Claim No. DEC 001/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

TECHTERYX LTD.

Claimant

and

(1) ARIA COMMODITIES DMCC

First Defendant/First Respondent

(2) MATTHEW WILLIAM BRITTAIN

Second Respondent

(3) MASHREQ BANK PSC
(4) EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC
(5) ABU DHABI ISLAMIC BANK PJSC

Defendants

and

(6) ARIA BIO INDUSTRIES FZE

Third Respondent

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE MICHAEL BLACK

UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black KC dated 28 February 2025 (the “WFO”) granting inter alia the following orders:

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 7 August 2025 inter alia continuing the injunctions made under the WFO until further order of the Court

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 17 October 2025 (the “October Disclosure Order”) in response to the Applicant’s Application No. DEC-001-2025/12, directing Aria DMCC to remedy its non-compliance with the disclosure orders in paragraphs 14-16 of the WFO by inter alia (a) Mr Brittain swearing and submitting a further affidavit providing all of the information required by paragraph 14(2) of the WFO and (b) Aria DMCC, among other things, explaining the complete onward flow of moneys and their traceable proceeds from the payments out of the its bank accounts

AND UPON the Claimant's Application No. DEC-001-2025/21 dated 30 April 2026 for permission to amend the Contempt Application (the “Amendment Application”) in the form of the Amended Application Notice and draft Particulars of Contempt filed together with the application

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 6 May 2026 giving directions in respect of the Contempt Application, including that the Final Hearing be listed for 5 days beginning on 27 July 2026

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. DEC-001-2025/22 dated 13 May 2026 seeking an order requiring the First Defendant to remedy its non-compliance with paragraph 17(2) of the Order dated 28 February 2025 (the “Remedy Application”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 30 June 2026 in respect of, inter alia, the application of paragraph 17(2) of the Orders (the “30 June Order”)

AND UPON the Respondents’ Application No. DEC-001-2025/28 dated 17 July 2026 to adjourn the Final Hearing of the Contempt Application and for further directions (the “Adjournment Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant sending amended draft Particulars of Contempt to the First and Second Respondents on 17 July 2026

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the First and Second Respondents in respect of the Adjournment Application at the hearing on 27 July 2026

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and the Second Respondent, acting for himself and on behalf of the First Respondent, in respect of the Amendment Application on the same date

AND UPON the Court having determined, in the course of hearing the Adjournment Application, the proper interpretation and effect of paragraph 4(b) of the 30 June Order

AND UPON the Amended Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Michael Black dated 25 August 2026

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Applicant and Counsel for the Respondent at a hearing held before H.E. Justice Michael Black on 26 August 2026 (the “Hearing”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Committal Hearing shall be adjourned to 26 October 2026 with an estimated length of hearing of 4 days.

2. The Committal Hearing shall take place in person in the Court save that Mr Peto KC has permission to attend remotely.

3. The parties shall liaise with a view to agreeing directions leading to the Committal Hearing no later than 4pm (GST) on 7 September 2026. In default of agreement, the parties shall communicate their proposals to the Court by 4pm ( GST) on 8 September 2026 and the Court will determine the appropriate directions on paper.

4. Matthew William Brittain shall, to the best of his ability, swear and serve an affidavit by 4pm (GST) on 7 September 2026, which must:

5. There shall be liberty to the Claimant to apply to the Court for sanctions in the event that Matthew William Brittain fails to comply with the Order in the preceding paragraph.

6. The Legal Costs Order shall be further amended in accordance with the attached draft.

7. All matters of costs are reserved.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 1 September 2026
At: 11am

INTRODUCTION

1. On 26 August 2026, I adjourned the Committal Hearing listed for 4 days commencing on 1 September 2026 for a third time. I gave brief reasons orally. These are my expanded written reasons and I also make consequential directions. I will address:

THE ADJOURNMENT

2. I should begin by emphasizing that save in the most extreme circumstances (substantiated by strong evidence), no further adjournments will be granted.

