Claim No. CFI 118/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURT

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

PETRICHOR ENERGY FZCO

Claimant/Respondent

and

(1) ULTIMATE OIL & GAS FZCO
(2) ALHAJI ABDULRAHMAN MUSA BASHAR

Defendants/Appellants

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE

UPON the Claimant’s Part 7 Claim Form dated 8 December 2025 (the “Claim”)

AND UPON the Defendants’ Application No. CFI-118-2025/1 dated 9 January 2026, seeking to stay the Claim pursuant to Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law and, in the alternative, challenge the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts (the “Stay Application” or the “Article 13(1) Stay Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-118-2025/2 dated 20 January 2026, seeking immediate judgment pursuant to Part 24 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) (the “Immediate Judgment Application”)

AND UPON the Defendants’ Application No. CFI-118-2025/3 dated 3 February 2026, to stay the Immediate Judgment Application or for an extension of time to put on evidence pending the determination of the Stay Application (the “IJ Stay Application”)

AND UPON the Court directing, via email to the parties dated 25 February 2026, that the Defendants’ Article 13(1) Stay Application and the IJ Stay Application be heard before the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application at a consolidated hearing (the “Consolidated Application Hearing”)

AND UPON hearing counsel for the Claimant and counsel for the Defendants at the Consolidated Application Hearing on 27 March 2026

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere dated 2 April 2026 (i) dismissing the Article 13(1) Stay Application and ordering that the Immediate Judgment Application is not stayed and may proceed (the “Order of 2 April 2026”)

AND UPON the Defendants’ Appeal Notice dated 23 April 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “PTA Application”)

AND UPON the Defendants’ Application No. CFI-118-2025/4 dated 15 April 2026, seeking an extension of time to file its evidence in answer to the Immediate Judgment Application (the “Application” or “EOT Application”)

AND UPON review of the Claimant’s evidence in answer to the EOT Application dated 5 May 2026

AND UPON the Claimant’s submission in opposition to the PTA Application dated 14 May 2026

AND UPON the Defendants’ evidence in reply to the EOT Application dated 19 May 2026

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Defendants’ Application is dismissed.

2. The Defendants shall file and serve any evidence in response to the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application within 7 days of the date of this Order.

3. The Claimant shall file and serve any reply evidence within 7 days thereafter.

4. The Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application shall be listed for hearing on the first available date after the close of evidence.

5. The Defendants shall pay the Claimant’s costs of the EOT Application to be assessed if not agreed.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 9 June 2026
At: 3pm

A. Introduction

1. The Defendants have applied by Application No. CFI‑118‑2025/4 dated 15 April 2026 for an extension of time to file and serve evidence in response to the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application.

2. The extension is sought until after:

3. By the time of the determination of this Application, permission to appeal has been granted.

4. The issue for the Court is whether the Defendants should be relieved of the obligation to comply with the timetable set out in the Order of 2 April 2026

B. Procedural Background

5. On 9 January 2026, the Defendants filed Application No. CFI-118-2025/1 seeking an order staying the Claim under Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law, and, in the alternative, a declaration that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Claim.

6. On 20 January 2026, the Claimant filed its Immediate Judgment Application.

7. On 3 February 2026, the Defendants issued Application No. CFI-118-2025/3, seeking an order that the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application be stayed pending determination of the Defendants’ Article 13(1) stay and jurisdiction application, and, alternatively, that they be granted an extension of time to file and serve evidence in response to the Immediate Judgment Application until after that application is determined.

8. Those applications were heard together.

9. By Order with Reasons dated 2 April 2026, the Court determined the applications adversely to the Defendants. The Court

10. The effect of the Order of 2 April 2026 was to determine the Defendants’ applications to stay the Claim and the Immediate Judgment Application, and to require the Defendants to engage with the Immediate Judgment Application by filing evidence within a short, defined timetable.

11. The Defendants did not comply with that timetable. Instead, on 15 April 2026, they filed the present Application seeking an extension of time to file and serve evidence until after the determination of their PTA Application and any ensuing appeal. The Immediate Judgment Application has not been listed pending the determination of this Application.

