March 11, 2026 court of first instance - Orders
Claim No. CFI 009/2024
IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
AMITESH GAHLOWT AMAR NATH SINGH
Claimant
and
COINVESTING CAPITAL LIMITED
Defendant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE SAPNA JHANGIANI
UPON the Judgment of H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani dated 30 October 2025 (the “Judgment”), issued following the trial of this matter from 23 to 25 June 2025 (the “Trial”)
AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and the Defendant’s representatives at the Case Management Conference before H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani on 21 January 2026 which included discussion of the remaining substantive issues to be determined in this case (the “Remaining Issues”)
AND UPON the Order of H. E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani dated 27 January 2026 setting out the Remaining Issues and ordering the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of USD 190,586.00 within 14 days (the “January Order”)
AND UPON reviewing the Claimant’s written submissions dated 4 February 2026 on the Remaining Issues, with accompanying particulars of interest dated 6 February 2026
AND UPON the Defendant being directed to file written submissions on the Remaining Issues in response to the Claimant’s written submissions, but electing not to do so
AND UPON DIFC Law No. 2 of 2019, as amended (the "Employment Law")
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Defendant shall pay to the Claimant within 14 days the sum of USD 95,572.88 in respect of a penalty pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Employment Law.
2. Simple interest at the rate of 9% shall apply to all sums ordered to be paid to the Claimant by the Defendant in this Order and in the January Order, from the date that payment is due.
Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 11 March 2026
At: 1pm
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
Introduction
1. This Order with Reasons is to be read in conjunction with the Judgment, which sets out the background to this case and to the Remaining Issues.
2. The Remaining Issues to be determined are as follows:
Penalty
1. Is the Defendant liable in principle to pay a penalty equal to the Claimant’s daily wages for each day in arrears (Article 19(2) Employment Law)?
2. If the answer to the previous issue is ‘yes’, should the penalty be waived for a period (and if so for which period) on the basis that:
2.1 There has been/is a dispute pending in the Court regarding any of these amounts due to the Claimant (Article 19(4)(a) Employment Law)?
2.2 The Claimant has acted unreasonably with the result that he has not received any of these amounts due from the Defendant (Article 19(4)(b) Employment Law)?
Financial Relief
3. Having regard to the Court’s findings, what further sums (if any) should the Defendant be ordered to pay the Claimant? Without prejudice to the generality of that (and without addressing issues already fully determined by the Court)?
4. What penalty should the Defendant pay pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Employment Law?
5. What interest is due on any financial relief ordered in favour of the Claimant by the Court (Article 118 Contract Law, Article 17 Law of Damages and Remedies DIFC Law No. 7 of 2005 and/or Practice Direction No. 4 of 2017)?
Court’s Decision
Penalty
3. Article 19 of the Employment Law provides as follows:
(a) all Remuneration, excluding, where applicable, any Additional Payments deferred in accordance with Article 18(2);
(b) where applicable, any Gratuity Payment that accrued prior to the Qualifying Scheme Commencement Date under Article 66(1) not transferred to a Qualifying Scheme under Article 66(6);
(c) a Daily Wage for each day of accrued Vacation Leave not taken; and
(d) all outstanding amounts due in respect of the Employee under Article 66(7) not yet paid to a Qualifying Scheme.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Article 19(3) and 19(4), an Employee shall be entitled to and the Employer shall pay a penalty equal to an Employee’s Daily Wage for each day the Employer is in arrears of its payment obligations under Article 19(1).
(3) A penalty pursuant to Article 19(2) may only be awarded to an Employee if the amount due and not paid to the Employee in accordance with Article 19(1) is held by a Court to be in excess of the Employee's Weekly Wage.
(4) A penalty pursuant to Article 19(2) will be waived by a Court in respect of any period during which:
(a) a dispute is pending in the Court regarding any amount due to the Employee under Article 19(1); or
(b) the Employee's unreasonable conduct is the material cause of the Employee failing to receive the amount due from the Employer.”
The Judgment found that the Claimant is entitled to be paid his outstanding salary and DEWS contributions from 11 June 2021 until 11 August 2023, and that he is also entitled to be paid one month’s Wages (as defined in the Employment Law) in lieu of his notice period, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Employment Law. The January Order ordered payment by the Defendant to the Claimant of these amounts.
4. It is not disputed that the Defendant did not pay the Claimant his outstanding dues under Article 19(1) of the Employment Law within 14 days of the termination of his employment with the Defendant on 11 August 2023. Therefore, in principle, the Defendant is liable in principle to pay a penalty equal to the Claimant’s daily wages for each day in arrears pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Employment Law.
5. Article 19(4) provides that a penalty pursuant to Article 19(2) will be waived by a Court in respect of any period during which (i) a dispute is pending in the Court regarding any amount due to the Employee under Article 19(1) (sub paragraph (a)); and (ii) the Employee’s unreasonable conduct is the material cause of the Employee failing to receive the amount due from the Employer (sub paragraph (b)).
6. The Defence pleaded both limbs of Article 19(4), but at Trial, the Defendant did not lead evidence to support any argument under Article 19(4)(b) of the Employment Law.
7. In relation to Article 19(4)(a), several cases have proceeded before this Court on the basis that the time of issuing proceedings is the relevant trigger for the penalty under Article 19(4)(a) to be waived. However, the Claimant argues that there was only a “dispute pending before the Court” as to the Claimant’s entitlements under Article 19 upon service of the Defence, and that the correct date for the waiver to commence pursuant to Article 19(4) is therefore 16 July 2024.
8. The Claimant seeks to substantiate its position by arguing that, despite repeated correspondence form the Claimant and his solicitors seeking to be paid, including a formal demand in the Claimant’s resignation letter, and then in a full letter of claim, there was no “substantive or coherent” response from the Defendant until the service of its Defence.
9. The Claimant relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Expresso Telecom Group Ltd v Rahamtalla [2022] DIFC CA 002 (2 September 2022) at [69] (with emphasis added):
“(1) The employer is under a statutory obligation under Article 19 to pay, within 14 days of termination, all remuneration and any gratuity payment that has accrued prior to the Qualifying Scheme Commencement Date under Article 66(1) not transferred to a Qualifying Scheme under Article 66(6).
(2) The employer’s obligation to pay remuneration under Article 19(1) is not the source of the employee’s entitlement to that remuneration. That must come from the employment contract or perhaps some other statutory source. It is not in dispute that the Respondent had an entitlement to accrued annual leave. The Respondent having such an entitlement, the Appellant was obliged to pay it within 14 days.
(3) The source of the entitlement to the End of Service Gratuity will not be found in Article 19. It will be found in Article 66. The Appellant’s obligation to pay it within 14 days of termination was imposed by Article 19(1)(b). The contractual and statutory entitlements were not extinguished by the Appellant’s assertion of a counterclaim. If the Appellant had commenced court proceedings disputing the Respondent’s entitlement to the accrued leave and gratuity, then the waiver provisions of Article 19(4) would have been engaged. But the counterclaim did not dispute the amounts due to the Respondent in that respect.”
10. The Claimant argues that the Court of Appeal’s conclusion in the Expresso Telecom Group case correctly turns on the Court’s analysis of what the Defence and Counterclaim did and did not put in issue. Further, that it must therefore follow that the question of whether there is a dispute over sums due under Article 19(1) of the Employment Law “pending in the court” falls to be resolved upon sight of the Defence (at least where there is a dispute about whether there is a dispute), such that the waiver under Article 19(4) is triggered from the Defence. In any event, the Claimant submits that in this case, there only came to be a dispute “pending before the Court” upon service of the Defence.
11. I do not accept the Claimant’s creative reading of Expresso Telecom Group as authority for the proposition that whether a dispute is “pending” before this Court must be determined upon sight of the Defence, and I reject the Claimant’s submission. The crux of the decision in that case was that certain entitlements due to the employee by the employer were admitted, and had never been disputed, such that the waiver under Article 19(4)(a) was not engaged.
12. Turning to the facts of this case, the Claimant’s resignation letter and pre-action correspondence refer to the Defendant’s refusal to make any payments to the Claimant; the Defendant’s assertions that the Claimant was not employed by the Defendant; and the Claimant’s attempts to resolve the situation amicably. To my mind, there can have been no doubt by the time proceedings were issued that the entitlements due to the Claimant were disputed by the Defendant. That dispute was pending before this Court as soon as proceedings were issued by the Claimant. I therefore find that the waiver under Article 19(4) was triggered on the date these proceedings were commenced.
Financial Relief
Penalty Amount
13. The penalty to be paid by the Defendant to the Claimant commences from 25 August 2023, being 14 days after the termination of his employment, and is waived from the date these proceedings were issued, being 9 February 2024.
14. The total penalty payable is therefore USD 95,572.88, calculated as follows:
(a) Daily Wage: USD 565.52; and
(b) Calculation period: 25 August 2023 to 9 February 2024 (172 days).
Pre-Judgment Interest
15. The Claimant claims interest on unpaid wages, and other sums the Defendant was liable to pay, during the period (a) before the penalty provisions pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Employment Law were engaged; and (b) after the penalty due pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Employment Law is suspended. The Claimant therefore does not claim interest for the period during which I have found a penalty is payable pursuant to Article 19 of the Employment Law.
16. The Claimant submits that, given the contractual relationship between the parties, Article 17 of the Law of Damages and Remedies (relating to damages under the Contract Law) should apply. Article 17(1) provides as follows:
“If a party does not pay a sum of money when it falls due the aggrieved party is entitled to interest upon that sum from the time when payment is due to the time of payment whether or not the non-payment is excused.”
17. As pointed out by the Claimant, the issue of pre-judgment interest in employment claims has arisen in some SCT cases but has not been resolved by them. For example, in Lucila v Linkalinka [2020] DIFC CFI 052 (11 November 2020), the Claimant succeeded in a CFI appeal from an SCT decision that there was no entitlement to commission. He had claimed interest, but the Court found at [15] that it had been shown no basis for an award of pre-judgment interest.
18. I find that the interest provision under Article 17 of the Law of Damages and Remedies is not applicable, given that the Claimant’s claim in these proceedings has been determined in this Order and in the Judgment pursuant to the Employment Law, rather than the Contract Law. I am mindful of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lutfi v The Dubai International Financial Centre Authority [2013] DIFC CA 003 (26 November 2014), as cited in Nancy v Narcissa [2023] 098 (8 July 2024) at [70] to the effect that “the Employment Law exclusively governs relations between employers and employees in the DIFC and no other DIFC law… determines their rights and obligations”.
19. Whilst the Employment Law provides at Article 19 for a penalty for non-payment of outstanding dues – in relation to which the Claimant has been awarded USD 95,572.88 - the statute does not provide for pre-judgment interest. Nor a fortiori does the Employment Law provide for how pre-judgment interest is to be applied alongside a penalty under Article 19(4). As implicitly acknowledged by the Claimant in the time periods for which he claims pre-judgment interest, the Claimant would be overcompensated if he were to be awarded a penalty under Article 19(4) and pre- judgment interest for the same period.
20. In all the circumstances, I find no basis to award the Claimant pre-judgment interest in these proceedings.
Post-Judgment Interest
21. I see no reason to depart from the general position on post-judgment interest nor the proposed rate of 9% which is set out at Practice Direction No. 4 of 2017: “Any judgment of the DIFC Courts issued after the date of this Practice Direction shall carry simple interest, from the date the judgment is entered, at the rate of 9% or such other rate as the judge may prescribe.”
22. Post-Judgment Interest at 9% shall therefore be applied to the sums ordered to be paid to the Claimant in the January Order and in this Order from the date payment is due.
