Claim No. CFI 118/2025

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURT

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

PETRICHOR ENERGY FZCO

Claimant

and

(1) ULTIMATE OIL & GAS FZCO
(2) ALHAJI ABDULRAHMAN MUSA BASHAR

Defendants

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ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE RENE LE MIERE

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UPON the Claimant’s Part 7 Claim Form dated 8 December 2025 (the “Claim”)

AND UPON the Defendants’ Application No. CFI-118-2025/1 dated 9 January 2026, seeking to stay the Claim pursuant to Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law and, in the alternative, challenge the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts (the “Stay Application” or the “Article 13(1) Stay Application”)

AND UPON the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-118-2025/2 dated 20 January 2026, seeking immediate judgment pursuant to Part 24 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) (the “Immediate Judgment Application”)

AND UPON the Defendants’ Application No. CFI-118-2025/3 dated 3 February 2026, to stay the Immediate Judgment Application or for an extension of time to put on evidence pending the determination of the Stay Application (the “IJ Stay Application”)

AND UPON the Court directing, via email to the parties dated 25 February 2026, that the Defendants’ Article 13(1) Stay Application and the IJ Stay Application be heard before the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application at a consolidated hearing (the “Consolidated Application Hearing”)

AND UPON hearing counsel for the Claimant and counsel for the Defendants at the Consolidated Application Hearing on 27 March 2026

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Defendants’ Stay Application pursuant to Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law is dismissed.

2. The Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application is not stayed and may proceed.

3. The Defendants shall file and serve any evidence in response to the Immediate Judgment Application within 14 days of the date of this Order.

4. The Claimant shall file and serve any reply evidence within 14 days thereafter.

5. The Immediate Judgment Application shall be listed for hearing on the first available date after the close of evidence, with a time estimate of one day.

6. The Defendants’ alternative application for an extension of time is determined in accordance with orders 3 and 4.

7. The question of the costs of the Defendants’ Stay Applications is reserved.

8. The parties shall have liberty to apply.

Issued by:
Delvin Sumo
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 2 April 2026
At: 11am

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

Defendants’ Stay Application made under Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law (and related applications)

A. Introduction

1. These proceedings raise a question regarding how Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law applies to proceedings brought to recognise and enforce foreign court judgments.

2. The Claimant brings these proceedings to obtain judgment in the DIFC Courts based on final and conclusive judgments of the High Court of England and Wales, relying on the common law principle that a foreign judgment gives rise to an enforceable obligation in debt.

3. The Defendants contend that, because of a subsequent contractual agreement containing an arbitration agreement, the Claim has been brought in a matter that the Court is required mandatorily to stay.

4. The English judgments were followed by the parties entering into a further agreement concerning the payment of the judgment debt (the “New Payment Agreement”). That agreement regulated the way the judgment debt was to be satisfied and included a broadly drafted arbitration clause applicable to disputes arising out of or in connection with the agreement. It also imposed contractual restraints on the enforcement of the English judgments, subject to defined conditions in the event of default.

5. The Claimant asserts that the conditions were met, that the Defendants defaulted under the New Payment Agreement, and that it was therefore entitled to resume enforcement. On this basis, it brings these proceedings and has sought an immediate judgment.

6. The Defendants dispute that entitlement. They contend that the Claimant’s right to enforce the English judgments depends upon the resolution of disputed issues arising under the New Payment Agreement, which, they say, fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement and are the subject of arbitral proceedings.

7. The issue for the Court is therefore not whether, in principle, a foreign judgment may be sued upon in the DIFC Courts at common law, but whether, properly characterised, this claim has been brought “in a matter” which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration, such that Article 13(1) requires a stay unless one of the statutory conditions is satisfied.

8. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that these proceedings are not properly characterised as proceedings brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Article 13(1). Although the New Payment Agreement contains a broad arbitration clause and imposes contractual restraints on enforcement, the present proceedings are brought by way of a common‑law claim to obtain judgment in the DIFC Courts on the English judgments and concern the anterior question whether any contractual restraint presently precludes the Court from entering such judgment.

9. In proceedings seeking judgment based on foreign judgments at common law, the Court is entitled to determine whether the contractual conditions governing the continuation or release of the asserted restraint have been engaged. That inquiry arises as a threshold question of whether the bringing of the proceedings is contractually restrained and may be resolved without determining substantive disputes that the parties have agreed are to be determined in arbitration.

10. It follows that Article 13(1) does not require a stay and that there is no statutory impediment to the Court proceeding to consider the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application.

B. Factual background

The parties

11. The Claimant, Petrichor Energy FZCO (“Petrichor”), is a commodities trading company incorporated in the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (“DMCC”). It was formerly known as CE Energy DMCC until 26 May 2025.

12. The First Defendant, Ultimate Oil & Gas FZCO (“Ultimate”), is also incorporated in the DMCC. It was previously known as Ultimate Oil & Gas DMCC.

13. The Second Defendant, Mr Alhaji Abdulrahman Musa Bashar (“Mr Bashar”), is described in the pleadings as a Nigerian businessman, the chairman and owner of Ultimate, and the named manager on Ultimate’s DMCC trade licence.

English proceedings and judgments

14. The background includes a series of commercial contracts between Petrichor and Ultimate, payment arrangements, and a personal guarantee by Mr Bashar. It is unnecessary to set these out in detail.

15. Petrichor commenced proceedings in the English High Court against Ultimate and Mr Bashar and applied for summary judgment.

16. On 14 February 2025, Mr Paul Stanley KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, granted summary judgment and made orders requiring Ultimate and Mr Bashar to pay specified principal sums, interest and costs.

17. In these proceedings, the Claimant seeks to enforce the judgment dated 14 February 2025 together with the two associated orders made in English High Court proceedings CL-2024-000225 and CL-2024-000426 (together, the “English Judgments”).

18. The principal sums ordered were AED 122,189,310.46 and AED 22,846,944.69, plus interest and costs, giving credit for payments made.

19. Appeals and applications for stays in England were refused. The English Judgments are final and unappealable.

The New Payment Agreement and alleged default

20. On 24 April 2025, the parties entered into the New Payment Agreement, intended to result in a full and final settlement upon complete performance of its terms.

21. Clause 14.1.3 imposed a contractual restraint on the enforcement of the English Judgments. Clauses 14.2 and 14.3 provided a default and notice mechanism, under which Petrichor would, upon default and expiry of a defined two-UAE-Banking-Day period, be entitled to enforce the English Judgments and to take steps in any jurisdiction to obtain payment.

22. Clause 24.2 contained a broadly framed arbitration agreement providing for LCIA arbitration.

23. Petrichor pleads that on 15 September 2025, it gave notice pursuant to clause 14.2 that Ultimate failed to cure the default within the two-UAE-Banking-Day period allowed, and that Petrichor was thereby entitled to enforce the English Judgments.

C. Procedural history and applications

24. The Claimant issued the Claim on 8 December 2025, commencing proceedings in the DIFC Courts by way of a common law claim based on the English Judgments, which are relied upon as giving rise to an obligation in debt.

25. The Defendants applied for orders staying the Claim pursuant to Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law and, in the alternative, challenging jurisdiction. The Defendants do not pursue the jurisdictional objection.

26. The Claimant applied for immediate judgment under Part 24. The Defendants then applied to stay the Immediate Judgment Application or for an extension of time to put on evidence pending the determination of the Stay Application.

27. The Court directed that the Defendants’ Article 13(1) Stay Application and the IJ Stay Application be heard before the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application. These reasons address the Article 13(1) Stay Application and the related procedural applications.

D. Issues

28. The principal issue is whether this Claim must be stayed under Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law because it is brought in a matter that is the subject of an arbitration agreement.

29. If that question were answered in the affirmative, a further question would arise whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. However, the Claimant does not contend that the arbitration agreement is affected by any such defect for the purposes of the statutory exceptions in Article 13(1).

30. The Claimant also advanced a submission that there is not, in fact, any dispute as to its entitlement to enforce the English judgments. That submission was relied upon as bearing on whether Article 13(1) is engaged at all, on the footing that there is no dispute capable of being referred to arbitration. It was not advanced as an additional statutory exception, nor as a contention that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

31. A further issue concerns the procedural consequences for the Claimant’s Immediate Judgment Application.

E. Legal framework

32. Article 13(1) provides that where an action is brought before the DIFC Court in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, the Court shall, upon timely request, dismiss or stay the action unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

33. The approach to identifying whether proceedings are brought “in a matter” is now authoritatively explained in Republic of Mozambique v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) [2023] UKSC 32 and FamilyMart China Holding Co Ltd v Ting Chuan (Cayman Islands) Holding Corp [2023] UKPC 33. The inquiry is a two-stage exercise: first, the Court identifies the matter or matters in respect of which the proceedings are brought; secondly, it determines whether each such matter falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement as properly construed.

34. A “matter” is not synonymous with a cause of action, nor with any issue that may arise in the litigation. It is a substantial issue which is legally relevant to the claim or a defence (including a reasonably foreseeable defence), and which is susceptible of determination by an arbitral tribunal as a discrete dispute. Issues that are merely peripheral or tangential do not qualify.

35. In identifying the relevant matter or matters, the Court looks to substance rather than form. It is not overly respectful of pleading formulations which may be designed to avoid arbitration, and it takes account of defences (which may be pleaded only in outline at the stay stage) and reasonably foreseeable defences. The exercise is not mechanistic. It involves evaluative judgment and common sense and requires close attention to the context in which the putative matter arises in the proceedings.

F. Analysis

Article 13(1): clause 24.2 and clause 14 restraint

36. The Defendants submit that these proceedings must be stayed because the Claimant’s ability to sue upon and enforce the English Judgments is contractually constrained by clause 14.1.3 of the New Payment Agreement. However, they do not positively assert that the contractual restraint has not been lifted by satisfaction of the conditions in clauses 14.2–14.3. Rather, they say that they have not admitted the Claimant’s alleged entitlement to resume enforcement, and that gives rise to issues arising under the New Payment Agreement, which fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement and are matters for determination by the arbitral tribunal.

37. In advancing that characterisation, the Defendants submit that the question whether the Claimant is contractually entitled under the New Payment Agreement to seek enforcement of the English Judgments raises several disputed issues arising under that agreement. They identify the following issues:

38. The Defendants submit that these issues, taken together, are substantive disputes of contractual entitlement falling within the scope of the arbitration agreement and constitute the “matter” in which the present proceedings are brought for the purposes of Article 13(1).

39. The identification of these contractual issues, however, does not determine the enquiry under Article 13(1). The Court’s current task is not to resolve those issues, nor to assess their merits, but to identify the matter in which the proceedings before it are brought, having regard to their substance and procedural context.

40. The fact that accounting, interest or other contractual questions may arise during proceedings brought to obtain judgment in the DIFC Courts based on foreign judgments does not, without more, transform those proceedings into proceedings brought in a contractual dispute under the New Payment Agreement.

41. The Claimant submits that the proceedings are not brought “in” such a matter. It says that it sues in debt upon final and conclusive English judgments, and that the New Payment Agreement forms part of the surrounding contractual background only.

42. The Defendants do not contend, by pleaded defence or evidence, that the New Payment Agreement presently operates as a bar to the Claimant’s entitlement to judgment in these proceedings; rather, they submit that issues which may arise under that agreement are foreseeable and are required to be determined, if they arise, by the arbitral tribunal.

43. For the reasons that follow, I accept the Claimant’s submission.

The governing approach

44. The relevant approach is that articulated by Lord Hodge, delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mozambique and the judgment of the Board in FamilyMart. The Court must

The nature of the present proceedings

47. These proceedings are brought to obtain judgment in the DIFC Courts upon the English Judgments as debts at common law. The New Payment Agreement did not compromise or extinguish the English Judgments. It regulated their satisfaction and contained conditional forbearance from enforcement. Clause 14.1.3 imposed a restraint on enforcement, subject to specified conditions upon default and notice, and clauses 14.3.3–14.3.5 expressly contemplated enforcement steps being taken “in whatever jurisdiction” once the contractual conditions were satisfied.

48. Issues as to whether proceedings before the Court are contractually restrained, permitted, or premature are gateway or restraint questions of a kind which courts routinely determine notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration agreement. Their determination is directed to whether the Court may proceed at all, not to the underlying merits of any arbitral dispute.

49. It follows that the Claimant’s cause of action is not founded upon the New Payment Agreement. The obligation sued upon is the judgment debt. The New Payment Agreement is relied upon by the Defendants not as a presently operative bar to the Claimant’s entitlement to judgment, but as giving rise to issues which, they submit, may foreseeably arise and therefore fall to be determined by the arbitral tribunal. The fact that such issues, if they arose and were resolved in the Defendants’ favour, might defeat the claim does not, without more, determine whether the proceedings are brought “in” that matter for the purposes of Article 13(1). That inquiry is contextual.

50. Nothing in these reasons should be understood as determining, or expressing any concluded view upon, the parties' substantive contractual rights or obligations under the New Payment Agreement, other than to the limited extent necessary to decide whether any contractual restraint precludes the Court from entering judgment in these proceedings.

51. The fact that issues which may arise under the New Payment Agreement might also fall to be determined in arbitral proceedings between the parties does not deprive the Court of its responsibility to determine whether Article 13(1) is engaged by the proceedings before it. The Court must necessarily decide whether it has authority to proceed with the claim as brought. That inquiry is directed to the characterisation of the proceedings and the Court’s jurisdiction, not to the determination of any substantive contractual rights or obligations as between the parties.

52. The fact that a gateway determination may require consideration of issues which could also arise before an arbitral tribunal does not amount to impermissible encroachment or fragmentation. The Court is not determining whether the New Payment Agreement gives rise to any contractual restraint upon enforcement of the English Judgments, but only whether the mere foreseeability of issues arising under that agreement is sufficient to engage Article 13(1) and require a stay. The Court does not finally determine any substantive contractual rights or obligations, nor does its reasoning bind the arbitral tribunal.

53. The arbitral tribunal remains free to determine, for the purposes of the parties’ contractual relationship, whether the conditions in the New Payment Agreement were satisfied, whether any breaches occurred, and what contractual consequences, if any, follow.

54. The Court’s role is confined to determining whether the possibility that such issues may arise engages Article 13(1) so as to preclude the Court from proceeding with the Claim as brought. The potential for overlap does not transform that threshold inquiry into the substantive “matter” in which these proceedings are brought for the purposes of Article 13(1).

Application of Mozambique: context and party autonomy

55. Mozambique emphasises that a stay analysis is not a mechanistic exercise in identifying any issue capable of falling within an arbitration clause. The Court must evaluate whether the putative issue is reasonably substantial and relevant in the proceedings and must have regard to the context in which it arises.

56. The Supreme Court recognised that a claimant is entitled to choose which of several available claims it wishes to advance and that the court must respect that autonomy when identifying the “matter” in respect of which the proceedings are brought. It also warned against construing an arbitration agreement so as to require arbitration of a subordinate issue which arises only in the context of court proceedings whose essential subject lies outside the arbitration agreement.

Distinguishing FamilyMart

57. FamilyMart illustrates that a dispute may constitute a “matter” even where it is an essential precursor to relief sought in court proceedings. In that case, disputes as to loss of trust and confidence and breakdown of the shareholder relationship were matters because they were controversies of substance lying at the heart of the relief sought; they were constitutive of the factual basis upon which the statutory remedies depended.

58. Here, however, the proceedings are not brought to vindicate contractual rights under the New Payment Agreement. They are brought to obtain judgment in the DIFC Courts based on final and conclusive English judgments, giving rise to a judgment debt at common law. Any dispute under clause 14 arises not because the Defendants presently rely upon a contractual restraint as a bar to the proceedings, but because they submit that issues which may arise under the New Payment Agreement would be required to be determined by arbitration. Even if such a dispute were substantial and outcome‑determinative were it to arise, it does so in the context of proceedings whose essential subject is the judgment debt, not the New Payment Agreement.

59. On the Mozambique approach, the Court must pay careful attention to that context and to what rational businesspeople would be taken to have intended by an arbitration clause in an agreement which itself contemplates enforcement steps in court “in whatever jurisdiction” once the contractual conditions are met.

Conclusion on Article 13(1)

60. Having regard to the substance and context of these proceedings, I am not satisfied that they are brought “in a matter which is the subject of” the arbitration agreement within the meaning of Article 13(1). The relevant matter in respect of which these proceedings are brought is the enforcement at common law of the English Judgments as debts.

61. The New Payment Agreement issue arises in these proceedings only in the sense that the Defendants submit that issues which may arise under that agreement would fall to be determined by arbitration. Properly analysed through the lens of Mozambique and FamilyMart, the mere foreseeability of such issues does not convert these proceedings into proceedings brought “in” a dispute under the New Payment Agreement so as to require a mandatory stay under Article 13(1).

62. That conclusion is reinforced by the nature of the relief sought. An arbitral tribunal does not enforce foreign judgments as judgments; at common law, that function lies with the Court. The Court is not required to stay proceedings merely because, in determining whether Article 13(1) is engaged, it must consider the potential relevance of contractual issues under the New Payment Agreement.

63. I accept that clause 24.2 of the New Payment Agreement is broadly framed, and that, viewed in isolation, a dispute as to whether enforcement is contractually permitted could fall within its literal language. However, Article 13(1) does not require the Court to ask only whether an arbitrable dispute can be identified. The statutory inquiry is directed to whether the proceedings before the Court are brought in respect of a dispute of that kind as the relevant “matter”.

64. As emphasised in Mozambique and FamilyMart, that inquiry is not answered by clause literalism. It requires an evaluative judgment as to the substance and context of the proceedings, and as to what, in a real and practical sense, they are brought to determine. Broad arbitration clauses do not, without more, convert proceedings whose essential subject is the Court’s determination of a claim to judgment based on foreign judgments at common law into proceedings “in” an arbitrable matter merely because a contractual issue is said to arise as a condition or restraint upon the Court’s ability to grant that relief.

65. Here, the proceedings are brought to obtain judgment upon foreign judgments as debts at common law. Any dispute under clause 14 arises not as the object of the proceedings, but because the Defendants contend that issues which may arise under the New Payment Agreement are required to be determined by arbitration. Although such a dispute may be arbitrable for other purposes if it arises, it does not follow that these proceedings are brought in that dispute for the purposes of Article 13(1).

66. The existence of ongoing arbitral proceedings concerning the New Payment Agreement does not alter that conclusion. Article 13(1) does not confer a general power to stay proceedings to avoid parallel determination or procedural inefficiency; it operates only where the court proceedings are brought in a matter which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.

67. That conclusion is reinforced by the contractual context: a commercially rational construction does not treat an arbitration clause in an agreement which itself contemplates enforcement steps in court, in whatever jurisdiction is appropriate once contractual conditions are met, as requiring proceedings whose essential subject is the court’s determination of a claim to judgment to be referred to arbitration.

68. Nor does the Court’s determination of the present threshold issue give rise to any impermissible risk of conflicting decisions. The Court is concerned only with whether it may proceed with the claim to judgment as brought, and with the characterisation of those proceedings for the purposes of Article 13(1). Nothing in this determination decides, or assumes the answer to, any question as to the existence, operation or effect of the parties’ contractual rights or obligations under the New Payment Agreement. Those questions, if and when they arise, remain for determination by the arbitral tribunal, unencumbered by this decision.

69. Parallel consideration of related issues for different juridical purposes is not unusual where courts and arbitral tribunals exercise distinct functions. The possibility of overlap does not convert a threshold question necessary for the Court’s own proceedings into a substantive “matter” in which the proceedings are brought for the purposes of Article 13(1).

G. The “no dispute” submission

70. The Claimant submitted that, even if Article 13(1) were engaged, the mandatory stay would not apply because there is "not in fact any dispute" between the parties regarding the Claimant's contractual entitlement to enforce the English Judgments. This submission proceeds on the hypothesis that Article 13(1) was otherwise engaged, contrary to my earlier conclusion, and is addressed only on that basis.

71. In support of that submission, the Claimant relied on the absence of any defence evidence asserting non-default, the production of the notice of default, an agreed statement of account confirming the dates and amounts of instalments and payments, and the Defendants' confirmation of those figures in email correspondence.

72. The concept of a “dispute” for the purposes of a stay in favour of arbitration is construed broadly. The English and other common law authorities reject an approach which, in substance, imports a summary judgment test into the stay inquiry.

73. As Saville J explained in Hayter v Nelson and Home Insurance Company [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 265 at 268, parties may have a “dispute” even where the issue can readily be shown to have a correct answer; the existence of an objectively demonstrable answer does not mean that no dispute exists.

74. Consistent with that approach, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Halki Shipping Corp v Sopex Oils Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 726 and subsequent authorities emphasise that, under modern arbitration legislation, a stay is not defeated because a defendant’s position may appear weak or because a claimant asserts that there is no “real” dispute.

75. In Collins (Contractors) Limited v Baltic Quay Management (1994) Limited [2004] EWCA Civ 1757, Clarke LJ explained that the removal of the former “no dispute” language from the statutory scheme means that it is no answer to a stay application to say that a defendant has no arguable defence; the focus is whether there is a “dispute”, not whether it is likely to succeed.

76. The Privy Council in Sian Participation Corporation (In Liquidation) v Halimeda International Ltd [2024] UKPC 16, described the threshold as a “very low” one: all that is necessary is that the debt (or entitlement) is not admitted; it need not be expressly denied, and no substantial grounds need be shown for disputing it. The policy underpinning that approach is to prevent a creditor from avoiding a mandatory stay by seeking summary judgment on the basis that the dispute is insufficiently substantial.

77. Against that framework, the Court does not accept that the matters relied on by the Claimant establish the absence of any dispute for the purposes of Article 13(1).

78. First, the absence of a pleaded defence or evidence in these proceedings positively disputing steps in the Claimant’s asserted “default machinery” cannot properly be treated as an admission of contractual entitlement. The question is not whether the Defendants have, in this Court, put forward an evidentially articulated case on the merits, but whether there is a dispute in the relevant sense—something which is not admitted and which is capable of being the subject of arbitral determination.

79. Secondly, even if the email correspondence demonstrates agreement on the arithmetical accuracy of the figures in the statement of account as at a particular date, and the historical fact of payments made and credited, that would not equate to agreement as to the contractual consequences said to follow under the New Payment Agreement (including whether contractual preconditions were met, whether notices were valid, or whether any purported contractual entitlement is made out). Agreement on figures and allocation is not the same as agreement on liability or entitlement.

80. Thirdly, and in any event, the positions adopted by the parties from time to time, including in the LCIA arbitration, do not support the proposition that there is no dispute between them concerning contractual entitlements under the New Payment Agreement. In its Request for Arbitration dated 5 December 2025, the Claimant itself pleads that Ultimate has repeatedly breached the New Payment Agreement, relies upon Clause 14.3 and related provisions, and seeks declaratory relief as to breach, title to the Remaining Product, and entitlement to require its release and resale. The Defendants have responded by denying liability in that arbitration.

81. That arbitration is not, of course, determinative of the anterior question whether these court proceedings are brought “in a matter” which is the subject of the arbitration agreement. Nor does the Court treat the existence of arbitral proceedings as establishing, without more, that all contractual questions arising under the New Payment Agreement must be stayed. However, for the more limited purpose of the Claimant’s alternative submission—that there is, in fact, no dispute between the parties as to contractual entitlement—the pleadings in the arbitration are material.

82. They demonstrate that the parties do not share a common position on whether there has been a breach of the New Payment Agreement or on the contractual consequences said to flow from the instalment payment history and the service of notices. The Claimant’s reliance on agreed figures and the absence, in this Court, of a pleaded merits defence does not negate the existence of a dispute in that sense.

83. Nor is it to the point that the Claimant may consider the Defendants’ position to be weak. As the authorities make clear, the Court is not concerned, at the stay stage, with evaluating the strength of the competing positions, but only with whether a matter is disputed.

84. Accordingly, had Article 13(1) been engaged, I would not have refused a mandatory stay on the basis that there is no dispute between the parties as to the Claimant’s contractual entitlement.

H. Disposition

85. The proceedings are not brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law.

86. The Defendants’ Article 13(1) Stay Application is dismissed.

I. Orders

87. The Court will order: