Claim No: SCT 946/2025

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

PEMBROKE

Claimant/Respondent

and

PALOMA

Defendant/Appellant

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ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE

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UPON the Judgment of H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser dated 14 July 2026 (the “Judgment) issued after the hearing before H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser on 2 July 2026 (the “SCT Hearing”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 28 July 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “Application for Permission to Appeal”)

AND UPON the hearing before H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere on 11 August 2026 with the Claimant and the Defendant’s representative in attendance (the “Hearing”)

AND UPON considering the documents on the case file

AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the Courts of the Dubai International Financial Centre (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Application for Permission to Appeal is dismissed.

2. There shall be no order as to costs.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
SCT Judge and Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 19 August 2026
At: 8am

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

A. Introduction

1. This is an application by the Defendant, Paloma (the “Appellant”), for permission to appeal against the judgment of H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser dated 14 July 2026 in SCT 946/2025. The Appellant applies pursuant to RDC 53.76 and seeks an order setting aside the SCT judgment in its entirety.

2. The Respondent, Mr Pembroke (the “Respondent”), engaged the Appellant to provide consultancy services in connection with an application under the Innovator Founder visa route. Pursuant to that engagement, the Respondent paid AED 35,224 in professional fees and GBP 1,500 in connection with the UK-related aspects of the engagement.

3. Following two unsuccessful endorsement applications, the Respondent sought repayment of the sums paid pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The Appellant disputed liability, contending, among other matters, that the services had been performed, the visa process had not reached the stage of a visa refusal, further steps remained available to the Respondent, and the GBP 1,500 had been paid to a third party rather than to the Appellant.

4. After a hearing on 2 July 2026, at which the Respondent appeared, but the Appellant did not, the Small Claims Tribunal (the “SCT”) entered judgment for the Respondent and ordered that the Appellant pay:

5. The Appellant subsequently filed an appeal notice and application for permission to appeal. The application was heard on 11 August 2026. At that hearing, the Appellant advanced five proposed grounds of appeal, namely:

6. For the reasons which follow, the Court is not satisfied that any of the proposed grounds disclose a real prospect of success, nor that there exists any other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard. Permission to appeal is therefore refused.

B. Applicable Principles

B1. Permission to Appeal

7. This application concerns permission to appeal from a judgment of the SCT.

8. Under RDC 53.91, permission to appeal may be given only where:

9. In determining whether the proposed appeal has a real prospect of success, the Court must have regard to the grounds upon which an appeal may be allowed under RDC 53.87. Under that rule, the Court will allow an appeal where the decision was:

10. A real prospect of success means a realistic, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of establishing one of those appellate grounds. It is insufficient that the Appellant disagrees with the decision, or that another conclusion might have been advanced before the SCT. The question is whether the proposed appeal has a real prospect of establishing that the SCT judgment falls within one of the grounds identified in RDC 53.87.

B2. Appeals are not a Rehearing

11. An appeal is not an opportunity for an unsuccessful party to reargue the case or invite the appellate court to conduct a general rehearing of the dispute.

12. Restraint is required where the proposed appeal challenges findings of fact or the SCT Judge’s assessment of the evidence. In such cases, the appellant must identify a realistic basis for establishing that the relevant finding was wrong, unsupported by the evidence, or otherwise affected by an appealable error.

13. Where the proposed appeal concerns contractual interpretation, the question is whether the appellant has a real prospect of establishing that the SCT Judge’s construction of the agreement was wrong. The fact that an appellant advances an alternative construction does not, without more, establish a real prospect of success.

B3. Procedural Irregularity

14. Where permission is sought on the basis of an alleged procedural irregularity, the relevant question is whether the proposed appeal has a real prospect of establishing that the SCT judgment was “unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings” within the meaning of RDC 53.87(2).

15. That requires the Court to consider two matters. First, whether the alleged irregularity arguably occurred. Secondly, whether there is a realistic basis for concluding that the alleged irregularity caused material unfairness or may have affected the outcome of the proceedings.

16. An appellant who complains that it was deprived of an opportunity to be heard must ordinarily identify the prejudice said to have resulted from that inability to participate. It is not sufficient merely to establish a procedural defect in the abstract. The appellant must demonstrate a realistic possibility that the alleged irregularity rendered the decision unjust.

B4. Adequacy of Reasons

17. A first instance judgment is not required to address every argument advanced by the parties or every item of evidence filed in the proceedings.

18. The requirement is that the judgment disclose, with sufficient clarity, the essential reasoning by which the judge reached the conclusions that were material to the disposition of the case.

19. The mere fact that a judgment does not refer expressly to every submission advanced by a party does not establish that the submission was overlooked or ignored.

B5. Approach to Present Application

20. The Court must therefore determine whether any of the proposed grounds disclose a real prospect of establishing that the SCT judgment:

21. If none of those grounds has a real prospect of success, the Court must also consider whether there is any other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard under RDC 53.91(2).

C. Ground 1: Alleged Procedural Irregularity

C1. Appellant’s Submissions

22. The Appellant submits that the SCT proceedings were affected by a serious procedural irregularity because he was deprived of the opportunity to participate in the hearing conducted on 2 July 2026.

23. The Appellant contends that he attempted to attend the remote hearing at the scheduled time but encountered technical difficulties which prevented him from accessing the hearing link and joining the proceedings. The Appellant submits that he remained available to participate and took steps to resolve the issue by contacting the Court Registry through a colleague.

24. The Appellant further submits that he provided evidence of those difficulties, including a screenshot showing its attempts to access the hearing. According to the Appellant’s representative, the Registry informed his colleague that the assigned Judge was engaged in another hearing and that a decision concerning the matter would be issued later.

25. The Appellant submits that it received no further notification concerning the hearing and was subsequently surprised to learn that judgment had been entered against it. It contends that the statement in the SCT judgment that the Defendant failed to attend the hearing despite being served with notice was factually incorrect because the Appellant had attempted to participate and its inability to do so was caused by circumstances beyond its control.

26. The Appellant argues that, by proceeding in its absence, the SCT deprived it of a fair opportunity to present oral submissions, explain its Defence, address the Respondent's allegations and draw attention to the documentary evidence it had previously filed. The Appellant submits that this constituted a denial of its right to be heard and a breach of procedural fairness.

27. The Appellant further submits that, had it been permitted to participate in the hearing, it would have explained its Defence, its response memorandum and the documents filed in support of its position, including its contentions that the Respondent had withdrawn from the application process, that the contractual refund provisions had not been engaged and that the GBP 1,500 payment was not recoverable from the Appellant.

28. Accordingly, the Appellant submits that the SCT judgment was reached following a materially unfair process and that this procedural irregularity gives rise to a real prospect of success on appeal.

C2. Assessment

29. I accept that the Appellant has advanced an arguable explanation for its non- attendance at the SCT hearing. The material filed in support of the application indicates that the Appellant had difficulty accessing the hearing link and that it subsequently sought assistance from the Registry. The Appellant's account was maintained during the permission hearing.

30. However, even assuming, in the Appellant's favour, that a technical difficulty prevented its participation in the hearing, that does not, without more, establish a real prospect of success on appeal. The Court must also consider whether the alleged irregularity arguably resulted in material unfairness or may have affected the outcome of the proceedings.

31. In this regard, an important consideration is that the Appellant had already filed:

32. The SCT judgment expressly records the substance of the Appellant's case. The SCT Judge identified the Appellant's contentions that:

33. The SCT Judge further stated that he had considered both the further defence and memorandum filed by the Appellant and had reviewed the documents and evidence contained on the court file.

34. During the permission hearing, the Appellant accepted that, had it participated in the SCT hearing, its oral submissions would have consisted substantially of explaining his Defence, his memorandum, and the documents already before the Court.

35. Even if the Court assumes in the Appellant’s favour that technical difficulties prevented its participation in the SCT hearing, the Appellant has not identified any error of fact or law in the SCT judgment that was arguably caused by that inability to participate. The Appellant has not pointed to any finding that may arguably have been different had it been heard orally, nor to any argument that was unavailable to the SCT Judge because of the Appellant’s absence.

36. The Appellant’s complaint is therefore not directed to any identifiable error in the judgment but to the fact of non-participation itself. However, an arguable procedural irregularity, without accompanying prejudice, is insufficient to establish a real prospect of success under RDC 53.91. The Appellant has not identified any finding of fact or conclusion of law that the SCT Judge may arguably have reached differently had oral submissions been made. Nor has the Appellant demonstrated a realistic possibility that the alleged irregularity affected the outcome of the proceedings.

37. Accordingly, even assuming in the Appellant’s favour that a procedural irregularity occurred, the Appellant has not demonstrated a real prospect of establishing that the SCT judgment was unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity within the meaning of RDC 53.87(2). Ground 1 therefore does not disclose a real prospect of success.

D. Ground 2: Alleged Failure to Consider the Appellant’s Evidence

D1. Appellant’s Submissions

38. The Appellant submits that the SCT Judge failed to properly consider the documentary evidence and written submissions that had been filed on its behalf.

39. The Appellant contends that the judgment was based substantially upon the Respondent's evidence and submissions and did not engage adequately with the Appellant's Defence, response memorandum or supporting documentation.

40. The Appellant submits that the SCT Judge failed to analyse or give proper weight to its contentions that:

41. The Appellant submits that the judgment does not demonstrate that those arguments and the evidence advanced in support of them were meaningfully considered. It argues that the absence of detailed reference to its evidence and submissions gives rise to an inference that they were overlooked or insufficiently considered.

42. The Appellant further submits that a proper consideration of its Defence and evidence would have led the SCT Judge to conclude that the Respondent was not contractually entitled to a refund and that the claim should have been dismissed.

43. Accordingly, the Appellant contends that the alleged failure to consider its evidence and submissions constituted a material error of law and procedure which affected the outcome of the proceedings and gives rise to a real prospect of success on appeal.

D2. Assessment

44. I am not persuaded that this ground discloses a real prospect of success.

45. The Appellant's submission proceeds on the premise that the SCT Judge failed to consider the Defence, response memorandum and supporting documents filed by the Appellant. However, that premise is inconsistent with the judgment itself. The SCT Judge expressly recorded the substance of the Appellant's position, including its contentions that it had performed the services under the agreement, that alternative immigration options had been offered to the Respondent, that no refund was payable, and that the GBP 1,500 had been paid to a third party rather than to the Appellant.

46. The SCT Judge further stated that he had considered the Defendant's further Defence and memorandum and that, after reviewing all documents and evidence submitted on the Court file, he would give judgment.

47. The mere fact that the SCT Judge did not accept the Appellant's contentions does not establish that those contentions were not considered. Nor is a judge required to refer expressly to every item of evidence or every submission advanced by a party. It is sufficient that the judgment demonstrates that the judge understood the competing cases and explains the essential reasoning which led to the conclusions reached.

48. During the permission hearing, the Appellant repeatedly asserted that the SCT Judge had failed to consider its evidence. However, when invited to identify where the judgment demonstrated such a failure, the Appellant was unable to point to any finding establishing that the Judge had overlooked the Defence or memorandum. Conversely, the judgment itself expressly refers to those documents and records that they were considered.

49. More fundamentally, the Appellant has not identified any specific finding of fact or conclusion of law that was reached because the SCT Judge failed to consider relevant evidence. Nor has the Appellant identified any document, submission or item of evidence which, if considered, may realistically have led to a different conclusion.

50. The Appellant’s complaint is therefore not that the SCT Judge overlooked some identified piece of evidence or failed to address a particular argument. Rather, the complaint amounts to an assertion that the SCT Judge should have attached greater weight to the Appellant’s evidence and should have reached different conclusions on the issues in dispute.

51. That is not sufficient to establish a real prospect of showing that the decision was wrong within the meaning of RDC 53.87(1), or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity within the meaning of RDC 53.87(2).

52. In the present case, the SCT Judge expressly considered the Appellant’s case and rejected it. The fact that the reasoning ultimately favoured the Respondent does not give rise to an arguable inference that the Appellant’s evidence was ignored.

53. Accordingly, Ground 2 does not disclose a real prospect of establishing any ground upon which an appeal could be allowed under RDC 53.87. Permission to appeal on this ground is therefore refused.

E. Grounds 3 and 5: Interpretation of the Agreement

E1. Appellant’s Submissions

54. Grounds 3 and 5 of the proposed appeal are closely related and may conveniently be considered together. Both grounds challenge the SCT Judge's interpretation of the parties' agreement and, in particular, the conclusion that the Respondent became entitled to a refund under Clause 7 following the refusal of the endorsement applications.

55. The Appellant submits that the SCT Judge erred in law by treating the rejection of the Respondent's business plan by the UK endorsing body as equivalent to a refusal of the visa application itself. According to the Appellant, endorsement is merely one stage in the wider visa application process and does not constitute a refusal of the visa for the purposes of Clauses 6 and 7 of the agreement.

56. The Appellant relies upon the terms of the agreement and, in particular, the provisions stating that:

57. The Appellant contends that the agreement was concerned with obtaining a visa rather than obtaining endorsement from an endorsing body and that the SCT Judge impermissibly expanded the scope of the refund provision by treating endorsement refusal as equivalent to visa refusal.

58. The Appellant further submits that the Respondent's visa application never reached the stage at which a visa application was submitted to, or determined by, the relevant immigration authorities. Rather, the endorsement process concluded unsuccessfully before the visa application stage was reached. On that basis, the Appellant submits that the contractual condition giving rise to a refund was never satisfied.

59. The Appellant also contends that the SCT Judge failed to consider or give effect to what it says was the contractual mechanism following rejection by the endorsing body. The Appellant submits that, following the initial rejection, the contract contemplated revision and resubmission of the business plan rather than termination of the engagement and repayment of the fees already paid. It points to evidence that additional business concepts were prepared, revised business plans were provided, further supporting material was requested, and alternative means of progressing the application were proposed.

60. The Appellant submits that the Respondent elected not to pursue those further steps and instead sought a refund while the process remained capable of continuing. According to the Appellant, the SCT Judge failed to properly consider the significance of that conduct in determining whether the refund provisions had been triggered.

61. Finally, the Appellant submits that the SCT Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding that the endorsement refusals rendered the application "unsuccessful" within the meaning of Clause 7. The Appellant argues that the judgment does not sufficiently explain how the contractual language was interpreted or why the distinction between endorsement refusal and visa refusal was rejected.

62. On that basis, the Appellant contends that the SCT Judge misinterpreted the agreement, extended the operation of the refund provisions beyond their proper scope, and thereby committed an error of law giving rise to a real prospect of success on appeal.

E2. Assessment

63. I am not persuaded that Grounds 3 and 5 disclose a real prospect of success.

64. The Appellant's primary complaint is that the SCT Judge erred in concluding that the Respondent's entitlement to a refund arose upon the failure of the endorsement process, notwithstanding that no formal visa application had been submitted to, or determined by, the immigration authorities.

65. In considering that issue, the SCT Judge carefully analysed the contractual provisions upon which both parties relied, including Clauses 5, 6 and 7 of the agreement. The SCT Judge recognised that Clause 7 required repayment where "the application remains unsuccessful" unless the circumstances fell within Clause 6. The Judge also considered the evidence concerning the endorsement process and the relationship between endorsement and the Innovator Founder visa route.

66. The SCT Judge found that the endorsement application was a mandatory prerequisite to the visa process and that, without a successful endorsement, the visa application could not proceed. The Judge further found that the Respondent's endorsement application had been rejected and that the rejection had subsequently been upheld on review. On that basis, the Judge concluded that the application had "remained unsuccessful" within the meaning of Clause 7.

67. The question on this application is not whether the Appellant can advance an alternative interpretation of the agreement. Plainly it can. The question under RDC 53.91 is whether the Appellant has a real prospect of establishing that the SCT Judge’s interpretation was wrong within the meaning of RDC 53.87(1).

68. In my view, the Appellant has not demonstrated such a prospect. Clause 7 refers to circumstances in which “the application remains unsuccessful”. It does not expressly confine the refund entitlement to circumstances in which a formal visa application has been refused by the immigration authorities. Nor does it expressly exclude the failure of a mandatory preliminary stage in the visa process.

69. The SCT Judge interpreted Clause 7 as extending to circumstances in which the mandatory endorsement stage failed, with the result that the visa application process could proceed no further. That interpretation was based upon the language of Clause 7 and the Judge’s finding that endorsement was an indispensable step in the Innovator Founder visa process.

70. The Appellant’s proposed appeal therefore depends upon establishing that the SCT Judge was wrong to conclude that an application which could not proceed beyond a mandatory endorsement stage had “remained unsuccessful” within the meaning of Clause 7. I am not persuaded that the Appellant has a real prospect of doing so. The Appellant has not identified any error of contractual principle or rule of construction which gives rise to a realistic prospect of establishing that the SCT Judge’s interpretation was wrong.

71. I also do not accept the Appellant’s submission that the SCT Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for his conclusion. The judgment addressed the relevant contractual provisions, the significance of the endorsement process, and the basis upon which the SCT Judge concluded that the refund obligation had arisen. The reasons were sufficient to enable the parties to understand why the decision was reached and to permit appellate review.

72. The Appellant further relies upon the Respondent’s alleged withdrawal from the process and refusal to pursue further resubmissions or alternative proposals. That submission depends upon the premise that Clause 7 had not already been triggered. The SCT Judge rejected that premise by finding that the application had remained unsuccessful once the endorsement process failed. Since the Appellant has not demonstrated a real prospect of establishing that this construction was wrong, the Respondent’s later refusal to pursue further proposals does not provide an independent basis for appellate intervention.

73. Grounds 3 and 5 therefore do not disclose a real prospect of establishing that the SCT judgment was wrong within the meaning of RDC 53.87(1), or wrong in relation to any other matter provided for or under law within the meaning of RDC 53.87(3). Permission to appeal on these grounds is therefore refused.

F. Ground 4: Recovery of GBP 1,500

F1. Appellant’s Submissions

74. The Appellant challenges the SCT Judge's order requiring repayment of the sum of GBP 1,500 in addition to the AED 35,224 paid under the parties' principal agreement.

75. The Appellant submits that the SCT Judge erred in finding that the GBP 1,500 formed part of the contractual engagement that was the subject of the proceedings. According to the Appellant, the payment was not made to the Appellant in Dubai pursuant to the agreement relied upon by the Respondent, but was instead paid separately to a UK entity in connection with a different immigration route.

76. In support of that contention, the Appellant relies upon correspondence referring to a payment of GBP 1,500 to its UK office and submits that the payment related to the Paulina ("Paulina") route rather than the Innovator Founder visa application which formed the principal subject of the parties' agreement.

77. The Appellant further submits that the GBP 1,500 was intended to be applied towards company registration and other UK-related services and was therefore distinct from the professional fees paid to the Appellant under the agreement.

78. The Appellant contends that, even if the Respondent became entitled to repayment of the AED 35,224 under Clause 7 of the agreement, it does not follow that the separate GBP 1,500 payment was recoverable from the Appellant. The Appellant argues that the SCT Judge failed adequately to distinguish between the contractual arrangements governing the two payments.

79. The Appellant also submits that the documentary evidence demonstrated that the GBP 1,500 was paid to a UK entity and not to the Appellant itself. Accordingly, the Appellant contends that the SCT Judge lacked a proper evidential basis for concluding that the payment formed part of the sums which the Appellant was obliged to refund.

80. On that basis, the Appellant submits that the SCT Judge erred in ordering repayment of the GBP 1,500 and that this aspect of the judgment gives rise to a real prospect of

success on appeal.

F2. Assessment

81. I am not persuaded that Ground 4 discloses a real prospect of success.

82. The Appellant's principal submission is that the GBP 1,500 payment was distinct from the parties' principal agreement and was paid to a UK entity in connection with a different immigration route. The Appellant therefore contends that, even if the Respondent became entitled to repayment of the AED 35,224, the SCT Judge erred in ordering repayment of the GBP 1,500.

83. The difficulty with the Appellant’s submission is that the SCT Judge was aware of, and expressly considered, the Appellant’s contention that the GBP 1,500 was paid to a third party rather than to the Appellant. The judgment records that contention before rejecting it and concluding that the payment formed part of the overall engagement between the parties.

84. The issue for present purposes is not whether another inference could have been drawn from the documents concerning the GBP 1,500. The question is whether the Appellant has a real prospect of establishing that the SCT Judge’s finding was wrong, unsupported by the evidence, or affected by an error of law within the meaning of RDC

85. I am not satisfied that the Appellant has demonstrated such a prospect. The contemporaneous correspondence concerning the GBP 1,500 was capable of being read as linking that payment to the broader immigration-related engagement between the parties, rather than as a wholly separate transaction for which the Appellant bore no responsibility.

86. The Appellant has not identified any legal principle which the SCT Judge misapplied in reaching that conclusion. Nor has it identified any contractual provision or decisive item of evidence which compelled the SCT Judge to treat the GBP 1,500 as falling wholly outside the parties’ overall arrangements.

87. In substance, Ground 4 challenges the weight that the SCT Judge attached to the documentary evidence and the factual inference drawn from that evidence. The Appellant submits that a different conclusion should have been reached. That is insufficient to establish a real prospect of showing that the decision was wrong within the meaning of RDC 53.87(1).

88. Accordingly, Ground 4 does not disclose a real prospect of establishing any ground upon which an appeal could be allowed under RDC 53.87. Permission to appeal on this ground is therefore refused.

G. Conclusion

89. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that any of the Appellant's proposed grounds disclose a real prospect of success.

90. Viewed individually and collectively, the proposed grounds seek substantially to reargue matters that were raised in the materials before the SCT and further developed before this Court on the permission application. They do not identify any arguable error of law, material error of fact, serious procedural irregularity rendering the judgment unjust, or other circumstance warranting appellate intervention.

91. Nor am I satisfied that there exists any other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard.

92. Accordingly, the Appellant has failed to satisfy either limb of the test for permission to appeal.

93. Permission to appeal is therefore refused.