3. I was reminded of the principles governing adjournment applications that I set out in giving my oral reasons when adjourning the Hearing on 27 July 2026. I noted that the Court approaches an application to adjourn with a considerable degree of caution, and will only contemplate an adjournment, if it is “really necessary to achieve justice between the parties”: Corinth Pipeworks S.A v Barclays Bank PLC v (1) Afras Limited (2) Radhakrishnan Nand Kumar, [2010] 16 DIFC CFI-024 (Justice Steel) at paragraphs 9, 27 to 28, and 30. This is reinforced by RDC 26.89 to 26.91, under which postponement of a trial is an order of last resort, and the Court will not postpone a hearing without a very good reason.

4. Where an adjournment is sought at a late stage of the proceedings, the Court has required the applicant to demonstrate a defence with a realistic prospect of success. This is the same test is applicable to an application for immediate judgment under RDC 24.1: Transasia Private Capital Limited v Mados Trading [2021] DIFC CFI-079, at paragraphs 44 to 46.

5. The requirement to show a good defence is qualified where a respondent has a right of silence and indeed is entitled simply to say to the applicant, “prove it”, rather than make a substantive defence. In dealing with any Committal Application, the Court will have regard to the need for the respondent to have details of the acts of contempt and the opportunity to respond to the Committal Application. At RDC 52.21, it is provided that the Court should also have regard to the need for the respondent to be (1) allowed a reasonable time for responding to the Committal Application, including, if necessary, preparing a defence, and (2) given the opportunity, if unrepresented, to obtain legal advice.

6. I adjourned the Hearing on the latter basis. The Claimant submitted that against a background of previous criticisms of the Defendants for evasiveness, obfuscation and delay they may have manufactured the situation where they were unrepresented. I did not rule that out as a possibility but I made the following observations that I repeated in giving my oral reasons on this occasion:

7. Mr Peto KC for the Claimant put much emphasis on the last sentence and submitted that the Defendants have signally failed to demonstrate their bona fides by making yet another application for an adjournment. That there was much force in these submissions was realistically recognised by Mr Cogley KC instructed on behalf of the Defendants by Rosenblatt Law Limited (“Rosenblatt”).

8. In answer, Mr Cogley made a number telling submissions while he accepted that it was a difficult application and he was effectively appearing before the Court (on behalf of his clients) as a supplicant.

9. First, he raised the issue of representation. Not only did he make the obvious points about the gravity of the proceedings and RDC 52.21 but also that the Court and the interests of justice would be served if the Defendants were represented by an experienced legal team. He suggested that if the hearing were to go ahead, the likely positions were either that Mr Brittain would appear in person with little or nothing to say or neither Defendant would attend. He asked me not to regard Mr Brittain as well able to represent himself just because the written documents presented by him appear to be professionally drafted. He suggested that they were written with the assistance of AI. I have no evidence for this and I note that the Claimants do suggest that he has had covert legal assistance. In addition, Mr Peto described the submission as a threat. I do not accept that. In my judgment, were the hearing to have proceeded, my strong suspicion is that in reality neither Defendant would have attended. On the most favourable view to Mr Brittain he may feel that attending unrepresented might inadvertently expose him to a liability that could otherwise have been avoided if properly advised. On the least favourable view, as Mr Peto colourfully put it, he might just “cock a snook” at the Court.

10. Mr Cogley assured me (insofar as he was able) that he and Rosenblatt were instructed for the duration and we will not have a repeat of the previous and undesirable position that counsel were only instructed for the Adjournment Application. I did observe that if Mr Cogley and Rosenblatt were now disinstructed, it would not go well for the Defendants.

11. His second point was that the Claimant refers to the committal application as “a trial” and there is a danger that the proceedings before the DIFC Courts should not be permitted to usurp the proceedings before the Hong Kong Courts. In this Court what has been ordered is disclosure of assets in order to police a freezing injunction not the tracing claim to discover what has become of the Six Remittances. The latter is the exclusive province of the Hong Kong Courts. While there is clearly an overlap between the two, I accept Mr Cogely’s point that there is a difference and that this Court should be astute to avoid overreaching. This not a matter that had been raised before and, in my view, demonstrates the benefit to the administration of justice of the Defendants being represented by experienced Counsel.

12. His third and final point was that it is hard to see the prejudice to the Claimant. Indeed, there may be a benefit. It is possible that on the advice of experienced Counsel Mr Brittain may be more cooperative than he has been hitherto. I do not prejudge whether that lack of cooperation would amount to contempt; giving him the benefit of all doubts, he may have felt reluctant to take any definitive steps without the benefit of advice. I will come back to this point at paragraph 33 below.

13. I observed if one were to take the contrary view and make all the assumptions against Mr Brittain and that he has done his best to hide the Defendants’ assets from the Claimants, he has had 18 months to do it and would surely have done so by now.

14. Either way, it would seem that there would little further prejudice to the Claimant by some further delay.

15. That is not to say that I do not have considerable sympathy for the Claimant. Mr Peto correctly observed that Court has been at great pains to enable the Defendants to be legally represented and (also correctly) that there is no adequate explanation why the lawyers previously instructed did not continue to act. He accused Mr Brittain of giving the Court “the run around”: he has not explained where the money to pay lawyers hitherto had come from but every time we get close to a hearing he raises some ostensibly plausible issues about funding. Mr Peto submitted that Mr Brittain brought these problems on himself. He questioned why ARIA Bio (a company that had previous discharged the legal bills) does not keep funding the Defendants. As to prejudice, Mr Peto, said it was attrition, 18 months delay is prejudice.

16. In reply, Mr Cogley, obviously on instructions, made some observations about the conduct of the previous legal team and stated that ARIA Bio was no longer in a position to provide funding due to the situation in the Gulf. There was no evidence to support these suggestions. He did however end by recognising the force of Mr Peto’s submissions and suggested that “just because it is easy to shoot fish in a barrel that does not mean it is right thing to do”. Why, he asked rhetorically, would the Defendants play “Russian Roulette” just to gain a short adjournment.

17. In coming to my decision to grant the adjournment I am primarily motived by the Overriding Objective to deal with cases justly. In each case some of the underlying criteria must yield to others. Here expedition and (I regret) saving expense must yield to the criterion of ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing. It is obvious that the case involves very substantial sums of money, it is as important as a case can get in that it could lead to the imprisonment of Mr Brittan and the sequestration of assets of companies of which he is the ultimate beneficial owner. The issues are extremely complex. I will however say nothing about the financial position of the parties as that is a hotly contested issue. I am also of the view that it would be wrong at this stage to make any findings that might, even inferentially, be said to touch upon the question of whether the Defendants are guilty of contempt. The observations I made on 27 July 2026 set out at paragraph 6 above still apply but with added light at the end of the tunnel that the Defendants now appear to be properly represented for the Committal Hearing. I agree with Mr Cogley that that benefits all parties and ends of justice.

DATE AND VENUE OF THE ADJOURNED HEARING

18. At the hearing on 26 August 2026, I indicated that I was unable to hear a 4-day matter before mid-October and offered to find out whether another Judge might be available earlier. Following the hearing, the Claimant’s legal representatives, Al Tamimi & Company (“ATCO”) wrote the Court stating that provided that the hearing can be relisted not later than October, the Claimant’s strong preference is that the Committal Application remains to be determined by H.E. Justice Michael Black as these proceedings are factually and procedurally complex, spanning 18 months. Any potential advantage that may be gained by proceeding before another Judge sooner is likely to be outweighed by the additional time and expense that would need to be incurred to enable another Judge to have the requisite knowledge of the proceedings to be able to determine the Committal Application effectively.

19. In the those circumstances I am content to reserve the hearing to myself.

20. The parties have liaised over Leading Counsel’s availability. Both are available 26-30 October 2026, as am I. The hearing shall be relisted for that date.

21. As to venue, the Defendants initially raised technical issues as to why this Court could not sit in London but now press strongly for the hearing to take place there. They suggest that either permission could be obtained from the UK Government or the DIFC Court can formally sit in the DIFC, but with parties and myself physically in London for the purposes of giving and receiving evidence.

22. For its part, the Claimant is content with the venue being in London or the DIFC as the Court considers appropriate.

23. I am guided by RDC 52.27 which states that a committal application should normally be heard in public. On reflection, I interpret this to mean in public in the DIFC not in public in another country at a venue that would be physically inaccessible to members of the public in the DIFC.

24. It may be argued that the requirement for a public hearing may be met by a remote hearing broadcast on the Court’s live feed. I accept that in most cases that is likely to be acceptable. As a matter of discretion in the present case I do not: this will be a lengthy and complex hearing that will require detailed examination and comparison of numerous documents whether or not Mr Brittain chooses to give evidence. I would expect that at least half the time will be occupied by granular submission both on fact and law. It seems to me that justice will best be achieved through the interaction within an in-person hearing.

25. One exception is that Mr Peto has asked (and has hitherto been granted) the indulgence to appear by video-link. Mr Brittain as a lay person has made the point that if Mr Peto can appear remotely why should he not also so attend. There is of course no analogy between counsel making submissions and a witnesses or party giving testimony. While the demeanour of a witness has been demonstrated by academic research to be largely irrelevant and sometime misleading in assessing the credibility of a witness, there is a salutary difference between the witness sitting in the comfort of their home or in their lawyers’ office surrounded by their legal team and standing in a witness box in a public courtroom.

26. So far as Mr Peto is concerned, as I have already noted I have accepted that his difficulties are of a compelling personal and private nature, are not mere preference and are not logistical in nature. The Court reposes trust in the assurance of Registered Practitioners and as will be seen at paragraph 28 below that applies equally to the Defendant’s representatives. I accept ATCO’s submission that it would be unfair to compel the Claimant to instruct alternative Counsel as Mr Peto has now appeared on behalf of the Claimant at three hearings. He is under brief and has already undertaken significant work in connection with the Committal Application. In short, the Claimant has already incurred significant legal fees in reliance on the Court’s ruling that Leading Counsel would be able to attend the hearing of the Committal Application by video conference.

27. The hearing will therefore take place in person in the DIFC but exceptionally Mr Peto and only Mr Peto will be permitted to attend remotely.

CLARIFICATION OF WFO IN CONNECTION WITH LEGAL COSTS

28. On 25 August 2026, I amended the Order made on 10 August 2026 (the “Legal Costs Order”) to clarify that certain bank accounts in the name of the First Defendants may be used to defray legal costs and expenses without breach of the WFO. The Order made Rosenblatt, as officers of the Court, the gatekeepers of the funds.

29. By letter dated 27 August 2026, Rosenblatt informed the Court of a further source of funding – an account in the name of Mr Brittain with IG Limited, DIFC Branch, containing USD 371,753.52. IG Limited has declined to release the funds in the light of the WFO.

30. ATCO wrote on 27 August 2026 that “As to the proposed funding from Mr Brittain’s personal IG account (which is trading platform and not a bank), we have no objection to the Court making such orders as it sees fit to ensure that the re-listed committal hearing can proceed without any further delay.”

31. In the circumstances, I shall reamend the Legal Costs Order made on 10 August 2026 to include the account with IG Limited.

THE REMEDY APPLICATION

32. In the Legal Costs Order, I granted the Claimant’s Remedy Application of 13 May 2026 in the following terms:

33. In Mr Brittain’s Thirteenth Witness Statement dated 21 August 2026, he stated:

34. More time was granted than initially suggested. The original Order was made on 10 August 2026 and must be complied no later than 4 PM GST on 7 September 2026.

35. Mr Cogley tentatively suggested that I might make compliance with the Order a condition of the adjournment. In fairness to him, that was very much “on the hoof” and in an attempt to persuade the Court of the Defendants’ good intentions. I am not sure how that might work given the constraints on the Court’s availability and more fundamentally having regard Mr Brittain’s right to defend himself against the Committal Application. I would definitely wish to hear argument on the latter point. I will therefore give the Claimant liberty to apply for sanctions in the event that Mr Brittain fails to provide the affidavit so that the question can be considered more fully.

CONSEQUENTIAL DIRECTIONS

36. The Legal Costs Order set out a procedural timetable leading to a hearing on 1 September 2026.

37. Given that the hearing is now adjourned until 26 October 2026, I rely on the good sense of the parties to liaise and adjust the timetable accordingly.

COSTS

38. I wish at this stage to avoid any satellite litigation that might distract from the preparations of the Committal Hearing, accordingly all matters of costs shall remain reserved.

DISPOSTION

39. I make the following directions: