Claim No: ARB 034/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

OHTLI

Claimant/Applicant

and

ONORA

Defendant/Respondent

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI

UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 22 December 2025 (the “December Order”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Appeal Notice dated 12 January 2026 for permission to appeal the December Order, limited to costs (the “PTA Application”)

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 28 January 2026 (the “Costs Order”)

AND UPON reviewing Respondent’s submissions in opposition to the PTA Application dated 2 February 2026

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. ARB-034-2025/4 dated 12 February 2026, seeking a stay of the payment obligation under the Costs Order until determination of the PTA Application, alternatively, permission to pay the amount owed by the Costs Order into Court (the “Stayed Costs Application”)

AND UPON review of the Defendant’s evidence in answer to the Stayed Costs Application dated 17 February 2026

AND UPON review of the Claimant’s evidence in reply to the Stayed Costs Application dated 18 February 2026

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The PTA Application is dismissed.

2. The Stayed Costs Application is granted insofar as the interest on the costs awarded by paragraph 3 of the December Order, as quantified by the Costs Order, shall be suspended from 12 January 2026 until the date of this Order.

3. The Applicant shall pay the Respondent’s cost of the PTA Application. The Respondent shall submit their statement of costs not exceeding 2 pages within 5 days of this Order.

4. There shall be no order as to costs in respect of the Stayed Costs Application.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 27 February 2026
At: 9am

Introduction

1. This is a PTA Application made by the Claimant pursuant to RDC 44.6, seeking permission to appeal in respect of costs only, namely paragraph 3 of the December Order, by which the Claimant was ordered to pay the Defendant’s costs of the Application to set aside the interim anti-suit injunction (the “Set-Aside Application”) on the standard basis.

2. For the reasons set out below the PTA Application is dismissed.

Background

3. The factual background to the proceedings, the procedural history, and the Court’s reasons for discharging the ASI Order are set out in previous Orders and are not repeated here.

4. The subsequent assessment and quantification of the Defendant’s recoverable costs in the amount of USD 37,897.70 are set out in the Costs Order and are likewise not repeated.

5. I will proceed on the basis of those Orders.

The PTA Application

6. The Claimant submits that the PTA Application is confined to costs. The Claimant expressly states that it does not, at this stage, seek to re-open the substantive decision to discharge the interim anti-suit relief, save to the limited extent that it contends the earlier interim relief and related matters are material to the exercise of the Court’s costs discretion.

7. The Claimant advances five grounds, in substance contending that: (i) the Court failed to address alleged procedural default and prejudice; (ii) the “event” was wrongly identified; (iii) insufficient account was taken of the interim order and alleged breach of the arbitration agreement; (iv) reserved costs were not determined; and (v) reasons were inadequate and the outcome procedurally unfair.

8. The rule under RDC 44.19 is as follows:

9. Where the decision under challenge concerns a discretionary costs order, particularly one closely connected to case management and the evaluative assessment of what is just in all the circumstances, I will apply the threshold with appropriate discipline.

10. In addition, where an application is made to appeal a costs outcome in circumstances where costs have already been assessed and quantified following a standard basis assessment, the case for permission is, as a matter of practical reality and proportionality, even more exacting.

Discussion & Analysis

Ground 1

11. The Claimant contends that the Set-Aside Application and/or supporting materials were filed or served late and in a manner said to have caused prejudice, and that this was not addressed in the Costs Order.

12. I reject the submission that this ground establishes a real prospect of success. The complaint is, in substance, a disagreement with how case-management and procedural matters were handled.

13. Even assuming that there was some degree of lateness or procedural imperfection, it does not follow that the costs conclusion was wrong in principle. The costs discretion is not a mechanistic sanction for lateness. It requires a broad evaluative judgment as to what is just, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

14. The Claimant does not demonstrate that any alleged procedural default was of such a nature or degree as to compel a different costs outcome, or that my conclusion fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes. Nor does the Claimant identify any concrete prejudice in the conduct of the hearing that renders the costs decision unjust.

15. This ground accordingly discloses no arguable error of principle and no real prospect of success.

Ground 2

16. The Claimant submits that the Court wrongly identified the “event” as the Defendant’s success on the Set-Aside Application, contending that the Claimant’s earlier interim success should have driven the costs outcome.

17. I reject this ground as unarguable. The Set-Aside Application and the return date hearing constituted the inter partes determination of whether the interim anti-suit relief should continue. I determined that issue against the Claimant, discharged the interim relief, and granted the Defendant’s application.

18. In those circumstances, it was plainly open to me to treat the relevant “event” for costs purposes as the outcome of the inter partes application being decided at that stage. Interim ex parte relief is provisional by nature. When it is later discharged on an inter partes return date, it does not become the controlling “event” for costs on the set-aside/return date application.

19. The Claimant’s argument is an invitation to re-balance the discretionary factors and to substitute a different view as to what the “event” should be. This ground does not satisfy RDC 44.19.

Ground 3

20. The Claimant relies on the fact that interim anti-suit relief was granted and on the Claimant’s contentions regarding the Defendant’s conduct, arguing these should have materially affected the costs outcome.

21. This ground also fails to disclose a real prospect of success. My decision on the return date turned on whether continued injunctive relief was appropriate and necessary in light of the procedural position as it stood at that time. I decided it was not and discharged the order.

22. It is not an error of principle that the costs consequence followed the outcome of the Set-Aside Application. The Claimant’s submission again amounts to disagreement with the discretionary evaluation. It does not identify any misdirection of law, nor any failure so fundamental as to render the costs decision unjust.

Ground 4

23. The Claimant submits that costs said to have been reserved in earlier orders were not determined.

24. The costs were reserved because the applications were of an interim and preliminary nature, and it was appropriate for any costs determination to await the Court’s assessment at the return date hearing as to whether the relief should be continued. The reservation of costs did not amount to a final or conclusive determination but reflected the provisional character of the earlier applications.

25. Even if there were outstanding reserved costs that point does not demonstrate an arguable error in the costs order made in paragraph 3 of the December Order concerning the Set-Aside Application.

26. If any reserved costs remain to be addressed, the proper course is to pursue the appropriate procedural mechanism within the proceedings for determination of those reserved costs, rather than to pursue a costs-only PTA seeking to reconfigure the overall costs landscape through appellate intervention.

27. This ground therefore does not satisfy RDC 44.19.

Ground 5

28. The Claimant submits that the reasons were inadequate and the outcome procedurally unfair.

29. I reject this ground. The December Order sets out the outcome on the Set-Aside Application and the discharge of the interim relief, together with the Court’s reasoning for that outcome. Against that context, the costs consequence following the successful party on the application was a standard exercise of discretion.

30. The subsequent Costs Order dated also demonstrates that the costs outcome has been subject to a further judicial assessment of reasonableness and proportionality on the standard basis. That reinforces that the process was fair and judicial, and it further undermines any suggestion of procedural injustice.

31. No procedural unfairness is shown. No real prospect of success is established.

32. The Claimant also contends that there are compelling reasons for the appeal to be heard. The Court does not accept that submission.

33. The proposed Application is confined to costs and seeks to invite appellate re-evaluation of discretionary matters already determined and, thereafter, assessed and quantified. The substantive dispute is proceeding in arbitration. There is no compelling reason to permit a PTA over costs in these circumstances.

Conclusion

34. The PTA Application does not meet the threshold in RDC 44.19. The PTA Application has no real prospect of success, and there is no other compelling reason to grant permission.

35. The PTA is therefore dismissed.

36. For the avoidance of doubt, interest on the costs awarded by paragraph 3 of the December Order, as quantified by the Costs Order dated 28 January 2026, shall be suspended from 12 January 2026 until the date of this Order.