C. The Application

12. The Defendants contend, in substance, that:

13. The Claimant submits that:

D. Applicable Principles

D1. No automatic stay

14. Under RDC 44.4, an appeal does not operate as a stay unless the Court orders otherwise.

D2. Burden and starting point

15. The party who has obtained an order is ordinarily entitled to the benefit of it.

16. The burden lies on the applicant to demonstrate why a stay, or equivalent relief, should be granted.

D3. Nature of the discretion

17. The Court has a discretion to stay the operation of its orders.

18. That discretion is exercised by reference to the relative risk of injustice to the parties pending the outcome of the appeal.

D4. Characterisation of the present application

19. Although framed as an extension of time, the relief sought would:

20. The Application is therefore properly analysed as seeking, in substance, a stay of the procedural Orders made on 2 April 2026.

E. Analysis

E1. Nature of the Order of 2 April 2026

21. The Order of 2 April 2026:

22. That is a material factor against granting a stay.

E2. Prejudice to the Defendants

23. The Defendants submit that they will suffer serious prejudice if the extension of time is not granted. In their solicitors’ letter to the Registry, that alleged prejudice is put in three related ways: first, that if the Immediate Judgment Application proceeds, the Defendants’ appeal from the refusal of a stay under Article 13(1) would be rendered nugatory or futile; secondly, that judgment on the Immediate Judgment Application may give rise to res judicata or issue estoppel in relation to matters which the Defendants contend should be referred to arbitration; and thirdly, that the Defendants would be placed in an unfair procedural position by being forced either to engage with the merits of the proceedings or to risk judgment being entered against them without having been heard.

24. The first of those submissions has some force, but only in a limited sense. If the Immediate Judgment Application were to proceed while the appeal remained pending, the appeal would no longer determine, before any merits-based response is required, whether the Court should be seised of the Claim at all.

25. In that sense, the utility of the appeal would be diminished. However, it does not follow that the appeal would be rendered futile in any legally material respect. If a stay is refused now and the appeal later succeeds, the Court of Appeal would retain ample power to grant appropriate consequential relief, including setting aside any summary judgment entered in the meantime and ordering the restitution of money paid pursuant to it.

26. In those circumstances, refusing the present Application would not irreversibly defeat the substance of the appeal, even if it would allow the proceedings to proceed pending its determination.

27. Secondly, I do not accept that requiring the Defendants to file evidence in response to the Immediate Judgment Application would deprive them of the right conferred by Article 13(1) on a party who has timely requested a stay.

28. Article 13(1) requires a party to request dismissal or a stay no later than when submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute. The Defendants did so. They requested a stay before submitting any statement on the substance of the dispute. In those circumstances, the subsequent filing of evidence in response to the Immediate Judgment Application, after the stay request has been made and while appellate rights remain pending, would not retrospectively forfeit that right.

29. If the Court of Appeal concludes that the action is brought in a matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement, the statutory consequence under Article 13(1) would remain available notwithstanding that the Defendants, in the meantime, had responded defensively to the Claimant’s application to comply with this Court’s procedural directions.

30. Thirdly, I do not accept that filing such evidence would constitute a waiver of any right to arbitrate, thereby rendering the arbitration agreement inoperative.

31. Waiver of arbitral rights requires conduct amounting to a deliberate, intentional and unequivocal abandonment of the right to arbitrate. Mere defensive participation in court proceedings, particularly when undertaken only after a stay has already been sought and while an appeal is pending, is properly characterised as compliance with procedural requirements rather than an abandonment of arbitral rights.

32. Filing evidence in response to an application for immediate judgment in those circumstances would not, without more, constitute an affirmative election to abandon arbitration and submit the dispute to curial determination. It would instead be a defensive response to the procedural posture in which the Defendants presently find themselves, while maintaining their contention that the proceedings should have been stayed.

33. Fourthly, the Defendants’ reliance on possible res judicata or issue estoppel materially overstates the practical consequences of refusing the present application.

34. If the Immediate Judgment Application proceeded to judgment and the appeal later succeeded, any summary judgment set aside on appeal would no longer provide a basis for estoppel. The appellate disposition would supplant the interlocutory judgment below. On that hypothesis, any issue estoppel would arise, if at all, from the appellate court’s determination, not from the summary judgment itself.

