(a) paragraph 3 of the Judgment is replaced with the following: “The Defendant shall reimburse the Claimant’s original DIFC Courts’ filing fee in the amount of AED 6,136.43”; and

(b) paragraphs 64 and 66 of the Schedule of Reasons are varied such that the Claimant’s original DIFC Courts’ filing fee is referred to as “AED 6,136.43” instead of “AED 6,316.43”.

(a) On 20 November 2024, the Claimant received an email from the Defendant saying that its account had been suspended, and a reserve had been placed on its funds (the “Funds”) to cover any potential disputes or chargebacks for 6 months.

(b) On 21 November 2024, the Defendant sent an email to the Claimant including the following:

(c) On 22 May 2025, the Defendant sent an email to the Claimant stating:

(d) On 20 July 2025, the Defendant informed the Claimants that it considered there to be an active “chargeback risk window” of 540 days from the date of each transaction. The Defendant stated that it would either (i) continue withholding the Claimant’s Funds until expiry of the full 540-day period; or (ii) release the funds only if the Claimant first provided extensive documentation for every transaction on hold, including each customer’s full name, transaction details, and supporting records. No documentation was provided by the Claimant.

(e) On 16 December 2025, after the Defendant continued to retain the Funds, the Claimant filed this Claim seeking payment of AED 125,928.20 held by the Defendant upon suspension of the account for more than the contractually agreed upon period of 180 days.

(f) On 14 January 2026, the third-party payment facilitator, Parks, confirmed by email to the Defendant that no refunds would be taken from the Defendant for disputes or complaints raised by customers related to the Claimant (the “Parks Email”).

(g) On 23 January 2026, the Defendant released back to the Claimant the Funds it held upon the suspension of the Claimant’s account, in the amount of AED 125,928.20.

(h) On 27 February 2026, the Claimant amended its claim to remove the claim for the principal amount, and to pursue interest and reimbursement of its Court filing fee, as further detailed below.

(a) Clause 5.6 of the Business Terms reads as follows:

(b) Clause 5.7 of the Business Terms provides as follows:

(c) Clause 6.7 provides for the Business to indemnify the Defendant against all losses, costs and expenses arising from chargebacks, and further provides:

(d) Clause 8.10 provides:

(a) Interest for the period that the Funds were retained by the Defendant beyond 180 days, pursuant to Articles 17 and 18 of DIFC Law No. 7 of 2005. Interest was claimed at 9% pursuant to Articles 39(1) and (2) of DIFC Court Law No. 10 of 2004 which provides that damages carry interest "at such rate as is fixed by the Rules of Court; or at such lower rate as the DIFC Court determines is just in the circumstances".

(b) The Claimant’s Court filing fee, on the basis that the Defendant acted unreasonably in failing to release the Claimant’s Funds until January 2026, after the Claimant had issued proceedings before the SCT.

(a) The Defendant acted in compliance with Clauses 5.6 and 5.7 of the Business Terms, and the Claimant was informed of the suspension and the reason for it.

(b) Although Clause 5.7 of the Business Terms provides for a reserve for 180 days, the provision also states that the Claimant is bound by the Scheme Rules. The 540-day window applied by Prudence is consistent with chargeback and dispute timelines under the Applicable Scheme Rules, in particular for transactions processed via third-party payment facilitators such as Tabby. The Defendant legitimately held the Funds for 429 days during which period it considered there to be an active and significant risk of payment disputes, as was clearly communicated to the Claimant. The Funds were then released once necessary risk assessments were completed internally and with Tabby.

(c) As communicated to the Claimant in the Defendant’s email of 22 May 2025, the Defendant was prevented by UAE laws and regulatory requirements from disclosing the specific reason for the suspension.

(a) The crux of the dispute between the parties was whether the Defendant was entitled to extend the reserve period for the Funds beyond 180 days up to 540 days, and whether interest and Court fees are payable as a result.

(b) Clause 5.7 permits the Defendant to hold funds for up to 180 days, or for a longer period if such longer period is required by the applicable Scheme Rules, law, regulation or a competent authority, where the circumstances outlined in Clause 5.6 arise. The issue is whether the Defendant established, by evidence, that a 540-day reserve was required by any applicable Scheme Rule, law, regulation or competent authority.

(c) The Defendant did not place before the Court the relevant Scheme Rules, regulatory requirement, competent authority direction, or contractual provision with Tabby which required a 540-day reserve in this case. The Court therefore could not verify the asserted basis for the extended hold of the Funds.

(d) The Defendant’s email of 22 May 2025 referred generally to the nature of the transactions, account activity, the elevated risk profile, internal reserve policies, and card scheme and regulatory guidelines. However, that email did not identify the specific Scheme Rule, law, regulation or competent authority requirement said to require a 540-day hold, and the Defendant did not produce such evidence to the Court.

(e) In relation to the Defendant’s request to the Claimant for invoices and identification documentation, the Judgment noted that those documents were only requested in July 2025, after the expiry of the initial 180 day reserve period, whereas the decision to extend the reserve period was communicated to the Claimant in May 2025. The Defendant’s request therefore did not justify the extension decision.

(f) The Defendant failed to submit prior emails from Parks preceding the Parks Email which would justify extending the timeframe for the Defendant’s withholding of the Claimant’s Funds.

(g) On the basis of the above, the Court held that the Defendant failed to establish that it was contractually entitled to extend the reserve period from 180 days to 540 days.

(h) In relation to the Defendant’s email to the Claimant of 21 November 2024, the Judgment held that the Defendant failed to reserve its right to extend the 180 day period, and failed to mention that the period might be extended under other applicable laws or scheme rules.

(i) On the basis of the Court’s finding that the Defendant was entitled to withhold the Funds for the initial 180 day period, but not beyond that, the Court held that the Claimant was entitled to interest on the Funds from 18 May 2025 until payment. The Court saw “no sufficient reason” to apply a lower rate than the standard rate of 9%, and therefore applied an interest rate of 9% per annum on a simple basis.

(j) The Court held that the standard rule in the SCT is that the successful party may recover the Court fee paid, and awarded the Defendant the Claimant’s original DIFC Courts’ filing fee on the basis that the Claimant “substantially succeeded” in its amended claim.

(a) Ground 1: Construction of Clause 5.7 of the Business Terms wrong as a point of law. The Defendant submits Clause 5.7 cannot require that the words “or for any longer period required by those Scheme Rules” are deprived of practical effect unless the relevant card network or payment scheme is placed in evidence by the Defendant in every case, and such a construction is inconsistent with Clause 6.7 under which the parties agreed that the applicable chargeback windows are set externally to the Business Terms by relevant payment networks and partners. Further, the 540-day outer limit is the recognised industry standard for the reserve of funds, and the learned Judge failed to give the 14 January 2026 Tabby Email sufficient weight.

(b) Ground 2: Finding that the Defendant “failed to reserve its right to extend” in its 21 November 2024 email was wrong as a point of law; alternatively constitutes a serious procedural irregularity. The learned Judge issued a finding of waiver, variation or estoppel which is wrong in law because the Business Terms contain an express “no-waiver” provision, as well as an entire agreement and amendment provision providing that no amendment is binding on the Defendant unless in writing and signed. Further, the Claimant did not advance a claim in waiver, variation or estoppel. A customer service email summarising the default 180-day position, which was not a signed written waiver and did not purport to amend the parties’ agreement, could not deprive the Defendant of its express contractual right under Clause 5.7.

(c) Ground 3: Award of interest in the Judgment wrong as a point of law. The Defendant submits that the Claimant is not entitled to interest pursuant to Clause 8.10, and Articles 17 and 18 of DIFC Court Law No. 7 of 2005 fall to be applied consistently with the parties’ bargain under the Business Terms. Further, the Judgment stated that there was “no sufficient reason to apply a lower rate”, without engaging with the Defendant’s submissions that a lower rate than 9% was just in the circumstances because the withholding of the Funds was conducted in good faith pursuant to a genuine risk-management process; the Defendant repaid the full principal to the Claimant voluntarily in January 2026 upon the Parks Email without the need for a contested hearing or judgment; and the Claimant’s failure to comply with the Defendant’s document requests in July and August 2025 contributed materially to the duration of the withholding of the Funds.

(d) Ground 4: the award of costs was wrong in law and in principle. The Claimant sought AED 6,136.43 and was awarded AED 6,316.43, which exceeds the sum pleaded and evidenced. Further, the learned Judge proceeded on the basis that a successful party before the SCT recovers its court fee which the Defendant submits is wrong, in reliance on RDC 53.70 (which the Court assumes to be a mistaken reference to RDC 53.79). RDC 53.79 provides that the SCT may order a party to a small claim to pay such part of the other party’s court or tribunal fees as it considers appropriate, and further costs only where a party has behaved unreasonably, with the discretion to be exercised on the facts of the case, and not applied as a default rule of recovery. The learned Judge failed to take into account the Claimant’s conduct and mischaracterised the proceedings since:

1. a question of law;

2. an allegation of a miscarriage of justice;

3. an issue of procedural fairness; or

4. a matter provided for in or under DIFC Laws.

(1) wrong

(2) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings; or

(3) wrong in relation to any other matter provided for or under any law.

(1) the Court considers that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or

(2) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

(a) Ground 1: Construction of Clause 5.7 of the Business Terms wrong as a point of law. Clause 5.7 is clear in its terms that should the Defendant wish to retain a client’s funds for more than 180 days where clause 5.6 applies, then this must be “required” by the applicable Scheme Rules or by law, regulation or a competent authority. If the Defendant wishes to rely upon the longer period provided in this clause, it must establish with evidence that it is entitled to do so. I see no prospect of an appeal court interfering with the learned Judge’s finding that the Defendant failed in meeting that burden before the SCT by relying on the Parks Email and referring to a “standard” 540 day period, with no further evidence.

(b) Ground 2: Finding that the Defendant “failed to reserve its right to extend” wrong as a point of law; alternatively constitutes a serious procedural irregularity. Whilst the Judgement referred to the Defendant’s email of 21 November 2024 and held that “the Defendant failed to reserve its right to extend the period and failed to mention that the period might be extended under other applicable laws or scheme rules”, the determinative finding in the Judgment was that the Defendant had not established that it was entitled to extend the 180 day period, regardless of the contents of the 21 November 2024 email. This ground of appeal, even if made out, would not have any impact on the ultimate outcome that the Defendant was not entitled to hold the Funds beyond 22 May 2025, leading to a finding that the Claimant was entitled to interest from that date until payment of the Funds was made.

(c) Ground 3: Award of interest in the Judgment wrong as a point of law. It bears mentioning that DIFC Court Law No. 10 of 2004, under which the Claimant claimed interest, has been repealed. However, the Court may order pre-judgment interest pursuant to RDC 36.32 and the standard rate applied is 9% (see eg. Nest Investments v Deloitte & Touche (ME) [2020] DIFC TCD 003 (13 September 2021)). I see no prospect of a successful appeal on the ground that the learned Judge did not engage with the Defendant’s submissions that a lower rate than 9% was justified. Firstly, the Defendant is precluded from relying on Clause 8.10 of the Business Terms on appeal, as it did not raise this point at first instance. However, in any event, I do not foresee any prospect of an appeal court finding that clause 8.10 would apply in circumstances where the Defendant withheld the Claimant’s Funds without contractual justification. Further, I foresee no prospect of an appeal court interfering with the learned Judge’s discretionary finding that there was “no sufficient reason” to apply a lower rate than the standard rate of 9%. Pursuant to RDC 53.58, a SCT Judge must give reasons briefly and simply as the nature of the case requires, and the learned Judge considered whether a lower rate was justified before concluding it was not.

(d) Ground 4: the award of costs was wrong in law and in principle. There is a clear minor error in the Judgment, where the Claimant was awarded AED 6,316.43, instead of the Court filing fee it sought of AED 6,136.43. This can be corrected, as set out in paragraph 16 below. In relation to the Judge’s award of the Claimant’s filing fee, the Judge held that “the standard rule in the SCT is that the successful party may recover the Court fee paid” (emphasis added). It is not clear that this is inconsistent with RDC 53.79 which provides that “the SCT may order a party to a small claim” (emphasis added) to pay “such part of any Court or Tribunal fees paid by that other party as the SCT may consider appropriate”, albeit that the general rule set out at RDC 53.79 is that each party shall bear its own costs. However, and in any event, the learned Judge exercised her discretion in finding that the Claimant was substantially successful in its claim and that it was entitled to its Court filing fee for commencing its claim before the SCT. I see no prospect of an appeal court interfering with the Judge’s discretion in this regard.

(a) paragraph 3 of the Judgment be varied to state: “The Defendant shall reimburse the Claimant’s original DIFC Courts’ filing fee in the amount of AED 6,136.43”; and

(b) paragraphs 64 and 66 of the Schedule of Reasons be varied such that the Claimant’s original DIFC Courts’ filing fee is referred to as “AED 6,136.43” instead of “AED 6,316.43”.