Claim No: CFI 019/2025

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

ATUL ASHOK AMIR CHAND DHAWAN

Claimant

and

ZURICH INTERNATIONAL LIFE LIMITED

Defendant

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE THOMAS BATHURST

UPON the Claimant’s Part 7 Claim Form dated 25 February 2025 (the “Claim”)

AND UPON Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Thomas Bathurst dated 9 September 2025 (the “Order”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Appeal Notice dated 1 October 2025 seeking permission to appeal the Order (the “Application for Permission to Appeal”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-019-2025/3 dated 29 December 2025 seeking permission to adduce additional evidence in the Application for Permission to Appeal (the “Application to Adduce Evidence”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-019-2025/4 dated 29 December 2025 seeking an order staying the enforcement of the costs order dated 9 September 2025 pending the determination of the Application for Permission to Appeal (the “Stay Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-019-2025/5 dated 30 December 2025 seeking specific disclosure of documents from the Defendant (the “Disclosure Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-019-2025/6 seeking a retrospective extension of time to file an appeal notice in support of the Application for Permission to Appeal (the “EOT Application”)

AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the DIFC Courts (the “RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The EOT Application is granted.

2. The Application for Permission to Appeal is refused.

3. The Application to Adduce Evidence is dismissed.

4. The Stay Application is dismissed.

5. The Disclosure Application is dismissed.

6. The Claimant shall pay the Respondent’s costs of the Application for Permission to Appeal, the Application to Adduce Evidence, the Stay Application and the Disclosure Application as agreed or assessed.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 13 March 2026
At: 1pm

1. The Claimant, Atul Ashok Amir Chand Dhawan (the “Claimant”), has sought permission to appeal from my orders of 9 September 2025 (the “Application for Permission to Appeal”) finding that the DIFC Courts had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the Claim brought by him against Zurich International Life Limited (the “Respondent”) which was described as a claim for breach of confidentiality and financial losses in respect of an insurance policy issued by the Respondent.

2. The relevant Appeal Notice was filed on 1 October 2025, one day out of time. By an Application No.CFI-019-2025/6 dated 21 January 2026 (the “EOT Application”), the Claimant sought a retrospective extension to file an Appeal Notice. In an affidavit by the Claimant in support of that extension, he asserted the Appeal Notice was in fact filed at 4:31pm on 30 September 2025 in circumstances where as a litigant in person he was not aware of the provisions of Rule 2.17 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) which provides that any action required by the Rules must take place by 4pm on the date specified.

3. I have no reason to doubt that the Claimant was unaware of the provision of the RDC and intended to file the Appeal Notice within time. No injustice is suffered by the grant of the extension of time to lodge the Appeal Notice and in the circumstances I would extend the time to 1 October 2025, the effect being that the Appeal Notice was filed in time.

4. In addition to seeking permission to appeal, the Claimant has brought a number of other applications. They are an Application No.CFI-019-2025/3 dated 29 December 2025 to adduce additional evidence on the appeal (the “Application to Adduce Evidence”), an Application No. CFI-019-2025/4 on the same date seeking a stay of the enforcement of a cost order made by me on 9 September 2025 (the “Stay Application”) and an Application No.CFI-019-2025/5 dated 30 December 2025 seeking specific disclosure of documents (the “Disclosure Application”).

THE APPEAL NOTICE

5. The Appeal Notice relies on six grounds of appeal. The first is that I misapplied Article 14A(1) of DIFC Courts Law No. (2) of 2025 (the “Law”) in assessing jurisdiction only at the date of the claim ignoring the Respondent’s DIFC Establishment status at the time of the contract and underlying events.

6. In my opinion, this ground of appeal has no merit. It is clear from the text of Article 14A(1) that the jurisdiction is conferred in respect of claims against DIFC Bodies or DIFC Establishments not bodies which, may in the past, have had that status.

7. The Claimant also suggests my decision is contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Al Khorafi & Ors v Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Limited & Anor [2011] DIFC CA 003 and Tavira Securities Limited v Re Point Ventures Fzco & Ors [2017] CFI 026. That submission, with respect, is incorrect. Al Khorafi involved the question of whether the Law which conferred jurisdiction on DIFC Courts at the time permission to appeal was granted (DIFC Law No.12 of 2024) or the jurisdictional provision at the time of the substantive appeal (DFIC Law No.16 of 2011) was the applicable law for determining the appeal. The Court concluded at [6] that because the appeal was concerned with the matter of procedural jurisdiction it must be determined only be reference to Law No.16, not Law No.12.

8. In Tavira Securities Field J concluded at [32] that it was implicit in the approach in Al Khorafi that the time in which jurisdiction is to be determined is the time when the test for jurisdiction is to be applied and not by reference to time in the past. Both these cases are directly contrary to the Claimant’s submissions on this ground.

9. The second proposed ground of appeal is that in considering whether Article 14A(2) of the Law conferred jurisdiction in respect of the Claim I erred in holding that no plausible evidential basis existed to show the contract was wholly or partly concluded or negotiated in the DIFC despite undisputed evidence of DIFC involvement.

10. It is first suggested (Claimant’s skeleton argument, paragraphs 6 and 7) that I concluded that for Article 14A(2) to apply, the contract had to be wholly negotiated, completed or performed in the DIFC. Having regard to paragraphs [54]-[55] of my reasons, this is clearly incorrect.

11. The Claimant also asserted that I ignored or overlooked evidence in determining that Article 14A(2) did not confer jurisdiction. I dealt with the evidence before me at [57]. The bulk of material which it is said I did not consider was not before me but is contained in the material sought to be brought forward in new evidence on the appeal. As will appear below I do not think that material should be admitted.

12. It follows that I do not regard this ground of appeal as arguable.

13. The Claimant also contended that I erred in concluding that the alleged wrongful disclosure of matters to Mashreq Bank could not give jurisdiction under Article 14A(3) because it occurred after the Respondent ceased operating in the DIFC. He submitted this was an error because it occurred in respect of a policy created and administered by the Respondent as a DIFC Establishment.

14. There was no issue that the alleged wrongful disclosure took place after the Respondent had ceased to be a DIFC Establishment. In those circumstances, the Claim was not relevant to the activities of a DIFC Establishment. I do not think the contrary is arguable.

15. The Claimant also contended I erred in concluding that the Respondent’s group affiliation did not make it a DIFC Establishment. As the Claimant pointed out, in reaching this conclusion, I relied on the decision in Globe Investment Holdings Ltd v Commercial Bank of Dubai [2023] DIFC CFI 028 at [45] (see paragraph [15] of my reasons). I do not think it is arguable that the position is any different merely because the Respondent was a recognised foreign company in the DIFC particularly in circumstances where its licence to carry on business had expired (see paragraph [16] of my reasons).

16. Ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal states that I erred in concluding the “opt in clause” in the policy did not confer jurisdiction under Article 14B. The Claimant in this regard relied on clause 7.10B of the policy document tendered by him at the hearing (see paragraph [21] of my reasons). I concluded at [65] of my reasons that the relevant clause was in the policy document tendered by the Respondent, not that tendered by the Claimant. This does not appear to be challenged.

17. In reaching my conclusion I accepted that the expressions “Dubai courts” and “courts of the UAE” should be construed to include DIFC Courts and courts of Dubai. However, I expressed the view that the word “competent” in the clause which I held applied limited the submission to jurisdiction to courts which otherwise would have such jurisdiction.

18. Although this ground of appeal has more substance than the other grounds, I do not think it has sufficient merit to warrant permission to appeal.

19. Ground 6 alleges a failure to consider material evidence. I have dealt with this in dealing with ground 2 and I do not think it has sufficient merit to warrant the grant of permission.

20. In these circumstances, I would refuse the Application for Permission to Appeal.

THE OTHER APPLICATIONS MADE BY THE CLAIMANT

i. The Application to Adduce Evidence

21. In this Application the Claimant has sought to adduce new evidence being the documents in Exhibit AD1 to the first affidavit of Mr Dhawan dated 29 December 2025. The nature of the documents is summarised accurately in the third witness statement of Mr Max Edward Davis, the legal representative of the Respondent. The documents comprise email correspondence relating to underwriting procedure for the Policy, a spreadsheet setting out the Claimant’s chronology of meetings within the DIFC and related policy and underwriting documents.

22. Although strictly speaking the Application would only be relevant if permission to appeal was granted I accept in dealing with the Application to grant permission to appeal it is relevant to consider whether the documents, the subject of the Application, would be admissible on the appeal.

23. The Claimant accepted the test for the admission of such evidence is that contained in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 adopted in Nest Investments v Deloitte & Touche (ME) [2020] DIFC TCD 003 at [11]. The relevant criteria are that the additional evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing and was such, that it probably would have had an important influence on the result of the case.

24. The Claimant stated in his witness statement that he could not have reasonably appreciated that the absence of the material would be determinative or that it was necessary to address it at first instance.

25. In my view, the fact that the Claimant did not appreciate the significance of the documents does not provide justification for their admission on appeal. The limited and stringent basis for the introduction of such evidence shows that it is not designed to permit a litigant to rectify deficiencies in his or her case which have only become apparent after judgment.

26. The Application to Adduce Evidence should be dismissed.

ii. The Disclosure Application

27. As permission to appeal has been refused, there is no basis for this Application. It should be dismissed.

iii. The Stay Application

28. As permission to appeal has been refused, there is no basis for this Application. It should be dismissed.

ORDERS

29. I would make the following orders: