June 11, 2026 court of first instance - Orders
Claim No. CFI 121/2025
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
VTB BANK PJSC
Claimant/Applicant
and
(1) TIMUR ORAZBEKOVICH KUANYSHEV
(2) EVGENY VYACHESLAVOVICH SHLENSKIKH (AKA YEVGENIY SHLYONSKIKH)
(3) SHEV ENERGY LLC-FZ
(4) ALFIYA ABULKHAIR ASKAR (AKA ALFIYA KUANYSHEVA)
(5) MUNIRA ORHAYEVNA BAYMENOVA (AKA MUNIRA ORHAEVNA BAIMENOVA)
Defendants/Respondents
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE MICHAEL BLACK
UPON the the Order of H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani dated 19 December 2025 in respect of the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-121-2025/1 dated 16 December 2025 for a worldwide freezing order against the Respondents pursuant to Rule 25.1(6)(b) and (7) of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) (the “WFO Order”)
AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-121-2025/4 dated 21 January 2026 seeking an order that the Respondents be committed for contempt of court under Part 52 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) (the “Committal Application”)
AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 15 April 2026 granting the Committal Application (the “15 April Order”)
AND UPON the Claimant’s Statement of Costs and submissions dated 22 April 2026
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Claimant is awarded its costs as sought in the sum of USD 282,020.38 assessed on the indemnity basis against the Defendants and each of them jointly and severally.
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 11 June 2026
At: 11am
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
1. On 15 April 2026, I made an Order granting Application No. CFI-121-2025/4 dated 21 January 2026 seeking an order that the Respondents be committed for contempt of court under Part 52 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) (the “Committal Order”). I ordered (amongst other things) that:
(a) The following fines shall be paid to the DIFC Courts within 28 days of this Order:
(i) Mr Kuanyshev shall pay a fine of USD 250,000;
(ii) Mr Shlenskikh shall pay a fine of USD 150,000;
(iii) Shev Energy shall pay a fine of USD 150,000;
(iv) Mrs Kuanysheva shall pay a fine of USD 250,000; and
(v) Ms Baymenova shall pay a fine of USD 150,000.
(b) The said fines and each of them shall continue at the rate of USD 10,000 per day unless and until each of the Defendants/Respondents fully and properly comply with the terms of the Order of H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani dated 19 December 2025.
(c) Each of the Defendants/Respondents shall be referred to the Attorney General of Dubai pursuant to Article 35(B) of the Courts Law.
(d) The Claimant shall file submissions of not more than 4 pages with a statement of costs in the usual form for summary assessment within 5 working days of the date of this Order.
(e) The Defendants shall file submissions in reply to those costs submissions within 3 working days thereafter.
2. On 22 April 2026, the Claimant served its submissions on costs with a statement of costs in the usual form for summary assessment. The Defendants failed to serve any submissions in reply.
3. RDC 38.7(1) provides that if the Court decides to make an order about costs, the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the Court must have regard to all the circumstances, including the conduct of all the parties (RDC 38.8). The conduct of the parties includes the conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings, whether it was reasonable for a party to contest a particular allegation or issue and the manner in which a party has defended his case or a particular allegation or issue (RDC 38.9). Where the Court is to assess the amount of costs, it may assess those costs on the indemnity basis but the Court will not allow costs which have been unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount (RDC 38.17). Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the indemnity basis, the Court will resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount in favour of the receiving party (RDC 38.19).
4. Paragraph 1 of Practice Direction 5 of 2014 — DIFC Courts’ Costs Regime provides guidance of the award of costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis:
“1. In determining whether costs should be assessed on the indemnity
basis as opposed to the standard basis (see in this regard RDC (Rules of the DIFC Courts) 38.17), the following factors, inter alia, will be taken into consideration in the exercise of a judge ’s discretion:
(i) circumstances where the facts of the case and/or the conduct of the paying party are/is such as to take the situation away from the norm; for example where the Court has found deliberate misconduct in breach of a direction of the Court or unreasonable conduct to a high degree in connection with the litigation; or
(ii) otherwise inappropriate conduct in its wider sense in relation to a paying party’s pre-litigation dealings with the receiving party, or in relation to the commencement or conduct of the litigation itself; or
(iii) where the Court considers the paying party’s conduct to be an abuse of process.”
5. It is the practice of the English courts to award indemnity costs in committal proceedings. In JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2016] EWHC 258 (Ch), [56] it was held:
“The second issue is whether those costs should be assessed on the standard or indemnity basis. Having been referred to the well-known authorities I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case for the award of costs on the indemnity basis. That is the order usually imposed by the court in contempt cases and as I have described in the Liability Judgment and in this judgment, Mr Pugachev has not acted in a way which justifies any departure from that salutary practice. I will therefore order that costs be assessed on the indemnity basis.”
and in SIA Investment Industry v Pardus Wealth Ltd [2025] EWHC 269 (Comm), [94-5]:
“I am also satisfied that the Applicant is entitled to its costs on an indemnity basis for two reasons. First, on established principles, indemnity costs is the usual costs order in contempt proceedings - see Kea Investments at [18]; JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev ("Pugachev") [2016] EWHC 258 (Ch) at [56] and Isbilen v Selman Turk [2024] EWHC 565 (Ch) at [35]). In Pugachev (at [56]), Rose J observed that the defendant in that case had not acted in a way which justified any departure from that "salutary practice". In Collardeau v Fuchs [2024] EWHC 642 (Fam), Mrs Justice Knowles held at [6] that the general rule as to costs contained in CPR 44.2(2)(a) does apply to committal proceedings, and that where they are ordered against the unsuccessful party, they will generally be on the indemnity basis (citing Pugachev). In that case, and following that general rule, Mrs Justice Knowles ordered the unsuccessful applicant to pay the costs on the indemnity basis. There is no reason why there should be any departure from this "salutary practice" in the present case.
Secondly, I am in no doubt that Mr Bryce's conduct is sufficiently "outside the norm", on established principles, so as to justify an order for indemnity costs. Mr Bryce's conduct has been out of the norm by reference to a defendant's proper conduct of litigation against it. Litigants should, and do, comply with orders of the Court, most importantly in the context of freezing injunctions and associated disclosure orders, in circumstances where not to do so renders them liable to committal for contempt of court as in the present case. In the present case not only has Mr Bryce's conduct been out of the norm by repeatedly breaching orders of the Court attached with penal notices, but he has also prevaricated as to compliance and remains in continuing breach of the Freezing Orders.”
I am satisfied that there is every reason in principle why the DIFC Courts should follow the same “salutary practice” (see DIFC Courts Practice at paragraph 38.6.1).
6. Indeed, it does reflect the historical approach of the DIFC Courts when dealing with conduct “away from the norm”: see GFH Capital Ltd v Haigh [2014] DIFC CFI 020 (10 November 2016) [5]:
“On my conclusions in the application for immediate judgment, the Defendant acted dishonestly in misappropriating money from the Claimant. But more than that, he sought to defend the claim against him with explanations which I considered to be lacking in credibility and a concoction. In the course of the proceedings the Defendant brought applications and appeals with marked paucity of success and diversionary and collateral proceedings, while not engaging with the application for immediate judgement made in March 2015. In my opinion, his dishonest conduct and his conduct in relation to the claim brought against him was inappropriate and unreasonable, to the level of taking the case out of the norm and warranting an order for costs on the indemnity basis.”
and Mad Atelier International BV v Manes [2022] DIFC CFI 030 (10 February 2023) [36]-[37],
“In circumstances where the Defendants have failed to produce witness statements directed to the issues which the Court has to determine, have failed to appear to be cross examined on the statements in their Defences and earlier affidavits/witness statements, have failed to produce documents in accordance with the Court’s order which could have substantiated their case if it was true, have told lies to this Court or the English Court and have made inconsistent statements, their evidence in those earlier statements and Defences lacks any credibility. The documents that the Court has seen are inconsistent with the Five Dining shares being held on trust for Ms Zhilla and the Court has no hesitation in concluding that Mr Manes as at all times since the incorporation of Five Dining on 10 October 2019 been the beneficial owner of all the shares in it.
In the circumstances and for these reasons, the Claimant is entitled to the declaration sought and to the costs of the action. The conduct of the Defendants is way beyond the norm both in dishonestly putting forward a version of events relating to the ownership of the Five Dining shares, in seeking to avoid enforcement of a judgment debt, following a three-week trial in London and in taking multiple points which had no merit in an effort to impede the progress of this action.”
7. In the present case, Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh are indebted to the Claimant (“VTB”) in the sum of RUB 7,191,396,362.56 (approximately USD 89.25 million) affirmed by a judgment of the Russian courts. The debt is not disputed but is unpaid. Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh appear only to want time to pay. Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh produced forged letters purporting to come from First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC showing that Shev Energy (a company ultimately owned and controlled by Mr Shlenskikh) held funds exceeding the debt. Mrs Kuanysheva and Ms Baymenova are respectively the wives of Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh whom they married in Kazakhstan. It has hitherto been undisputed that under the applicable law, property acquired in the course of marriage is held jointly whereby Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh have each a 50% beneficial interest in any property or assets legally owned by their wives.
8. On 19 December 2025, H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani made a freezing order on the application of VTB against the Respondents and each of them (the “WFO Order”). I continued the Order on 7 January 2026.
9. In making the Committal Order, I held:
(a) The Respondents served no admissible evidence in response to the application;
(b) On 6 February 2026, Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh emailed the Court and VTB a bundle containing inadmissible, irrelevant, repetitive and incomprehensible documents lacking in any credibility;
(c) Also served were:
(i) an undated unsworn (but signed) draft affidavit of Mr Shlenskikh in which he acknowledged that he had not filed any asset disclosure in compliance with the WFO and promising to comply within 21 days;
(ii) an unsworn (but signed) draft affidavit of Mr Kuanyshev dated 29 January 2026 in identical terms; and
(iii) so-called “Compliance Packs” for Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh that contained no usable information;
(d) On the same day, the English court made an order in similar terms to the WFO Order against Mr and Mrs Kuanyshev. They complied with the English WFO (whether their compliance was in full is not a matter on which I can opine). Given their non-compliance with the earlier order of the Deputy Chief Justice, I found this to be an aggravating factor;
(e) On 16 March 2026, in Russian proceedings Mr Shlenskikh made false and scandalous allegations against VTB’s UAE legal representatives;
(f) Mrs Kuanysheva and Ms Baymenova respectively took no admissible and no part at all in the proceedings;
(g) Mr Kuanyshev claimed at the hearing on 25 March 2026 that all breaches of the WFO Order were curable. Mr Kuanyshev admitted that he understood his obligations. Any delay, he said, was only because he was collecting information. He claimed he never tried to hide anything. If there was delay, he was sorry. He would try to comply with the Order. I asked him when he would comply with the Order, he replied that he hoped it would be soon. I asked him why he and his wife complied with the English Order but did not comply with the Order of this Court. He said it was on the advice of counsel;
(h) I found it extraordinary that no admissible evidence had been served. I could only think that in serving purported but inadmissible evidence the most likely reason the Respondents had acted in breach of the Court’s Rules in failing to provide evidence on affidavit was a misguided attempt to avoid criminal liability for perjury;
(i) Even if the so-called evidence were admissible, I would have rejected it. The purported reasons for delay did not bear scrutiny, were mere assertion and were unsupported by any objective evidence or indeed any evidence at all;
(j) Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh claimed that they had no intention to disobey the Orders of this Court. I found their excuses demonstrably false;
(k) I rejected the explanation as to why Mr Kuanyshev and Mrs Kuanysheva were able to comply with the English WFO but disregarded this Court’s Order;
(l) I considered any suggestion that the so-called “Compliance Packs” served on 6 February 2026 satisfied the Respondents’ obligations under the WFO to be an insult to the intelligence;
(m) Subsequent promises of compliance turned out to be completely false;
(n) Mr Kuanyshev gave a disingenuous non-apology in the course of his submissions: “If the Court thinks there has been delay, I apologise”. Those were more empty words; as was his “hope” to comply with the Order “soon”;
(o) I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondents and each of them had engaged in a cynical policy of delay, deceit and obfuscation. I did not accept, notwithstanding their protestations to the contrary, that any of the Respondents has ever had the slightest intention of disclosing the full extent of their assets in compliance with the Orders of this Court. I imposed continuing penalties in respect of non-compliance in the hope of securing the promised compliance but even those mounting penalties have not been enough for it to materialise - proving beyond doubt that the Respondents never intended to comply.
10. Those findings amply justify the assessment of VTB’s costs on the indemnity basis on the principles set out at paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 above.
11. I see nothing in VTB’s Statement of Costs to suggest that costs have been unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount. Nor do any of the Respondents raise any such issues.
12. I shall therefore award VTB its costs as sought in the sum of USD 282,020.38 assessed on the indemnity basis against the Defendants and each of them jointly and severally.
13. For the avoidance of doubt, I should say that even if I were assessing the costs on the standard basis, I should have awarded the same sum.
