Claim No: SCT 027/2026

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

PARKER

Claimant/Respondent/Appellant

and

PENELOPE

Defendant/Appellant/Respondent

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE

UPON the claim having been filed on 15 January 2026 (the “Claim”)

AND UPON the Judgment of SCT Judge Maitha AlShehhi (the “Judge”) giving judgment for the Claimant on 15 May 2026 (the “Judgment”)

AND UPON considering the Claimant’s Appeal Notice dated 2 June 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “Claimant’s Application for Permission to Appeal”)

AND UPON considering the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 2 June 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “Defendant’s Application Permission to Appeal”)

AND UPON considering the Claimant’s Response to the Defendant’s Permission to Appeal Application dated 16 June 2026

AND UPON considering the Defendant’s Response to the Claimant’s Permission to Appeal Application dated 29 June 2026

AND UPON a hearing having been held before H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere on 29 June 2026 with both parties in attendance

AND PURSUANT TO Part 4 and Part 53 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Claimant is granted permission to appeal in respect of:

2. The Claimant's Application for Permission to Appeal is dismissed in respect of:

3. The Defendant is granted permission to appeal in respect of:

4. The costs of the parties' Applications for Permission to Appeal shall be costs in the appeals.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
SCT Judge and Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 6 July 2026
At: 1pm

A. Introduction

5. Before the Court are two applications seeking permission to appeal (“Application for Permission to Appeal”) from the judgment of the Small Claims Tribunal (“SCT”) dated 15 May 2026.

6. The first application is brought by the Claimant, who seeks permission to appeal on four issues: accrued vacation leave, Provident Fund B, Article 19 penalties, and the omission of the certificate of employment.

7. The second application is brought by the Defendant, who seeks permission to appeal, limited to issues concerning entitlement to notice and the order requiring the Defendant to reimburse the Claimant’s SCT Court fees.

8. The Court is not determining the appeals. The question is whether each proposed ground has a real prospect of success or otherwise warrants appellate consideration.

9. The parties proceeded on the basis that permission should be granted where the proposed appeal has a realistic prospect of success, and that a real prospect means more than mere arguability but does not require a probability of success.

10. The SCT judgment ordered the Defendant to pay the Claimant USD 51,202.93, required the Defendant to notify the Court of the Claimant’s bonus payment by 15 June 2026, required the parties to cooperate in cancellation of the Claimant’s employment visa, and ordered the Defendant to pay the DIFC Courts’ filing fee of USD 1,024.05.

B. The Parties

11. The Claimant is Parker.

12. The Defendant is Penelope , a company registered in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

C. The Claimant’s Application for Permission to Appeal

D1 Accrued Vacation Leave

D 1.1 Statutory seven-day notice requirement

13. The Claimant contends that the Defendant did not comply with Article 29(2) of the DIFC Employment Law, which permits an employer to require an employee to take vacation leave on specified days only by giving at least seven days’ prior written notice. The Claimant submits that the direction required him to commence terminal leave on 1 December 2025, whereas the communication was sent to him only on 28 November 2025 at 7.00 pm, after working hours

14. The Defendant responds that the leave direction was contained in the non-renewal letter, that the Claimant did not object during the remaining period of employment, and that the relevant notice was sufficient because the Claimant had been informed of the requirement to take accrued leave before the employment ended on 1 January 2026.

15. The SCT held that it was not disputed that the Claimant received notice exceeding seven days. That conclusion is arguably open to challenge. Article 29(2) appears to be directed to notice before the vacation leave is required to commence, not notice before the termination or expiry date.

16. During the PTA Hearing, the Court explored with the Claimant whether his arguments about weekends, holidays and after-hours receipt were essential to the point; the essential point remains that the direction to take leave from 1 December 2025 was communicated on 28 November 2025, less than seven days before the stated commencement date.

17. The ground is not free from difficulty. It may be that the Defendant can establish that the direction was validly given or that the Claimant acquiesced in the leave arrangement. However, there is a real issue as to whether the Tribunal applied the statutory notice requirement to the correct date.

