(a) The First Defendant may respond to such application within 7 days of the date of this Order; and

(b) The Claimant may reply to such response 7 days thereafter.

(a) That there is no such agreement; and

(b) That even if there is such agreement, the Court should refuse to decline jurisdiction.

(a) That the Claimant was not entitled to bring her employment to an end with immediate effect;

(b) That the employment was brought to an end on 18 June 2025; and

(c) That the Defendants would pay the Claimants until the end of a notice period on 18 August 2025 together with sums in lieu of untaken holiday and an end of service gratuity.

(a) Denied that the DIFC Employment Law was applicable to the Claimant’s employment;

(b) Expressed sympathy for the Claimant’s health difficulties whilst pointing out that discretionary sick pay had been paid throughout the Claimant’s absence from work;

(c) Denied and responded to the allegations made; and

(d) Said that a challenge would be mounted to any attempt to institute proceedings in the DIFC.

(a) It identified the parties and referred to D1 as having its address at its Registered Office within the DIFC;

(b) A Preamble which recorded that whereas the Claimant had expressed the desire to be employed “in the below mentioned job” both parties had previously signed a Job offer “of the year (07/01/2022)” after both parties had acknowledged their legal capacity to enter into the Contract and that “this preamble, the Job Offer previously signed by the same and the Annex hereof shall be an integral part of the Contract”;

(c) The First Article provided that the Claimant should work for D1 “in the job/profession of Information Technology Manager within the UAE, (Emirate Name: “Dubai”);

(d) The Second Article provided that the labour relations should commence from the date of entering the State by the Claimant or from “the date of status amendment on 07/01/2022”;

(e) The Sixth Article identified a monthly wage of AED 50,000 including basic salary of AED 30,000 and other allowances of AED 20,000 and provided that the wage should be paid and received “according to the regulations determined by MOHRE”;

(f) The Seventh Article provided:

(g) The Ninth Article contained an acknowledgement by the Claimant that she had thoroughly reviewed all the articles enclosed in the Annex (7 Articles in total) and was well aware of all provisions contained therein and that the Contract ant the Annex were consistent with the Job Offer and the Annex “previously signed by [the Claimant] in the State of recruitment or inside the UAE”.

(h) The Annex:

“Attached is a copy of your employment agreement with Platt Dubai and a copy of your Joining Deed for Pierino. When reviewing the employment contract please keep in mind that your prime contract is the joining deed with Pierino, and that the Dubai employment contract is primarily for residency purposes, and as such follows the local labor law.

Below are a few answers to frequently asked questions you may find helpful 70% of your remuneration is included as your salary, as this is the amount you will be paid by Dubai office this year. The remainder of your remuneration will be paid by Pierino directly from its bank account.

The labor law notice period is 3 months. Your notice period for a Partner is that as set out in the Pierinoregulations, with the relevant appeal options mentioned. The 2 year term is per Dubai Labor law Probationary period is standard in Dubai Labor law”.

(a) Had on its front page “Employment Agreement”;

(b) Appeared to be a complete agreement of all applicable terms and contained no reference to the first MOHRE contract;

(c) Had as its first provisions the facts:

(d) Identified the commencement date as being 22 January 2022;

(e) Recorded D1’s principle location as being the DIFC registered office;

(f) Recorded in clause 3.1 that D1 should employ the Claimant in the position specified in Item 5, namely a partner;

(g) By clause 7.1 recorded the obligation of D1 to pay the salary and allowances specified in Item 12 of Schedule 1 being a basic salary of USD 26,250 per month and medical insurance;

(h) By clause 16.1 that the Agreement was governed by the laws of the Jurisdiction which was identified in the Schedule as “Dubai, UAE”;

(i) By clause 16.2 that the parties agreed that any dispute would be resolved in accordance with the procedures more particularly described in Item 18 of Schedule 1 namely “Any Dispute arising out of relating to this Agreement shall be resolved subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Jurisdiction [namely Dubai, UAE] /As provided by the Regulations [Defined in Schedule 2 as the “Pierino Regulations” – the “Regulations”]; and

(j) Clause 17.1 contained an entire agreement clause.

(a) Referred to the Employment Contract as the Supplementary Employment Contract³;

(b) Stated:

(c) Initially stated that the Claimant was not issued with a DIFC identity card by the DIFC Authority which “she would have been had she been employed by a DIFC entity under DIFC law”⁵ but then corrected the position in his third witness statement providing that DI did obtain a DIFC identity card for the Claimant in May 2022 which was cancelled on 24 October 2023.

(a) No explanation was provided as to how or why the DIFC identity card was obtained given Mr Pilar’s earlier evidence or as to why it was cancelled (although the cancellation took place during the period when the Claimant was off work due to cancer);

(b) It does not appear that the Employment Contract was supplementary to the First MOHRE contract in that it appears to be complete and self-contained;

(c) The remuneration to be provided to the Claimant are materially different:

(d) It is not clear what sums were processed through the MOHRE system but it appears unlikely to have been the sums set out in the Employment Contract;

(e) The job title in the first MOHRE contract (Information Technology Manager) was not the same as that in the Employment Contract (partner – which was correct);

(f) It is also not clear how or on what sums the gratuity was assessed.

“Please find attached your local employment contract, your signed joining deed and the MENA Partner regulations. Please bear in mind that your main contract is the joining deed and the local employment contract is provided for local regulatory purposes…”.

(a) Referred in Article 1 to the Claimant working “in the designation/profession of information technology manager:

(b) Stated that it was for a 2 year period with the ability to extend the same;

(c) Referred to a total salary of AED 50000 made up as to AED 30000 and AED 20000;

(d) Stated in Article 4 that any condition that violated the provisions of Decree-Law no 33 of 2021 concerning the regulation of labour relations and the executive regulations and the relevant decisions in force in respect thereof shall be null and void;

(e) Stated in Article 5 that the parties “are bound to abide by all the laws and regulations in the country and to maintain public order and public decency. Imposing any of the sanctions mentioned in the Federal Decree-Law on the Regulation of Labour Relations, or its Executive or Implementing Decrees, shall not hinder enforcing further sanctions mentioned in other laws in case of violating such laws.”

(f) Declared in Article 6.2 that the provisions of Federal Decree-Law no 33 of 2021 concerning the regulation of Labour Relations and its Executive Regulations and decisions implemented shall apply.

(a) Referred to the term being two years from 4 July 2023;

(b) Referred to a basic salary of AED 57850 and a total salary of AED 96416;

(c) Also referred to provision of a “cash bonus” of unidentified amount.

(a) The DIFC Court laws governing the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts;

(b) The substantive DIFC Employment Law; and

(c) The relevant substantive UAE and Dubai laws which are not DIFC laws.

(a) Contains definitions including:

(b) Provides by Article 14A for the DIFC Courts to have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine a series of matters including at Article 14A(3) “Civil or commercial and employment claims and applications arising from or related to any incident or transaction relevant to the DIFC bodies or DIFC Establishments, their own activities, or those related to the activities of the employees in any of them, that take place wholly or partly, within the DIFC”;

(c) Provides by Article 14B that the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine civil and commercial claims and applications, where the parties expressly agree in writing to the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction whether before or after the dispute arises, provided that such agreement is made pursuant to specific, clear and express provisions”;

(d) Provides by Article 14C(1) that the DIFC Courts may decline to hear claims falling within the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts but where the parties have agreed in writing to the jurisdiction of another court”;

(e) Further provides by Article 23 that the DIFC Courts shall apply the DIFC Laws and DIFC Regulations to the proceedings before them, except where the DIFC Laws and DIFC Regulations provide otherwise or where the parties have expressly agreed that another law shall govern their dispute.

(a) Identifies its purpose at Article 3 as being to:

(b) Provides by Article 4(1) that subject to Article 4(3) the Law applies to:

(c) Provides by Article 4(2) that subject to Article 4(3) an Employee may be employed in the DIFC pursuant to an employment contract subject to an applicable law other than the Employment Law where:

(d) Article 4(3) provides that notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4(2) identified provisions of the DIFC Employment Law remain applicable during a secondment or to an Employee employed in the DIFC pursuant to articles 4(2)(b) or (c). The identified provisions include:

(a) Identifies its Objectives in Article 2;

(b) Provides by Article 3(1) that the provisions of this Decree shall apply by law to all Establishments, Employers and Workers in the Private Sector in the State;

(c) Identifies in Article 3(3) that the Cabinet may, upon a proposal by the Minister, exclude any category from being subject to all or some of the provisions of this Decree by law, and specify the legislation applicable thereto;

(d) Sets out in Article 4 provisions concerning equality and non-discrimination;

(e) Identifies a series of other obligations and rights in the substantive articles;

(f) Provides in Article 54:

(g) By Article 65(3) that every condition that violates the provisions of the decree “shall be considered null unless it is more beneficial to the Worker, and every release, reconciliation, or waiver of the rights arising to the Worker under this Decree by law shall be considered null, if it is in violation of its provisions”

(a) D2 is a DIFC establishment within the definition in Article 2 with the consequence that, as it is a party to the claim, the case falls withing Article 14A(1);

(b) D1 is also a DIFC Establishment as being registered as an authority for the purposes of Articles 97(b) and 98 of DIFC law No 1 of 2004 – again with the consequence that it falls within Article 14A(1);

(c) That the discrimination to which the Claimant was allegedly subject constituted “incidents” relevant to DIFC taking place within the DIFC so that the claim falls within 14A(3); and

(d) As there is jurisdiction over D2, it is desirable to add D1 so that the claim falls within Article 14A(7).

(a) That the parties’ agreements should be construed in accordance with the law of (non DIFC) Dubai on the grounds that the parties have expressly chosen that law to govern their relations;

(b) That whether the law of the DIFC or the law of Dubai outside the DIFC applied, the history and context of the parties’ agreements required a construction whereby exclusive jurisdiction was given to the courts of Dubai;

(c) That the employment law in the DIFC and the federal employment law of Dubai are mutually exclusive and cannot operate simultaneously so that, by way of example, employees are either paid an end of service gratuity or enrolled in DEWS;

(d) That the only exception is that provided for by Articles 4(2) and (3) of the DIFC Courts law;

(e) That Federal law prescribes mandatory MOHRE forms of contract which provide for a mandatory MOHRE dispute resolution process;

(f) That the law renders void a dispute resolution process which violates the mandatory dispute resolution process by virtue of Article 65(3) of the UAE labour law;

(g) That, in context:

(h) That there was no change in the parties’ relationship as a result of the revised June 2023 document.

(i) That, upon the basis that the agreements on their proper construction provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the non DIFC courts, effect should be given to such agreement absent strong reasons for departing from it with the burden being upon the Claimant to establish such strong reasons;

(j) That there are no such strong reasons and, indeed that there is a stronger link with non DIFC Dubai given the facts:

(a) That in considering the operation of Article 14C of the current Courts law, the Court should apply the principles established under the previous Court law (which had no express equivalent) namely:

(b) That although contracts always had to be construed in accordance with their particular terms, the DIFC courts have consistently construed jurisdiction agreements which refer to “Dubai” or “UAE” courts as including the DIFC courts with the leading decision being the decision of the DIFC Court of Appeal in Investment Group Private Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank [2015] DIFC CA 004, with it being consistently applied thereafter;

(c) That, on a proper construction of the agreements, there is nothing to suggest that the parties intended to opt out of the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts given:

(d) The suggestion that the Claimant’s employment relationship was governed by federal UAE law is both wrong and of limited relevance given:

(a) The UAE is a federal state with separate federal and Emirate laws within each of the 7 Emirates naturally leading to the fact that there are a number of Court Systems within the UAE;

(b) Dubai has two relevant, co-operating court systems, those of the DIFC Courts and those of the Emirate outside the DIFC – both can properly be termed Courts within Dubai.

(a) Expressions such as “the Courts of the UAE” or “the Courts of the Emirate” or “the Courts of Dubai” have always to be construed in their particular context both by reference to the type of agreements in which they appear and the particular context of the agreements;

(b) Thus, for example, there may well be a difference in meaning between the same words in an arbitration agreement where it is likely to be necessary, or at least highly desirable, to identify the particular arbitral seat which the parties have chosen and in a jurisdiction clause where it is perfectly possible that the parties intended to confer jurisdiction on a number of different courts;

(c) The ordinary and natural meaning of general expressions such as “Courts of the UAE” will be to refer to all the Courts within the UAE; and

(d) The relevance of the adopted law is of limited relevance in assessing the meaning to be attributed to such expressions in determining the choice of jurisdiction.

“128. The DIFC Courts, established under the Judicial Authority Law, is an independent judicial authority in the Emirate of Dubai. However, it is nevertheless an integral part of the Emirate’s judicial system, a fact that was recognized by the DIFC Courts in Taaleem PJSC v National Bonds Corporation PJSC & Deyaar Development PJSC CFI 014/2010 at [6] to [10]. The judgments issued by the DIFC Courts are in the name of His Highness, the Ruler of Dubai. Within the Emirate of Dubai, these judgments are directly enforceable by the competent authority within Dubai Courts as if they were, for enforcement purposes, judgments of the non-DIFC Dubai Courts.’

136…..With jurisdiction agreements, and in contrast with choosing arbitral seats, parties are free to (and often do) confer jurisdiction on more than one forum. In the present case, the parties could have intended the phrase “Dubai Courts” to mean (i) only the non-DIFC Dubai Courts (as IGPL contends), (ii) only the DIFC Courts, or (iii)both (as SCB contends). IGPL now seeks to persuade us that the parties have chosen to confer jurisdiction on only one forum, the non-DIFC Dubai Courts. The question before us is therefore this: was there any reason why the parties would wish to deprive themselves of the benefit of one of two closely-related and complementary forums in Dubai?...

138. For the reasons set out at [125] to [137] above, we find that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “Dubai Courts” must include all the courts and judicial committees formed within the territory of Dubai and established by the Emirate’s legislation, regardless of whether these courts exercise separate jurisdictions.

139. We also do not accept IGPL’s argument that the phrase “Courts of the UAE” was intended to refer specifically to the UAE Federal Judicial Authority.

140. An essential plank to the argument is IGPL’s contention that the DIFC Courts is a “court of the UAE” for constitutional purposes, but is not necessarily a “court of the UAE” for jurisdictional purposes.

141. IGPL contends that a court is only a “court of the UAE” when exercising jurisdiction under the Federal Judicial Authority. On the basis that the DIFC Courts was created by Dubai law rather than UAE federal law, IGPL contends that it is not a “court of the UAE” and goes even further to contend that the DIFC Courts is not even a “court of Dubai” in jurisdictional terms because it exercises a specifically devolved jurisdiction. IGPL further claims that, “UAE Law only enacted enabling legislation, which was necessary but not sufficient to create the DIFC.” IGPL has offered no authority in support of this assertion. It relies only on the principle the DIFC Courts’ decision in ARB-002-2013, where it was stated at [34] – [37] that the jurisdictions of the Dubai Courts and the DIFC Courts are mutually exclusive andalso complementary, a point which does not carry IGPL’s case any further.

142. The foundation of IGPL’s argument is fundamentally flawed. Notwithstanding (i) the analysis in the preceding paragraphs and (ii) the conclusion reached in Hardt that the DIFC Courts is an integral part of the Dubai legal system and is considered a “court of Dubai”, Article 1 of UAE Federal Decree 35, provided for the establishment of the DIFC within Dubai and directed the competent authorities to implement the Decree in Article 2. It did not simply enable legislation; it created the framework by which the competent authorities were allowed to execute the Decree. The fact that Dubai Laws were enacted to work in tandem with Federal Decree 35 does not negate the fact that the DIFC was a creation of Federal Law. As such, it cannot be maintained, as IGPL contends, that the DIFC Courts are “a creature of Dubai Law, not UAE Law” and thus not a “court of the UAE.” Neither do we see any force in IGPL’s submission that the Dubai Courts are not courts of the UAE because they “apply Dubai Law, not UAE Law”. The Dubai Courts, and indeed the DIFC Courts, are free to apply UAE law if, upon the proper application of the rules of private international law, that is the governing law of the dispute.

143. As a practical matter, it is more conceivable that the meaning of “courts of the UAE” under the Agreements was intended to cover all courts located within the territory of the UAE. This includes all courts within Dubai, which in turn includes the DIFC Courts.”

“1. It is not necessary for a jurisdiction agreement to specifically refer to the “DIFC courts” or some variant of that expression to engage the gateway to jurisdiction provided by Article 5(A)(2) of the JAL.

2. The question which the Court must determine as a matter of contractual construction, is whether it was the mutual intention of the parties to confer jurisdiction upon the DIFC courts to hear and determine a dispute of the kind that has arisen.

3. That question is to be resolved by reference to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the jurisdiction agreement as they would have been mutually understood by the parties (objectively) having regard to the background circumstances, the nature of the agreement, and the context in which the words are used.

4. If the Court concludes that, as a matter of construction of their agreement, the parties did intend to confer jurisdiction upon the DIFC courts to hear and determine a dispute of the kind that has arisen by the words they have used in their agreement, those words will satisfy the requirement imposed by Article 5(A)(2) for “specific, clear and express provisions”.

5. The phrases “courts of Dubai” or “Dubai courts” in their natural and ordinary meaning encompass all the courts established within the Emirate of Dubai, and therefore include both the DIFC courts and the non DIFC courts.”

“89. It is a constitutional fact in the Emirate of Dubai, that the courts of Dubai are the courts created by the Laws of the Emirate. When the term “the courts of Dubai” is used in a contract the ordinary meaning, absent context and purposes pointing in a different direction, refers to all of the courts of Dubai. When, by an agreement, the parties subject themselves to the jurisdiction of “the courts of Dubai” an important contextual limit is that only those courts which have relevant jurisdiction would be covered. Where the jurisdiction of a relevant court is required by law to be enlivened by the agreement of the parties, as in Article 5(A)(2), it is still able to be embraced within the ordinary meaning of “the courts of Dubai…

91. The cases point to a default position in which the DIFC CFI is included within the terminology “the courts of Dubai” along with the onshore courts….

99. It makes no difference to that conclusion that the parties specified the Laws of the United Arab Emirates as the governing laws. That did not affect the construction of “the courts of Dubai” in the Guarantees as essentially executed for the reasons already given. The choice of governing law is not determinative of the choice of jurisdiction.

100. It must be emphasised of course, that the construction of terms such as “courts of Dubai” and “the courts of the Emirate” will depend upon their particular context. The history of the transactions in issue in this case is central to the constructional conclusion. It does not answer the question of construction for every case in which the term “the courts of Dubai” is used.”

(a) The natural courts to have jurisdiction over such a contract would be the Courts of the DIFC;

(b) The mandatory applicable law would, as set out above, be the DIFC Employment law (with limited and irrelevant exceptions); and

(c) The factors relied on by D1 as counteracting the prima facie meaning are extremely weak.

(a) The choice of the MOHRE form appears to have been that of D1 and the terms did not reflect the true terms agreed between the parties as set out in the Employment Contract;

(b) The fact that the Claimant was living outside the DIFC is of no relevance to the question of jurisdiction over her employment contract – a French or Italian person commuting over the border each day to undertake employment in Switzerland would not expect their employment to be governed by French or Italian law;

(c) The location of D1’s incorporation is equally irrelevant particularly given that D1’s only office is within the DIFC. A foreign person employing persons in the DIFC has to comply with DIFC employment law in the same way that DIFC persons do;

(d) The non registration of the Claimant within DEWS and the payment of the gratuity is also irrelevant. It may be (although I did not hear full argument on the point) that D1 breached the DIFC employment law in not registering the Claimant within DEWS but that does not mean the law does not apply. The payment of the gratuity took place long after the contract was entered into. Further, there was nothing to stop the parties agreeing such a benefit.

“76. In the same way once it is established that a bank trading on NASDAQ Dubai is a DIFC Establishment the DIFC Courts will “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear and determine claims over any branch of that bank wherever located. Article 14(A)(1) of the Courts Law expressly includes employment claims. As D1 points out that would mean that the DIFC Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear UAE Federal Labour Law disputes between ENBD and its former or current employees employed in any of its branches in Dubai outside the DIFC unless the relevant employment contracts contained exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of the Dubai Courts. I accept that is unlikely to have been intended by the Dubai legislator. D1 suggests the way to ameliorate that surprising result is by the application of the FNC doctrine.

77. It may be that the fear underlying this submission is more apparent than real. I was not addressed on the point in detail as a matter of UAE law, but from subsequent information provided by the Bank, I note that before an employment claim can be litigated it must first be referred to the Ministry of Human Resources & Emiratisation for conciliation and then the Ministry will refer the dispute to the “competent court” (Federal Decree by Law No. (33) of 2021, Regulating Labor Relations, Article 54). I am told that as an “Employer” employing “Workers”, ENBD is mandated to enter into an Employment Contract in accordance with set “contract forms” for each Worker. Those “contract forms” mandate that the provisions of the Labour Law apply. Therefore, it is said by the Bank, the DIFC Courts would decline jurisdiction under Article 14(C)(1) of the Courts Law which provides that the DIFC Courts may decline jurisdiction to hear claims falling within the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts but where the parties have agreed in writing to the jurisdiction of another court.”

(a) That D1 respond to the application for costs within 7 days of the date of this Order; and

(b) That the Claimant may reply to such response within 7 days thereafter.