Claim No. DEC 001/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

TECHTERYX LTD.

Claimant/Applicant/Receiving Party

and

(1) ARIA COMMODITIES DMCC

Defendant/Respondent/Paying Party

(2) MATTHEW WILLIAM BRITTAIN

Respondent/Paying Party

(3) MASHREQ BANK PSC
(4) EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC
(5) ABU DHABI ISLAMIC BANK PJSC

Defendants

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AMENDED ORDER WITH REASONS OF THE REGISTRAR AYESHA BIN KALBAN

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UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 17 October 2025 ordering that the First Defendant pay the Claimant's costs of the substantive proceedings, such costs to be assessed if not agreed

AND UPON the Claimant filing and serving its Notice of Commencement of Assessment of Bill of Costs dated 26 January 2026

AND UPON the Consent Order dated 16 February 2026 extending the time for the First Defendant to serve its Points of Dispute until 9 March 2026

AND UPON the First Defendant filing its Points of Dispute dated 9 March 2026

AND UPON the Claimant filing its Request for a Default Costs Certificate dated 10 March 2026 (the “DCC request”)

AND UPON the First Defendant filing Application No. DEC-001-2025/19 dated 13 April 2026 seeking a retrospective extension of time to serve its Points of Dispute (the “Extension Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant not filing evidence in answer to the Extension Application

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 27 March 2026, as amended by the Order dated 30 March 2026, awarding the Claimant its costs of Application No. DEC-001- 2025/17 (the "Alternative Service Application")

AND UPON the Claimant filing and serving its Notice of Commencement of Assessment of Bill of Costs dated 4 May 2026 in respect of the costs of the Alternative Service Application

AND UPON the Respondents serving their Points of Dispute dated 25 May 2026

AND UPON the Claimant serving its Replies to the Respondents' Points of Dispute dated 16 June 2026

AND UPON reviewing all the documents and written submissions filed by the parties

AND UPON reviewing the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Extension Application is granted.

2. The First Defendant's time for serving its Points of Dispute to the Claimant's Notice of Commencement of Assessment of Bill of Costs dated 26 January 2026 is retrospectively extended to 23 March 2026, and the Points of Dispute shall be treated as having been validly served on that date.

3. Pursuant to RDC 40.16, the First Defendant shall have permission to be heard further in the detailed assessment proceedings commenced by the Notice of Commencement dated 26 January 2026.

4. The DCC request is refused, and no Default Costs Certificate shall be issued.

5. If the Claimant intends to serve a Reply to the First Defendant's Points of Dispute in the substantive detailed assessment proceedings, it shall file and serve that Reply within 21 days of the date of this Order. If the Claimant does not intend to serve a Reply, it shall notify the First Defendant and the Registry within the same 21-day period.

6. If no Reply is filed and served within that period, the substantive detailed assessment shall proceed without a Reply.

7. Any party affected by paragraphs 4 and 5 may apply, within 7 days after service of this Order, to set aside, vary or stay those directions.

8. The First Defendant shall pay the Claimant's reasonable costs of and occasioned by the First Defendant's failure to serve its Points of Dispute within time, including the reasonable costs of the Claimant's DCC request and the Extension Application, such costs to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

9. The Claimant's Bill of Costs dated 4 May 2026 in respect of the Alternative Service Application is assessed in the sum of AED 54,059.62.

10. The Registry shall issue a Final Costs Certificate in respect of the detailed assessment of the Bill of Costs dated 4 May 2026.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 28 July 2026
Date of Re-Issue: 3 August 2026
At: 3pm

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

Introduction

1. Two matters are before me for determination on the papers. The first is the First Defendant’s Application No. DEC-001-2025/19, issued on 13 April 2026, seeking confirmation that its email of 23 March 2026 constituted service of its Points of Dispute, a retrospective extension of time for that service, and permission to participate further in the substantive detailed assessment (the “Extension Application”). The related matter is the disposal of the Claimant’s Request for a Default Costs Certificate dated 10 March 2026 (the “DCC request”).

