Claim No: CFI 081/2024

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN

KITOPI CATERING SERVICES LLC

Claimant

and

MONS HOSPITALITY FZE

Defendant

ORDER WITH REASONS H.E. CHIEF JUSTICE WAYNE MARTIN

UPON the Judgment of H.E. Justice Roger Stewart KC dated 4 February 2026 (the “Judgment”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 25 February 2026 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “Permission to Appeal Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s submissions in opposition dated 18 March 2026

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Roger Stewart dated 25 March 2026 referring the Permission to Appeal Application to the Court of Appeal for determination

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Permission to Appeal Application is dismissed.

2. The Defendant shall pay the Claimant’s costs of the Application to be assessed on the standard basis by way of immediate assessment in accordance with the directions which follow.

3. Within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, the Claimant is to file a Statement of Costs together with submissions in support of the costs claimed.

4. Within twenty-one (21) days of the date of service of the Statement of Costs, the Defendant is to file any submissions in opposition to the quantum of the costs claimed.

5. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of the Defendant’s submissions pursuant to the preceding order, the Claimant shall file any submissions in reply.

6. The quantum of the Claimant’s costs to paid by the Defendant will thereafter be assessed on the papers by H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 15 April 2026
At: 2pm

Summary

1. The Defendant, Mons Hospitality FZE (“Mons”) has applied for permission to appeal from the decision of the Judge at first instance (the “Judge”) in which he entered judgment after trial in favour of the Claimant, Kitopi Catering Services LLC (“Kitopi”) (the “Application”). The Application was made in the first instance to the Judge, who then referred the Application to the Court of Appeal pursuant to Rule 44.8 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”).

2. For the reasons which follow, Mons has failed to establish that its proposed appeal has any real prospect of success, or that there is any other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, and the Application must be dismissed.

The decision at first instance

3. After a four day trial, the Judge entered judgement in favour of Kitopi in the sum of AED 725,047 and also ordered Mons to pay interest on that amount, on terms which were to be the subject of submissions by the parties. The Judge made a similar direction for the provision of submissions in relation to costs.

4. The Judge commenced his reasons with an overview of the dispute, noting that it arose as a result of a complaint made on 4 December 2023 about the supply of mouldy pasta at the prestigious 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“CoP 28”) which was held in Dubai between 30 November and 15 December 2023 at the Expo Centre.

5. The Judge noted that Mons had the benefit of an exclusive catering contract for the supply of food within the blue and green zones at CoP 28 and had contracted with Kitopi for the supply of a minimum quantity of 2,500 meal boxes under the terms of an agreement dated 15 December (sic November) 2023 (the “Agreement”).

6. The Judge noted that Mons claimed that Kitopi had committed a series of breaches of contract which culminated in the termination of the Agreement by Mons on 6 December 2023. Mons claimed that Kitopi had repudiated the terms of the Agreement and that the consequence of its breaches led directly to the closure of the food portal under which Mons received its orders, which caused Mons to incur substantial loss and damage which was the subject of its counter-claim.

7. On the other hand, Kitopi claimed a payment for meal boxes which it says were delivered prior to 5 December 2023 and that Mons repudiated the Agreement by wrongfully terminating it on 6 December 2023 and claimed lost profits said to arise from the repudiatory breach of the Agreement by Mons. Kitopi denied that it had breached the Agreement and specifically denied that it had repudiated the Agreement or was responsible for any of the damage allegedly suffered by Mons.

8. In his review of the evidence before the Court, the Judge noted that four witnesses had been called by the parties, three of whom he considered to be reliable witnesses. However, the Judge was critical of the evidence given by Mr Simon Wright, who is the owner and CEO of Mons. It is unnecessary to recount the detailed criticism of Mr Wright’s evidence provided by the Judge in his reasons, other than to observe that the evidence given caused the Judge to conclude that Mr Wright had convinced himself that all the problems that Mons suffered at CoP 28 were the responsibility of Kitopi.¹

9. The Judge concluded that no weight should be given to Mr Wright’s evidence where it was unsupported by contemporaneous documents or inherent probabilities.

10. In his review of the Agreement, the Judge noted that clause 10 provided that the governing law of the Agreement was to be English law, and the parties agreed to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Courts of the DIFC in relation to disputes arising under the Agreement.

11. After referring to other clauses of the Agreement, the Judge gave his reasons for accepting Mons’ submission to the effect that Kitopi’s obligation was to deliver the relevant meal boxes to the end consumers that were specified, rather than to deliver the meals to Mons.² This conclusion is relevant to the question of whether Mons could be held responsible for any defects in the quality of the food supplied by Kitopi to end users. As the Judge noted:

“This meant that Kitopi was responsible for the quality and condition of all the boxes from the time of receipt of an order until delivery to the end consumer.”³

12. The Judge recounted various practical matters relating to the facilities made available to Kitopi for the preparation of food, access to the conference venue etc.. The Judge observed that, to some extent, Mons and Kitopi were sharing facilities and noted that the practice was that the chillers were cleared each evening by Mons’ staff, with any leftover meals being disposed of.

13. The Judge noted that the documentary evidence disclosed a significant number of complaints made to Mons by its customers prior to the formal start of CoP 28 and in the first few days of the main event, largely concerned with the non-delivery of products which had nothing to do with Kitopi. The Judge noted:

“Kitopi’s services were only a very small part of the total provision. Kitopi actually appears to have done well in fulfilling the orders with which Mons provided it in somewhat difficult conditions by comparison with other parts of the Mons operations.”⁴

14. The Judge noted that the orders were provided through the medium of a portal by which customers could provide orders to Mons. The portal was operated by CoP 28 rather than by Mons. Kitopi did not have direct access to the portal but was, instead, provided with details of the orders made by end customers by way of spreadsheets provided to Kitopi by Mons.

15. The Judge noted that Kitopi did not consider itself responsible for the conditions pertaining to the area where the food boxes were put together on site, although the Judge considered this view to be wrong, but understandable, with the situation being somewhat chaotic. In this context, the Judge noted that although Kitopi was responsible for the conditions in the area which it occupied, it wouldn’t have been easy for Kitopi to monitor chillers and their temperatures in an environment which was under the overall control of Mons.

16. The Judge noted, based on the documentary evidence, that prior to 4 December 2023 there was nothing to suggest that Mons sought to criticize Kitopi in respect of the food it was delivering or as to the conditions in which it was preparing that food. However, on the afternoon of 4 December 2023, a serious food safety issue was raised with Mr Elhait, who was the Director of Operations at CoP 28. Mr Elhait was told that one of the youth delegates had become ill as a result of eating contaminated food supplied by Kitopi while another had observed mould on the food and had not eaten the dish concerned. In that context, the Judge noted that there was in evidence a photograph which showed mouldy pasta.⁵

17. The Judge accepted that the photograph depicted spoiled food but noted that there was no direct evidence as to when the photograph was taken or as to the circumstances in which the food became mouldy. The Judge also observed that:

“The investigations which followed demonstrated that Kitopi were not in a position to show that every possible care had been taken in relation to the preparation of food such that it could not have been Kitopi’s fault that contamination had occurred.”⁶

18. The Judge found that it was likely that the concerns expressed to Mr Elhait led to an inspection by officers of the Dubai Municipality on the afternoon of 4 December 2023, after which Kitopi were directed to cease working from the site and told not to serve food which had already been loaded onto trolleys for service. The Judge noted that an inspection report timed at after 22.30 on 4 December recorded failings in relation to training, food hygiene, the temperature of the food store, and the discovery of spoiled pasta in the kitchen for potential service to customers. Mons was fined AED1,500 by reason of the failings, as the operator of the relevant food hall.

19. The Judge noted that Kitopi was instructed to leave the food hall immediately and were not given to the opportunity to clear up.

20. The Judge also noted that in an inspection conducted by Ms Sabouneh, the Sustainability and Food Safety Manager at Mons, who had been seconded to Expo City Dubai as the Food Safety Manager Consultant for CoP 28, she observed five violations of the Dubai Food Code, namely:

21. The Judge also noted that later that evening, Kitopi proposed to assemble food at its central kitchen off site, for delivery in a refrigerated van to the chiller situated in the food hall on site.

22. The Judge noted that Ms Sabouneh did not observe any mouldy pasta and concluded that the most likely explanation for that was that the pasta stored on trolleys which Dubai Municipality had required not to be delivered was not disposed of, as it should have been, but was instead placed back in the chillers, where it was seen by the officials of Dubai Municipality when they inspected later that evening. The Judge concluded that disposal did not take place because of confusion caused by the interruption to operations and the fact that Kitopi had been required to leave the site, and noted that the disposal would have ordinarily taken place by the agency of stewards employed by Mons.⁷

23. The Judge found that Kitopi arranged for staff to work all night at its kitchen off-site in order to prepare food for delivery on 5 December, but the food was not prepared in time for the breakfast boxes to be delivered, and that it proved to be impossible for Kitopi to deliver food boxes for the lunch service because deliveries to the site were banned after 6.00am. As a result, no deliveries were made on 5 December and Kitopi proposed to recommence operations with effect from 6 December 2023.

24. The Judge found that Mr Wright discussed the situation with Mr Elhait and told him that he could not guarantee the performance of Kitopi, consistently with the Judge’s view that Mr Wright had by then convinced himself that all the problems that had occurred were caused by Kitopi. The Judge found that as a result of that discussion Mr Elhait decided to close down the portal in order to avoid the catering issue distracting from the more important events taking place at CoP 28. Kitopi was advised of the cancellation of all future orders by an email sent in the early hours of the morning of 6 December 2023. The Judge found that:

“Mr [Wright] was, no doubt surprised and disappointed by this decision but it may well reflect the fact that the problems in Mons’ operations were much wider than those attributable to Kitopi alone.”⁸

25. In relation to the breaches of the Agreement alleged by Mons, the Judge found:

“The evidence does not establish that Kitopi actually supplied products which were not fit for purpose to an end customer. Plainly, if the pasta was supplied in the mouldy condition shown in the photograph sent to Ms Sabouneh on the afternoon of 4 December, that pasta was not fit for purpose, ie for human consumption. However, no evidence was adduced as to when the pasta was supplied or in what condition. Furthermore, if pasta was supplied in that condition, I would have expected far more than a single complaint.”⁹

26. It seems clear from the terms in which this finding was made, that the Judge was not prepared to reply upon the hearsay report to Mr Elhait in order to find that Kitopi had supplied contaminated food to the delegate the subject of that complaint. Although Mons eschews any challenge to any finding of fact made by the Judge, or any inference drawn by him, in its skeleton argument it contends that the Judge should have found that Kitopi supplied contaminated food to at least one end consumer. That contention will be addressed below.

27. The Judge held that the terms of the Agreement had the practical effect that Kitopi was required to comply with the provisions of the Dubai Food Code in relation to its supply of the meal boxes.

28. The Judge found that Kitopi was responsible for a significant number of breaches of that Code in relation to the conditions in which it was handling food on 4 December 2023, the most relevant being:

29. The Judge found that these breaches were serious and led directly to Dubai Municipality refusing to allow the premises to be used until they had been rectified, and to the fine of AED 1,500 being imposed on Mons. He also found that these breaches led directly to Kitopi not being permitted to deliver food for the rest of 4 December and to its inability to deliver food over the whole of 5 December 2023.¹¹

30. The Judge went to observe that although the breaches were serious, they were, at least to an extent, understandable for various reasons, in the nature of mitigation, which he gave. It is unnecessary to recount those reasons as they are not relevant to the issues in the appeal.

31. The Judge rejected Kitopi’s contention that it was not responsible for the failure to deliver food on 5 December, noting that no delivery to site was attempted before the time after which it was known that deliveries would not be accepted, and further noted that this failure flowed directly from the breaches on 4 December 2023.

32. The Judge also rejected Mons’ contention that Kitopi was responsible for other significant failures of delivery, finding that any failures to deliver prior to 4 December by Kitopi were small scale and dwarfed by the failures of Mons.

33. The Judge then addressed the question of whether Kitopi had repudiated the Agreement at the time Mons purported to terminate, and directed himself by reference to English authorities as to the legal principles to be applied. In that context, the Judge noted that by the time Mons purported to accept the alleged repudiatory breach, Mons had been told by CoP 28 that the portal would be closed, so that no more orders for food could be placed, and Mons was to refund the payments for all orders which had been made but not filled. The Judge reasoned that if that consequence was caused by Kitopi’s breaches, Mons was in a good position to say that it was deprived of the remaining benefit of its contract with Kitopi.¹²

34. However, the Judge held, as a matter of fact, that Mr Elhait’s decision to close the portal was not caused by Kitopi’s breaches of the Agreement but rather by Mr Wright’s expression of lack of confidence in Kitopi to Mr Elhait and had that not occurred, the portal would not have been closed. In the Judge’s view, Mr Wright’s strategy of blaming Kitopi backfired on Mons.¹³

35. After making those findings, the Judge went on to hold:

“I also do not consider that the closure of the portal was a foreseeable consequence of the breaches of contract by Kitopi. It was not a natural and probable result of the breaches that there would be cancellation of all of Mons’s orders whether attributable to Kitopi or not. There were no particular circumstances which would have led Kitopi to think that such a consequence would occur. It follows that any losses caused by the closure of the portal are too remote to be recoverable.”

35. After making those findings, the Judge went on to hold:

“I also do not consider that the closure of the portal was a foreseeable consequence of the breaches of contract by Kitopi. It was not a natural and probable result of the breaches that there would be cancellation of all of Mons’s orders whether attributable to Kitopi or not. There were no particular circumstances which would have led Kitopi to think that such a consequence would occur. It follows that any losses caused by the closure of the portal are too remote to be recoverable.”

36. The above conclusions also mean:

37. As a result of his conclusions with respect to liability, the Judge found that Kitopi was entitled to be paid for meal boxes which it delivered up to and including 4 December 2023 and to the lost profit on boxes which had actually been ordered for delivery but had not been delivered after 6 December 2023 as a result of the cancellation of existing orders. He found that the amount due up to 4 December was AED 517,500 as set out in a spreadsheet which he accepted represented the amount unpaid to Kitopi up to 4 December 2023. He also found that Kitopi’s lost profits from 6 December 2023 onwards were AED 232,722 as shown in Kitopi’s expert report, which he considered to be a reliable estimate.¹⁵

38. The Judge also found that Mons was entitled to payment in the sum of AED 23,675 for refunds that it made as a result of non-delivery of Kitopi meal boxes which should have been delivered, being the figure calculated by Kitopi’s expert. He also found that Mons was entitled to be reimbursed for the fine of AED 1,500, which was caused by Kitopi’s breaches. He rejected the other counter-claims by Mons.

39. After setting off the amounts due to Kitopi and the amounts due to Mons, the Judge found that Kitopi was entitled to the net balance of AED 725,047.

Permission to appeal – legal principles

40. RDC 44.117 provides:

41. RDC 44.5 requires that an appellant obtain permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal except where the appeal is against a committal order.

42. RDC 44.19 provides:

43. RDC 44.19 provides that permission to appeal may only be given where the appeal would have a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

44. In the context of an assessment of the prospects of success “real” means realistic rather than fanciful and involves the same test as is applied in applications for immediate judgment.¹⁶

45. A real prospect of success does not mean a probability of success, but more than mere arguability.¹⁷

46. “Some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard” may include the public interest in clarifying the meaning and scope of relevant practice and provisions of DIFC and wider UAE law.¹⁸

47. It is established that “real” in the context of an assessment of the prospects of success means realistic rather than fanciful, applying the same test as is applied in an application for immediate judgment.¹⁹

48. It is also established that a real prospect of success does not mean a probability of success, but more than mere arguability.²⁰

49. Accordingly, in order to obtain the grant of permission, a prospective appellant needs to establish more than the proposition that the proposed appeal is reasonably arguable – rather, it must be established that there is a real prospect of success.²¹

50. When a renewed application made to the Court of Appeal is refused, it is appropriate for the Court to provide reasons which adequately explain the reasons why permission has been refused. The adequacy and extent of those reasons will be informed by the fact that the refusal of permission is final and conclusive and determines the issues the subject of the appeal.

51. On the other hand, when a renewed application for permission to appeal is granted, the reasons for the grant can and should be expressed more briefly, and any views expressed should be expressed and read as provisional, on the basis that a different view might well be formed following the consideration of the fuller argument which will be presented at the hearing of the appeal. Further, the reasons for granting permission in respect of grounds of appeal will be expressed economically, not only because the determination of the issue raised by the ground must await the hearing of the appeal but also to limit the prospect that a party might consider that a member of the Court of Appeal does not retain an open mind in relation to any of the issues in the appeal.

52. Particular principles apply to appeals against findings of fact based upon the testimony heard by the Judge at first instance, multifactorial evaluative assessments, and discretionary judgments. In most common law jurisdictions, including the DIFC, it is well established that in cases falling within any of these categories, an appellate court will show considerable restraint before intervening, and will only intervene in limited circumstances.

53. In relation to findings of fact made in reliance upon evidence given by witnesses, in Al Khorafi v Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Ltd²² the Court of Appeal observed:

54. Similar principles apply to constrain appellate intervention in cases involving appeals from multifactorial evaluative assessments.²⁴

55. In other words, within these categories of case, the appellate court will not intervene merely because it would have made a different decision to that made by the Judge at first instance. Rather, appellate intervention will only be justified if an appellate court is satisfied that:

The grounds of appeal

Ground 1

56. Ground 1 asserts that the Judge erred by concluding that Mons did not have an entitlement to accept repudiatory breaches of the Agreement by Kitopi.

57. In its skeleton argument in support of this ground, Monds does not appear to take issue with the legal principles relating to repudiation under English law applied by the Judge, while drawing attention to a difference in terminology in some of the authorities as between deprivation of “substantially the whole benefit” which the innocent party was to obtain,²⁵ or “a substantial part of the benefit” to which the innocent party was entitled under the contract.²⁶

58. Nevertheless, Kitopi accepts in its skeleton that whatever verbal formulation is adopted, the Court is required to undertake a multifactorial assessment of the effect of the breach on the injured party viewed in the context of the benefits the injured party was intended to obtain from performance of the contract.

59. Mons contends that the Judge’s finding that Kitopi had committed serious breaches of the Dubai Food Code, which resulted in its inability to deliver food during the latter part of 4 December and all of 5 December 2023, were sufficiently serious to constitute a repudiatory breach of the Agreement.

60. In this context, Mons submits that “there is no dispute that Product supplied by Kitopi, in the form of a pasta dish, was mouldy or contaminated”.²⁷ That submission is not correct. It is correct that there is photographic evidence that, at some point in time, pasta prepared by Kitopi was contaminated by mould, but the Judge expressly found that there was no evidence to establish that contaminated food was supplied by Kitopi to an end consumer.

61. Also in this context Mons contends, contrary to its earlier assertion, that the Judge should have found that Kitopi supplied contaminated food to the delegate whose complaint initiated the course of events that led to Kitopi being directed to leave the site. In support of that contention, Mons relies upon the provisions of the Agreement, and contends that the Judge had, in effect, required Mons to establish what had happened in relation to the relevant products when under the Agreement, Kitopi was responsible for the delivery of non-contaminated food to end customers.

62. These contentions are not sustainable. While the Judge found that there was evidence that some of the food prepared by Kitopi had become contaminated, he was not prepared to find, on the evidence, that any of that food had been supplied to an end consumer. There is no provision in the Agreement capable of discharging Mons from the burden of proving that contaminated product was supplied to an end consumer if it wished to rely on a finding to that effect in support of its claim of repudiatory breach. There was no direct evidence of any such supply.

63. Mons further contends that the Judge erred in principle by placing weight upon his conclusion that Kitopi’s breaches were not the cause of the closure of the portal which deprived Mons of the capacity to derive profit from the food to be supplied by Kitopi for the remaining eight days of CoP 28. It is difficult to reconcile this contention with the position advanced by Mons at trial, evident in its trial skeleton argument, in which it was contended that the reason why Mons terminated the Agreement was because the CoP 28 organisers had decided to cancel the service.

64. The cause of the decision by the Conference organisers to close the portal through which food would have been ordered for the remaining term of the Conference was clearly very relevant to the assessment of the consequences of Kitopi’s breach, as the Judge expressly held. The consequences of the breach is a most significant factor in the assessment of whether it can be properly characterized as repudiatory under English law. Having heard evidence from Mr Wright and Mr Elhait, it was clearly open to the Judge to find that the cause of Mr Elhait’s decision to direct the closure of the portal was the things said by Mr Wright, rather than the breaches of the Agreement by Kitopi. There is no prospect that the Court of Appeal would interfere with that finding, given the significant advantages which the Judge had of hearing and seeing the witnesses give their evidence. The Judge was also entitled to bring to account, in making that finding, the fact that Mr Elhait may well have been influenced by problems with the provision of services by Mons which had nothing to do with Kitopi.

65. Mons contends that the Judge took irrelevant considerations into account, and in particular his assessment that the breaches which he had found were “understandable”. Mons contends that the issue which the Judge was required to determine was the consequence of the breaches, rather than the reasons for them. The flaw in this submission is that it cannot be inferred from the Judge’s reference to the circumstances which contributed to Kitopi’s breaches of the Food Code that he did not consider the consequences of those breaches in order to determine whether or not they were repudiatory in character. Having expressly directed himself that the matters which he was required to take into account included the consequences of the breaches, there is no basis for concluding that the Judge did not do just that.

66. The Judge rejected Mons’ contention that contaminated products had been supplied by Kitopi to end consumers and further rejected Mons’ contention that Kitopi’s breaches were the cause of the decision to close the portal and to terminate service. Those were findings of fact with which an appellate court would not interfere, consistently with the principles enunciated above.

67. It follows that the Judge was left to assess whether the breaches which he had found established - namely, breaches of the Dubai Food Code and non-supply of food on the latter part of 4 December and all of 5 December 2023, constituted breaches of such significance as to entitle Mons to terminate the Agreement. That assessment fell to be made in a context in which the evidence established that arrangements had been put in place for Kitopi to resume the supply of food prepared in its own kitchen external to the Conference site with effect from 6 December 2023 and for the balance of the Conference. On that basis, the breaches for which Kitopi was responsible resulted in the non-delivery of products on some of one day and all of another day in a conference of 14 days duration, plus additional days prior to the formal start of the Conference on 30 November 2023. In this regard, it is significant that the Judge found that prior to the complaint on 4 December 2023 Kitopi was not perceived to be doing a bad job and was making more deliveries with fewer complaints than other parts of Mons’ operation.

68. The question which the Judge had to determine with respect to repudiatory breach was a multifactorial evaluative assessment based on findings of fact that he had made after hearing testimony from relevant witnesses. No error of legal principle has been identified, nor any failure to take relevant factors into account, nor the taking into account of irrelevant factors, and the decision that the breaches which the Judge had found (breach of the Food Code and non-supply for one and a bit days out of more than 14 days) were not such as to entitle Mons to terminate was clearly a decision open to the Judge and well within the range of reasonable decisions which could have been made. It follows that there is no basis upon which an appellate court could interfere with that decision.

69. For these reasons, ground 1 has no real prospect of success.

Ground 2

70. Ground 2 asserts that the Judge erred in deciding that the closure of the portal was not a foreseeable consequence of Kitopi’s breaches of the Agreement. In particular, it is contended that the Judge erred in law by applying the test of whether it was “a natural and probable result of the breaches that there would be cancellation of all of Mon’s orders whether attributable to Kitopi or not”.²⁸

71. Mons contends that the test which should have been applied is whether the closure of the portal was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties as a not unlikely result of Kitopi’s breach.

72. It is unnecessary to consider the legal principles relating to remoteness of damage in relation to breaches of contract because this ground would only arise if ground 1 succeeded and it was held that Mons was entitled to terminate the Agreement. In the absence of such a finding, the observations of the Judge with respect to remoteness are surplusage.

73. As ground 1 has no prospect of success, even if ground 2 were upheld, it would not result in the Judge’s decision being set aside. In that sense, ground 2 has no real prospect of success.

Ground 3

74. Ground 3 contends that the Judge erred by awarding Kitopi sums representing the contract price of products which he had held it failed to deliver. Mons contends that the spreadsheet upon which the Judge relied for his assessment of the amount payable in respect of orders up to 4 December 2023 was based upon orders, rather than delivered product, and also included orders for delivery on 5 December 2023 when no deliveries occurred at all on that day.

75. Mons further contends that the Judge fell into error by allowing Kitopi to benefit from an amount of AED 23,100 in respect of “boxes printed” which was included in the amount awarded to Kitopi.

76. These submissions appear to overlook the fact that the Judge granted Mons’ counter-claim in respect of refunds which Mons was obliged to make because product which had been ordered was not delivered. It was open to the Judge to find that this amount covered product in respect of which orders had been placed but which were not in fact delivered on the latter part of 4 December or 5 December 2023.

77. It was also open to the Judge to find that Kitopi was entitled to recoup its cost of printing boxes which were not used because of the unlawful termination of the Agreement by Mons.

78. This ground of appeal has no real prospect of success.

Conclusion

79. For the reasons given, none of the proposed grounds of appeal has any real prospect of success. Mons does not contend that there is any other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard. It follows that the Permission to Appeal Application must be dismissed with costs.