September 09, 2026 Court of First Instance - Orders
Claim No: CFI 089/2026
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
PATTON
Claimant/Respondent
and
PANSIE
Defendant/Appellant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE ROGER STEWART
UPON the Claim being filed on 2 January 2018 in SCT-004-2018 (the “Claim”)
AND UPON the Order of SCT Judge Ayesha Bin Kalban dated 7 June 2018 (the “Default Order”)
AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. SCT-004-2018/2 dated 28 October 2025 seeking to set aside the Default Order (the “Application”)
AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Maha Al Mheiri dated 28 January 2026 dismissing the Application (the “Dismissal Order”)
AND UPON the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 11 February 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Dismissal Application (the “Permission to Appeal Application”)
AND UPON hearing the Claimant and the Defendant at a hearing held on 27 February 2026 before H.E. Justice Roger Stewart (the “Hearing”)
AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Roger Stewart dated 4 March 2026
AND UPON the Defendant filing a statement on 9 March 2026 setting out the grounds of his substantive defence to the original claim by the Claimant
AND UPON the Claimant not filing a statement setting out its grounds of opposition to the Defendant’s appeal notice, in particular identifying any occasions when it is said that the Default Order was brought to the attention of the Defendant whether by 16 March 2026 or at all
AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Roger Stewart dated 5 June 2026 granting Permission to Appeal Application and making provision for further submissions with the determination of the appeal then taking place on paper
AND UPON the Defendant’s written submissions dated 18 June 2026 setting out grounds upon which the appeal should be allowed
AND UPON the Claimant’s written submissions dated 19 June 2026 setting out grounds upon which the appeal should be dismissed
AND UPON the Defendant’s submissions dated 26 June 2026 responding to the Claimant’s submissions
AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the DIFC Courts (the “RDC”)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Appeal against the Dismissal Order is allowed.
2. The Default Order is Set Aside.
3. The matter is remitted to the Small Claims Tribunal for substantive determination on the merits.
4. There is no order as to the costs of the Appeal.
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 9 September 2026
At: 10am
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
1. As set out in the Dismissal Order of H.E. Justice Maha Al Mheiri:
(a) This Claim was originally filed by the Claimant bank more than 8 years ago on 2 January 2018 seeking recovery of AED 142,666.17 plus payment of Court fees from the Defendant;
(b) The Claim was not served personally on the Defendant but on 9 May 2018, H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser granted the Claimant permission to serve the Claim Form by way of newspaper publication in Arabic and English;
(c) On 16 May 2018, the Claimant filed a Certificate of Service confirming that the Defendant had been served notice of the Claim by newspaper publication in accordance with the Order;
(d) A consultation was listed before SCT Judge Ayesha Bin Kalban on 3 June 2018 which was attended by the Claimant’s representative but not the Defendant; and
(e) On 7 June, following the Defendant’s failure to attend the Consultation, the Default Order was made in the sum of AED 149,799.49.
2. On 28 October 2025, more than seven years after the Default Order, the Defendant applied to set aside the Default Order. There were a large number of matters set out in the Application including that:
(a) The Claimant had wrongly obtained permission to serve the original Claim Form in that it had used the wrong contact details for the Defendant despite knowing his correct details;
(b) He had never had actual knowledge of the original Claim Form;
(c) The Default Order was never validly served on the Defendant; and
(d) The Defendant only had actual knowledge of the proceedings and the Default Order in October 2025 after the Claimant started enforcement proceedings in the Dubai Courts.
3. As recorded in the Dismissal Order, the Claimant did not reply to the Application to set aside the Default Order.
4. As set out in the Dismissal Order, the Judge dismissed the Defendant’s Application. Having correctly observed that the Application was wrongly framed by reference to RDC Part 4 when it should have been brought in accordance with RDC 53.35, she held that:
(a) An application had to be made not more than seven days after the day on which the day on which notice of the Default Order was served upon a Party;
(b) The Court had a discretion to set aside or vary a default judgment or order but that discretion had to be exercised consistently with the overriding objective under RDC 1.6;
(c) The Application was filed more than seven years after the Default Order;
(d) “[T]he Defendant has not provided any satisfactory explanation for this substantial delay. In particular, the Application does not identify when the Defendant first became aware of the Default Order, nor does it explain why no steps were taken to apply to set it aside for such an extended period; and
(e) Given that the Application was brought after several years of unexplained delay, it was not brought promptly and did not justify reopening proceedings from 2018 and would be dismissed on this basis.
5. On 11 February 2026, the Defendant issued the Permission to Appeal Application in which he asserted, amongst other things, that the first actual knowledge that he had of the Default Order was after the Claimant issued enforcement proceedings in the Dubai Courts on 10 September 2025 and the Defendant then received the Dubai Courts notification dated 15 September 2025.
6. The Court invited a response to the Permission to Appeal Application from the Claimant, but none was provided.
7. The parties appeared before me on 27 February 2026 at which:
(a) The Claimant’s representative stated that he did not know when the Defendant had first been given notice of the Default Order due to the difficulties of taking instructions in such an old matter; and
(b) It was not clear to me what the substantive defence to the Claim was said to be.
8. I therefore made the Order with Reasons dated 4 March 2026 which:
(a) Required the Defendant to file a statement by 9 March 2026 setting out the grounds of his substantive defence to the original Claim; and
(b) Required the Claimant by the same time to file a statement setting out its grounds of opposition to the Defendant’s Appeal Notice and, in particular, identifying any occasions on which it is said that the Default Order was brought to the attention of the Defendant.
9. The Defendant duly filed a statement setting out the grounds of his substantive defence but the Claimant did not file any statement setting out its grounds of opposition to the Default Notice or identifying any occasions upon which it was said that the Default Ordre was brought to the attention of the Defendant.
10. I granted permission to appeal by my Order with Reasons dated 5 June 2026 for the reasons there stated.
11. The parties each served substantive submissions dated 18 and 19 June 2026. Those submissions disclose that:
(a) The Defendant substantially maintained the points that he had made previously but emphasized that:
(i) There had been no order permitting service of the Default Order by publication (as distinct from the order permitting service by newspaper publication of the original claim form);
(ii) He had no knowledge of the Default Order before 15 September 2025 when he received notice of the enforcement action;
(iii) He had acted promptly thereafter given the necessity to obtain details of the Default Order and the delays caused by lapse of time;
(iv) He had a real jurisdictional defence as well as substantive defences; and
(v) The papers disclosed by the Claimant showed that it had his correct email address and details of his employer but had used the wrong email address in trying to contact him;
(b) That the Claimant emphasised:
(i) the validity of the Default Order;
(ii) the sound basis of the original judgment; and
(iii) the length of time which had elapsed since the Default Order.
12. I do not consider that the Defendant’s Reply submissions added materially to the points already made except that he emphasised that the Default Order itself required service on the Defendant and that there was no provision made for substituted service.
Discussion
13. The circumstances in which the Court of First instance may give permission to appeal, are strictly circumscribed by Article 21 of the DIFC Courts Law No. 2 of 2025 which provides:
“21. Appeals Against Small Claims Tribunal Judgments
A. Judgments of the Small Claims Tribunal may be appealed before the Courts of First Instance in accordance with the procedures established under the DIFC Laws, DIFC Regulations, Rules of the Courts or any Practice Direction or Order issued by the DIFC Courts, where the appeal relates to:
1. A question of law
2. An allegation of a miscarriage of justice
3. An issue of procedural fairness; or
4. A matter provided for in or under DIFC Laws.”
14. In this case, the Judge proceeded upon the basis, as set out above, that the Application did not identify when the Defendant first became aware of the Default Order. That was, with respect to the learned Judge, wrong. The Application stated: “[T]he Defendant became aware of the judgment only in October 2025, when the Bank initiated enforcement proceedings before the Dubai Courts”.
15. It is true that a precise date is not provided. Furthermore, it is now clear that the Defendant accepts that he had notice somewhat earlier on 15 September 2025. It is thus clear that the Defendant had notice of the Default Order more than 7 days before the Application.
16. However, RDC 53.35 refers to the seven day period commencing “not more than 7 days after notice of the Order was served on him” (emphasis added). I consider that the Defendant is correct to state that the Claimant did not have permission to serve the Default Order (as distinct from the Claim Form) by publication. The Application was, accordingly, brought in time.
17. In any event, it is apparent that a delay of just over a month is vastly different from the 7 years contemplated by the Judge. Despite being given every opportunity, the Claimant has not identified any action which it took to bring the Default Order to the attention of the Claimant (other than publication) before enforcement action was commenced in 2025. No explanation for the 7 year delay in this enforcement action has been provided. It is thus clear that the explanation for almost all of the delay in this matter is attributable to the Claimant.
18. It also appears clear that the Defendant had no actual knowledge of the institution of the proceedings given the information provided about the use of incorrect email addresses and that an order for service by publication was given. No explanation has been given by the Claimant as to why it did not attempt contact with the Defendant by the email address that it had for him on file. It follows that, on the evidence before the Court, that the Defendant had no actual knowledge of the Claimant’s claim until September 2025 almost 7 and a half years after it was issued.
19. Although I agree with the Judge that a delay in enforcement does not provide a defence to the action, it does suggest, together with the Claimant’s failure to provide any response to the Application or the Application Permission to Appeal that the Claimant has not made any real attempt to bring these proceedings to the attention of the Defendant for some seven and a half years.
20. In the circumstances, I consider that permission to appeal must be given. It is not procedurally fair for the Court to have proceeded upon the basis that the Defendant knew of the Default Order for 7 years and the fault for not challenging it lay with him when the uncontroverted position was that knowledge was only available for about a month. Further, the judgment wrongly proceeded on the basis that the Application was made out of time when it was not (because there had been no permission for service by publication).
21. There has been no adjudication on the merits of the claim and no explanation from the Claimant as to why it did not serve the Default Order on the Defendant. Any delay by the Defendant has been of a very small scale compared with that of the Claimant.
22. I have considered briefly the statement of substantive defence filed by the Defendant. It appears there is at least a real possibility of a substantive defence to some or all of the claim. I am unpersuaded that there is a jurisdictional defence but I come to no conclusion on this point as it is unnecessary to my decision.
23. I should emphasise that it is also entirely possible that the Defendant is liable to the Claimant for some or all of the sums claimed. The matter will be remitted to the SCT for determination in accordance with the SCT procedures. It would be sensible for both parties to make real efforts to settle this very old dispute.
24. I do not consider it is appropriate to make any order as to costs.
