Claim No. CFI 055/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN

GANESAN MUTHIAH

Claimant/Respondent

and

ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMMAD

Defendant/Applicant

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. CHIEF JUSTICE WAYNE MARTIN

UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 20 October 2025 (the “Order”) dismissing Claim No. CFI-055-2025 (the “Claim”) pursuant to the Conflict of Jurisdiction Tribunal’s (“CJT”) decision dated 13 October 2025, which determined that the Dubai Courts have jurisdiction to hear the Claim

AND UPON the Reasons of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 13 January 2026 for the Order

AND UPON the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 10 November 2025 seeking permission to appeal (the “PTA Application”) against the Order pursuant to Rules 44.6 and 44.19 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (the “RDC”)

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 21 January 2026 dismissing the PTA Application (the “21 January Order”)

AND UPON the Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi dated 29 January 2026 directing the Applicant to pay the Respondents costs of the PTA Application (the “29 January Order”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 6 February 2026 seeking renewed permission to appeal the Order (the “Renewed Application”) as well as seeking an application for a stay of enforcement of the costs award arising from the 21 January Order and the 29 January Order (the “Stay Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s submissions in opposition dated 27 February 2026

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin dated 27 February 2026 granting the Stay Application

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Renewed Application is granted and permission to appeal is granted on all grounds (other than those relating to the stay of the costs orders pending determination of the appeal).

2. The order for a stay upon the enforcement of the costs orders made by the Judge in relation to the PTA Application will be extended to the determination of the appeal.

3. The costs of the Renewed Application are reserved to the Court of Appeal.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 26 March 2026
At: 12pm

Summary

1. The Defendant, Abdul Rahman Mohammad (“Mr Mohammad”) applies to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal from the decision of the Judge at first instance (the “Judge”) on 20 October 2025 to the extent that he vacated all prior orders made in these proceedings and dismissed all pending applications (the “Renewed Application”). The effect of the orders was to vacate costs orders made in favour of Mr Mohammad and to dismiss an application which he had made for the appointment of a receiver to assets held by the Claimant, Ganesan Muthiah (“Mr Muthiah”) which had been made for the purposes of enforcing a costs order made in favour of Mr Mohammad. The Renewed Application is made to the Court of Appeal because the Judge dismissed an Initial Application for permission to appeal (the “Initial Application”) made to him.

2. Mr Mohammad also challenges costs orders made by the Judge with respect to the Initial Application and seeks a stay on the enforcement of those orders until the appeal has been determined. The Court of Appeal has placed a stay upon the enforcement of those orders until the Renewed Application is determined.

3. For the reasons which follow, Mr Mohammad has established that all the grounds of appeal have a real prospect of success and permission to appeal must be granted. If the appeal succeeds it is likely that the Court of Appeal will set aside the costs orders made in favour of Mr Muthiah in respect of the Initial Application. Accordingly, the stay upon the enforcement of those orders will be maintained until the determination of the appeal.

The dispute

4. Mr Muthiah and Mr Mohammad are shareholders in the company Gulf IT Network Distribution – Freezone – LLC (“Gulf IT”) which is located in Dubai International City and which provides telecommunication and internet services. They are in dispute in relation to the dissolution and liquidation of that company, although the substance and merits of the dispute are not germane to the issues which arise on the Renewed Application.

The procedural context

5. On 9 June 2025, Mr Muthiah commenced proceedings against Mr Mohammad in the DIFC Courts. On 14 July 2025 default judgment was issued against Mr Mohammad in those proceedings, and on 22 July 2025 an ex parte Worldwide Freezing Order (“WFO”) was granted against Mr Mohammad.

6. On 25 July 2025, Mr Mohammad filed applications for orders setting aside the default judgment and declaring service of the claim form void and discharging the WFO, striking out the claim form, and declaring that the DIFC Courts lacked jurisdiction.

7. Those applications were heard on 14 August 2025 and on 19 August 2025 the Judge issued orders in which he:

8. No reasons were provided at the time those orders were issued, although after Mr Muthiah lodged an appeal against the orders made by the Judge on 9 September 2025 without identifying the grounds of appeal because of the lack of reasons, on 10 September 2025 the Judge published reasons for his orders with respect to costs and the jurisdiction of the Court, on the basis that the other orders which he had made were agreed between the parties.

9. In the meantime, on 3 September 2025 Mr Mohammad issued an application to appoint a receiver over Mr Muthiah’s shareholding in Gulf IT for the purpose of enforcing the costs order made by the Judge.

10. On 29 September 2025, the Judge ordered that his earlier order with respect to costs be varied to provide that Mr Muthiah should pay Mr Mohammad’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings on the standard basis to be assessed if not agreed – thereby setting aside his assessment of the amount of costs to be paid by Mr Muthiah. No reasons were given for that order, which does not appear to have been occasioned by any application from either party, nor does either party appear to have been provided with the opportunity to make submissions with respect to the orders made, which included directions for the exchange of submissions with respect to the assessment of the quantum of costs.

11. In the meantime, on 22 September 2025 Mr Mohammad had applied to the Conflict of Jurisdiction Tribunal (“CJT”) seeking a determination that the Courts of greater Dubai, rather than the DIFC Courts, were the competent forum to hear and determine the disputes between the parties. It may be inferred that this application was made in order to avert the risk of a successful appeal from the Judge’s orders dismissing the claim in the DIFC proceedings and declaring that the DIFC Court either lacked jurisdiction or should not exercise it.

The CJT decision

12. On 13 October 2025, the CJT issued its decision on Mr Mohammad’s application. It is apparent from that decision that the CJT application was brought against both Mr Muthiah and Gulf IT. The Tribunal noted that in his response to the application Mr Muthiah did not deny or contest the jurisdiction of the Dubai Courts and declared his waiver of the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts conferred upon those Courts by Article 28 of the Articles of Association of Gulf IT. The Tribunal noted that Mr Muthiah also reaffirmed his waiver of the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction in the case pending before the Dubai Courts and had requested an order that the Tribunal suspend all proceedings in case No. CFI-055-2025, including any related applications or appeals. The Tribunal noted that Mr Muthiah had also sought orders confirming the jurisdiction of the Dubai Courts to hear any existing or potential dispute between Mr Muthiah and Mr Mohammad and requested a declaration that the DIFC Courts were divested of jurisdiction over any disputes between the parties concerning the subject matter of the proceedings before the Dubai Courts.

13. In its reasons, the Tribunal noted that Mr Muthiah had waived his right to assert the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts and had requested an order from the Tribunal suspending all the proceedings in CFI-055-2025. The Tribunal noted that Mr Muthiah’s position with respect to jurisdiction corresponded with that of Mr Mohammad, who contested the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts.

14. In its reasons the Tribunal asserted that in the interests of the proper administration of justice and to avoid conflicting or inconsistent judgments, only one of the two Courts must hear the case and not both, and as the Dubai Courts possessed general jurisdiction, they were deemed to be the competent authority to adjudicate the dispute between the parties.

15. The Tribunal’s orders are in the following terms:

16. In light of the issues which have since arisen, it is significant to note that:

17. Both before and after the publication of the decision of the CJT, the parties took steps in relation to the assessment of Mr Mohammad’s costs of the proceedings in accordance with the directions made by the Judge.

The order under appeal

18. On 20 October 2025, the Judge made the orders which are the subject of the Renewed Application, in the following terms:

19. The effect of these orders was to:

20. The orders under appeal were not made on the application of either party, nor was any opportunity provided for the parties to exchange submissions in relation to the orders that should be made as a result of the decision of the CJT. No reasons were provided at the time the orders were made.

The Initial Application for Permission to Appeal

21. On 10 November 2025, Mr Mohammad applied for permission to appeal from the orders made on 20 October 2025. Mr Muthiah filed his skeleton argument in opposition to the application on 3 December 2025.

22. On 13 January 2026, the Judge published reasons for the orders made on 20 October 2025 and directed the parties to file any supplemental skeletons in the light of those reasons.

23. The Judge’s reasons for the order under appeal include the following propositions:

24. For these reasons, the Judge purported to exercise his discretion so as to order that there be no order as to costs and that any prior directions or orders, insofar as they purport to entitle Mr Mohammad to recover costs “are hereby set aside”.⁷

25. On 21 January 2026, the Judge published orders with reasons dismissing Mr Mohammad’s application for permission to appeal and ordering Mr Mohammad to pay Mr Muthiah’s costs of the application.

26. As any appeal lies against the orders made on 20 October 2025, it is the reasons for those orders which are relevant to the appeal, rather than the reasons given for refusing the Initial Application. However, it is pertinent to observe that in those reasons the Judge maintained the position which he had adopted in the reasons published on 13 January 2026, to the effect that:

27. In addition, the Judge rejected any suggestion of procedural irregularity on the basis that the orders made on 20 October 2025 did not represent a reconsideration or variation of prior orders but rather the implementation of the inevitable legal consequences of the decision of the CJT and was not an exercise of appellate power. Further, in his view no substantive rights were being adjudicated – the Court was merely giving effect to a binding decision. Accordingly, the requirements of procedural fairness did not oblige the Court to invite submissions on whether it should comply with a binding direction of the CJT.

28. The Judge further held that the provision of the opportunity to serve supplemental skeleton arguments after reasons had been given for the orders made on 20 October 2025 satisfied the requirements of procedural fairness.

29. The Judge concluded that the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason to hear the appeal.

30. The Judge justified the costs orders which he had made on the basis that the application for permission to appeal was made subsequent to the decision of the Tribunal and constituted “a distinct procedural step, giving rise to its own costs consequences”.⁸

Permission to appeal – legal principles

31. RDC 44.117 provides:

32. RDC 44.5 requires that an appellant obtain permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal except where the appeal is against a committal order.

33. RDC 44.19 provides:

34. RDC 44.19 provides that permission to appeal may only be given where the appeal would have a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

35. In the context of an assessment of the prospects of success “real” means realistic rather than fanciful and involves the same test as is applied in applications for immediate judgment.⁹

36. A real prospect of success does not mean a probability of success, but more than mere arguability.¹⁰

37. “Some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard” may include the public interest in clarifying the meaning and scope of relevant practice and provisions of DIFC and wider UAE law.¹¹

38. It is established that “real” in the context of an assessment of the prospects of success means realistic rather than fanciful, applying the same test as is applied in an application for immediate judgment.¹²

39. It is also established that a real prospect of success does not mean a probability of success, but more than mere arguability.¹³

40. Accordingly, in order to obtain the grant of permission, a prospective appellant needs to establish more than the proposition that the proposed appeal is reasonably arguable – rather, it must be established that there is a real prospect of success.¹⁴

41. When a renewed application made to the Court of Appeal is refused, it is appropriate for the Court to provide reasons which adequately explain the reasons why permission has been refused. The adequacy and extent of those reasons will be informed by the fact that the refusal of permission is final and conclusive and determines the issues the subject of the appeal.

42. On the other hand, when a renewed application for permission to appeal is granted, the reasons for the grant can and should be expressed more briefly, and any views expressed should be expressed and read as provisional, on the basis that a different view might well be formed following the consideration of the fuller argument which will be presented at the hearing of the appeal. Any views expressed in these reasons should be read and construed on that basis. Further, the reasons for granting permission in respect of grounds of appeal will be expressed economically, not only because the determination of the issue raised by the ground must await the hearing of the appeal but also to limit the prospect that a party might consider that a member of the Court of Appeal does not retain an open mind in relation to any of the issues in the appeal.

The grounds of appeal

43. There are seven grounds of appeal, apart from those pertaining to the stay of the costs order made in relation to the Initial Application. The first three grounds are concerned with the merits of the decision made by the Judge, and the other four grounds allege procedural irregularities in relation to that decision. It is convenient to deal with the grounds in those groupings.

Grounds 1-3 - merits

44. Grounds 1-3 are in the following terms:

45. It is convenient to deal with these grounds together.

46. In support of these grounds Mr Mohammad submits:

47. On behalf of Mr Muthiah it is submitted that:

Analysis

48. It is not contentious that a Court has power to award costs in favour of a party who successfully challenges the jurisdiction of the Court, and indeed the Judge made such orders on two occasions. The Judge’s reference to a general principle to the effect that parties should bear their own costs when proceedings are terminated for want of jurisdiction is unsupported by cited authority and is arguably inconsistent with the orders which he made in these proceedings. It follows that, but for the decision of the CJT, the Court had jurisdiction to make and enforce the costs orders by appropriate means. There is a cogent argument to the effect that the decision of the CJT only determined which of the two Courts was the most appropriate Court to exercise jurisdiction going forward and did not address the jurisdiction of either Court with respect to orders previously made. If that argument were to succeed, it would follow that the Judge erred in principle when making the orders under appeal.

49. There is a cogent argument to the effect that Mr Mohammad was the successful party in his challenge to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts, and that there is nothing in the decision of the CJT which should be taken as depriving him of the fruits of that success as a result of his successful application to the CJT.

50. For present purposes it is sufficient to observe that the cogency of the arguments in support of these grounds is such that they enjoy a real prospect of success. It follows that permission to appeal must be granted in respect Grounds 1-3.

Grounds 4-7 – procedural irregularity

51. Grounds 4-7 are in the following terms:

52. As is evident from the grounds themselves, Mr Mohammad submits that:

53. On behalf of Mr Muthiah it is submitted that:

Analysis

54. As Grounds 1-3 above have real prospects of success, it is cogently arguable that the orders under appeal were not the inevitable consequence of the decision of the CJT, with the result that the principles of procedural fairness were enlivened and the parties were deprived of the opportunity to be heard in relation to the course proposed by the Judge. It is also cogently arguable that the opportunity to provide supplemental skeletons in support of the Initial Application after the Judge provided reasons for the decision he made some months earlier is an inadequate substitute for the right to be heard before the orders were made.

55. It is also cogently arguable that the Judge at first instance had no power to vary final orders which had been issued under the seal of the Court and that any variation to those orders could only be made by way of an appeal.

56. For present purposes it is sufficient to observe that the arguments in support of Grounds 4-7 are sufficiently cogent to provide them with real prospects of success. It follows that permission to appeal must be granted in respect of those grounds as well.

Enforcement of the costs orders made against Mr Mohammad

57. As the grounds of appeal have a real prospect of success, there is a real prospect that the appeal will be allowed. If that occurs, it is highly likely that the orders made by the Judge in relation to the costs of the Initial Application will be set aside.

58. Mr Mohammad submits that if he is obliged to satisfy the costs order relating to the Initial Application before the determination of the appeal, there is a risk that the costs will not be recovered from Mr Muthiah. In support of that submission Mr Mohammad points to Mr Muthiah’s failure to pay the costs ordered by the Court within the time specified by the Court.

59. Mr Mohammad’s submission on this topic should be accepted and the order for the stay of enforcement of the costs order made by the Judge with respect to the Initial Application extended until the determination of the appeal.

Conclusion

60. For the reasons given above: