Claim No. CFI 084/2024

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

CITY STARS TRADING CRUDE OIL AND REFIND PROUDUCTS

Claimant

and

LANGUR HOLDING CORPORATION S.L

Defendant

ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE ANDREW MORAN

UPON the Claimant’s Part 7 Claim Form dated 6 November 2024 (the “Claim” or “Claims”)

AND UPON the Case Management Order of H.E. Justice Andrew Moran dated 19 March 2025 (the “CMO”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Andrew Moran dated 26 May 2025 (the “26 May Order”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. CFI-084-2024/4 dated 15 December 2025, for an Unless Order and for Security for Costs (the “UO&SFCA”)

AND UPON the parties agreeing under the Rules of the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts 2014 (“RDC”), Rule 23.6 that the UO&SFCA should be determined on the documents filed without a hearing

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Andrew Moran dated 12 February 2026, (the UO&SFCA Order”)

AND UPON the Claimant failing to comply with paragraph 1 of the UO&SFCA Order by the date ordered for its compliance, and upon such failure, its claim being automatically struck out and dismissed

AND UPON paragraph 2 of the UO&SFCA Order that the Claimant shall, in the event of its Claim being struck out, pay the Defendant’s costs of the proceedings, which shall be summarily assessed by the Court in default of agreement

AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. CFI-084-2024/6, dated 4 March 2026 (the “Application”) and the fifth statement of Brian Dayton in support thereof

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-084-2026/7 dated 6 March 2026, seeking the recusal of H.E. Justice Andrew Moran (the “Recusal Application”)

AND UPON reviewing the Court file

IT IS HEREBY DECLARED AND ORDERED THAT:

1. The Claimant’s claim in these proceedings has been automatically struck out and stands dismissed.

2. The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs of the proceedings summarily assessed in the amount of USD 314,292.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 5 May 2026
At: 1pm

1. By paragraph 1 of the UO&SFCA Order dated 12 February 2026, the Court ordered that:

“Unless the Claimant complies with paragraph 5 of the 26 May Order, by payment of the amount of USD 19,905.03 to the Defendant into its bank account, details of which have been provided to it for that payment, within fourteen days of the date of this order, that is, by or before normal bank closing time where the designated account is held, on 26 February 2026, its Claims in these proceedings shall be struck out and stand dismissed upon expiry of that time for payment.”

It made that Order for the detailed schedule of reasons attached to it, following a protracted course of non-compliance by the Claimant with the RDC and orders and directions that the Court had made during the course of the proceedings, which are found in earlier orders made by the Court and the reasons for them, recorded on the Court file. This conduct culminated in the Claimant’s failure to comply with paragraph 5 of the 26 May Order, which led to the UO&SFCA Application, pursuant to which the UO&SFCA Order was made.

2. By this Application No. CFI-084-2024/6, dated 4 March 2026 now before the Court, in respect of which a Certificate of Service dated 23 March 2026 has been filed showing that the Application was served upon the Claimant and its designated representative Mr Ali Abualhasan at a total of six different email addresses, the Defendant seeks orders as follows:

3. The Court is satisfied the Application was duly served and that the Claimant has had due notice of it; but it has neither acknowledged it nor responded to it, within the time allowed for doing so, and after further ample opportunity to do so. The Court therefore considers it appropriate to proceed to determine the Application.

4. Before doing so, the Court records that it is aware of the Recusal Application issued by the Claimant on 6 March 2026, which has not been shown to have been served on the Defendant, and in relation to which the Registry has, on two separate occasions, (the most recent being by email sent on 23 March 2026), sought confirmation of service from the Claimant. These inquiries have not been responded to, and service of the Recusal Application has not been confirmed.

5. Whilst the court would not normally consider an application that has not been served on another party, it is an application that I should recuse myself from continuing to preside in this case and thus not decide the Application. This is for reasons set out in a statement by Mr Ali Abualhasan dated 26 February 2026. In it, he claims that there is “a legitimate and reasonable doubt on the part of the Claimant as to the impartiality of the presiding Judge, which necessitates his recusal in order to safeguard the proper administration of justice” which claim I have carefully considered.

6. In the circumstances, I am satisfied it is both necessary and appropriate that I should deal with the Recusal Application briefly (notwithstanding it has not been served upon the Defendant) to hold that it is an application entirely without merit because: (i) in making it, the Claimant posits the wrong test, viz. whether there is “a reasonable and legitimate doubt on the part of the claimant as to the impartiality of the Judge”; and (ii) for all of the valid reasons given by me justifying the various orders I have made in the course of these proceedings, on which the Claimant bases its Recusal Application.

7. Applying the relevant and applicable objective test in this jurisdiction, of whether a fair- minded and informed observer (not the Claimant), having considered the facts, would conclude that there is a real possibility that the tribunal was biased, I am satisfied that the answer would be in the negative.

8. Turning to the Application, the evidence of Mr Dayton in his fifth witness statement confirms and I am satisfied, that the unless order I made in paragraph 1 of the UO&SFCA Order, has not been complied with. Mr Dayton is correct in his assertions that the sanction of striking out for its breach applies automatically; and that the Defendant is entitled to its costs of the proceedings to be summarily assessed by me. There is no response to this evidence or the Application; and there is no application for relief from the sanction which has automatically come into effect. It is not necessary to apply for the claim to be struck out because that has occurred automatically; and no judgment can be given on a claim which has been struck out, because there is no claim to be judged. Accordingly, the appropriate order is one of declaring that the claim has been struck out and by that means, stands dismissed.

9. As for assessing costs payable, the record of these proceedings stands as testimony to the substantial costs that have undoubtedly been incurred in responding to the claim and more significantly, to the Claimant’s conduct of the proceedings, which is recounted in the several orders and reasons, I have made and given.

10. I have considered the Statement of Costs carefully and note the following features. The first is that the charging rates of the lawyers, from a first tier global law firm, practicing in multiple cities including (relevant to this case) Madrid and Dubai, are, for two of the senior partners Mr Dayton and Mr Vinals, slightly above rates the court commonly encounters being charged by senior partners in such firms both in Dubai and other major common law jurisdictions in litigation and arbitration (but only by a small amount). Mr Bhullar’s rate is significantly higher. The rates for the junior lawyers who have done most of the work on the case, Ana Morales and Jimena Machado, are certainly reasonable and at the lower end of the scale of charging for lawyers of their seniority, that are commonly encountered in commercial litigation. It is also apparent that the allocation of work has been sensible, efficient and costs-saving, in that by far the greater number of hours spent and claimed for work on the case was by these junior lawyers. As commonly arises, a larger than necessary team of lawyers has been engaged – nine in all. This is, however, mitigated by the apparent fact that apart from Ivan Tescon, all of the rest together spent less than 20 hours working on the case.

11. As for disbursements, these are all costs that were reasonably and proportionately incurred and I find them to be reasonable and proportionate in amount. They will be awarded in full.

12. The balance of legal costs claimed after deduction of disbursements from the total, is USD 274,972.13. Taking all of the relevant factors I have mentioned into account, and having regard to my knowledge of the case and my own time spent on it, I have formed the view that a modest reduction of the amount of costs claimed is appropriate, to arrive at an amount of costs that was reasonably and proportionately incurred, by the Defendant. This takes account of the likelihood that there was some avoidable duplication of work, some time spent that could have been avoided in briefing a multiplicity of lawyers, and some higher than reasonable charging rates being applied for some work. The Court therefore concludes that an appropriate award of costs in this case is USD 250,000 plus the disbursements paid of USD 64,292, being in total, USD 314,292.