Claim No: SCT 321/2025

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

PABLO

Claimant/Appellant

and

PIERCE

Defendant/Respondent

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE LIM THIAM SUAN

UPON the claim having been filed on 5 May 2025 (the “Claim”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s counterclaim dated 26 May 2025 (the “Counterclaim”)

AND UPON reviewing the Judgment of H.E. Justice Maha Al Mheiri dated 25 December 2025 (the “Judgment”)

AND UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Appeal Notice dated 29 January 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “Application for Permission to Appeal”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. SCT-321-2025/2 dated 29 January 2026 seeking an extension of time to file a notice for permission to appeal the Judgment (the “EOT Application”)

AND UPON reviewing the Defendant’s Response dated 31 March 2026 to the Application for Permission to Appeal

AND UPON reviewing the documents and evidence filed and recorded on the Court file

AND UPON hearing the Appellant and the Respondent’s representative at the hearing held on 6 April 2026 before H.E. Justice Lim Thiam Suan (the “Hearing”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The EOT Application is dismissed.

2. The Application for Permission to Appeal is dismissed.

3. The Appellant shall pay the Respondent’s costs of the Applications. The Respondent shall submit a statement of costs not exceeding 3 pages within 5 days of this Order.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
SCT Judge and Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 31 July 2026
At: 9am

The Parties

1. The Claimant is Pablo (the “Claimant”), a company registered in Dubai, the UAE.

2. The Defendant is Pierce (the “Defendant”), a company registered in Dubai, the UAE.

Background

3. There are two applications before the Court.

4. The first is an application dated 29 January 2026 seeking an extension of time to file a notice for permission to appeal the Judgment of H.E. Justice Maha Al Mheiri dated 25 December 2025 (the “Judgment”), (the “EOT Application”) and the second application is the Notice for Permission to Appeal (the “Permission to Appeal Application”).

5. On 5 May 2025, the Claimant commenced proceedings against the Defendant before the Small Claims Tribunal (“SCT”).

6. The Claimant sought recovery of an outstanding sum of AED 71,775.70 together with interest due under an Agreement on Organization and Management of Delivery Service entered into between itself and the Defendant on 15 August 2024 (the “Service Agreement”).

7. The Claimant claimed it had fulfilled its obligations by providing the agreed services of finding and engaging delivery service providers to the Defendant for the purpose of delivering the Defendant’s parcels to third parties. The Claimant issued monthly invoices for the services rendered. A total sum of AED 95,501.70 including VAT was invoiced.

8. The Defendant paid a sum of AED 23,726.00 leaving a balance of AED 71,775.70 still outstanding.

9. The Defendant contested the Claim and brought a Counterclaim of AED 150,000.00 representing various losses said to have arisen from the Claimant’s failure to comply with the terms of the Service Agreement.

10. According to the Defendant, there were 843 confirmed failed deliveries during the service period. These failed deliveries were documented and reported through official channels to the Claimant. Despite acknowledgments by its representatives, these concerns were not reflected in the invoices issued by the Claimant. The Defendant claimed that as a direct result of the Claimant’s delivery failures, it had to issue refunds to its customers totaling AED 20,846.00 aside from suffering other operational losses.

11. The Defendant alleged that the Claimant was in breach of clause 10.1 of the Service Agreement when it failed to give the Defendant contractual credits or financial adjustments for these failures.

12. The Defendant further claimed that customer satisfaction declined during the period of the Claimant’s services with 29% of its customers citing delivery issues as their reason for leaving.

13. On the matter of partial payments, the Defendant explained that it was made out of goodwill, with the express reservation that full payment could not be committed until all invoices had been fully issued, reconciled and credits give, as agreed under the Service Agreement.

14. In its Response to Defence and Counterclaim, the Claimant maintained the accuracy of its invoices, that there were no timely written objections from the Defendant; that the Defendant had repeatedly acknowledged its indebtedness to the Claimant, citing massive strains on cash flow and had requested time to settle the outstanding sums.

15. More particularly, the Claimant cited clause 10.1 of the Service Agreement as providing that its liability only arises where it has failed to arrange a third-party service provider to carry out the deliveries. The Claimant is not responsible for any delivery delays, which was the essence of the Defendant’s Counterclaim. In any event, its liability, if any, was limited to not exceeding AED 100 per parcel, and in all circumstances, its aggregate liability shall not exceed the fees for the relevant month. Here, the Counterclaim far exceeded the relevant fees and was thus inadmissible.

16. The parties attended a consultation on 25 August 2025, but were unable to reach any settlement.

Decision of the SCT

17. The matter was listed for hearings on 7 October 2025 and 24 December 2025 before the SCT.

18. The Claimant failed to attend both hearings. The Defendant’s representative attended both hearings.

19. After alerting herself to the availability of Rule 53.60 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts where the SCT has power to strike out a claim where a claimant does not attend the hearing, the Judge nevertheless proceeded to consider the respective Claim and Counterclaim upon the evidence produced in Court.

20. On 25 December 2025, the Judge dismissed the Claim in its entirety after finding the Claimant had failed to establish entitlement to the full invoiced amount claimed.

21. The Judge further granted the Defendant’s Counterclaim upon being satisfied that the Defendant was entitled to contractual credits, reimbursement of customer refunds and verifiable operational and reputational losses. The SCT directed the Claimant to pay the Defendant AED 150,000.00 in damages together with the payment of filing fee of AED 3,020.00.

Claimant’s Applications

22. As mentioned at the outset, there are two Applications before me: the “EOT Application” and the “Permission to Appeal Application”.

23. In the Permission to Appeal Application, the Claimant cites 6 grounds:

24. In the EOT Application, Claimant seeks an extension of time to file its Notice for Permission to appeal the Judgment. It is 21 days late. This EOT Application is supported by witness statements prepared by its general counsel and authorized representative, Mr. Princeton.

25. Mr. Princeton explained his non-attendance before the SCT, claiming that “At no stage was the Claimant’s non-attendance deliberate or intended to disregard the proceedings of the Court”.

26. He elaborated that he was “unable to attend the First SCT Hearing due to technical difficulties being experienced at the listed time on 7 October 2025 in accessing the online hearing platform.” He claims to have emailed the Registry on the same day to draw the Court’s attention to this; that the Claimant “attempted to join the hearing for 20 minutes and made unanswered calls to the Court to address these issues”. He added the “SCT Registry did not provide a response to the Claimant’s aforementioned correspondence”.

27. As for the Second SCT Hearing, Mr. Princeton states he “was unable to join the SCT Hearing due to my flight on the same day being delayed for landing, which resulted in me being unable to join the virtual hearing at the listed time mid-flight due to connectivity issues”. He claims to have “reported to the Court in my email correspondence to the SCT Registry sent at 5:02pm GST on 24 December 2025”.

28. As for the EOT Application itself, Mr. Princeton described the extension sought by the Claimant as “modest and finite at three weeks only, and this does not impact the efficient progression of these proceedings”. On the other hand, refusing a short extension is said to “risk depriving the Claimant of the opportunity to seek permission to appeal on potentially arguable grounds”.

29. He also explained the Claimant required additional time because of Christmas, that “This Court will have in mind that while the DIFC Court does not break for Christmas, the holiday is celebrated around the world and it is slightly unfortunate that Judgment was handed down on 24 December”.

30. Mr. Princeton further explained the Claimant required “reasonable time to assess the Court’s factual determinations” which included “perusing 843 orders and their logs”, assess its implications, and determine whether there exist properly arguable grounds of appeal meeting the threshold under Rule 53 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (the “RDC”). This was a “tedious and time-consuming exercise in circumstances when many employees are on holiday”; with the Claimant, a corporate entity and any decision to pursue an appeal requires internal deliberations, consultations, and approvals at senior management level. These internal processes could not be completed within the original time period given the holiday period, despite the Claimant acting diligently and without delay.

31. He added that the Claimant took steps to appoint legal counsel, a process, according to him, “necessarily required additional time”.

32. The Defendant opposes both Applications.

33. On the EOT Application, the Defendant argues that the 21-day delay is substantial and the explanations offered, clearly inadequate.

34. The Defendant argues that there is a pattern of procedural non-compliance on the part of the Claimant. Each time, the Claimant offered explanations after the fact as opposed to taking reasonable steps in advance to comply with its obligations.

35. The Defendant further claims that it will suffer prejudice as it had already proceeded with enforcement proceedings where an interim third party debt order has already been issued against Emirates NBD Bank P.J.S.C. directing the bank to freeze AED 153,020 in the Claimant’s account. On 28 January 2026, a judicial deputation letter was sent to the Dubai Courts for enforcement of the Judgment in onshore Dubai. The Claimant has not engaged with these enforcement proceedings

36. The Defendant argues that the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success on the six grounds disclosed and there is no other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.

The EOT Application

37. RDC 53.107 provides that the appellant must file the appellant’s notice at the lower Court within 14 days after the date of the decision of the lower Court that the appellant wishes to appeal.

38. RDC 53.110 further provides that where the time for filing an appellant’s notice has expired, the appellant must:

39. RDC 53.111 states that the appellant’s notice should state the reason for the delay and the steps taken prior to the application being made.

40. In deciding whether to accede to the Claimant’s request for an extension of time to file the notice, RDC 4.2 must be considered. There is a broad power to relieve against an injustice, as explained by H.E. Justice Le Miere in Kapova v Makovini [2023] DIFC CFI/CA 004 (4 November 2023) but material must be placed before the Court so that the Court can exercise its discretion.

41. In Lakhan v Lamia [2021] DIFC CA 001 (24 June 2021), the Court opined that the matters that may weigh with the Court in the exercise of discretion include the following:

42. In the present case, I agree with the Defendant that the delay of 21 days is substantial. The Claimant is required to file its notice immediately when time for filing the notice expired on 8 January 2026. Instead, it waited another 21 days, till 29 January 2026 before filing. I do not see any attempt at compliance; neither do I see promptitude.

43. As for the reasons, the fact that the end or the beginning of the year is holiday period is immaterial. The Second SCT Hearing was fixed for 24 December 2025, and it was fixed after the Claimant failed to turn up at the First SCT Hearing. If the date was not suitable, the Claimant, represented by Mr. Princeton from the time the Claim was filed in May 2025, ought to have taken appropriate steps to alert the SCT or asked for a rescheduling. These are reasonable measures that ought to have been taken by the Claimant and/or its representative within the two-month period leading up to the Second SCT Hearing. This appears to be more of an afterthought. This Court is constrained in coming to the assistance of a party that has not been vigilant or diligent in attending to its affairs under the law and the rules of procedure, enacted for the proper administration of justice.

44. I also agree with the Defendant that the Judgment is not complex, warranting a review in detail of the 843 orders in the manner claimed by the Claimant. The Counterclaim was fixed for hearing, just as much as the Claim was. That must mean the Claimant should already have been prepared to answer the Counterclaim and the 843 orders at the SCT Hearings; and not leave it till after the Judgment was entered, to then peruse the orders and their logs.

45. On a careful perusal of the records and the exhibits offered by the Claimant, I further find that the Claimant, and in particular Mr. Princeton did not act with promptitude at all material times. On the First SCT Hearing on 7 October 2025, he did not alert the Registry of any purported technical difficulties with the Court’s online platform until 14:31 PM on 7 October 2025. In his email, he stated “We were trying to log in for 20 minutes, also called the SCT but no answers.” The First SCT Hearing was scheduled for 11:00 AM but rescheduled to 10:00 AM. It would have been reasonable to expect the email to have been sent around the time of the hearing, and not 2 hours after the scheduled conclusion time.

46. As for the Second SCT Hearing, it was scheduled for 11:00 AM on 24 December 2025. No less than two emails were sent to the Claimant/Mr. Princeton. He did not reply till 17:02 PM acknowledging that the SCT had been “chasing”. However, according to him, his flight was late for landing due to airport conditions and he could not log in. Aside from this, there were no other details.

47. Again, I do not consider any of this to be evidence of a party who has acted diligently and with promptitude.

48. In Dadic v Orion Holding Overseas Ltd [2008] DIFC CFI 007 (21 October 2010), the Court of Appeal refused to retrospectively extend time for the filing of an appellant’s notice on account of failure to provide medical evidence of alleged periods of sickness. The delay there was some four months. Similarly, I do not see any evidence of the efforts related to the matters mentioned by the Claimant on whether or not to proceed with the appeal.

49. Meanwhile, the Defendant waited till the 14-day period for permission to appeal had lapsed before initiating enforcement proceedings on the judgment sum ordered. Before commencing those proceedings, the Defendant had in fact issued a formal demand letter attaching the Judgment. It was only after the Claimant had failed to pay the Judgment sum that the Defendant proceeded to obtain the third party debt order against Emirates NBD Bank P.J.S.C. and issue a judicial deputation letter to the Dubai Courts.

50. In my view, the Defendant would, in these circumstances, be prejudiced by a grant of extension of time. The EOT Application must therefore stand dismissed.

51. For completeness, I shall deal with the second application, the Permission to Appeal Application which relies on six grounds as elucidated earlier.

52. Article 21 of the DIFC Law No. (2) of 2025 provides that judgments of the SCT may be appealed where the appeal relates to:

53. RDC 53.87 provides that the Court to which an appeal is made will allow an appeal where the decision of the SCT:

54. Under RDC 53.89, permission to appeal may only be granted where:

55. The Defendant therefore needs to show that the appeal has a real prospect of success on the grounds relied on.

56. Having carefully examined all six grounds relied on by the Claimant, I do not find any of them to be of any merit.

57. The Counterclaim concerns the failure of the Claimant to issue credit or make financial adjustments in respect of 843 incidents of Non-Delivered Orders despite giving the Defendant repeated assurances. The SCT found detailed, contemporaneous documentary evidence proving the existence of these Non-Delivered Orders. These documentary records were actually from the Claimant’s own delivery logs, dashboards and operational records. Each failure was not only found to have been reported in real time but through the designated channel established and managed by the Claimant. This same reporting channel was used by the parties throughout the entire contract.

58. The first ground concerns the application of incorrect governing law. It is an attempt to characterize the complaint as a question of law.

59. However, it is clear from the Judgment that the Counterclaim was allowed after the Judge was satisfied that there was evidence proving the Counterclaim; and not on an application or interpretation of the terms of the Service Agreement alone. Any error on the part of the SCT, of which there is none, is not altered by that material fact. From a consideration of the evidence on record and the terms of the Service Agreement, I agree with the findings of the SCT.

60. The remaining grounds concern complaints on the findings of fact by the SCT. Such grounds do not meet the requirements of RDC 53.87 for permission to appeal to be granted. The appellate Court cannot be expected to reopen the findings, particularly findings premised on contemporaneous documentary evidence.

61. The Judge further found as a fact that the Defendant had submitted a written consolidation of the reported failures within the reconciliation window referenced in the Claimant’s invoices and correspondence. At no time did the Claimant reject the Defendant’s submission on the basis that the method used was wrong or that there was another method or mechanism. Neither did the Claimant notify the Defendant the reported failures would not be accepted for credit.

62. Yet, the Claimant repeatedly failed to make the contractually agreed adjustments. Instead, it charged the Defendant, full-service fees.

63. On the issue of partial payment, there is no procedural unfairness involved. The Judge did not find the partial payment to operate as a waiver of the Defendant’s right to dispute the invoices or to claim contracted credits.

64. On the contrary, the Judge accepted, [and the SCT is entitled to so accept] that the payment was in goodwill and conditional to avoid service disruption. The Court found support for this conclusion from the contemporaneous correspondence where the Defendant repeatedly stated that it could not commit to full payment until invoices were fully issued and reconciled.

65. There is no prospect of success on any or all of the six grounds relied on. The Judge has not erred in her findings. There is also no compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

66. The Application for Permission to Appeal is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

67. For the reasons set out above, the Applications are dismissed with costs to the Defendant.