2. The second matter is the detailed assessment of the Claimant’s costs of Application No. DEC-001-2025/17, the application for alternative service of the Committal Application (the “Alternative Service Application”). By an Order dated 27 March 2026, amended on 30 March 2026, H.E. Justice Michael Black (the “Amended Order”) granted that application and ordered the First and Second Respondents to pay the costs of and occasioned by it on the standard basis, to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed. I refer to that costs order because it defines the entitlement and basis of the assessment; I neither reproduce nor reconsider the substantive relief granted by Justice Black.

3. I have read and considered all documents, evidence and submissions placed before me. For the Extension Application and the DCC request, these include the Notice of Commencement served on 26 January 2026 and its amendment dated 13 February 2026; the Consent Order dated 16 February 2026; the filing confirmation and Points of Dispute dated 9 March 2026; the DCC request; the email correspondence of 11 and 23 March 2026; the Extension Application and the Seventh Witness Statement of Matthew William Brittain dated 10 April 2026; and the Claimant’s written request for directions. The Claimant filed no evidence in answer to the Extension Application. It agreed that the application could be determined on the papers, but it did not consent to the relief sought.

4. For the Alternative Service assessment, I have considered the signed Bill of Costs dated 4 May 2026; the Notice of Commencement dated 4 May 2026; the Respondents’ Points of Dispute served on 25 May 2026 and subsequently filed; the Claimant’s Replies dated 16 June 2026; the relevant filing documents; the Amended Order dated 30 March 2026 as described and reproduced in the Bill; and the Claimant’s correspondence requesting a paper determination. The filing notice for Application No. DEC-001-2025/25 and the correspondence concerning the 16 June deadline are administrative documents: they confirm the procedural sequence but add no independent evidence on quantum.

5. The substantive Bill of Costs commenced by the Notice dated 26 January 2026 is not assessed in these Reasons. The January and February versions of that bill, its annexures, the substantive Points of Dispute and the underlying costs schedules are relevant only to the procedural history, the scale of the sum in dispute and the consequence of excluding the First Defendant from the assessment. I make no finding on the reasonableness, proportionality or recoverability of any item in that substantive bill. I do, however, give directions for the next procedural steps following my decision to allow the Points of Dispute to stand.

6. The extensive materials concerning the worldwide freezing order, the Hong Kong proceedings, disclosure, Kroll, Ogier, FTI and the underlying allegations are not relevant to the present quantum assessment or to the procedural extension, except to the limited extent that the Order dated 17 October 2025 created the right to a substantive costs assessment and that the later Committal Application required personal service. Duplicate copies of the same bills, orders and exhibits add no separate evidential value. I make no determination on the merits of the substantive proceedings, the Committal Application or any alleged non-compliance with the orders underlying it.

The Extension Application

The chronology and the parties’ positions

7. By the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 17 October 2025, the First Defendant was ordered to pay the Claimant’s costs of the substantive proceedings on the indemnity basis, to be assessed if not agreed. The Claimant commenced detailed assessment by serving its Notice of Commencement on 26 January 2026. The Notice was amended on 13 February 2026. The amended Notice records a bill total of AED 8,870,356.61 and a full amount payable of AED 4,889,687.99.

8. Rule 40.15 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (the “RDC”) ordinarily allowed 21 days for service of Points of Dispute, which produced a deadline of 16 February 2026. The parties agreed an extension. The Consent Order issued on 16 February 2026 provided that the First Defendant’s time to serve its Points of Dispute was extended to 9 March 2026.

9. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan UK LLP ceased acting for the First Defendant on 6 March 2026. The Notice of Change records that Aria Commodities DMCC thereafter acted for itself. The First Defendant was therefore unrepresented during the final three days of the extended period.

10. On 9 March 2026, Mr Brittain uploaded the Points of Dispute to the DIFC Courts’ eRegistry on behalf of the First Defendant. The filing confirmation identifies the document as the Points of Dispute and records that it was filed ‘With Notice’. Mr Brittain expressly accepts in his witness statement that he did not separately email the Points of Dispute to the Claimant or its legal representatives on that date.

11. On 10 March 2026, the Claimant filed the DCC request under RDC 40.17 on the basis that the extended period had expired without service. On 11 March 2026, and again on 23 March 2026, the Claimant asked the Registry to issue the certificate. The Request itself records service of the Notice of Commencement on 26 January 2026.

12. At 1:23pm on 23 March 2026, the Registry referred to the Notice of Commencement, the Points of Dispute dated 9 March 2026 and the DCC request, and asked the parties to confirm by 4pm how they wished to proceed. At 2:54pm that day, Mr Brittain emailed the Registry and the Claimant’s legal representatives. He attached the Points of Dispute, their supporting documents and the eRegistry filing confirmation, and invited the Claimant to withdraw its request. The Claimant therefore received the Points of Dispute by email on 23 March 2026, 14 days after the extended deadline. No order on the DCC request had been issued.

13. Mr Brittain submits that, having selected ‘With Notice’ on the eRegistry, he believed the portal would notify the Claimant and make the Points of Dispute available on the electronic case file. He submits he did not understand that RDC 40.14 and 40.15 required separate service on the receiving party. He relies upon the recent cessation of Quinn Emanuel’s retainer, his lack of familiarity with the Rules and the portal, and his belief that the breach was not intentional.

14. On 7 April 2026, the Registry informed Mr Brittain that he was required either to file a certificate of service or to apply for a retrospective extension. His supporting witness statement is dated 10 April 2026. The formal Application Notice was issued on 13 April 2026. The witness statement says the application was made within 80 hours of the Registry email; the Application Notice shows an issue date six days after that email. I address promptness by reference to the documented sequence rather than the description of 80 hours.

15. The First Defendant seeks an order treating the 23 March email as service, extending time retrospectively to that date, granting relief from sanctions and permitting it to be heard under RDC 40.16. It says refusal would prevent it from advancing the detailed objections which it had prepared and filed on 9 March against a bill of approximately AED 4.9 million. The witness statement refers to AED 4,924,218.08, which was the amount in the original Notice; the amended Notice records AED 4,889,687.99.

16. The First Defendant also states that the Claimant commenced the substantive assessment nine days late under RDC 40.10 and did not seek relief. It expressly acknowledges that it has not applied for any order concerning that alleged delay. No such application is before me. I therefore make no finding on the allegation, and it does not answer the First Defendant’s separate obligation to serve by the deadline fixed in the Consent Order.

The applicable Rules and legal principles

17. RDC 4.2(1) provides that, except where the Rules provide otherwise, the Court may ‘extend or shorten the time for compliance with any Rule, Practice Direction or Court order’, even where an application is made after time has expired. RDC 4.2(14) also permits the Court to take any other step or make any other order for managing the case and furthering the overriding objective. Those powers are broad but discretionary. They do not confer an entitlement to indulgence, and procedural timetables remain important to fairness, finality and efficient case management.

18. RDC 40.14 requires a party disputing an item in a bill to serve Points of Dispute on the receiving party and every other party to the detailed assessment. RDC 40.15 fixes the ordinary period at 21 days after service of the Notice of Commencement. RDC 40.16 provides that a party serving Points of Dispute after that period ‘may not be heard further in the detailed assessment proceedings unless the Court gives permission’.

19. RDC 40.17 permits the receiving party to request a Default Costs Certificate (“DCC”) where the service period has expired and no Points of Dispute have been served. RDC 40.18 is mandatory in effect: if Points of Dispute are served before a DCC is issued, the DCC may not be issued. RDC 40.22 allows the fixed sum of USD 160 only where the receiving party obtains a DCC.

20. The application also invokes RDC 4.46 to 4.50. RDC 4.49 requires consideration of all the circumstances, including the administration of justice, promptness, whether the failure was intentional, the explanation, compliance with other Rules and orders, responsibility for the default, the effect on any trial date, the effect of the failure and the effect of granting relief. RDC 4.50 requires supporting evidence.

21. In Khaled Salem Musabeh Humaid Almheiri v Mohammad Ezelddine El Araj and John Cameron (CFI-057-2021) at [35]-[40], Justice Wayne Martin (as he then was) reasoned that RDC 4.2 is the specific provision governing extensions of time and continues to operate notwithstanding the general relief-from-sanctions provisions. Where time is extended and the act falls within the extended period, there is no remaining failure or sanction to which RDC 4.46 to 4.49 must separately be applied. I follow that analysis. The primary question is whether I should extend time to 23 March 2026. I nevertheless treat the considerations listed in RDC 4.49 as useful and relevant to the exercise of the broad discretion under RDC 4.2.

22. In Zuzana Kapova v Miloslav Makovini and Pharm Trade Holding Ltd (CFI-004-2023; CA-004-2023) at [47], Justice Rene Le Miere described RDC 4.2(1) as ‘remedial’ and as conferring a broad power to relieve against injustice, while emphasising that time limits must be obeyed and that material must exist on which the discretion can properly be exercised. I apply that approach.

Assessment of the Extension Application

23. I find that the default was real. Filing the Points of Dispute on the eRegistry did not itself constitute service on the Claimant. RDC 40.14 distinguishes service on the parties from filing with the Court. The Consent Order required service by 9 March 2026, and Mr Brittain accepts that separate service did not occur until his email of 23 March 2026.

24. The default was not trivial because service performs an essential function in the detailed assessment regime: it informs the receiving party that the bill is disputed and identifies the issues to which a Reply and assessment must be directed. The 14-day delay was therefore material. I nevertheless distinguish a failure to prepare and engage with the process from a failure to complete the additional procedural act of service. The First Defendant prepared and filed detailed objections on the last day permitted by the Consent Order. It did not ignore the assessment. That reduces, but does not eliminate, the seriousness of the breach.

25. I find that the Claimant was entitled to file its DCC request on 10 March 2026. The agreed deadline had expired and no Points of Dispute had been served. The request was based on non-service, not on the proposition that no document had been filed. I therefore reject the suggestion in Mr Brittain’s 23 March email that the request rested on an incorrect premise merely because the document was already on the eRegistry.

26. I accept that the explanation given by Mr Brittain is genuine. The contemporaneous ‘With Notice’ designation supports his account that he believed the portal would notify the Claimant. Quinn Emanuel had ceased acting three days earlier, and there is no evidence that the failure was a tactical attempt to deprive the Claimant of notice. I therefore find that the failure was not intentional.

27. The explanation is not compelling. A party acting without lawyers remains bound by the Rules, and serving an opposing party is a basic procedural obligation. The default was caused by the First Defendant through Mr Brittain, not by its former legal representatives. I therefore treat the explanation and his recent transition to litigant-in-person status as mitigating circumstances, not as an excuse.

28. As to compliance more generally, the material establishes compliance with the agreed filing date but non-compliance with service. The First Defendant refers to an alleged delay by the Claimant, but no application has been made in respect of it. I have no sufficient evidential basis to make any broader finding about the First Defendant’s overall compliance record, and I do not speculate.

29. Promptness has two aspects. When the Registry squarely identified the competing filings on 23 March, the First Defendant served the Points of Dispute that same day, curing the practical absence of notice. When the Registry advised on 7 April that a formal application was required, the witness statement was prepared by 10 April and the application was issued on 13 April. Although the formal application was not immediate after 23 March, I find that the response to the 7 April direction was prompt.

30. No trial date or hearing date in the substantive detailed assessment is shown to have been endangered by the delay. The factor corresponding to RDC 4.49(7) is therefore neutral. I do not infer the absence or presence of any other timetable not contained in the materials.

31. The effect of the failure on the Claimant was real but limited and compensable. The Claimant was put to the procedural disruption and expense of filing and pursuing the DCC request and considering the Extension Application. No DCC was issued, no payment was made under a certificate and no substantive hearing is shown to have been lost. An appropriate costs order can address the financial consequence.

32. The effect of refusing the extension on the First Defendant would be markedly greater. It would be prevented from being heard on detailed objections to a bill seeking approximately AED 4.9 million even though those objections were prepared and filed on the agreed date and were actually served before any DCC was issued. That consequence would go beyond enforcing procedural discipline and would determine a very substantial costs liability without consideration of objections already formulated.

33. The administration of justice requires both compliance and proportionality. Strict timetables protect receiving parties from delay and uncertainty, and I do not dilute that policy. The remedial power in RDC 4.2 exists, however, to prevent a curable procedural failure from producing an unjust result where the other party can be protected. Granting the extension does not confer a tactical advantage: it restores the ordinary detailed assessment process and preserves the Claimant’s right to prove and recover every cost properly due.

34. Balancing all of those matters, I find that time should be extended retrospectively to 23 March 2026. The breach concerned service rather than preparation; the objections were filed on time; the failure was not intentional; actual service occurred before any order on the DCC was issued; the response to the Registry’s formal direction was prompt; the Claimant’s prejudice can be compensated in costs; and refusal would impose a disproportionate consequence.

35. I therefore treat the 23 March 2026 email as valid service and extend time to that date. Once time is extended, the Points of Dispute fall within the extended period and no separate relief order under RDC 4.46 to 4.49 is necessary. Strictly, RDC 40.16 is then no longer engaged. For the avoidance of doubt, however, I grant the First Defendant permission, insofar as permission is required, to be heard further in the substantive detailed assessment.

The DCC request

36. The Claimant’s DCC request was procedurally proper when filed. The later service and extension alter the position before the certificate was issued. The Points of Dispute were actually served on 23 March and are now treated as served within the extended period. RDC 40.18 therefore precludes the issue of a DCC. I refuse the request and direct that no DCC can be issued.

37. Because the Claimant does not obtain a DCC, the fixed USD 160 under RDC 40.22 does not arise. That does not dispose of the separate question whether the Claimant should recover the reasonable costs caused by the service default, which I address below.

Further conduct of the substantive detailed assessment

38. My decision on the Extension Application does not determine the quantum of the Claimant’s substantive costs. Its effect is that the First Defendant’s Points of Dispute stand and that the substantive Bill must proceed through the ordinary detailed assessment process. The merits of the substantive objections remain wholly open.

39. RDC 40.27 provides that, where Points of Dispute have been served, the receiving party may serve a Reply. RDC 40.28 ordinarily allows 21 days after service. A Reply is optional, but the retrospective nature of the extension means that the ordinary period calculated from 23 March would have expired before this decision.

40. It would be procedurally unfair to validate the Points of Dispute retrospectively while denying the Claimant a practical opportunity to respond. Exercising the case- management power in RDC 4.2(14), I therefore direct that, if the Claimant wishes to serve a Reply, it may file and serve that Reply within 21 days of the date of the accompanying Order. The period mirrors the ordinary allowance in RDC 40.28 and does not confer any greater procedural advantage.

41. If no Reply is filed and served within that period, the substantive detailed assessment shall proceed without a Reply. I do not in this decision set or extend the separate deadline for requesting a detailed assessment hearing under RDC 40.29 and 40.30, because that matter was not the subject of the Extension Application. Any party affected by this own- initiative direction may apply within seven days after service of the Order to set it aside, vary it or stay it, consistently with RDC 4.13 and 4.14.

Costs arising from the service default, the DCC request and the Extension Application

42. RDC 38.6 gives me discretion as to whether costs are payable, their amount and when they are paid. RDC 38.7 states the general rule that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party’s costs, but RDC 38.8 and 38.9 require consideration of all the circumstances, including conduct, partial success and whether it was reasonable to raise or contest an issue. RDC 38.10 permits an order confined to costs relating to a particular procedural step.

43. The First Defendant succeeds in obtaining the extension, but it required that application only because it failed to serve in time. The Claimant acted reasonably in requesting a DCC on 10 March and in following up before it received the Points of Dispute. It would be unjust to transfer to the Claimant the costs generated by a default for which it was not responsible merely because I have exercised the discretion to cure that default.

44. In Kapova at [54], Justice Le Miere identified the ordinary principle that a party applying for an extension of a time fixed by the Rules usually pays the costs of and occasioned by the application, subject always to the surrounding circumstances. More recently, in Label Labs FZ LLE v Five International Hotel Management LLC (CFI-032-2025), the defaulting party obtained retrospective permission but was ordered to pay the costs of and occasioned by the extension application. Those authorities accord with causation and fairness in the present case.

45. I therefore order the First Defendant to pay the Claimant’s reasonable costs of and occasioned by the failure to serve the Points of Dispute within time, including the reasonable costs of preparing and pursuing the DCC request and of considering and dealing with the Extension Application. Those costs are to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed. The First Defendant is not entitled to its costs of obtaining the extension.

46. No schedule quantifying those procedural costs is before me. The amount will therefore be determined separately if the parties cannot agree it.

Detailed assessment of the Alternative Service Application costs

Background and the existing costs order

47. The Bill states that, following the orders made in the substantive proceedings, the Claimant filed Application No. DEC-001-2025/15 on 16 March 2026 under RDC Part 52 seeking committal orders against Aria Commodities DMCC and Mr Brittain (the “Committal Application”). The Bill states that personal service of that application was required by RDC 52.9(1).

48. The Bill and the Claimant’s Replies record that, on 24 March 2026, the Claimant’s lawyers asked Mr Brittain to identify a time and place for personal service or consent to acceptance by email. They warned that an application for dispensation or alternative service would be made, and that its costs would be sought, if he did not cooperate. The Claimant submits that Mr Brittain did not respond.

49. The Claimant states that it then conducted further investigations into Mr Brittain’s whereabouts, instructed Tremark Associates Limited as a United Kingdom process server, attempted service in the UAE and United Kingdom, and prepared detailed evidence of the attempts. Its Replies state that Mr Mohammad Haykal personally attended four Dubai addresses, travelled with a physical service bundle, encountered obstacles at the addresses and explained the purpose of his attendance to occupants. The Respondents do not advance a contrary factual account in their Points of Dispute; their case is that the application remained straightforward and that the staffing and time were excessive.

50. On 26 March 2026, the Claimant filed the Alternative Service Application under RDC 9.31 seeking dispensation from personal service or permission to serve the Committal Application by email. The application was made without notice and determined on the papers. The Amended Order dated 30 March 2026 dispensed with personal service, permitted service by email and ordered the Respondents to pay the costs of and occasioned by the Alternative Service Application on the standard basis, to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

51. RDC 38.22 requires me to give effect to the existing order. I therefore do not decide whether the application should have been made, whether Justice Black should have granted it, or whether the underlying Committal Application has merit. I determine only the reasonable and proportionate amount payable under the existing costs order.

52. The Claimant commenced the assessment on 4 May 2026. The Respondents served their Points of Dispute on 25 May 2026 and subsequently filed them. The Claimant served Replies on 16 June 2026. The parties asked for the assessment to be conducted on the papers, and I have done so.

The Bill and the parties’ positions

53. The signed Bill claims AED 70,249.62. It comprises professional fees of AED 64,590 and disbursements of AED 5,659.62. The professional fees comprise AED 58,590 for work on the Alternative Service Application and AED 6,000 for preparing the Bill. The disbursements comprise the DIFC Courts application fee of AED 1,121.75 and Tremark fees of AED 4,537.87.

54. The Respondents submit that the matter was a straightforward procedural application conducted over approximately one week, determined without a hearing, without opposition and without responsive evidence. They contend that 30.2 hours across four fee earners, excluding bill preparation, was unreasonable and disproportionate; that Mr McCarthy’s senior involvement was unnecessary or excessive; that the use of multiple fee earners produced duplication, internal discussion and excessive supervision; and that AED 25,000 is the appropriate global allowance.

55. The Respondents’ itemised objections offer reduced time for initial drafting, associate work, the service-related work, Registry correspondence and bill preparation. They make no offer for most of Mr McCarthy’s time, for repeated post-order costs discussions, or for part of the service work. They offer AED 2,500 against the Tremark disbursement and object to the printing component.

56. The Claimant submits that the Respondents materially understate the work. It relies on the unsuccessful efforts to obtain cooperation, investigations in two jurisdictions, the instruction of Tremark, the attendance at four UAE addresses, the preparation and revision of witness evidence, filing, Registry correspondence and correction of the first order. It says the work was predominantly undertaken by junior fee earners and that Mr McCarthy supplied limited and necessary supervision.

57. The Claimant identifies Mr McCarthy as Of Counsel with 13 years’ experience, Ms Vijayan as an Associate with two years’ experience, Mr Haykal as a newly qualified Associate, Ms AlAmri as a paralegal and Mr Alexander as a legal assistant. It says the work was appropriately delegated and that its rates were below the indicative figures in Registrar’s Direction No. 1/2023 (“RD 1/2023”). It also relies on the Respondents’ alleged non-cooperation under RDC 38.23(1).

58. I take the asserted conduct into account because the Respondents do not dispute in their Points of Dispute the Claimant’s account that the 24 March email received no response. Conduct may explain why particular work was necessary. It does not, however, convert all expenditure into recoverable costs. The standard basis continues to exclude duplication, excess and disproportionate supervision.

The applicable assessment principles

59. The Amended Order expressly requires assessment on the standard basis. RDC 38.17 provides that I must not allow costs which were unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount. RDC 38.18 requires me to ‘only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue’ and to resolve any doubt about whether costs were reasonably incurred or reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

60. RDC 38.21 requires regard to all the circumstances. RDC 38.23 specifically directs attention to the parties’ conduct, the amount or value involved, the importance of the matter, complexity or novelty, skill and responsibility, time spent, and the place and circumstances in which the work was done. These considerations require a contextual assessment rather than a mechanical comparison with the length of the order or the absence of a hearing.

61. RDC 38.24 cautions that the relationship between costs and financial value may not be a reliable guide and prohibits use of a fixed percentage in all cases. RDC 38.25 recognises that necessary work must be remunerated at economic rates. Those provisions prevent proportionality from becoming an arbitrary cap, but they do not remove the obligation to use an efficient team and reasonable time.

62. I apply those provisions by asking four linked questions: whether the work was reasonably required; whether it was allocated to an appropriate level of fee earner; whether the time and rate were reasonable; and whether the resulting total is proportionate when the Bill is viewed as a whole.

Reconciliation of the Bill

63. The Bill’s summary page records 5 hours 18 minutes for Mr McCarthy. The claimed fee of AED 15,190 at AED 3,100 per hour corresponds to 4.9 hours, and the individual chronology also totals 4.9 hours. The Claimant’s Replies repeat the 5 hours 18 minutes description. I assess the certified monetary claim and itemised entries, namely AED 15,190 for 4.9 hours.

64. The itemised entries therefore total 29.8 hours for work on the application, rather than the 30.2 hours used in the Points of Dispute and in the Claimant’s percentage calculation. Adding 3.8 hours for preparation of the Bill produces 33.6 hours. The Claimant’s reference to 34 hours is a rounded description.

Hourly rates

65. The claimed hourly rates are AED 3,100 for Mr McCarthy, AED 2,000 for Ms Vijayan, AED 1,900 for Mr Haykal, AED 1,400 for Ms AlAmri and AED 1,200 for Mr Alexander. RD 1/2023 identifies indicative average rates of AED 3,298 for lawyers with more than ten years’ experience, AED 2,391 for trainees and lawyers with up to five years’ experience, and AED 1,450 for paralegals. The Direction states that those figures are guidance, not fixed tariffs.

66. Each claimed rate is at or below the relevant indicative benchmark. The Respondents do not identify evidence that the rates themselves were commercially excessive. Their substantive complaint concerns the level and allocation of time. I therefore allow the claimed rates and address proportionality through the time allowances.

Staffing, delegation and senior supervision

67. I reject the proposition that the involvement of several fee earners establishes overstaffing by itself. A paralegal may undertake initial procedural review and drafting; a junior associate may investigate facts, attempt service and prepare evidence; a senior lawyer may settle the application; and a legal assistant may prepare the Bill. That division is capable of reducing rather than increasing cost.

68. I also reject the Respondents’ categorical submission that internal discussions are absorbed entirely within overheads. Reasonable instructions, supervision and coordination are part of conducting litigation. The recoverable question is one of extent: whether the time reflects necessary management of delegated work or duplicated reconsideration of work already performed.

69. The application nevertheless remained a paper application without opposition or a hearing. The committal context justified care and some senior review, but it did not require Mr McCarthy to duplicate the factual and drafting work carried by the junior team. I therefore allow senior involvement in principle and reduce it where the cumulative entries exceed a proportionate level of settling and oversight.

Individual entries

70. I have considered each item in the signed chronology, every corresponding objection and every reply. My individual allowances and reasons are recorded in Appendix 1. That appendix forms part of these Reasons. I summarise the principal conclusions here so that the reasoning chain for the assessment is clear.

71. I allow in full the four hours spent by Mr Haykal making personal service attempts on 25 March 2026. The Claimant’s Reply identifies attendance at four addresses, travel, a physical service bundle and interactions at the addresses. The Respondents’ objection treats the combined day as if it were only further drafting. The described attendance and travel justify the separate four-hour entry.

72. I allow substantial but reduced time for the surrounding preparation and evidential drafting. Initial procedural review, searches, drafting, preparation for service, revision of evidence after failed attempts, filing and Registry correspondence were all connected to the relief. The reductions reflect cumulative overlap among eight hours of paralegal drafting, associate drafting and senior review over successive days; they do not reflect a finding that the categories of work were unnecessary.

73. I allow modest senior supervision but reduce the substantial Mr McCarthy entries on 25 March and the final review on 26 March. The junior team had developed the application and evidence. The material supports senior settling and procedural oversight, but not every unit of cumulative review at the full level claimed.

74. I allow the work on 27 and 30 March in full. Reviewing the order and drawing the omission of Mr Brittain to the Registry’s attention were necessary consequential steps, and the time was modest. I reduce the repeated internal discussions on 6, 9 and 10 April concerning recovery of costs. Some consideration of the costs order was reasonable, but repeated discussion was disproportionate to a short and clear costs direction.

75. I allow three hours rather than 3.8 hours for preparation of the Bill: 1.5 hours for Ms Vijayan and 1.5 hours for Mr Alexander. Preparation required checking the chronology, rates and disbursements, and junior preparation was appropriate. The underlying application nevertheless covered a short period and the signed Bill was ten pages. The purpose behind this reduction is to remove overlap while preserving a reasonable allowance for preparation and checking.

Disbursements

76. The DIFC Courts application fee of AED 1,121.75 is not specifically disputed. It was necessarily incurred in filing the Alternative Service Application. I allow it in full.

77. The Respondents challenge the Tremark fees and offer AED 2,500, asserting that the fees and printing were excessive. They do not identify an invoice defect, unnecessary attendance, market comparator or particular charge to be removed. The Claimant says Tremark was instructed for United Kingdom service and that GBP 63 represented printing of the physical service bundle. The work was relevant to the application and the objection is not sufficiently particularised to establish a reasonable reduction. I allow AED 4,537.87 in full.

The assessed amount and overall proportionality

78. The item-by-item assessment produces professional fees of AED 48,400, comprising AED 43,600 for the Alternative Service Application and AED 4,800 for preparation of the Bill. Adding the allowed disbursements of AED 5,659.62 produces a total of AED 54,059.62.

79. The reduction is AED 16,190, approximately 23 per cent of the amount claimed. It addresses overlapping drafting, cumulative senior review, repeated post-order costs discussions and modest excess in Bill preparation. It preserves the claimed rates, the four-hour UAE service attendance, the necessary filing and correction work, and both disbursements.

80. I find the final amount of AED 54,059.62 proportionate. The matter was procedural, paper-based and unopposed, which justifies a material reduction from AED 70,249.62. It was not merely a form-filling exercise: the work described included investigation, attempted service in two jurisdictions, physical attendance at four Dubai addresses, evidence of failed service and procedural care associated with a committal application. I do not impose a second global percentage reduction because the item-specific allowances already reflect the features said to make the Bill excessive.

Costs of the detailed assessment proceedings

81. RDC 40.44 provides that the receiving party is ordinarily entitled to its costs of the detailed assessment proceedings unless the Rules provide otherwise or the Court makes another order. No separate schedule quantifying costs incurred in the assessment after preparation of the Bill is before me, and the parties did not ask me to determine such a schedule. I therefore do not quantify those further costs or make a percentage order under RDC 40.44(2). The default position under RDC 40.44 remains unaffected.

82. The assessed total of AED 54,059.62 already includes AED 4,800 for preparing and checking the Bill. That amount must not be duplicated in any later agreement or assessment of further costs of the detailed assessment proceedings.

Conclusion

83. For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders:

APPENDIX 1 - ITEM-BY-ITEM ASSESSMENT