18. Permission to appeal is granted.

D 1.2 Contractual incorporation of Staff Rules

19. The Claimant relies on Article 8404 of the Defendant’s Staff Rules, which states that any notice period shall not run concurrently with any period of leave by the employee. The Claimant submits that those Staff Rules were incorporated into his Employment Contract and that the Tribunal erred in treating the Employment Contract as prevailing over an internal company policy without determining whether the Staff Rules were incorporated as contractual terms.

20. The Defendant responds that the point does not arise because the Claimant was employed under a fixed-term contract that expired on 1 January 2026, so no notice period applied. The Defendant also relies on Clause 9.4 of the Employment Contract, which reserves the Company’s right to require the employee to take outstanding annual leave during any period of notice

21. This ground has a real prospect of success. The Tribunal awarded the Claimant two months’ pay in lieu of notice, thereby proceeding on the basis that a contractual notice period was engaged.

22. The Tribunal also accepted that the Defendant could require the Claimant to take annual leave during that notice period. However, the Tribunal did not fully address the Claimant’s argument that the Staff Rules were incorporated into the contract and, if so, what effect should be given to the rule that notice and leave should not run concurrently.

23. It is therefore arguable that the Tribunal’s reasoning involved an incomplete contractual analysis.

24. Permission to appeal is granted.

D 1.3 Active duty and handover

25. This issue does not, on its own, demonstrate a real prospect of success. The Tribunal's conclusion that the Claimant had taken annual leave during the relevant period involved an evaluative finding of fact based on the documentary record and the parties' evidence. The Claimant relies on emails and clearance documents showing that he performed certain handover and administrative activities during the early part of December 2025. However, the existence of those activities did not compel a finding that the Claimant remained on active duty throughout that period or that the period could not properly be treated as annual leave or garden leave.

26. The evidence supported, at most, a mixed factual position. It was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the Claimant undertook limited handover obligations while nevertheless being on leave for the balance of the relevant period. The Tribunal's finding was reasonably available on the evidence before it. The Claimant has not identified any error of principle, misunderstanding of the evidence, or finding that was not open to the Tribunal.

27. In those circumstances, the proposed ground amounts principally to a challenge to the Tribunal's factual assessment and the weight it gave to the evidence. The Court is not satisfied that there is a real prospect of overturning the Tribunal's factual finding on appeal.

28. The point may nevertheless be relevant to the statutory notice and arithmetic grounds, because the fact and extent of any handover duties may bear upon the calculation of leave taken. For that reason, the factual material may be relied upon in connection with those grounds.

29. Permission to appeal is refused as a standalone ground.

D 1.4 Mathematical impossibility of leave utilisation

30. The Claimant argues that it was mathematically impossible for him to have exhausted 21 working days of accrued leave before 1 January 2026. He relies on weekends, public holidays on 1 and 2 December 2025, and the evidence that handover activities occurred during the first working days of December.

31. The Defendant’s response is that the Claimant was directed to take his accrued leave and did so before the expiry date.

32. This ground has a real prospect of success. The Tribunal concluded that the Claimant had utilised his annual leave but did not undertake a detailed calculation by reference to working days, weekends, public holidays and the actual period available after communication of the leave direction. The contractual entitlement was expressed in working days

33. The arithmetic point is distinct from the question whether the Defendant was entitled in principle to direct the Claimant to take leave. It raises an arguable question whether the Tribunal’s finding that all 21 working days were utilised was sustainable on the evidence.

34. Permission to appeal is granted.

D2 Provident Fund B

D 2.1 Redundancy exception

35. This ground has a real prospect of success. Rule 15(A)(1) directs attention to whether the termination occurred “for the cause of redundancy”. The Tribunal's reasoning appears to place significant weight on the fact that the non-renewal letter did not expressly refer to redundancy. It is reasonably arguable that the correct inquiry is not merely whether the term “redundancy” was used, but whether, viewed objectively and in substance, the Claimant’s employment ended because his position or services were no longer required. The statement in the non-renewal letter that the Claimant’s “services will no longer be required” can support that argument.

36. Although the issue involves an evaluation of the facts, the proposed appeal is not merely a challenge to the Tribunal's findings of fact. It raises an arguable question about the proper construction and application of Rule 15(A)(1), including whether the Tribunal was correct to place determinative weight on the absence of an express reference to redundancy in the non-renewal letter, or whether the inquiry required an objective assessment of the substantive reason for the termination. The proposed ground therefore raises an arguable mixed question of law and fact, suitable for appellate consideration.

37. That is not to say that the Claimant will succeed on the appeal. It remains reasonably open to conclude that the employment ended upon expiry of a fixed-term contract and not by reason of redundancy. However, the redundancy issue is sufficiently arguable to warrant appellate consideration.

D 2.2 Internal accounting records

38. The Claimant further relies on internal documents said to record calculations of Provident Fund B contributions and interest attributable to him. He contends that those documents constitute an admission by the Defendant that Provident Fund B was payable upon his departure.

39. The Defendant responds that the existence of accounting entries recording contributions to Fund Account B does not establish an entitlement to payment of those funds on termination. The Defendant submits that the Rules expressly contemplate that contributions may be accumulated while remaining subject to vesting conditions and forfeiture provisions, including the five-year service requirement.

40. Standing alone, this ground is weak. The fact that contributions were calculated, recorded or accumulated in Fund Account B does not necessarily establish that they had vested or become payable on termination. However, the accounting records may form part of the factual matrix relevant to the redundancy issue and may be relied upon in that context.

41. Permission to appeal is refused as a standalone ground.

D 3 Article 19 Late Payment Penalties

D 3.1 Pending dispute argument

42. The Claimant contends that the Tribunal erred in waiving penalties under Article 19(4)(a) on the basis that a dispute was pending before the Court. The Claimant says that the Defendant was not aware of the claim until after the statutory payment deadline had expired, and therefore could not rely on the existence of pending proceedings as an answer to its failure to pay.

43. The Defendant responds that Article 19(4)(a) turns on whether a dispute is pending in the Court regarding amounts due, not on when the employer became subjectively aware of the claim. The Defendant says that the Claimant filed the claim on 15 January 2026, the same day on which payment was due, and therefore the statutory waiver was engaged.

44. This ground does not have a real prospect of success. Article 19(4)(a) is expressed by reference to whether a dispute is pending in the Court. The Tribunal found that the Claimant filed the claim on the same day on which the Defendant ought to have paid the sums due, and that a dispute was therefore pending. The Claimant’s argument based on the Defendant’s knowledge of the filing does not answer the statutory language.

45. Permission to appeal is refused.

D 3.2 Withholding undisputed funds

46. The Claimant contends that, irrespective of any dispute about some components of his end-of-service entitlements, the Defendant wrongfully withheld admitted or undisputed sums, including Provident Fund A and ESOP redemption, and sought to condition payment on the Claimant signing a confirmation or release

47. The Defendant responds that the Claimant disputed the entirety of the final calculation, did not identify which elements he accepted, delayed in responding to the Defendant’s proposed computation, and then filed proceedings the following day. The Defendant says that the Claimant’s own unreasonable conduct was the material cause of non-payment within the meaning of Article 19(4)(b).

48. This ground has a real prospect of success. There is an arguable distinction between disputed entitlements and amounts which the Defendant accepted were payable. If the Defendant withheld admittedly payable amounts because the Claimant would not sign a document resolving or waiving broader claims, there is an arguable issue whether the Tribunal should have treated Article 19 differently, at least in relation to those undisputed sums.

49. The appeal may require consideration of whether particular sums were genuinely undisputed, whether the Defendant was ready and able to pay them without an impermissible condition, and whether the Claimant’s conduct was the material cause of non-payment.

50. Permission to appeal is granted.

B 3.3 Alleged unreasonable conduct

51. The Claimant also challenges the Defendant’s reliance on alleged unreasonable conduct by the Claimant as the cause of non-payment. The Defendant’s case was that the Claimant failed to cooperate with administrative and payment processes, disputed the entirety of the calculation, and gave the Defendant no opportunity to resolve matters before proceedings were commenced.

52. This issue substantially overlaps with the preceding ground concerning withholding of undisputed funds. To the extent that the Claimant says the Defendant could not rely on Article 19(4)(b), that argument may be advanced within the appeal on the withholding issue. It does not require separate permission as an independent ground.

53. Permission to appeal is refused as a standalone ground.

D 4 Certificate of Employment

54. The Claimant contends that the Tribunal failed to determine a specific pleaded remedy requiring the Defendant to issue a certificate of employment or work experience letter accurately reflecting the Claimant’s position, period of employment and duties performed. That relief was expressly sought in the amended claim form.

55. The SCT Judgment does not appear to address that pleaded relief.

56. This ground has a real prospect of success. A court should determine claims and remedies properly before it. The absence of any ruling on this requested relief is an arguable omission.

57. Permission to appeal is granted.

E The Defendant’s Application for Permission to Appeal

E 1 Notice entitlement and payment in lieu

58. The Defendant seeks permission to appeal the Tribunal’s finding that the Claimant was entitled to two months’ payment in lieu of notice. The Defendant contends that the Claimant’s employment was governed by a fixed-term contract which expired automatically on 1 January 2026, and that no notice was required on the expiry of that fixed term. The Defendant relies on Clause 2.1 and Clause 20.1 of the Employment Contract and on Article 62(6)(b) of the DIFC Employment Law

59. The Defendant also submits that Clause 20.2 applies only to termination during the fixed term, and not to non-renewal or expiry at the end of the contractual period. Alternatively, the Defendant says that even if notice was required, the Tribunal overstated the quantum because the non-renewal letter gave at least 36 calendar days’ notice.

60. The Claimant responds that the Employment Contract did not specify an automatic expiry date, did not state that employment would terminate without notice at the end of the initial two-year period, and expressly contemplated renewal or conversion to permanent employment. The Claimant further relies on Clause 20.2 as a general contractual notice provision requiring three months’ notice or payment in lieu.

61. The Claimant also relies on Article 14(i) of the DIFC Employment Law, which requires an employment contract to state whether it is for an indefinite duration or fixed-term period and, if fixed-term, the termination date. The Claimant submits that the absence of an express termination date and automatic expiry provision undermines the Defendant’s reliance on Article 62(6)(b).

62. This ground raises a substantial issue suitable for appeal. There is an arguable tension between the Tribunal’s conclusion that three months’ contractual notice was required and the Defendant’s case that the contract expired automatically at the end of a fixed term. The proper construction of Clauses 2.1, 20.1 and 20.2, and their relationship with Article

62 of the DIFC Employment Law, requires appellate consideration.

63. The alternative quantum argument is also arguable. If notice was required, there is a further issue as to whether the Tribunal was correct to credit the Defendant with only one month and award two months’ pay in lieu, or whether any different calculation should have been made by reference to the actual date and effect of the non-renewal letter.

64. Permission to appeal is granted.

E 2 Court fees

65. The Defendant also challenges the order requiring it to reimburse the Claimant’s SCT Court fee of USD 1,024.05. The Defendant submits that it succeeded on several heads of claim and that if it succeeds on the notice issue, the basis for the fee order will be materially affected.

66. The Claimant responds that he was the successful party at SCT level and obtained a monetary judgment in his favour, so the fee order was properly made.

67. This ground is weak if considered in isolation. However, it is properly arguable as consequential upon the Defendant’s challenge to the notice award. If the notice award were set aside or reduced, the SCT’s assessment of the appropriate fee order might require reconsideration.

68. Permission to appeal is granted on a consequential basis.

Conclusion

69. For the reasons above, the Court makes the following orders.

70. The Claimant is granted permission to appeal in respect of:

71. The Claimant's Application for Permission to Appeal is dismissed in respect of:

72. The Defendant is granted permission to appeal in respect of:

73. The costs of the parties' Applications for Permission to Appeal shall be costs in the appeals.