35. The prospect of irreversible preclusion is therefore not a compelling reason to halt the proceedings at this stage.

36. It follows that the prejudice said to arise from filing evidence is narrower than the Defendants submit. I accept that refusing the extension would allow the Immediate Judgment Application to proceed before the appeal is decided, thereby reducing the practical benefit of the appeal in one respect. But the consequences are not irreversible. The Defendants would not thereby lose the benefit of their prior Article 13(1) request; they would not, by defensive compliance with the Court’s directions, waive any arbitral right without more; and they would not face any enduring estoppel if an intervening judgment were later set aside on appeal.

37. Properly analysed, the prejudice relied on is real but limited, and it falls to be weighed against the prejudice to the Claimant if the proceedings are further delayed.

E3. Prejudice to the Claimant

38. The Claimant would suffer substantial prejudice if the extension of time sought by the Defendants were granted.

39. First, the Claimant has already obtained case management directions from the Court following a contested hearing, under which the Court directed that the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application proceed expeditiously and that the Defendants file evidence within a short, defined timetable. The Claimant is entitled, in the ordinary course, to the benefit of those orders. Granting the extension now would, in substance, suspend the operation of the Court’s prior directions and defer the progress of the proceedings for an indeterminate period, dependent on the timing and disposition of the appeal.

40. Secondly, the effect of the extension would be to delay the determination of the Immediate Judgment Application, which is intended to provide a prompt resolution where the claim admits of summary determination. That delay would deprive the Claimant of the procedural advantage inherent in such an application, namely the possibility of obtaining judgment without the cost and delay of a full trial. In circumstances where the Claimant seeks to enforce foreign judgments, the timely determination of the application is particularly important.

41. Thirdly, the extension would create a material risk of prolonged procedural stasis. The hearing of the appeal, and any consequential steps thereafter, may take a significant and uncertain period. During that time, the Claimant would be unable to advance its application, despite the Court having already determined that the proceedings should not be stayed. The practical effect would be to reintroduce, by way of an extension of time, the very delay the Court has previously declined to permit by refusing a stay.

42. Fourthly, the prejudice to the Claimant is not readily compensable by costs. While some additional expenses can be addressed by an order for costs, the delay in obtaining judgment and in enforcing rights already reduced to judgment in another jurisdiction cannot be adequately remedied by that means. The temporal and commercial consequences of such delay are real and significant.

43. In those circumstances, the prejudice to the Claimant in granting the extension is both immediate and substantial and weighs strongly against the relief sought.

E4. Prior determination of the same issue

44. The Court has already determined, by the Order of 2 April 2026, that the proceedings should not be stayed and that the Immediate Judgment Application may proceed under a defined timetable. That determination necessarily involved consideration of whether the proceedings, or any aspect of them, ought to be deferred pending the resolution of the Defendants’ application under Article 13(1).

45. Although framed as an extension of time, the present Application, in substance, seeks the same practical result as the previously refused application, namely, to prevent the Immediate Judgment Application from proceeding pending the appellate process. In that respect, it amounts to an attempt to revisit, through case management, a position the Court has already rejected.

46. Absent a material change of circumstances, there is no sufficient basis to depart from the earlier determination. The grant of the PTA Application is a relevant development, but it does not, without more, justify a different case management outcome. The Court’s prior decision that the proceedings should continue is therefore a significant factor against granting the relief now sought.

E5. Effect of the grant of permission to appeal

47. Permission to appeal has now been granted. This indicates that the appeal has a real prospect of success or raises a compelling question. It is a relevant consideration when assessing whether continuing the proceedings would result in injustice.

48. However, the grant of the PTA Application does not alter the fundamental position that an appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings. Nor does it establish that a stay or equivalent relief is necessary. The question remains whether, in the circumstances of the case, continuing the proceedings in accordance with the existing timetable would cause injustice of a kind that cannot be adequately remedied.

49. For the reasons already given, that is not demonstrated here. The Defendants’ appeal will not be rendered futile if the Immediate Judgment Application proceeds. Appropriate relief remains available from the Court of Appeal if the Defendants succeed. Further, compliance with the existing timetable does not involve any waiver of arbitral rights or a loss of the benefit of the Defendants’ prior request under Article 13(1).

50. In those circumstances, while the grant of the PTA Application is a relevant factor, it does not materially shift the balance of justice. It is not, either alone or in combination with the matters relied upon by the Defendants, sufficient to justify suspending the operation of the Order of 2 April 2026 or to postpone the Immediate Judgment Application.

E6. Overall Assessment

51. Drawing these matters together, the Court must assess the relative risk of injustice, having regard to the factors identified in E1 to E5.

52. As noted in E1, the Order of 2 April 2026 is procedural and case-management in character. It does not determine substantive rights but regulates the progression of the Immediate Judgment Application. That consideration informs the assessment of prejudice and weighs against suspending the Order's operation.

53. As to the Defendants’ position, for the reasons given in E2, I accept that refusing the extension would permit the Immediate Judgment Application to proceed before the appeal is determined, thereby, in practical terms, reducing the appeal’s utility. However, that prejudice is limited. It does not render the appeal nugatory in any legally operative sense. The Defendants would not thereby lose the benefit of their prior request under Article 13(1), would not necessarily waive any right to arbitrate by complying with the Court’s directions, and would retain the ability to obtain appropriate relief from the Court of Appeal if successful.

54. By contrast, as explained in E3, the prejudice to the Claimant if the extension is granted is immediate and substantial. Granting the relief sought would deprive the Claimant of the benefit of orders already made following a contested hearing, delay the determination of the Immediate Judgment Application for an indeterminate period, and, in substance, suspend the progress of the proceedings, notwithstanding the Court’s prior refusal of a stay. That prejudice is not adequately compensable in costs and would undermine the objective of the Immediate Judgment Application, being the expeditious determination of the Claim.

55. Further, as set out in E4, the relief now sought would in substance revisit the position already determined by the Order of 2 April 2026. Absent a material change of circumstances, the Court should not, through case management, depart from its earlier decision that the proceedings should continue. That consideration weighs materially against the grant of the extension.

56. Finally, while, as noted in E5, the grant of permission to appeal is a relevant factor indicating that the appeal is arguable, it does not, without more, justify suspending the operation of the Court’s order or displacing the ordinary principle that an appeal does not operate as a stay. It does not materially alter the balance where the continuation of the proceedings does not give rise to irremediable prejudice.

57. Having regard to these considerations and the procedural character of the Order identified in E1, the prejudice to the Defendants identified in E2 is limited and remediable, whereas the prejudice to the Claimant identified in E3 is immediate, substantial, and not adequately compensable. That conclusion is reinforced by the prior determination of the same issue (E4) and the limited significance of the grant of permission to appeal (E5).

F. Conclusion

58. For the reasons set out above, the Defendants have not established a sufficient basis to justify the extension of time sought.

59. The balance of justice, as reflected in the matters addressed in Section E, favours maintaining the existing procedural timetable and allowing the Immediate Judgment Application to proceed.

60. Accordingly, the Defendants’ Application for an extension of time until after the appeal is determined is refused.

61. However, as a matter of case management, and to ensure that the Immediate Judgment Application proceeds on a proper evidential basis, it is appropriate to afford the Defendants a short further period to comply with the Order of 2 April 2026 by filing and serving any evidence in response.

62. Subject to that limited indulgence, the timetable for the progression of the Immediate Judgment Application remains in place.

G. Costs

63. The general rule is that costs follow the event. The Defendants have been unsuccessful in their Application, and there is no sufficient reason to depart from that rule.

64. The Application was a discrete interlocutory application brought at the Defendants’ instance. The Claimant was required to respond to it and has successfully resisted the relief sought. No conduct on the Claimant’s part has been identified that would justify depriving it of its costs, nor is the limited indulgence granted to the Defendants a basis for doing so.

65. In those circumstances, the appropriate order is that the Defendants pay the Claimant’s costs of the Application.

66. Accordingly, the Defendants shall pay the Claimant’s costs of the application, to be assessed if not agreed.

H. Orders

67. The Court will order: