July 02, 2026 SCT - Judgments and Orders
Claim No: SCT 689/2025
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
PAISLEY
Claimant/Respondent
and
PEYTON
Defendant/Appellant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE ROGER STEWART
UPON the claim having been filed on 26 September 2025 (the “Claim”)
AND UPON the Judgment of H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser (the “Judge”) giving judgment for the Claimant on 18 May 2026 (the “Judgment”)
AND UPON considering the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 1 June 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “Permission to Appeal Application”)
AND UPON considering the Defendant’s Application No. SCT-689-2025/1 dated 2 June 2026 for a stay of execution or enforcement of the Judgment dated 2 June 2026 (the “Stay Application”)
AND UPON considering the Claimant’s Response to the Permission to Appeal Application and the Stay Application dated 5 June 2026
AND UPON considering the Defendant’s Reply to the Response dated 11 June 2026
AND UPON a hearing having been held before H.E. Justice Roger Stewart on 29 June 2026 with both parties in attendance
AND PURSUANT TO Part 4 and Part 53 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Permission to Appeal Application is refused.
2. The Defendant shall bear any DIFC Court’s filing costs which the Claimant has incurred.
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
SCT Judge and Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 2 July 2026
At: 3pm
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
A. Introduction
1. This is an application by the Defendant for permission to appeal and set aside the Judgment.
B. The Parties
2. The Claimant is Paisley , a company registered and located in Dubai, UAE.
3. The Defendant is an individual.
C. Background
4. This dispute arises out of renovation and fit-out works carried out by the Claimant contractor for the Defendant at her house in onshore Dubai. .
5. The works were carried out pursuant to a written agreement dated 18 November 2024. Of particular relevance to matters in respect of which the Defendant seeks permission to appeal in the agreement are:
(a) The contractual definitions of:
(i) Completion as “delivery to the site or installation for items the Contrator is supplying and carrying out works as per the line item descriptions on the Quotation, including any additionally approved Variations but excluding the remedying of any defects herein referred to as Snagging”;
(ii) “Snagging” as “the remedying of defects during the period immediately after completion where defects are rectified”;
(b) The original price for the works of AED 622,129.64 plus VAT;
(c) Clause 9 which provided for variations and contractual adjustments to the price;
(d) Clause 26 which provided for stage payments with:
(i) Stage 1 being 10% on signature of the Agreement;
(ii) Stage 2 being 25% three working days before commencement of the Works;
(iii) Stage 3 being 35% on completion of 30% of the Works;
(iv) Stage 4 being 20% on completion of 65% of the Works;
(v) Stage 5 being 5% on completion of 100% of the Works; and
(vi) Stage 6 being 5% on completion of Snagging;
(e) Clause 28 dealing with snagging which included a number of detailed provisions including that the client agreed to provide free access for the snagging works to be carried out within 2 days from the contractor that they have scheduled the works to commence;
(f) Clause 29 which permitted contractual notices to be issued by either party. In the case of the Defendant, she was entitled to issue a notice in the event that the Claimant failed to carry out the Works or make reasonable progress requiring the correction of the failure failing which she was entitled to employ other contractors to complete the Works; and
(g) Clause 34 which was a DIFC Courts jurisdiction dispute clause.
6. There were twelve variation lists such that the contract price increased to AED 1,042,497.70. The Defendant paid the invoices issued for Stages 1 to 4 but did not pay the invoices issued for Stages 5 (completion) and 6 (completion of snagging).
7. The Claimant maintained that completion took place on 29 July 2025. On that date, the Stage 5 invoice was issued and the Defendant issued a snagging list on the same date.
8. Following disagreements between the parties, the Claimant issued the Stage 6 invoice and issued proceedings on 26 September 2025 for payment of the Stage 5 and Stage 6 invoices. At that stage, the outstanding disagreements between the parties seemed relatively limited.
9. In her initial Defence served on 3 October 2025, the Defendant sought total deductions amounting to AED 116,573 which exceeded the sums claimed. She, accordingly, sought dismissal of the claim on the basis of a set off. At that stage, she did not issue a counterclaim.
10. Subsequently the Defendant issued a document entitled “Particulars of Counterclaim” on 6 January 2026 which sought dismissal of the claim together with payment of a total of AED 220,132 in respect of the Counterclaim
D. The Judgment
11. In the judgment, which runs to some 14 pages and 58 paragraphs, the Judge allowed the Claimant’s claim to the extent of AED 88,683.30 having made certain identified allowances from the sums claimed by the Claimant and dismissed the Counterclaim.
E. The Test for Permission to Appeal
12. The circumstances in which the Court of First instance may give permission to appeal, are strictly circumscribed by Article 21 of the DIFC Courts law No. 2 2025 which provides:
“21. Appeals Against Small Claims Tribunal Judgments
(a) Judgments of the Small Claims Tribunal may be appealed before the Courts of First Instance in accordance with the procedures established under the DIFC Laws, DIFC Regulations, Rules of the Courts or any Practice Direction or Order issued by the DIFC Courts, where the appeal relates to:
(i) A question of law
(ii) An allegation of a miscarriage of justice
(iii) An issue of procedural fairness; or
(iv) A matter provided for in or under DIFC Laws.”
13. There is no right to appeal on questions of fact. This is unsurprising given that hearings before the SCT are intended to be informal as set out in RDC 53.51 and that the strict rules of evidence do not apply as set out in RDC 53.53.
14. It is worth emphasising the important policy reasons which lie behind restrictions on rights of appeal from the SCT.
15. The SCT deals with monetary disputes where the amount at issue is below AED 500,000 (or, if the parties agree, up to AED 1,000,000). Although AED 500,000 is a substantial amount of money, it is also a sum which can very easily be spent on legal fees, if lawyers get involved in a dispute, relatively quickly.
16. Moreover, the parties to litigation will, even if unrepresented, spend very substantial time on disputes.
17. The SCT deliberately uses procedures which are designed to minimise time and cost and seek to ensure that judgments are issued relatively quickly. By doing so, it seeks to provide an independent and impartial adjudication service at a cost which is proportionate to the sums involved. It seeks to do so in a way which means that both parties do not inevitably lose simply from being involved in a legal dispute.
18. However, the informality and speed of the proceedings inevitably means that issues are not investigated as fully as they would be if the amounts in dispute were substantially larger. Furthermore, it may mean that more “mistakes” are made in the sense that, if much more time and expense were incurred it is at least possible that a Court could come to a different conclusion.
19. There are limited safeguards provided by the rules governing permission to appeal. These safeguards are, quite deliberately, limited. The Court is not permitted to grant permission on an issue of fact unless one of the other grounds for permitting permission is made out. The fact that an Appeal Court might have come to a different conclusion on an issue of fact is irrelevant. Permission cannot be granted on an issue of fact even if an Appeal Court considers that it is very likely that it would have come to a different conclusion. These restrictions are necessary to avoid parties expending disproportionate time and expense in investigating the issues.
20. The above considerations refer to all disputes. However, there is particular force in the policy considerations applying in relation to building disputes. Such disputes very often involve the consideration of large number of relatively minor items. Further expert evidence may, at least in theory, help to resolve some of these issues. The consequence is that the risk of disproportionate time and effort being involved in considering factual disputes is even greater than in other types of dispute.
21. All of the above analysis provides a strong incentive to parties to seek to settle their disputes amicably before going to court. It is often said that a good settlement involves both parties being dissatisfied with an outcome – but a settlement:
(a) Brings the dispute to an end and allows the parties to move on;
(b) Stops expenditure of time and energy on resolution of a dispute; and
(c) Removes uncertainty as to what a Court may do.
22. It is for this reason that the SCT Court procedures involve a compulsory consultation (RDC 53.21). That consultation is an opportunity for the parties to seek to come to a settlement. If they do not, the Court will resolve the matter for them but in a way which is necessarily uncertain to the parties and where there will be limited opportunity for further appeal.
F. The Grounds of Appeal
23. In the Permission to Appeal Application, four grounds were set out namely:
(a) Mischaracterisation of access and consequent misapplication of contractual clauses;
(b) Mischaracterisation of the Appellant’s position on completion and substantive defects;
(c) Procedural unfairness / error in approach to technical evidence; and
(d) Over-rigid application of the contractual notification time-bar to latent/ non apparent defects.
24. In the Reply to the Claimant’s response, the Defendant sought to add a fifth ground which she argued first namely “reliance on a claim expressly remove from the Counterclaim (procedural irregularity)”. Although this ground falls outwith the original application, I shall deal with it.
25. As a general matter the Defendant, who argued her case clearly and with precision, sought to suggest that she was not seeking to appeal questions of fact. Thus, in her Reply she stated:
“2.1 The Respondent repeatedly asserts that the appeal merely seeks a different view of the facts. That is not the Appellant's case. The Appellant's complaint is that the Tribunal's reasoning materially depended on incomplete or mistaken characterisation of the evidence, together with an unduly narrow treatment of the only technical evidence before it.
2.2 This is particularly significant in the SCT context. Proceedings are informal, strict rules of evidence do not apply, and the Tribunal is required to adopt a fair and pragmatic approach to evidential evaluation, particularly in technically complex disputes.”
26. I consider these paragraphs to be flawed. Mischaracterising evidence is making a mistake of fact as is treating expert evidence wrongly (whether narrowly or in some other way). Of course the SCT will seek to be fair. Further it is required to operate informally but that does not mean that there will be a ground of appeal if it makes an error of fact. In fact, the reverse is true for reasons I have sought to explain.
G. Alleged Reliance on a Withdrawn Claim
27. This was the first matter argued by the Defendant in her Reply and orally although it was not in the original grounds. The Defendant’s substantive complaint appeared to be that the Judge rejected a claim which she had already withdrawn and thus formed an adverse view of her credibility particularly as the Judge had noted that the Appellant’s position had escalated after proceeding commenced.
28. As to this ground:
(a) Paragraph 15 of the Judgment records that, before proceedings commenced, the parties had agreed deductions of AED 26,248 and the sole unresolved item was AED 25,000 in respect of drawings and regulatory approvals which she linked to alleged delays and losses;
(b) Paragraph 16 contains two sentences. The first said that after commencement of proceedings, the Defendant’s position escalated materially. This was true as is apparent from the original Defence which I have referred to above. This Defence alleged a set-off greater than the claim. The second sentence then referred to the filing of a counterclaim which sought AED 220,132. This was also correct – and represented a further escalation;
(c) The Defendant did not, in argument, identify any provision of the Judgment which wrongly set out her submissions;
(d) The Defendant did criticise paragraph 36 which rejected what was said to be “the approvals and delay claim”.
(e) Even assuming that the Defendant was not making any claim for delay:
(i) She did appear to be making a claim for wrongful approval of items;
(ii) The way in which her claim fitted together was far from completely clear; and
(iii) The rejection of a claim which was not pursued could hardly be said to be prejudicial;
(f) More fundamentally, the overall point made by the Judge – that the Defendant’s claim had escalated – was true and one which he was entitled to take into account in evaluating the evidence.
29. The second ground of appeal was a complaint that the Judge did not adequately deal with the facts concerning denial of access on the basis that there was no general denial of access but only to a specific subcontractor.
30. This ground is misconceived:
(a) Paragraph 14 of the Judgment records that the Defendant denied access to the carpentry subcontract principally on the basis of alleged misuse of a bathroom but also on the basis of alleged persistent substandard workmanship. This is factually accurate and accepted as such by the Defendant.
(b) Paragraph 26 records, again accurately that the Defendant accepted the restriction on the carpentry subcontractor but that she said this was proportionate and that she allowed the Claimant and other subcontractors on site.
(c) Paragraph 36 contains a finding by the Judge that denial of access to the carpentry subcontractor was the critical obstacle to the snagging process as the joinery items dominated the snag list.
(d) The Judge thus plainly understood the evidence and came to a conclusion on them as he was entitled to do. He considered and rejected the submissions that the Defendant now seeks to rely on.
H. Alleged Mischaracterisation of Practical Completion
31. The Defendant seeks to draw a distinction between what is referred to as “routine snagging and substantive defects”. As to this it is far from clear what consequence this is said to have but I consider that the Defendant’s complaints have, in any event, no substance to them:
(a) First, as set out above, there were in the contract, definitions of Completion and Snagging;
(b) Secondly the Defendant accepted that she entered into the villa and that the parties then entered into a snagging process
(c) On the face of it, this meant that the Claimant was entitled to payment of the Stage 5 invoice;
(d) I have identified the reasons the Judge gave for the failure of the snagging process already – there can really be no challenge to that;
(e) It is very difficult, from the material provided by the Defendant to identify any particular items where it was said that particular sums were due separate from the snagging process;
(f) In argument before me she confirmed that no items of rectification had been carried out; and
(g) In the circumstances, I do not consider that there is any validity in the proposed complaint or any monetary consequence.
I. Alleged Mistreatment of the Technical Reports
32. The Defendant alleges that the Judge treated the reports she had produced as non- determinative and relied on them selectively.
33. This ground is, again, misconceived. The Judge carefully recorded the evidential position including that the Claimant had adduced no expert evidence but that the Defendant had. He plainly took the reports into account in reaching his conclusions. However, he was not obliged to accept all of their conclusions and was entitled (arguably obliged) to consider other evidence. There is no merit in this ground.
J. Alleged Failure to Consider Latent and Non apparent defects
34. The Defendant complained that no adequate account was taken of defects which were latent or not fully apparent. The example she took in argument was alleged inadequate falls to the drainage in the main bathroom. However:
(a) This was only claimed under the heading tiling;
(b) It is very far from clear what complaint was made; and
(c) The Defendant confirmed she had not had any work carried out.
35. In the circumstances I do not consider that there was any unfairness or error by the Judge who necessarily had to proceed on the basis of the information before him
K. Conclusion
36. None of the grounds of appeal have a real prospect of success in respect of matters where appeals are permitted and permission for appeal is accordingly refused.
37. No request for any costs was made by the Claimant save that any court costs should be incurred by the Defendant. That order seems appropriate.
