Practitioner, did not file evidence in response to the Immediate Judgment Application, did not file a skeleton argument pursuant to the 15 May 2026 Order, and did not attend the hearing on 3 June 2026. For present purposes, the significance of those matters is not that fault is to be attributed to the Appellant, but that they form part of the procedural history against which the allegation of unfairness must be assessed.

59. Nor does Ground 2 identify any specific procedural ruling of the Court said to be erroneous. The complaint is directed principally to the consequences of the rights-of- audience issue and subsequent Registry communications. Even taking the Appellant's account at its highest, Ground 2 does not explain why the adjournment and directions subsequently granted by the Court were insufficient to afford a fair opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

60. The essential question is not whether the Appellant encountered difficulty in arranging representation, but whether there is a realistic prospect that an appellate court would conclude that the conduct of the proceedings deprived it of a fair opportunity to present its case. Having regard to the adjournment granted, the directions made, and the opportunities afforded to file evidence and submissions, I am not persuaded that Ground 2 demonstrates such a prospect.

61. In substance, Ground 2 does not identify a realistic basis upon which an appellate court could conclude that the proceedings were procedurally unfair or that the judgment was rendered unjust by reason of a serious procedural irregularity.

62. On the material before me, I am not persuaded that there is a realistic prospect of an appellate court concluding that the proceedings were procedurally unfair or that any alleged irregularity rendered the judgment unjust

63. Permission to appeal is therefore refused in respect of Ground 2.

E3. Ground 3 – Failure to Consider Skeleton Argument and Supporting Material

64. By Ground 3, the Appellant contends that the Court erred in finding that it had failed to identify specific examples of excessive charging, duplication of work and unreasonable billing practices. The Appellant submits that a skeleton argument was sent to the Registry before the hearing which identified a number of specific invoices and advanced submissions concerning alleged duplication of work, excessive supervision, overstaffing, repetitive work and unreasonable billing. The Appellant contends that those submissions were not considered by the Court and that, had they been considered, the Court would not have concluded that the Defence and Counterclaim had no real prospect of success.

65. I accept, for the purposes of this application, that the Appellant's complaint is not merely that additional argument could have been advanced, but that a skeleton argument containing more detailed submissions than those appearing in the pleaded Defence may have been provided to the Registry and was not before the Court when the Immediate Judgment Application was determined.

66. The question raised by Ground 3 is therefore not whether the skeleton argument itself constituted evidence. Rather, the issue is whether there is a realistic prospect that an appellate court would conclude that material submissions advanced by the Appellant were not considered and that such omission may have affected the outcome of the Immediate Judgment Application. In assessing that question, it is necessary to examine both the content of the document and the role that it could realistically have played in the determination of the application.

67. Even proceeding on that assumption in the Appellant's favour, I am not satisfied that Ground 3 discloses a real prospect of success.

68. The skeleton argument relied upon by the Appellant did contain more detailed submissions than the Defence and Counterclaim in relation to certain matters. It referred to specific invoices and advanced criticisms of the Respondent's billing practices, including allegations of duplication of work, excessive supervision, overstaffing, repetitive work and insufficiently particularised invoice narratives. It also advanced submissions concerning authority to provide instructions, the circumstances surrounding termination of the retainer and the Respondent's alleged performance of its obligations.

69. However, the skeleton argument contained submissions rather than evidence. It was not verified by a statement of truth, was not contained within a witness statement or affidavit, and did not constitute admissible evidence establishing the factual matters asserted within it. The allegations advanced in the skeleton argument therefore stood in the same position as the allegations advanced in the Defence and Counterclaim: they were assertions requiring evidential support.

70. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss the significance of the skeleton argument solely because it was not evidence. On an application for immediate judgment, written submissions may be important in identifying why a pleaded case is said to be arguable and in directing the Court to matters said to arise from the documentary record. Accordingly, I proceed on the assumption most favourable to the Appellant, namely that the skeleton argument ought to have been considered and that its contents should be assessed in determining whether there is a realistic prospect that the outcome would have been different.

71. Having reviewed the submissions relied upon by the Appellant, I do not consider that they materially alter the position. The submissions develop certain allegations beyond the generality of the Defence and Counterclaim. They identify specific invoices and advance more detailed criticisms of the Respondent's billing practices. However, those criticisms remained primarily directed to the reasonableness of fees charged and the way particular legal tasks were undertaken. They did not address a number of the independent bases upon which immediate judgment was granted.

72. This distinction is important because the Court's reasoning was not based solely on a finding that the Appellant had failed to identify examples of allegedly unreasonable billing. The judgment identified a number of separate reasons for concluding that the Defence and Counterclaim had no real prospect of success. Those reasons included the absence of evidence supporting allegations of professional negligence and breach of contract, the absence of evidence of loss, the documentary record concerning the parties' retainer and its termination, and the lack of evidential support for the factual allegations underlying the Counterclaim.

73. The Appellant's skeleton argument did not remedy those deficiencies. At its highest, it provided more detailed criticism of the Respondent's invoices and work practices. Even if those submissions had been before the Court, they would still have been unsupported by witness evidence verifying the factual allegations relied upon. They would therefore not have altered the fact that the Appellant had filed no witness statement, affidavit or other verified evidence in response to the Immediate Judgment Application.

74. Nor am I satisfied that the skeleton argument materially undermined the Court's broader reasoning. The judgment did not rest upon a single finding that the Appellant had failed to identify examples of allegedly unreasonable billing. Rather, the Court identified a number of separate and cumulative reasons for concluding that the Defence and Counterclaim disclosed no real prospect of success. Those reasons included the absence of evidence supporting the allegations of professional negligence and breach of contract, the absence of any adequately supported case on causation or loss, the documentary record concerning the parties' retainer and its termination, and the absence of verified evidence supporting the factual assertions upon which the Defence and Counterclaim depended.

75. Even if the Court had considered the skeleton argument and accepted that it identified a number of specific invoice-related criticisms, that would not, without more, have displaced those independent conclusions. At its highest, the skeleton argument demonstrated that the Appellant wished to advance a more detailed challenge to aspects of the Respondent's billing. It did not provide evidential support for the allegations of negligence, breach of duty, causation or loss forming the foundation of the Counterclaim, nor did it cure the deficiencies identified elsewhere in the judgment.

76. In those circumstances, the critical question is one of materiality. I am not persuaded that there is a realistic prospect that an appellate court would conclude that consideration of the skeleton argument could reasonably have led to a different outcome. While the document elaborated upon certain criticisms already advanced by the Appellant, it did not undermine the principal reasons upon which immediate judgment was granted. The proposed appeal therefore does not disclose a realistic prospect that any failure to consider the skeleton argument rendered the decision unsafe or unjust.

77. Accordingly, even assuming that the skeleton argument was sent to the Registry and did not come before the Court, I am not satisfied that there is a realistic prospect that its consideration would have led to a different outcome. The document contained submissions, some of them more detailed than those appearing in the Defence, but it remained unverified argument rather than evidence and did not address the independent bases upon which immediate judgment was granted.

78. For those reasons, Ground 3 does not disclose a real prospect of success. Nor does it disclose any other compelling reason why permission to appeal should be granted.

E4. Ground 4 – Dismissal of the Counterclaim

79. By Ground 4, the Appellant contends that the Court erred in summarily dismissing the Counterclaim. The Appellant submits that the Counterclaim alleged breach of professional duties, failure to follow instructions, failure properly to conduct the disclosure exercise, wrongful termination of the retainer and resulting loss. The Appellant further submits that those allegations raised factual disputes requiring disclosure, witness evidence and cross-examination and were therefore unsuitable for determination on an application for immediate judgment.

80. I am not satisfied that Ground 4 has a real prospect of success. In substance, Ground 4 largely repeats the complaints advanced in Ground 1, but directed specifically to the Counterclaim rather than the Defence. As with Ground 1, the proposed ground does not identify any error in the legal principles applied by the Court. Rather, it asserts that the Court should have reached a different conclusion regarding the viability of the Counterclaim.

81. The judgment did not proceed on the basis that allegations of professional negligence or breach of contract can never require a trial. Nor did the Court conclude that such claims are inherently unsuitable for determination only after a full evidential hearing. Rather, the Court examined the Counterclaim as pleaded and considered whether it disclosed a realistic prospect of succeeding at trial. The judgment concluded that it did not. The issue for present purposes is whether the Appellant has demonstrated a realistic prospect that an appellate court would regard that conclusion as affected by error. I do not consider that Ground 4 identifies such an error.

82. The Court identified a number of specific deficiencies in the Counterclaim. The judgment found that the Counterclaim did not plead any identifiable duty said to have been breached beyond broad assertions, did not identify the particular acts or omissions alleged to constitute breach, did not plead any causal connection between the breaches alleged and the losses claimed, and did not properly quantify the losses said to have been suffered. The Court therefore concluded that the Counterclaim, in its pleaded form, could not succeed at trial.

83. Ground 4 does not engage substantively with those findings. It repeats the broad categories of allegations advanced in the Counterclaim but does not identify any error in the Court's conclusion that those allegations lacked the particulars necessary to establish an arguable cause of action. Nor does the Appellant identify any specific aspect of the pleadings which the Court overlooked or misunderstood.

84. There is a further difficulty with Ground 4. As explained in relation to Ground 3, the Court's conclusions concerning the Counterclaim were not based merely upon pleading deficiencies. The Court also found that the Appellant had failed to adduce evidence supporting the allegations upon which the Counterclaim depended. The Appellant filed no witness statement, affidavit or other verified evidence in support of the Counterclaim or in response to the Immediate Judgment Application. The skeleton argument upon which the Appellant now relies was not evidence and contained no statement of truth or verification. Even if the skeleton argument had been considered, it could not have remedied the absence of evidential support for the factual allegations underlying the Counterclaim.

85. The Appellant argues that disclosure, witness evidence and cross-examination might have strengthened its position had the matter proceeded to trial. However, RDC Part 24 requires the Court to assess whether the claim or defence before it has a real prospect of success on the material available at the time of the application. The possibility that a party may subsequently obtain evidence capable of improving its case is not, without more, a reason to refuse immediate judgment where the pleaded case and evidence then before the Court disclose no realistic prospect of success.

86. The judgment also separately considered whether there was any other compelling reason for the proceedings, including the Counterclaim, to proceed to trial. The Court concluded that there was not. It found that the Appellant had not identified any properly particularised issue requiring oral evidence or cross-examination and had not demonstrated any evidential basis upon which the Counterclaim could realistically be transformed into a sustainable claim.

87. Ground 4 does not identify any error of law, material error of fact, or serious procedural irregularity in that reasoning. In substance, it amounts to an assertion that because allegations were made, the Counterclaim should necessarily have proceeded to trial. The Court was entitled to conclude that the allegations, as pleaded and unsupported by evidence, did not disclose a realistic prospect of success.

88. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that Ground 4 has a real prospect of success. Nor does it disclose any other compelling reason why permission to appeal should be granted.

89. Permission to appeal is therefore refused in respect of Ground 4.

E5. Ground 5 – Fair Opportunity to Present the Case

90. By Ground 5, the Appellant contends that the Court erred in proceeding to determine the Immediate Judgment Application in circumstances where the Appellant was allegedly deprived of a fair opportunity to present its case. The Appellant submits that it had taken steps to secure representation before the DIFC Courts, that issues arose concerning rights of audience and the availability of legal representation, and that it should have been afforded additional time to regularise its representation and participate in the hearing. The Appellant contends that the resulting decision was procedurally unfair.

91. I am not satisfied that Ground 5 discloses a real prospect of success. The ground substantially overlaps with Ground 2 and advances, in substance, the same complaint under a different heading. Both grounds are founded upon the proposition that difficulties encountered by the Appellant in securing representation resulted in procedural unfairness and deprived it of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

92. For the reasons given in addressing Ground 2, the procedural history does not support that contention. When the Appellant sought additional time in relation to representation, the Court granted the adjournment sought. The hearing originally listed for 15 May 2026 was adjourned to 3 June 2026. The Court also directed the Appellant to identify a Part II Registered Practitioner to represent it and to file any evidence and a skeleton argument upon which it intended to rely. Those directions were specifically intended to ensure that the Appellant had a further opportunity to participate effectively in the proceedings.

93. Ground 5 does not identify a realistic basis upon which an appellate court could conclude that the Appellant was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its case. On the contrary, it was afforded an additional opportunity to do so. The difficulty for the Appellant is that it failed to avail itself of that opportunity. The judgment records that the Appellant failed to comply with the Court's directions, failed to file evidence in response to the Immediate Judgment Application, failed to file a skeleton argument in accordance with the Court's order, failed to identify a Part II Registered Practitioner, and failed to attend the adjourned hearing on 3 June 2026.

94. Ground 5 does not identify any procedural ruling of the Court that was erroneous, nor does it identify any step taken by the Court that prevented the Appellant from presenting its case. Rather, the proposed ground seeks to attribute to the Court the consequences of the Appellant's own failure to comply with the opportunities and directions afforded to it. An allegation of procedural unfairness cannot be established merely by showing that a party did not participate in proceedings. It must be shown that the party was denied a fair opportunity to do so. The procedural record demonstrates the opposite.

95. Further, the Appellant has not identified any evidence that it was ready, willing and able to present a substantive response to the Immediate Judgment Application had additional time been granted. No witness statement or other verified evidence was filed in support of the Application. As noted in relation to Ground 3, the skeleton argument upon which the Appellant now relies was not evidence and contained no statement of truth or verification. Consequently, there is no proper evidential basis upon which the Court could conclude that the outcome of the proceedings may have been different had further time been afforded.

96. In considering whether a proposed appeal has a real prospect of success, it is also material that Ground 5 identifies no serious procedural irregularity capable of rendering the judgment unjust. The Court granted the relief sought by the Appellant in the form of an adjournment, afforded additional time for compliance, and provided an opportunity to adduce evidence and submissions. In those circumstances, I do not consider that there is any realistic prospect that an appellate court would conclude that the proceedings were procedurally unfair.

97. Ground 5 therefore adds nothing material to Ground 2 and fails for substantially the same reasons. It does not disclose a real prospect of success, nor does it identify any other compelling reason why permission to appeal should be granted.

98. Accordingly, permission to appeal is refused in respect of Ground 5.

E6. Ground 6 – Overriding Objective and Interests of Justice

99. By Ground 6, the Appellant contends that the Court failed to give sufficient weight to the overriding objective and the interests of justice. The Appellant submits that the dispute involved allegations concerning professional negligence, solicitor-client relations, authority to provide instructions and billing practices, and that those matters required a full evidential inquiry which could not properly be resolved on an application for Immediate Judgment.

100. I am not satisfied that Ground 6 discloses a real prospect of success. Properly analysed, the ground adds little of substance to Grounds 1 and 4. It does not identify any error in the legal principles applied by the Court, any material error of fact, or any serious procedural irregularity. Rather, it advances the proposition that, because the subject matter of the dispute concerns allegations of professional negligence and related matters, the proceedings should necessarily have proceeded to trial.

101. That proposition is inconsistent with RDC Part 24. The mere fact that a case involves allegations of professional negligence, breach of professional duty or other serious allegations does not preclude the grant of immediate judgment. The relevant question is not the nature of the allegations viewed in the abstract. The question is whether the claim, defence or counterclaim before the Court has a real prospect of success and whether there is some other compelling reason why the matter should proceed to trial. A claim or defence which is inadequately pleaded, unsupported by evidence or otherwise lacks a realistic prospect of success may properly be disposed of summarily irrespective of the label attached to it.

102. The difficulty with Ground 6 is that the judgment demonstrates that the Court expressly considered whether the interests of justice required the proceedings to continue to trial notwithstanding its conclusion that the Defence and Counterclaim lacked a realistic prospect of success. Under the heading "No Other Compelling Reason for Trial", the Court examined that question and concluded that there was no such reason. The judgment reasoned that the dispute was principally a debt claim turning upon contractual terms and contemporaneous documents and that no sufficiently particularised issue requiring trial had been identified. Ground 6 does not demonstrate a realistic prospect that those conclusions were outside the range of conclusions reasonably open to the Court on the material before it., that the Appellant had not identified any properly particularised issue requiring oral evidence or cross-examination, and that there was no evidential basis upon which the pleaded case could realistically be transformed into a sustainable defence or counterclaim.

103. The Court also considered and rejected the Appellant's request for an independent review of invoices. The Court concluded that, in the absence of any identified dispute concerning particular items, the possibility of expert review did not constitute a compelling reason for trial. Those findings demonstrate that the Court did not overlook the interests of justice or the overriding objective. Rather, the Court expressly addressed the question and gave reasons for its conclusion.

104. Ground 6 does not engage with that reasoning. It does not identify why the Court's conclusion was wrong. Nor does it explain how the overriding objective required a different outcome. Instead, it merely repeats the broad categories of allegations contained in the Defence and Counterclaim and asserts that their seriousness justified a trial. That assertion does not establish a realistic prospect that an appellate court would reach a different conclusion.

105. There is a further difficulty. As explained in connection with Grounds 1, 3 and 4, the Court's decision rested not merely upon pleading deficiencies but also upon the absence of evidence supporting the allegations advanced by the Appellant. The Appellant filed no witness statement, affidavit or other verified evidence in response to the Immediate Judgment Application. The skeleton argument upon which it relies was not evidence and contained no statement of truth or verification. In those circumstances, the Court was entitled to conclude that the interests of justice did not require a trial merely to permit unsupported allegations to be investigated in the hope that evidence might subsequently emerge.

106. To accept the Appellant's argument would be to suggest that allegations of professional negligence or breach of professional duty can never be summarily dismissed, regardless of the absence of particulars or evidence. That is not the law. RDC Part 24 requires the Court to assess whether a party has a realistic prospect of success on the material before it. The Court did so in the present case and gave detailed reasons for its conclusions.

107. Ground 6 therefore amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Court's assessment of whether the interests of justice required a trial. It does not identify any arguable error in the Court's application of RDC Part 24, any material factual error, or any compelling reason why an appeal should be heard. I am not satisfied that the proposed ground has a real prospect of success.

108. Accordingly, permission to appeal is refused in respect of Ground 6.

E7. Scope of the present decision

109. Before leaving the individual grounds, I emphasise that the present decision concerns only whether permission to appeal should be granted. Nothing in these reasons should be understood as a re-determination of disputed factual issues arising in the underlying claim. My conclusion is that the Appellant has not demonstrated a realistic prospect that an appellate court would conclude that the judgment was wrong or unjust on the basis of legal error, material factual error, or procedural irregularity.

F. Disposition

110. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that any of the six grounds advanced by the Appellant has a real prospect of success. The Appellant has not identified any arguable error in the Court's application of RDC Part 24, any material error of fact, or any serious procedural irregularity capable of rendering the judgment unjust. Further, I am not satisfied that there is any other compelling reason why the proposed appeal should be heard.

111. Grounds 1, 4 and 6 amount, in substance, to disagreement with conclusions that were properly open to the Court on the pleadings, evidence and contemporaneous documents before it. Grounds 2 and 5 fail to demonstrate that the Appellant was denied a fair opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Ground 3 does not establish a realistic prospect that the outcome would have been different had the Appellant's skeleton argument been considered, not least because the skeleton argument was not evidence and could not remedy the Appellant's failure to adduce evidence in support of the factual allegations advanced in its Defence and Counterclaim.

112. Considered individually and cumulatively, the grounds do not satisfy either limb of the test under RDC 44.19. The proposed appeal therefore has no real prospect of success and there is no other compelling reason for granting permission to appeal.

113. Accordingly, the Appellant's application for permission to appeal is dismissed.

G. Costs

G1. Applicable Principles

114. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party, although the Court retains a discretion to make a different order where the circumstances justify departure from that general rule. In exercising that discretion, the Court may have regard to the conduct of the parties, the issues raised by the application, the way the proceedings were conducted and the overall justice of the case.

115. A party who unsuccessfully seeks permission to appeal will ordinarily be required to pay the costs occasioned by that application. The rationale for that approach is that the successful party should generally be compensated for the reasonable costs incurred in opposing an application that should not have been brought or maintained.

G2 Whether Costs Should Follow the Event

116. In the present case, the Respondent has successfully resisted the Appellant's application for permission to appeal. I have concluded that none of the six grounds of appeal has a real prospect of success and that there is no other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

117. The Respondent was therefore required to incur costs in considering the proposed appeal and preparing submissions in opposition to it. Those costs were incurred because of the Appellant's unsuccessful application.

118. I see no reason to depart from the ordinary rule that costs should follow the event. The Respondent has been wholly successful in the application. Further, the application largely sought to reargue matters that were considered and determined in the judgment of 9 June 2026. No exceptional circumstance has been identified that would justify depriving the Respondent of its costs or making any different order.

119. In those circumstances, the Appellant should pay the Respondent's costs of and occasioned by the application for permission to appeal.

H. Orders

120. The Court orders that: