Claim No: CFI 117/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURT

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

QUORTIA LTD

Claimant

and

FRANK IRRLING

Defendant

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ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE MICHAEL BLACK KC

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PENAL NOTICE

IF YOU, FRANK IRRLING, DISOBEY THIS ORDER YOU MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DUBAI, FINED OR HAVE YOUR ASSETS SEIZED.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS THE RESPONDENT TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY ALSO BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DUBAI OR FINED.

UPON the Claimant’s ex parte Urgent Application No. CFI-117-2025/1 dated 5 December 2025 seeking a domestic freezing injunction over the assets held by the Defendant in Dubai and elsewhere in the United Arab Emirates up to the value of EUR 4,000,000 together with ancillary worldwide disclosure orders (the “Claimant’s Application”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black KC dated 9 December 2025 (the “Freezing Order”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black KC dated 16 December 2025 (the “16 December 2025 Order”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black KC dated 22 December 2025 (the “22 December 2025 Order”)

AND UPON the Order of H.E. Justice Michael Black KC dated 26 December 2025 (the “26 December 2025 Order”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. CFI-0117-2025/4 dated 2 January 2026 seeking to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court (the “Defendant’s Jurisdiction Challenge”)

AND UPON the Defendant’s Application No. CFI-0117-2025/5 dated 2 January 2026 seeking to discharge the freezing order (the “Defendant’s Discharge Application”)

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant at a further Return hearing held before H.E. Justice Michael Black KC on 9 January 2026 (the “9 January 2026 Return Date hearing”)

AND PURSUANT TO the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Defendant’s Jurisdiction Challenge is dismissed.

2. The Defendant’s Discharge Application is dismissed.

3. The Injunction granted on 9 December 2025 shall continue until further Order of the Court.

4. The Defendant shall pay the costs of the proceedings to the Claimant in the sum of AED 1,098,601.16.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 16 January 2026
At: 8am

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

INTRODUCTION

1. On 8 December 2025, I made a freezing order (the “Injunction”) without notice at the instance of Quortia Ltd (“Quortia/ Claimant”) against Frank Irrling (“Mr Irrling/ Defendant”). The Injunction restrained Mr Irrling from, until after the Return Date (15 December 2025) or further order of the Court, removing from the UAE or in any way disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of any of his assets in the UAE, save that: (a) if the total unencumbered value of his assets in the UAE exceeded EUR 3,520,000, he may remove from the UAE and may dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of such part of his assets as exceeded that amount, so long as the total unencumbered value of his assets remaining in the UAE continued to exceed EUR 3,520,000; and (b) he was entitled to spend sums of living and legal expenses.

2. The prohibition included the following bank accounts of Mr Irrling held with Mashreq Bank PSC:

3. The Injunction was made on the basis that it was in support of legal proceedings instituted by Quortia against Mr Irrling on 24 November 2025 before the District Court of Paphos in the Republic of Cyprus (the “Cypriot Proceedings”) bearing Case No. 690/25 for causes of action including breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud and extortion. A copy of the proceedings was exhibited to the First Affidavit of Styliana Pavlidou (“Ms Pavlidou”), an associate at Frangos & Associates, Quortia’s legal counsel in Cyprus, dated 13 December 2025.

4. The dealings between the parties raised the possibility that they may have been designed to circumvent sanctions levied by the Canadian Government. I therefore pressed the Claimant for evidence that this was not the case. While the Government of the United Arab Emirates does not recognise the relevant sanctions regime, this Court would nevertheless hesitate to grant discretionary relief directed to assisting acts that may be considered to breach the laws or regulations of another jurisdiction. In the event, the requested evidence was provided. The history recounted below does bear many of the hallmarks of money-laundering, but in the absence of firm evidence I am prepared to take the various explanations and transactions at their face value. If the question of illegality were to be raised, that would ultimately be a matter for the Cypriot courts and clearly a serious issue to be tried.

5. Quortia’s application on 8 December 2025 for a freezing order was supported by the First Affidavit of Artem Gabestro, who is a legal consultant employed by Quortia, who undertook most of the dealings with Mr Irrling on Quortia’s behalf. Mr Gabestro subsequently confirmed that he acts only behalf of Quortia and Nelya Levitina (“Mrs Levitina”).

6. On 10 December 2025, the Cypriot Proceedings documents were provided to a process server in Cyprus to proceed with service on Mr Irrling at his last known residential address. Ms Pavlidou noted that no other address, including any address of work, was known. On 10 December 2025, the process server attempted to effect service; however, service was not successful as Mr Irrling had vacated his last known address in Cyprus. As at 13 December 2025, Messrs Frangos & Associates were preparing an application requesting permission for service via alternative means.

7. On 15 December 2025, Quortia filed an application to continue the Injunction supported by the Second Affidavit of Mr Gabestro, the First Affidavit of Mrs Levitina and the First Affidavit of Ms Pavlidou.

8. Mr Irrling declined to attend the Return Date hearing on 15 December 2025 on the basis that he had not yet secured representation. Quortia filed a second affidavit from Mr Gabestro providing the information I had requested and applied for the Injunction to be continued. I continued the Injunction and adjourned the Return Date to 22 December 2025.

9. Quortia filed a further application to continue the Injunction on 19 December 2025 supported by a Third Affidavit of Mr Gabestro.

10. On 22 December 2025, Mr Irrling was represented by counsel (Mr Robert Sliwinski) who informed the Court that he had only been instructed the previous Friday (it being a Monday). I accepted that he needed more time to take instructions and I continued the Injunction initially contemplating a further hearing on 2 January 2025 but on reflection I directed that:

11. On 2 January 2026, Mr Irrling served an application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court (the “Defendant’s Jurisdiction Challenege”) and an application seeking to discharge the Injunction supported by his First Affidavit (the “Defendant’s Discharge Application”)

12. On 6 January 2026, Quortia served its evidence in response – the Fourth Affidavit of Mr Gabestro and the Second Affidavit of Ms Pavlidou.

13. Thus, the matters before the Court on 9 January 2025 were (in logical order):

THE FACTS

14. What follows is taken from the evidence filed by the Claimant. I will indicate where the narrative is contradicted by the Defendant. To say that the transactional history was complicated would be an understatement.

15. Quortia is a limited liability company incorporated in Cyprus on 22 August 2012. Its sole shareholder is Mrs Levitina, a Ukraine-born citizen of Malta. Mrs Levitina is not a sanctioned individual but is married to Leonid Levitin, who is sanctioned by Canada, and is the sister-in-law of Igor Levitin, who was apparently Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation and is an aide to the President of Russia.

16. Until 13 June 2025, Quortia owned 100% of Welfare Invest S.R.O., (“Welfare”) a company incorporated in the Czech Republic that owned a retirement home in the town of Čenkov, which primarily provides care for residents with dementia, chronic mental illness and Alzheimer’s disease. In his Second Affidavit dated 13 December 2025, Mr Gabestro, in order to reassure the Court that it was a genuine business, gave further details: the care home is a three-storey, 1,760 square-metre building completed in 2015. The website for the care home can be accessed on https://www.domovcenkov.cz/.

17. Welfare was indebted to Quortia in the sum of EUR 3,520,000 plus interest of EUR 582,264.59 as of 1 June 2020 plus interest accruing at 3% per annum.

18. At the same time Quortia was indebted to Mrs Levitina in respect of dividends, the oustanding balance of which is currently approximately USD 5.8 million.

19. Following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in February 2022, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions by various countries including those in the European Union (“EU”), it became increasingly difficult for Mrs Levitina and Russian nationals associated with Quortia and Welfare to manage Welfare’s operations, given that the Czech Republic is a member of the EU and Mrs Levitina is resident in Russia and married to a Russian national. Consequently, a decision was made to sell Welfare.

20. I expressed concerns at the without notice hearing as to whether the entire transaction involving Quortia, Welfare, Mr Irrling, and other parties, was genuine or whether it was part of an effort to evade sanctions or launder funds. In his Second Affidavit, Mr Gabestro stated that it was necessitated by the operational challenges caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, which affected Quortia and associated individuals, including its ultimate beneficial owner, Mrs Levitina. He produced the balance sheet in the 2021 audited financial statement of Quortia (prepared in July 2023) which showed a total asset value of approximately USD 282.9 million. Quortia’s assets included the following:

21. An interim dividend of USD 20 million was declared by Quortia’s board to Mrs Levitina on 31 December 2021. The dividend was reflected in the 2021 audited financial accounts. While Quortia had an operating loss in 2021, the dividend was declared utilising the share premium reserve of USD 267,983,382 and by transferring it to retained earnings. Out of the USD 20 million due to Mrs Levitina, Mrs Levitina has been paid approximately USD 14.5 million. This was settled through the sale of assets owned by Quortia:

22. I also expressed concerns as to whether Mrs Levitina was the real owner of Quortia or whether she was acting as nominee for her husband, who was, as noted, a sanctioned individual. In her First Affidavit of 31 December 2025, she explained that in 2016 she and her husband acquired Quortia. Its principal business was to act as a holding company for investments in real estate companies and the provision of finance. The funding of Quortia came from various business enteprises in which the Levitins had been involved since the 1990s. In 2017, Mr Levitin decided to retire and began transferring his shares to Mrs Levitina. By December 2021, Mrs Levitina was the 100% shareholder in Quortia. Between 2017 and 2019, Quortia generated profits from trading in real estate and stocks and shares.

23. Although Mr Levitin had retired, he remained available to assist Mrs Levitina when required. He gave her advice and interacted directly with Mr Irrling as she was not comfortable doing so herself.

24. A prospective purchaser of Welfare was identified in the Czech Republic. Having obtained permission, Mr Gabestro named the purchaser as Czech Investor Company - Bergmanuv mlyn s.r. (the “Buyer”); however, the Buyer then informed the Claimant that its financing bank would not approve financing for any transaction perceived as closely connected to Russia or Russian nationals. To address this concern and allow the Buyer to secure financing, it was agreed to introduce additional layers of separation between Welfare and the Russian nationals through a series of agreements relating to Welfare’s shareholding structure.

25. Quortia identified Stanislav Andonov, a Bulgarian national, as a potential intermediary purchaser to acquire its shares in Welfare on a nominal basis, with the intention of subsequently transferring those shares to the Buyer. Accordingly, Mrs Levitina entered into a Share Purchase Agreement dated 30 December 2022 with Stanislav Andonov for the sale and purchase of 100% of Quortia’s ordinary share capital in Welfare for a consideration of EUR 350,000.

26. Despite this arrangement, the Buyer remained reluctant to purchase the shares from Stanislav Andonov as he was born in Russia.

27. In or around April 2024, Quortia identified the Defendant, Mr Irrling, as a potential nominee shareholder on the basis that he was a German national and not born in Russia. Mr Irrling agreed to the proposal in consideration of EUR 80,500, stating in an email dated 19 April 2024:

“Entering as an (sic) Shareholder in a Cypriot company is not a problem at all and should be discussed in more details and stated in an MOU for all partners involved”.

28. Mr Gabestro emailed Mr Irrling on 8 May 2024:

29. Mr Irrling entered into a Services and Management Agreement with Mrs Levitina dated 6 August 2024, which was subsequently amended on 5 March 2025 (the “Amended Services Agreement”). There were terms of the Amended Services Agreement as follows (the Defendant was referred to as “FI” and Mrs Levitina as “NL”)

30. Thus, Mr Irrling was to receive 100% of the shares in Welfare from Quortia. The Buyer was to purchase the shares in Welfare from Mr Irrling and take an assignment from Quortia of the indebtedness of Welfare to Quortia all for the sum of around EUR 3.5 million which would be received by Mr Irrling into an escrow account in Germany. The monies would then ultimately be transferred into a bank account designated by Mrs Levitina. In return for his services, Mr Irrling would receive EUR 80,500. The Defendant has been paid a total of EUR 40,500 to date.

31. Following further discussions with the Buyer, Mr Irrling suggested, and ultimately a decision was taken, that it would be easier to sell Welfare if Mr Irrling became the direct shareholder of both Quortia and Welfare. Mr Irrling became the shareholder of Quortia by a Share Purchase Agreement dated 7 August 2024 (the “SPA”) made between Stanislav Andonov and Mr Irrling at a purchase price of EUR 350,000 and an associated Instrument of Transfer of Shares of the same date.

32. The arrangement was secured by the following also dated 7 August 2024:

33. By a “Business Purchase Letter of Intent” bearing the effective date of 1 November 2024 but signed on behalf of Quortia (by Mr Irrling) and the Buyer and Welfare on 30 April 2025, it was provided that:

“The Purchase Price constitutes EUR 3.500.000,00. The Buyer will enter into an agreement with the Seller for sale and purchase of the entire business share of WELFARE INVESTMENT S.R.O. for EUR 10.000,00 for receiving a 100 % ownership interest in the Business (the "SPA"). Besides the SPA the Seller will assign to the Buyer its rights to receive outstanding indebtedness from the Business to the Buyer and the Seller will procure that WELFARE INVESTMENT S.R.O. consents to such assignment (the "Assignment'). The Assignment will be for consideration in the amount of EUR 3,490,000.00 to be paid by the Buyer to the Seller.”

34. It is however to be noted that it was also provided that “This Letter of Intent will terminate if there has not been Formal agreements signed or a closing within 120 days from the Effective Date” which meant that it had already expired by the date it was signed. In his Third Affidavit dated 19 December 2025, Mr Gabestro said that this discrepancy was not identified by the parties at the time it was executed, and a new LOI was not executed as no party expressed any concerns.

35. On 3 June 2025, Quortia transferred the shares in Welfare to Mr Irrling. Thus, from that date Mr Irrling was the shareholder of both Quortia and Welfare.

36. The intention was that on the sale of Welfare’s shares to the Buyer, the consideration that was due to Quortia would be used in part to pay Quortia’s liability to Mr Levitina for dividends.

37. On 16 October 2025, by a Deed of Assignment Quortia assigned the principal debt due from Welfare of EUR 3.52 million to Mr Irrling on the basis that all payments would only be accepted into the escrow and trustee account operated by Prof. Dr. jur. H-C Jahr. By Clause 2.1 of the Deed of Assignment, it was provided:

“The Assignment is made with consideration of EUR 3,520,000 or equivalent in other currency to be paid by Frank Irrling to the account designated by Quortia in a separate letter within I business day after receipt of such letter by e-mail.”

38. It is said that there was a delay in the transaction and so a company called Yarkee SFO DMCC (“Yarkee”) made an interest-free loan to Mr Irrling of EUR 3.52 million on 20 October 2025 to be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of the Welfare shares to the Buyer (“the Loan”). It is Quortia’s case that the purpose of the Loan was to accelerate the payment to Mrs Levitina. It is Mr Irrling’s case that the Loan had nothing to do with his dealings with Quortia or Mrs Levitina. In fact, the purpose of the Loan was explained to Mr Irrling by Mr Gabestro in an email dated 8 October 2025:

39. Mr Irrling replied on 10 October 2025:

40. The Loan was indeed secured by a Personal Guarantee of the same date given by Mrs Levitina. It was said that Yarkee is a development company based in the UAE with whom Mrs Levitina has several investment agreements. Yarkee was willing to provide the Loan to Mr Irrling on the strength of its relationship with Mrs Levitina and the comfort provided by her personal guarantee.

41. I queried why a company that was said to be independent of Mrs Levatina should make what was alleged to be in effect an interest-free loan to her, albeit against her personal guarantee. In his Second Affidavit, Mr Gabestro said that Yarkee is a company established in the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), UAE and functions an international family office providing investment advice and opportunities for its clients (https://www.yarkee.com/about-yarkee/). Mrs Levitina has no direct (subsequently clarified to “no”) ownership or interest in Yarkee. All dealings with Yarkee have been with Romeo Abdo, Yarkee’s legal counsel Wael Abouhabib, and Jcel Cruz (sales manager). Mrs Levitina routinely invests through Yarkee, and has to-date, invested a sum of AED 32,500,000. Mrs Levitina’s investments through Yarkee have been in respect of real estate development projects. In or about, 30 July 2025, Mrs Levitina invested in the pre-launch of Phase 1 of a real estate development project named Ardee Al Marjan Island in Ras al Khaimah. This project is being implemented by Yarkee, through its subsidiaries, Ardee Developments FZ-LLC and Ardee Properties FZ-LLC. Yarkee holds funds transferred by Mrs Levitina for further investments.

42. On 21 October 2025, a letter of instruction was sent by Mr Gabestro to Mr Irrling dated 20 October 2025 referring to the Deed of Assignment dated 16 August 2025 (which is said by Mr Gabestro to be an erroneous reference to 20 October 2025) calling and upon him to pay the Loan amount received from Yarkee to Mrs Levitina in satisfaction of his liability to Quortia under the Deed of Assignment. The letter stated:

“By signing this instruction letter, we acknowledge that full payment of the Consideration to NL shall be deemed as full and final settlement of your payment obligations under the Deed.”

43. This would have left Mr Irrling in the position that he was owner of the shares in both Quortia and Welfare, he was the assignee of Welfare’s debt to Quortia and indebted to Yarkee in the sum of EUR 3.52 million. Thus, when the Buyer paid the consideration for the shares in Welfare, he would be able to transfer the shares to the Buyer and discharge his indebtedness to Yarkee. If the purchase of Welfare did not take place, Mr Irrling could return the money to Yarkee.

44. In his affidavit dated 2 January 2026, (wrongly marked as his First Affidavit – in fact it was his third) Mr Irrling stated:

“On 20 October 2025, an instruction letter was issued that the number of Euro 3,520,000 to Ms. Neyla's bank account in UAE, and the transfer shall be in AED, this became very suspicious to me, as this was totally different from what we agreed upon in the deed of assignment and the Service Agreement.”

45. This evidence appears inconsistent with the exchange of emails on 8 and 10 October 2025 where Mr Gabestro explained the rationale for the Loan and provided a draft of the Loan agreement to which Mr Irrling replied that the Loan agreement was “with my consent in general”, but he proposed some changes to the document.

46. On 3 November 2025, Yarkee transferred the funds under the Loan to Mr Irrling’s Euro bank account number ending 3820 with Mashreq Bank.

47. On 4 November 2025, by a WhatsApp message addressed to Mr Gabestro, Mr Irrling confirmed receipt of EUR 3,419,467.78 into his account with Mashreq bank. He did not receive the full EUR 3,520,000 because he provided his Euro account details instead of his Dirham account details, resulting in the funds being converted to Euros at the bank’s exchange rate.

48. All subsequent communications were via WhatsApp unless stated to the contrary.

49. On 5 November 2025, Mr Gabestro asked Mr Irrling if he had sent the funds to Mrs Levitina. He replied on 6 November 2025:

50. Later the same day, Mr Gabestro spoke to Mr Irrling and subsequently provided copies of all of the documents he requested (namely the Deed of Assignment and the Loan agreement) via WhatsApp so that he could present them to his bank. The next day, 7 November 2025, Mr Gabestro followed up with Mr Irrling responded, “I have sent the agreement to my relationship manager from Mashreq Bank to review the case. He will come back to me for clarification.”

51. On 8 November 2025, Mr Gabestro asked Mr Irrling that he simply instruct his bank to return the funds to Yarkee, he said,

52. Mr Irrling replied:

53. On 10 November 2025, Mr Gabestro asked Mr Irrling to confirm the value of the funds received in his account and whether his account was a Euro account stating “[t]he amount shown in transfer is 3.419,457,08 (sic). Is it your Euro account?” Mr Irrling replied, “Yes”.

54. Mr Gabesto says that subsequent conversations with Mr Irrling reinforced the impression that, despite his reassurances to the contrary, he was deliberately delaying the process and evading communication.

55. On 11 November 2025, Mr Gabestro asked Mr Irrling over the telephone to return the funds to Yarkee immediately. Mr Irrling responded via the email that day:

56. Mr Gabestro replied the same day by email (11 November 2025), once again asking Mr Irrling to instruct his bank to return the funds to Yarkee. The email contained a draft Deed of Termination and Release to be executed by Mr Irrling and Yarkee terminating the Loan.

57. Mr Gabestro travelled to Dubai in order to meet Mr Irrling and go to Yarkee’s offices. Mr Irrling’s WhatsApp messages indicate prevarication. It appears he then left Dubai.

58. On 13 November 2025, Mr Gabestro sent Mr Irrling a WhatsApp message requesting a fresh screenshot of his bank account to confirm that the funds remained intact. The screenshot provided indicated a current account balance of AED 11,330,376.52 (approximately €2,700,189.70 at the bank’s exchange rate) and a deposit of AED 2,000,000 with Mashreq Bank (bearing No. 019020185246). The screenshot indicated that the deposit was made on 5 November 2025, the day after Mr Irrling received the funds under the Loan. The deposit appeared to carry an interest rate of 3.93% with 20 October 2028 being the maturity date.

59. On 13 November 2025, via a call on BOTIM, Mr Gabestro asked Mr Irrling to explain the shortfall of approximately EUR 200,000 in the funds shown in his account. His reply was that this sum was transferred to his company in order to renew its business licence.

60. Mr Gabestro responded shortly thereafter (the same day) with the following WhatsApp messages referring to the screenshots:

61. The same day, 13 November 2025, Mr Irrling addressed an email to Mr Gabestro with a letter attached. The cover email stated that Mr Irrling had already left Dubai for Addis Ababa. The letter stated as follows:

62. In his affidavit of 2 January 2026, Mr Irrling said:

63. These assertions sit uneasily with the unchallenged correspondence passing between the parties and in particular his statement that “I have received a personal loan from the company YARKEE to cover the purchase of rights in consideration of the Deed of Assignment and to be transferred to the former shareholder of Quortia Mrs Nelya.”

64. Mr Irrling does not provide any explanation as to why Yarkee should make an interest-free loan to him coincidently in the same amount as due to Mrs Levitina in relation to the sale of Welfare or why Mrs Levitina would give her personal guarantee in respect of the Loan.

65. Also, on 13 November 2025, a resolution was passed removing Mr Irrling from his role as ‘director’ of Quortia.

66. On or around 14 November 2025, Mrs Levitina took steps to invoke the Call Option in order to claw back Mr Irrling’s shares in Quortia. The Call Option and supporting documents have been filed with the Department of Registrar of Companies in Cyprus.

67. Mr Gabestro replied to Mr Irrling’s letter of 13 November on15 November 2025:

68. Mr Gabestro explained in his Second Affidavit that the emphasized words above were an attempt to exert some pressure on Mr Irrling to return the funds.

69. Mr Gabestro left Dubai for Moscow on 16 November 2025. He spoke to Mr Irrling by telephone on 19 November 2025. He recorded and transcribed the call (“A” is Mr Gabestro; “F” is Mr Irrling):

70. As noted above, on 24 November 2025, Quortia commenced the Cypriot Proceedings and Messrs Frangos & Associates were preparing an application requesting permission for service via alternative means. In her Second Affidavit dated 6 January 2026, Ms Pavlidou confirmed that an application for Substituted Service of the Claim Form and Statement of Claim is listed for hearing before the Cyprus Court on 15 January 2026.

THE HEARING OF 9 JANUARY 2026

71. At the Hearing, Quortia was represented by Mr Mark Rainsford KC and Mr Martin Khoshdel, Mr Irrling was represented by Mr Sliwinski.

Jurisdiction Challenge

72. I directed that logically, Mr Irrling’s jurisdiction challenge should be heard first. Mr Sliwinski opened by referring to Article 5(A) of the Judicial Authority Law, Dubai Law No. (12) of 2004. I pointed out to him that the Judicial Authority Law had been superseded by the Court Law 2025, Dubai Law No. (2) of 2025. This seemed to come as something of a surprise to Mr Sliwinski notwithstanding that it was stated in terms at paragraph 10 of Quortia’s skeleton argument: “The Jurisdictional Challenge has made numerous references and submissions to Law No 12 of 2004 being the Judicial Authority Law, which has now been repealed and replaced by Dubai Law No 2 of 2025.” He said that the challenge had been drafted by those instructing him. I said that counsel must take responsibility for their submissions made to the Court and I regarded the situation as “wholly unacceptable”. I did however allow Mr Sliwinski a break of 10 minutes to gather his thoughts and look at the Court Law which was within the hearing bundle.

73. When the Hearing resumed, Mr Sliwinksi withdrew the jurisdiction challenge. At that point, Mr Sliwinksi said that those instructing him wished to address the Court. I asked if they had rights of audience, he said they did not. I said that they must therefore address the Court through counsel. He reaffirmed that the jurisdiction challenge was withdrawn. It therefore follows that Mr Irrling is to be treated as having accepted that the Court has jurisdiction to try the Claim (see Rules of the DIFC Court (“RDC”) Rule 12.5(1)).

Continuation/Discharge Applications

74. Mr Rainsford then opened the application to continue the Freezing Order (Mr Irrling’s application to discharge the Order was of course the obverse of the same coin). He referred to the customary tripartite test (as recorded in my decision in Techteryx v Aria Commodities & Others [2025] DIFC DEC 001 at [40]-[48]) namely that it was necessary first to show a serious issue to be tried, then, that there was a risk of dissipation of assets with a view to thwarting the satisfaction of any judgment of the Court if the injunction were not granted, and finally, that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of an injunction and that it was just and expedient or convenient and appropriate to grant the injunction.

75. Not only did Mr Sliwikski accept that these were the applicable principles, he conceded that there were serious issues to be tried.

76. Mr Rainsford moved on to the risk of dissipation and suggested that Mr Irrling was guilty of “unambiguous impropriety”. The phrase “unambiguous impropriety” is generally used in the context of an exception to without prejudice privilege, but I understood Mr Rainsford to be referring to the well-known passage in Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Morimoto [2019] EWCA Civ 2203 at [51] where Haddon-Cave LJ said,

77. It is accepted in Quortia’s skeleton argument for the without notice hearing that as to risk of dissipation of assets, there must be ‘solid evidence’ in support. It is insufficient to establish a risk of dissipation merely to establish a good arguable case that the respondent had been guilty of dishonesty; the evidence needs to lead to the conclusion that assets are likely to be dissipated in order to thwart enforcement by the Court.

78. “Mere” dishonesty is not enough; the dishonesty must be “relevant to the issue of dissipation”. Mr Rainsford submitted that it was not sustainable that the Loan had nothing to with the arrangements for the sale of Welfare and that Mr Irrling had misappropriated the funds by paying them away into his own accounts. This, he said, was evidence that showed dissipation of his assets. He accepted that these were matters for trial, but they amounted to serious issues to be tried.

79. Mr Rainsford submitted there was evidence of the movement of assets after he said Mr Irrling was aware of the Injunction. He went so far as to suggest that the Court might use its power under RDC 52.11 to make an order of committal on its own initiative for breach of the Court’s Order. I declined and observed that RDC 52.11 was primarily directed to “contempt in the face of the Court” (i.e. as described at Articles 35.A.1-4 of the Court Law). If it is alleged that a person is guilty of contempt as set out at Article 35.A.5 of the Court Law (“Failing to comply with, or declining to act upon, a judgement, decision or order of the DIFC Courts”) it is essential that the procedure in RDC Part 52 is followed and due process observed, in particular the claim form or application notice must set out in full the grounds on which the committal application is made and must identify, separately and numerically, each alleged act of contempt including, if known, the date of each of the alleged acts supported by written evidence in affidavit form served personally on the respondent. The respondent must generally be given an opportunity to be heard at a public hearing.

80. Quortia alleges that Mr Irrling was served with notice of the Injunction the dated it was made on 9 December 2025. It says that he was served by email at 12:34pm to: frank_irrling@yahoo.com and irrling_holding@yahoo.com. He was also notified by WhatsApp which apparently showed that the messages had been delivered and read.

81. By email dated 5 January 2026, Mr Irrling’s legal representative asserted “Nothing in the wording of the Order obliges the Respondent to provide explanations, justifications, supporting documents, or transactional histories relating to transfers made prior to service of the Order, which occurred on 12 December 2025 (the "Order Service Date").” Mr Irrling does not state when he was served in his three affidavits.

82. On the balance of probabilities, on the material currently before me, it appears more likely to me that Mr Irrling did become aware of the Injunction on 9 December 2025.

83. Quortia produced a schedule analysing the documents produced by Mr Irrling. The statement for Mashreq EUR Account No. 3820 showed the payments from Yarkee of EUR 3,419,457.08 on 3 November 2025. I will focus on the larger transactions. On 4 November 2025 Mr Irrling made a number of smaller payments to members of his family amounting to some EUR 80,000.

84. On the same day Mr Irrling’s AED Account No. 3080 was credited with AED 50,000 from EUR Account No. 3820 but it not possible for me to reconcile the payments. The opening balance of AED Account No. 3080 had been AED 10.70.

85. On 5 November 2025, Mr Irrling transferred just over half a million Euros to a joint account with his partner. This amounts to around AED 2 million. The sum came into AED Account No. 3080 and went out the same day.

86. On 6 November 2025, Mr Irrling transferred EUR 44,102.19, on 7 November EUR 48,875.14 and on 8 November EUR 18,000 (total EUR 110,977.30) to AED Account No. 3080. This corresponds to three credits received on those dates.

87. On 14 November 2025, Mr Irrling paid away EUR 1.5 million but it was apparently immediately reversed only to be reinstated in the sum EUR 1.55 million payable to Blue Fin Trading Enterprises Limited (“Blue Fin”).

88. On 9 December 2025 (possibly after notice of the Injunction) Mr Irrling transferred EUR 1 million to his account with his partner. The sum came into AED Account No. 3080 on the same day as AED 4.14 million. This left a balance of around EUR 100,000 in EUR Account No. 3820 which was reduced to approximately EUR 20,000 by a series of smaller payments.

89. On 9 December 2025, Mr Irrling paid AED 100,000 from AED Account No.3080 to Blue Fin. On 11 December 2025, he made payments of AED 100,000 and AED 50,000 to AB Diamond Manufaktur FZE (“AB Diamond”).

90. On 18 December 2025, Mr Irrling paid AED 3.165 million to AB Diamond.

91. There were no credits to AED Account No.3080 save from EUR Account No. 3820.

92. In his First Affidavit dated 19 December 2025, Mr Irrling disclosed:

93. In his Second Affidavit dated 25 December 2025 Mr Irrling disclosed:

94. It appears that the balance on No. 4985 and the omission of AB Diamond from the Second Affidavit are explained by Mashreq Bank reversing the payments to AB Diamond following the Court’s Order. The balance on Account No. 5246 is the deposit maturing in October 2028.

95. It is clear on any view that Mr Irrling acted as if the monies received from Yarkee were his to do with as he pleased.

96. Mr Sliwinski agreed that the evidence favoured Quortia’s account but that Mr Irrling was fearful that if he paid the Yarkee Loan monies to Mrs Levitina he would be “left in the lurch” because he would still have a liability to Yarkee after having settled the sum for the assignment of the Welfare indebtedness which could only be repaid if and when the Czech Buyer paid the consideration for the purchase of Welfare and the assignment of Welfare’s indebtedness.

97. He accepted (contrary to his client’s account in his Third Affidavit set out at paragraph 62 above) that the Loan was part and parcel of the scheme set up to enable Mr Irrling to buy out Welfare to avoid the issues with the Czech bank over Russia and that the Loan was not made to Mr Irrling for personal investment purposes. He said these were serious issues to be tried.

98. When I asked Mr Sliwinski about the telephone conversation in which Mr Gabestro says My Irrling asked for a further EUR 5 million he said that he had no instructions to challenge the evidence about the call.

99. I asked Mr Sliwinski about the allegations of dissipation. Again, he said he had no instructions but then apparently was told that Mr Irrling wanted to give evidence. I pointed out that he had been given ample opportunity to give evidence, but I said that I was willing to allow him to give evidence if Mr Rainsford wished to cross-examine him on his affidavits. Unsurprisingly Mr Rainsford declined.

100. In reply, Mr Rainsford submitted that Mr Irrling’s position was completely untenable. He wondered why the hearing was taking place at all given the concessions made – in the light of the telephone call it is hard to say that Mr Irrling was not dishonest; further once it is admitted that the Loan was not for Mr Irrling’s personal purposes his conduct was clearly improper.

101. He described as “nonsense” the suggestion that if Mr Irrling paid the Yarkee Loan over to Mr Levitina he would be left with a liability to repay Yarkee. On 11 November 2025, Mr Irrling was offered the opportunity to return the Loan and release from any liability. Instead of accompanying Mr Gabestro on a visit to Yarkee’s offices to remedy the situation, Mr Irrling left Dubai for Addis Abba.

102. Mr Rainsford asked that the Injunction be continued and that the Claimant be awarded its costs on the indemnity basis. He referred to paragraph 65 of my judgment in Techteryx where I followed the guidance of the English Court of Appeal in Unitel SA v dos Santos [2025] KB 438, [116]-[120] which stated that unlike other contested interlocutory or procedural applications, subject to any subsequent application to vary or discharge, a freezing injunction remains in place until trial to facilitate enforcement of the judgment. It is therefore won or lost at the interim stage and therefore costs should follow the event.

103. As to costs on the indemnity basis, he referred to Practice Direction No.5 of 2015:

and submitted that Mr Irrling had acted with dishonesty, flouted Injunction and given the concessions made, the application to continue the Order could not with propriety have been contested.

104. Mr Sliwinsk replied that Mr Irrling had not flouted the Injunction as following the reversal of the payment to AB Daimond the money was safe. Mr Irrling had not been deliberately obstructive. He was not trying to hide anything. It would be wrong to make a costs order at this stage.

CONCLUSIONS

Freezing Order

105. At the close of submissions, I indicated that the Freezing Order would continue until further Order, that I was minded make a costs order in the Claimant’s favour and that I would provide my reasons in writing thereafter. Mr Sliwinski said (correctly) that the Defendant had not had an opportunity to consider the Claimant’s Statement of Costs which had only been served shortly before the Hearing. I therefore allowed the Defendant until 2pm (GST) on Monday, 12 January 2026 to provide its comments on the reasonableness of the sums sought.

106. What follows are of course findings based on affidavit and documentary evidence. I have not had the opportunity to hear oral evidence nor any cross-examination. My findings are therefore necessarily interlocutory. Further, I will not be the trial judge, the trial will take place in Cyprus and nothing I say is intended to, nor can, bind the Cyprus courts.

107. There is no doubt that this Court has jurisdiction to make a Freezing Order in aid of proceedings before a foreign court that may result in a judgment capable of recognition and enforcement by this Court. It does not matter whether or not there is personal or subject matter jurisdiction; what matters is whether the Court is satisfied that there are serious issues to be tried between the parties, that there is a risk that unless enjoined the party against whom the Order is sought will seek to dissipate their assets in order to thwart execution of any judgment of this Court and that it is just and expedient that the injunction be granted. It is irrelevant whether are not at the time of making the Order that party has assets within the jurisdiction of this Court or that the applicant will seek to use the judgment of this Court to purse remedies elsewhere.

108. The execution of a judgment of this Court through proceedings in a third jurisdiction is still a form of enforcement which this Court will, in appropriate circumstances, protect. This is sometimes referred to as “conduit jurisdiction”. While a convenient shorthand that has gained wide currency it is not entirely accurate. It implies that a claim just passes through the DIFC on its way elsewhere. That is not correct. It is the fact that this Court will enforce a foreign judgment by issuing its own judgment (which may be enforced elsewhere) that confers the jurisdiction on the Court to make the Freezing Order to protect its own judgment (see Techteryx [53]-[59], [69]).

109. The concession that there are serious issues to be tried was unavoidable and properly made. Mr Sliwinski is to be commended for his realism. Subject to the points made at paragraph 106 above, I am satisfied that all the evidence before me is all one way and indicates significant dishonesty on the part of Mr Irrling:

110. I am satisfied that Mr Irrling’s conduct described above amounts to wrongdoing against Quortia relevant to the issue of dissipation. In addition, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the evidence before me indicates that Mr Irrling dealt with assets held by him in the UAE in breach of the terms of the Injunction with knowledge of its terms.

111. I am satisfied that it is just and expedient to extend the Injunction until further order. The evidence indicates that if Mr Irrling is not restrained from removing sufficient assets to satisfy any judgment from the UAE it is highly likely those assets will be removed. I am in no doubt that the balance of irremediable prejudice lies in favour of granting the injunction. It is at least well arguable that Mr Irrling has no right to any of the funds held by him. He has given no evidence of any prejudice that would be suffered by him if the Order were continued. On the other hand, judging by his conduct to date it seems likely that if the Injunction were not continued Mr Irrling would take steps to thwart any judgment of this Court. Further, Quortia appears to possess substantial assents and thus, in what I consider to be an unlikely eventuality, if Quortia were called upon to honour its undertaking in damages, it would be able to do so.

Costs

112. I will make an immediate order rather than reserve costs for the reasons appearing at paragraph 102 above.

113. I am satisfied that the costs should follow the event and Quortia should have its costs of the proceedings to date and that they should be assessed on the indemnity basis for the following reasons, I have found:

114. The next question is whether I should undertake an immediate assessment or order a detailed assessment of Quortia’s costs. RDC 38.30 provides that the general rule is that the Court should make an immediate assessment of the costs at the conclusion of any hearing which has lasted no more than one day, in which case the order will deal with the costs of the application or matters to which the hearing related. If the hearing disposes of the claim, the order may deal with the costs of the whole claim unless there is good reason not to do so e.g. where the paying party shows substantial grounds for disputing the sum claimed for costs that cannot be dealt with on the material available.

115. In his submissions of 12 January 2026, the Defendant contends that there should be detailed assessment of costs in that:

116. Quortia’s Statement of Costs follows the standard form and complies with RDC 38.34 in showing separately in the form of a schedule:

117. The DIFC Courts does adhere to the Indemnity Principle, namely that costs should be those actually incurred. That is inherent in the assessment process which considers whether costs have been unreasonably incurred. The Statement of Costs is made and verified by a Statement of Truth signed by a member of the Claimant’s legal team proving that the costs have been incurred. There is no obligation under the RDC to produce with a Statement of Costs invoices, engagement letters, or client-facing time records. There is no basis for the statement that in the absence of such proof, the costs are not recoverable.

118. The Defendant goes on to make the following further submissions:

119. Where the Court is to assess the amount of costs on the indemnity basis:

120. In my judgment, the criticisms at paragraphs 118(1) to 118(4) above do not discharge the burden of proof on the Defendant to show that the costs claimed were unreasonably incurred. The same is true of the criticisms at paragraphs 118(5)(a), 118(7)(a), 118(7)(b) and 118(8) above. I do however note that all hourly rates charged are well within the indicative hourly rates in Registrar’s Direction No. 1 Of 2023 – Indicative Hourly Legal Charges.

121. The criticisms at paragraphs 118(5)(b), 118(7)(c), 118(9) and 118(10) above are misconceived as the criterion of proportionality does not apply in an assessment of the indemnity basis.

122. I do find some force in the criticism at 118(6) above. Mr Fernando appears to be the lead lawyer in instructing counsel. I see no reason why any other lawyers were required in addition to leading and junior counsel. I would therefore deduct AED 41,973.33.

123. Has the Defendant shown that there is good reason not to carry out an immediate assessment, e.g. there are substantial grounds for disputing the sum claimed for costs that cannot be dealt with on the material available? In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that there is available material on which the assess the claim.

124. In the circumstances, I will make an immediate assessment of the Claimant’s costs on the indemnity basis in the sum of AED 1,098,601.16.

DISPOSITION

125. The Injunction granted on 9 December 2025 shall continue until further order of the Court.

126. The Defendant shall pay the costs of the proceedings to the Claimant in the sum of AED 1,098,601.16.