(a) Mr Kuanyshev shall pay a fine of USD 250,000;

(b) Mr Shlenskikh shall pay a fine of USD 150,000;

(c) Shev Energy shall pay a fine of USD 150,000;

(d) Mrs Kuanysheva shall pay a fine of USD 250,000; and

(e) Ms Baymenova shall pay a fine of USD 150,000.

(1) Timur Orazbekovich Kuanyshev (“Mr Kuanyshev”);

(2) Evgeny Vyacheslavovich Shlenskikh (AKA Yevgeniy Shlyonskikh) (“Mr Shlenskikh”);

(3) Shev Energy LLC-FZ (“Shev Energy”);

(4) Alfiya Abulkhair Askar (AKA Alfiya Kuanysheva) (“Mrs Kuanysheva”);

(5) Munira Orhayevna Baymenova (AKA Munira Orhaevna Baimenova) (”Ms Baymenova”).

(1) Each of the Respondents failed to comply with paragraphs 9 and 11 of the WFO Order and their failure to provide the information and affidavit required by paragraphs 9 and 11 of the WFO Order is continuing (“Count 1”); and

(2) the First and Second Respondents failed to comply with paragraphs 4 and 5 of the WFO Continuation Order, and their failure to provide the witness statement required by paragraphs 4 and 5 of the WFO Continuation Order is continuing (“Count 2”).

(1) RDC 52.1: The power of the Court of First Instance or Court of Appeal to punish for contempt of Court may be exercised by an order of committal.

(2) RDC 52.12: Written evidence in support of or in opposition to a committal application must be given by affidavit;

(3) RDC 52.14: A respondent may give oral evidence at the hearing, whether or not he has filed or served any written evidence. If he does so, he may be cross- examined;

(4) RDC 52.32: The Court may by order direct that the execution of the order of committal shall be suspended for such period or on such terms or conditions as it may specify.

“11. In VIH Dubai Palm Jumeirah Ltd v Assas Opco Ltd (“VIH”) Justice Sir Richard Field observed that: “Although Article 43 of the Court Law provides that the Court in the exercise of its contempt of court jurisdiction may make any order it considers necessary in the interests of justice, in my judgment this would not include the imposition by the Court of a sentence of imprisonment.”

12. I respectfully agree with that view. The DIFC Court does not have criminal jurisdiction, although it does have power to impose fines. That power is generally regarded as regulatory in nature, or, at the highest, quasi–criminal in nature.

13. In VIH Justice Sir Richard Field observed that in that case it was common ground that the allegations of contempt of court must be proved to what is the criminal standard of proof in criminal jurisdictions, namely, beyond reasonable doubt. I respectfully agree with that view and would add that in my view it follows that the normal procedures adopted by common law courts with respect to the determination of allegations of criminal conduct should be applied by this Court when considering an application for committal for contempt of court.

14. Those principles include the principle that the onus of proof of criminal conduct rests at all times upon the party alleging that criminal conduct has occurred. That onus does not change at any point in the process, and the party against whom an application for an order of committal is made carries no obligation to prove anything by way of defence… in common law criminal courts … juries are routinely directed that a person accused of a crime has no obligation to prove anything by way of defence, and no adverse inference can be drawn against a person accused of crime by reason of his or her failure to adduce evidence by way of defence. In my view those principles should be applied in this Court in the determination of applications for committal by reason of contempt of court.

15. Similarly, common law principles of mens rea should be adopted when this Court considers an application for an order of committal by reason of contempt. Those principles generally require that the conduct giving rise to the alleged contempt must have been the knowing and wilful act or omission of the alleged contemnor. It is important to emphasise that the mental element required to establish breach applies only to the act or omission said to constitute breach, not its consequences. Put more directly, an applicant for a committal order does not have to establish that the alleged contemnor knew or ought to have known that the act or omission said to constitute the contempt would involve a breach of the orders of the Court. Notice of the orders of the Court must be proven, but thereafter any act or omission which constitutes a breach of those orders will constitute a contempt of court irrespective of whether or not the contemnor knew or intended that the relevant act or omission would constitute a breach.

16. The authors of Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt express the relevant principles applicable to the mental element of contempt in the following terms:

“What was traditionally required was to demonstrate that the alleged contemnor’s conduct was intentional (in the sense that what he actually did, or omitted to do, was not accidental); and secondly that he knew the facts which rendered it a breach of the relevant order or undertaking. He must normally be shown at least in the case of a mandatory order to have been notified of its existence…… Yet there is no need to go so far as to show that the respondent realised that his conduct would constitute a breach, or even that he had read the order. This means that liability for contempt has been treated as though it were strict; that is to say, not depending on establishing any specific intention either to breach the terms of the order or subvert the administration of justice in general. Nor will it avail a respondent that he believed for some reason that he had a right to do the relevant act.”

17. Accordingly, in the case of the applications brought against the corporate defendants… contempt of court will be sufficiently proven if it is established that the companies had notice of the orders made by the Court and thereafter, by the acts or omissions of the relevant company, failed to comply with those orders. There is no requirement to establish that any natural person or persons within each company was aware of the orders made by the Court, and was also aware of the conduct which constitutes the alleged contempt. Once the relevant company is on notice of the orders made by the Court, it is legally obliged to comply with those orders and cannot rely upon the alleged ignorance of one or more of its officers as an excuse for non-compliance.

18. … as the DIFC Courts lack a general criminal jurisdiction and the power to order imprisonment, a reference to the Attorney General of Dubai may also be appropriate in cases in which the Court considers that the sanctions available to the Court, which are essentially limited to the imposition of a fine, are inadequate to appropriately reflect the significance of the contempt committed and impose appropriate punishment upon the contemnor.”

(1) The assertion in the first affidavit was “patently false” and therefore did not comply with the freezing order and that the respondents were “well aware of their failure to comply [with the order]”: [121], [125]-[126]; and

(2) In respect of the second affidavit, it found that the list of assets provided by the respondents was “manifestly incomplete” and that the disclosure given remained inadequate: [128].

“139. With respect, that submission misses the point of the provisions in WFOs relating to the disclosure of information with respect to assets. That purpose was succinctly identified by Justice Ali Al Madhani in SBM Bank (Mauritius) Ltd v Renish Petrochem FZE & Others . His Honour observed:

“Freezing injunctions generally serve two purposes. The first is to prevent the dissipation of assets in the hope that any liability determined by the Court may be satisfied and the second is to provide information as to the assets of a defendant. I accept … [the] submission that freezing injunctions would be rather toothless if the information orders were not complied with, as not only would a claimant be left in the dark as to what assets they may be able to recover, but also the claimant would be unaware as to whether the substantive orders, those prohibiting dissipation, were being complied with. The information element of freezing injunctions is of particular importance in cases … where a party is accusing another of fraud or wrongdoing and is seeking to trace back its assets before they were dissipated by the wrongdoer. Moreover in cases of fraud it is most often the case that the wrongdoer has left very little in the way of evidence. And so, the claimant seeks relief from the Court in the form of provision of information under the terms of a freezing injunction to piece together events and trace their assets.”

140. These helpful observations also explain the common practice of requiring that the information which is to be provided with respect to assets must be provided a very short time, measured in days, not weeks, after a freezing order is made. That practice recognizes the very real dangers to the efficacy of a freezing order if the Court and the beneficiary of that order are not provided with the information necessary to scrutinize compliance with the order very soon after it is made.”

“141. A number of English cases provide useful guidance in relation to the approach which the Court should take when dealing with an established contempt. Those cases establish the following principles:

(a) The serious and deliberate breach of a court order may well merit imprisonment, depending upon the Court’s assessment of the culpability of the conduct and the harm which it caused – see Oliver v Shaikh;

(b) Breach of a court order is always serious because it undermines the administration of justice, and imprisonment is likely to be required to punish serious contempt and manifest the Court’s disapproval of the breach of its orders – see McKendrick v FCA;

(c) A deliberate and substantial breach of a freezing order is a serious matter which normally attracts an immediate custodial sentence – see JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko (no. 2);

(d) Where there is a continuing failure to disclose relevant information, the Court should consider imposing a long sentence – see JSC BTA Bank;

(e) Mitigatory factors include:

(i) an immediate admission of breach;

(ii) an admission of the seriousness of the breach;

(iii) co-operation in order to mitigate the consequences of the breach; and

(iv) a sincere apology to the Court – see Oliver.”

“150. The information initially provided was farcical in its scope, and very late, and the information provided two months later was acknowledged to be incomplete at the time it was provided. The further information provided one month after that remains incomplete and at the time of the hearing each Defendant remained in breach of the order with respect to the adequacy of the information provided.

151. There are no mitigatory factors – the Defendants have not admitted their contempt, they have asserted through counsel that their contempts are not serious, they have not taken any steps to mitigate the consequences of their contempts and have proffered no apology to the Court other than the insincere apology proffered at the time their second affidavits were served, in which they expressly acknowledged their continuing non-compliance with the orders of the Court.

152. Again if I was sitting in a Court with a criminal jurisdiction, I would give very serious consideration to imposing terms of imprisonment upon each of Laamih and Labib. However, that option is not available. I consider that the imposition of a fine would not adequately reflect the seriousness of their deliberate and continuing breach of the orders of the Court. Accordingly, the appropriate order is to refer each contemnor to the Attorney General of Dubai in order that the Attorney General may consider the instigation of appropriate criminal proceedings. As I have noted, it will be for the Attorney General to determine whether the instigation of any such proceedings should await the outcome of the appeal in which the Defendants challenge the validity of the Second WFO.”

(1) The First Affidavit of Alexey Zolotukhin, Head of Distressed Assets Department of VTB, dated 16 December 2025 (“Zolotukhin 1”);

(2) The First Affidavit of Dimitriy Mednikov, an associate at Habib Al Mulla and Partners (“HAMP”), the legal representatives of VTB, dated 6 January 2026 (“Mednikov 1”;

(3) The Second Affidavit of Alexy Zolotukhin dated 15 January 2026 (“Zolotukhin 2”);

(4) The Third Affidavit of Alexey Zolotukhin dated 20 January 2026 (“Zolotukhin 3”);

(5) The Second Affidavit of Dimitriy Mednikov dated 23 February 2026 (“Mednikov 2”);

(6) The First Affidavit of Andrey Mazur dated 2 April 2026 (“Marur 1”);

(7) The Third Affidavit of Dimitriy Mednikov dated 3 April 2026 (“Mednikov 3”).

(1) A bundle of documents on 23 January 2023 attached to an Acknowledgement of Service filed on behalf of Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh by Awad Al Aryani Advocates & Legal Consultancy (“Alaryani”), attaching:

(2) A purported application under RDC Part 23 dated 4 February 2026 for “APPLICATION NOTICE (Part 23) ON NOTICE- REQUEST FOR DISPOSAL WITHOUT A HEARING (ON THE PAPERS} URGENT APPLICATION FOR PROTECTIVE DIRECTIONS (Confidentiality Ring/ Confidential+ Sealed Filing/ Redactions)”. It was accompanied by some 870 pages of documents. The index was as follows:

Why the Application was not filed is inexplicable. I can only think the motive was either to avoid paying Court Fees or fear that it might evidence a source of assets on the UAE;

(3) “THE RESPONDENTS' WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS IN OPPOSITION Committal Application - Application for Dismissal and/or Strike Out” on 17 March 2026;

(4) On 24 March 2026 Alaryani filed an Acknowledgement of Service on behalf Mrs Kuanysheva;

(5) After the hearing on 25 March 2026, Alaryani sent an email to the Court attaching “Certified Marriage Agreement and Respondent’s Supplemental Submissions and Respondents’ List of Assets dated 18 February 2026 and Final Supplemental Submissions”. The covering email stated, “Given the importance of these documents and their direct relevance to the matters currently before the Court, we kindly request that both documents be uploaded to the current hearing bundle / eBundle so that the Court may have them before it during the continued hearing up to 27 March 2026.” I find this quite bizarre as the hearing was not “continued hearing up to 27 March 2026”. The email was timed “2026-03-25 20:00” – the hearing had ended that day before 1 PM.

“9. Unless paragraph 10 applies, each Respondent must within 5 working days of service of this Order and to the best of his ability inform the Applicant’s legal representatives of all his assets worldwide exceeding USD 10,000 in value whether in his own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets.

10. If the provision of any of this information is likely to incriminate the Respondent, he may be entitled to refuse to provide it, but he is recommended to take legal advice before refusing to provide the information. Wrongful refusal to provide the information is contempt of court and may render the Respondent liable to be imprisoned, fined or have his assets seized.

11. Within 10 working days after being served with this Order, the Respondent must swear and serve on the Applicant’s legal representatives an affidavit setting out the above information, and (where possible) deliver up to the Applicant’s legal representatives documents or copies of documents which confirm their ownership of or interests in the assets identified in the affidavit.”

(collectively, the “Asset Disclosure Orders”) (Zolotukhin 3, [11])

(1) 5 January 2026, 7:42 PM:

(2) 6 January 2026, 1:54 PM:

(3) 6 January 2025, 2:43 PM

(1) The WFO Continuation Application is granted.

(2) The Return Date Hearing shall be rescheduled to 11am (GST) on 22 January 2026.

(3) The terms of paragraphs 4 to 15 and 18 to 24 of the WFO Order shall continue in effect, until further order of the Court.

(4) By no later than 4pm (GST) on 13 January 2026, the First Respondent shall provide a witness statement which, to the best of their knowledge and belief, confirms their understanding of the response of the Fourth Respondent to the WFO Order.

(5) By no later than 4pm (GST) on 13 January 2026, the Second Respondent shall provide a witness statement which, to the best of their knowledge and belief, confirms their understanding of the response of the Third and Fifth Respondent to the WFO Order.

(1) The Claimant’s Application to vacate the Return Date hearing is granted.

(2) The hearing for the Committal Application shall be listed on 11 March 2026, with a time estimate of 3 days. The Court shall proceed with the hearing regardless of any party’s non-attendance.

(3) By no later than 4pm (GST) on 9 February 2026, the Respondents shall file and serve any affidavit in the Committal Application.

(4) By no later than 4pm (GST) on 23 February 2026, the Applicant shall file and serve any affidavit in reply.

(5) By no later than 4pm (GST) on 4 March 2026, the parties shall file and exchange any written submissions.

(6) The requirement for personal service of the Committal Application and this Order on the Respondents shall be dispensed with.

(7) Service of the Committal Application, this Order, and other documents in these proceedings on the Respondents shall instead be effected by email to the email addresses set out in the Schedule.

(8) The deemed date of service shall be the second business day after the email containing the Committal Application and this Order is sent to each Respondent.

(9) The costs of the Return Date Hearing on 22 January 2026 shall be the Applicant’s in any event.

(10) The Court will not entertain any application by the Respondents to vary or set aside the WFO Order and/or the WFO Continuation order until the Committal Application has been determined and, to the extent the Respondents are found to be in contempt of court, each Respondent has purged their contempt respectively.

(1) 95 pages containing irrelevant, repetitive and incomprehensible documents relation to Alaryani’s registration as a Part1 DIFC Practitioner;

(2) A witness statement from Dr Awad Alaryani dated 30 January 2026. It asserts – without any supporting evidence or detail –

None of this is admissible not being on affidavit and in any event is lacking in any credibility.

(3) An undated unsworn (but signed) draft affidavit of Mr Shlenskikh in which he acknowledged that he had not filed any asset disclosure. After making various excuses he said:

“I appreciate that these reasons do not remove my obligation. I therefore set out below the steps I am now taking immediately to comply, and I respectfully ask the Court to adopt a structured compliance timetable rather than proceeding to committal in circumstances where compliance can be achieved promptly.”

He continued:

(4) An unsworn (but signed) draft affidavit of Mr Kuanyshev dated 29 January 2026 in identical terms;

(5) So-called “Compliance Packs” for Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh that contained no usable information. For Mr Shlenskikh there were references to bank accounts with accounts with Raifaisen Bank Russia and Forte Bank Kazakhstan. The accompanying documents appear to have had any relevant information blotted out. For Mr Kuanyshev there is refence to a bank account with Halyk Bank of Kazakhstan but no details and to 50% interests in Kazakh companies called Veles Holding Limited and Inari Holding Limited. No registration details are given.

“On Saturday, March 14, 2025, the representative of Tarhovskoye LLC received the position of VTB Bank (PJSC), which contains not only false accusations of illegal actions allegedly committed by Evgeny Vyacheslavovich Shlenskikh but also contradicts many actual circumstances of the case. This position was presented directly to the applicant of the present application (Е.V. Shlenskikh), who submitted refuting evidence regarding the claims of VTB Bank (PJSC). At minimum, by providing the court with documentation from foreign jurisdictions (UAE), the bank failed to mention that there are also ongoing lawsuits in the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.

Thus, in refutation of the stated facts, VTB Bank claimed alleged falsification of documents (bank payment orders) and asserted that Е. Shlenskikh allegedly has no accounts in UAE banks. However, the bank misleads the court in the following respects:

1. In the UAE, there is litigation between VTB Bank and Е. Shlenskikh, which has not been resolved because VTB Bank is а sanctioned bank and lacks sufficient legal capacity to provide evidence and documentation regarding the disputes.

2. The evidence presented by VTB Bank in the form of correspondence with an associate in the UAE, Habib Al-Mulla, is not admissible, as this representative was suspended from handling cases in the UAE related to VTB Bank due to engaging in unlawful actions during the court proceedings. This information was concealed by VTB Bank (PJSC) from the court when submitting documents.

3. The stated arguments regarding document falsification are unfounded, insofar as:

It is even more concerning that the submitted documents do not contain the ADIB Bank logo, although it appears in the translations. The correspondence was conducted only with а specialist in the Corporate Law Department of Habib Al-Mulla & Partners 1984 and not with ADIB Bank. We believe it is necessary to require the submission of the originals of these documents to the court.

[…]

While claiming that payments to creditors were impossible, VTB Bank also failed to mention that it itself attempted to seize the assets and funds of Evgeny Shlenskikh in the UAE and United Kingdom, totalling more than RUB 10 bln (evidence provided by the bank itself in its written explanations and appendices), most of which attempts were denied.

It should be noted that the interests of E.V. Shlenskikh are directly affected by this case and the present arguments, since VTB Bank (PJSC) has made false and defamatory allegations against the applicant of this application. Failure to admit Е. Shlenskikh in the present case will, in fact, constitute а limitation on Е. Shlenskikh's access to justice and his ability to refute the stated allegations and provide rebuttal evidence in connection with the foregoing.”

[original emphasis – in translation]

“Further, in the context of the proceedings commenced in Russia (Meshchansky District Court - Moscow, case no. 02-2515/2026), and during the hearing of 16 March 2026, the Respondents delivered/sent to the Claimant (VTB) a settlement proposal and debt restructuring proposal with a detailed repayment schedule. This confirms the Respondents' good faith and serious intention to repay the indebtedness by way of scheduling under a clear and workable mechanism, particularly in light of banking compliance constraints related to US sanctions which, according to the Respondents' position, affect direct repayment channels and require a clear procedural arrangement…

The Respondents rely on Schedule (A) (Compliance Chronology) appended to these submissions. Schedule (A), together with the supporting documents, sets out the key dates and steps including:

● Dates of notice and/or service of the relevant orders;

● Dates of instruction of legal representatives before the DIFC Courts;

● Dates of requests for information sent to banks and any other third parties, and their responses;

● What was served and/or filed, and when; and

● Any objective reasons for delay (if any), including response times of cross-border banks and technical issues related to filing.

Schedule (A) has been filed to assist the Court and to demonstrate the steps taken in good faith and the absence of any deliberate and knowing disobedience. In summary, the Respondents were notified/served on 31 December 2025, DIFC legal representatives were instructed on 23 January 2026, and compliance materials were served on 6 February 2026 (see Schedule (A)).”

“ Where the Claimant's own case is that the Committal Application "arose from" an alleged failure to comply with a foreign (English) order, the application is unsound to the extent that it seeks a committal sanction before the DIFC Courts for non-compliance with a foreign order as such.

Committal before the DIFC Courts must be founded on a clear and binding order of this Court …”

(1) Paragraph 6:

(2) Paragraph 8 described the basis of the WFO and WFO Contention Order as “on the alleged existence of a financial claim arising from a loan/guarantee and alleged future judgments in Russia—claims that are contrary to fact and reality.”

(3) “First: Objection and Reference”:

“The Defendants reject the continuation of the freezing of their assets and deny and repudiate all allegations and misleading statements contained in the Claimant’s Statement of Claim, to which reference is made to avoid repetition and in deference to the Honorable Court’s time, without conceding any of the allegations or grounds therein, which are based on non-material reasons, manifestly invalid defences, erroneous facts, contrary to the documents, and inconsistent with the true facts, particularly as the Defendants have not refused to pay.”

(4) “Second: Plea of Lack of Jurisdiction and Rejection of the Interim Freezing Order”:

(5) “Third: Plea of Lack of Jurisdiction for Abuse of Process” states

(6) “Prayer for Relief”

(1) This was the first occasion on which it was suggested that the Defendants “temporarily froze repayments due to legal impossibility of performance and force majeure”. There is no evidence to support the statement. It is inconsistent with the attempts to reschedule the debt. It is counter intuitive as it appears unlikely that international sanctions would impact a domestic Russian transaction;

(2) As will be seen at paragraph 51 above the Russian Court subsequently gave judgment against Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh so the suggestion that VTB’s claims were “contrary to fact and reality” would appear to be unfounded hyperbole;

(3) No details were given of the “non-material reasons, manifestly invalid defences, erroneous facts, contrary to the documents, and inconsistent with the true facts”;

(4) I strongly suspect that “Second: Plea of Lack of Jurisdiction and Rejection of the Interim Freezing Order” and “Third: Plea of Lack of Jurisdiction for Abuse of Process” were written by a Large Language Model like ChatGPT because not only are they plausible but wrong, they also contain a number of “hallucinations” inventing fake authorities. In particular,

If I am correct that the foregoing was written by AI there will have been non- compliance with “Practical Guidance Note No. 2 of 2023 Guidelines on the use of large language models and generative AI in proceedings before the DIFC Courts”;

(5) I accept that Prayers for Relief 1, 2, 3 and 5 are legitimate responses on the return date of a WFO, however I find 4 strange, even if it were within the powers of the Court (which it is not) it is wholly inconsistent with the submission that the DIFC Courts lack jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.

(1) She is not a party to the Credit Agreement relied upon by the Claimant. She did not sign the Credit Agreement;

(2) She did not sign any guarantee, security document, undertaking, or any other instrument in favour of the Claimant in relation to the alleged debt in these proceedings;

(3) Save for her marital relationship with the First Defendant, she has no contractual relationship with the Claimant; and

(4) She respectfully requests that the Court dismiss/strike out the claim against her and remove her as a party.

(1) The respondent confirms unequivocally that she is not a party to the loan agreement which is the subject of these proceedings and did not execute it, was not a party to any obligation arising therefrom, did not receive any money as pursuant to it, and bears no legal responsibility connected with it;

(2) Further, the Claimant has produced no document establishing that the Respondent is a party to that agreement or is any way liable under it. Accordingly, the attempt to link the Respondent to the loan agreement is without proper legal basis; and

(3) The Marriage Agreement has been produced solely for the purpose of demonstrating the true financial legal position of the Respondent and to clarify the ownership of funds and assets. This is a matter of central importance in the context of a committal application where full clarity as to the financial position is required and no assets or liabilities may be properly assumed in the absence of evidence. The dully authenticated agreement further confirms that there has been no deliberate concealment of assets.

“12. On 16 March 2026, the Russian Court held a trial of VTB's claim. In advance of the trial, VTB filed a reply to the statement of defence submitted by the Second Respondent, in which VTB confirmed that it was not engaged In settlement negotiations with the defendants (as was alleged by the Second Respondent in his defence).

13. After hearing from me and counsel for the Second Respondent, the Russian Court gave ex tempore Judgment for VTB and awarded VTB all the sums claimed In the Russian Proceedings (namely, the outstanding sum of RUB 7,191,396,362.56 due under the Guarantee Agreements).”

(1) Mr Kuanyshev, Mr Shlenskikh and Shev Energy accepted they had been served;

(2) They had engaged legal counsel;

(3) Their correspondence was in good English;

(4) They stated their “genuine intention to engage fully, properly, and constructively in these proceedings” and “to comply with the Court’s requirement and to submit all necessary documents in advance of the hearing”; and

(5) The emails were copied to “Munira”, i.e. Ms Baymenova.

(1) Mr Kuanyshev (from a Shev Energy email address) and Mr Shlenskikh accepted they had been served in their emails of 5 and 6 January 2026 and these were copied to the other Respondents.

(2) In respect of Mrs Kuanyshev, the documents were also (i) personally served by courier at her residential address in the UK on 20 December 2025 and (ii) served by process server in the UK on 30 December 2025. In respect of Mrs Baymenova, the documents were also personally served by courier at her residential address in Russia on 27 December 2025. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that Mrs Baymenova and Mrs Kuanyshev were made aware of the terms of the WFO by virtue of their marriage to and relationship with Mr Shlenskikh and Mr Kuanyshev respectively.

(3) I observe that Mrs Kuanysheva has in fact filed her own Acknowledgment of Service.

(4) None of the submissions suggest that the Respondents were not served. The Respondents are represented by Part 1 DIFC Practitioners who will have advised them of the terms of the Court’s Orders.

(1) The so-called “Appendix (1) - Schedule (A): Compliance Chronology” (see paragraph 56 above) referred to “Service of the asset disclosure schedule (if any)” dated 6 February 2026. This was a reference to the so-called “Compliance Packs” (see paragraph 42(5) above) which made no disclosure.

(2) The annexed Forte Bank document shows no amount (ibid.).

(3) The annexed Raiffeisen Bank document had been deliberately redacted (ibid.).

(4) In particular the “Compliance Packs” fail to disclose the interests in Andoro Trading Corp (Belize) and PMG Holding GmbH (Austria) (see paragraph 47 above).

(5) There is no reference to interests held by Mr Kuanyshev and Mrs Kuanysheva in numerous companies identified in the English WO, particular a company called Batt Invest LLP, the email address for which appeared in Mr Kuanyshev’s and Mr Shlenskikh’s email correspondence with the Court on 5 and 6 January 2026 but also in Alaryani’s emails to Court.

(6) The schedules provided for Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh are materially incomplete.

(7) No schedules were provided for Shev Energy, Mrs Kuanysheva or Ms Baymenova at the time of the hearing. I do note that after the Hearing, Mrs Kuanysheva purported to provide a schedule but also that that too is materially incomplete (see paragraph 65 above).

(8) VTB relies on the admission in the purported affidavits of Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh - “I acknowledge that, as at the date of this affidavit, I have not filed any asset disclosure in compliance with the Disclosure Order”. I note that in the 17 March 2026 document Alaryani submits that, “an acknowledgment that the obligation exists, together with an explanation of practical reasons and steps being taken, is not an admission of contempt. The test for contempt is deliberate and knowing disobedience beyond reasonable doubt.”

(9) As to Dr Alaryani’s witness statement dated 30 January 2026 (paragraph 42(2) above), even if admissible, is full of ill-founded excused rejected by the courts in the reported cases. None of what is said is backed up by any evidence. The alleged “cross jurisdictional nature of the records” did not seem to be a problem in the English proceedings. The reference to data held by third parties is unclear. The suggestion that international sanctions has made compliance impossible is patently false.

(10) In summary there is clear breach on the part of all Respondents.

(1) efforts to identify and instruct DIFC-qualified legal representatives;

(2) the time required for counsel to be registered / appear on the Court record; and

(3) the need to collect information and documents from third parties (including banks and other institutions).

“7. Since securing legal representation, I have taken (and will continue to take) the following steps:

(a) I have instructed my legal representatives to prepare an Asset Schedule in the format required and to file it in an appropriate form to protect confidential banking information (sealed and redacted versions).

(b) I am initiating requests to my banks and relevant institutions for statements/confirmations required to populate the Asset Schedule and to evidence balances and ownership.

(c) I will provide my legal representatives with all available information within my possession, custody or control without delay.

8. I propose the following timetable (subject to the Court’s directions) to complete compliance:

(a) Within 7 business days of the Court’s directions, I will file and serve an interim Asset Schedule based on information currently available, identifying any items pending third-party confirmations;

(b) Within 21 business days thereafter, I will file and serve a final updated Asset Schedule supported by available third-party documentation, or such other period as the Court considers appropriate.”

(1) Mr Kuanyshev shall pay a fine of USD 250,000;

(2) Mr Shlenskikh shall pay a fine of USD 150,000;

(3) Shev Energy shall pay a fine of USD 150,000;

(4) Mrs Kuanysheva shall pay a fine of USD 250,000; and

(5) Ms Baymenova shall pay a fine of USD 150,000

(1) The Claimant shall file submissions of not more than 4 pages with a statement of costs in the usual form for summary assessment within 5 working days of the date of this Order;

(2) The Defendants shall file submissions in reply to those costs submissions within 3 working days thereafter;

(3) The Claimant shall file any reply submissions on costs within 3 working days thereafter, limited to 4 pages.

(1) On 7 April 2026 Alaryani purported to serve “THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS IN REPLY TO THE FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREY MAZUR DATED 2 APRIL 2026, TOGETHER WITH EXHIBIT AM-1, AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DIMITRIY MEDNIKOV DATED 3 APRIL 2026, TOGETHER WITH EXHIBIT DM-3” In that document it was asserted that “The Russian judgment exhibited within AM-1 is not a final and conclusive judgment. It is a short-form judgment which expressly states that it may be appealed to the Moscow City Court through the Meshchansky District Court of Moscow within one month from the date on which the judgment is prepared in its full form.” Even if permission had been granted and even if the assertion were true, it would be inadmissible as this is yet another breach of the RDC in failing to serve evidence by affidavit. The document then went on to make submissions on the weight to be attached to the affidavits of Andrey Mazur and Dimitriy Mednikov. What I find particularly offensive is the joinder of issue with Mednikov 3 the function of which was to address the false allegations in the Russian Courts that Mr Mednikov and HAMP had been suspended from handling cases in the UAE related to VTB Bank. It is unacceptable that a DIFC Registered Practitioner should associate themselves with unfounded allegations against another and could, arguably, constitute contempt of court within the meaning of Article 35(A)(1) of the Courts Law;

(2) By email to the Court Registry on 8 April 2026, Alaryani purported to serve similar but not identical submissions on behalf of Ms Baymenova. The same observation apply: the submissions were served without permission, are not verified by affidavit and are inadmissible;

(3) Later the same day, Alaryani purported to serve submissions identical to those of Mr Kuanyshev on behalf of Mr Shlenskikh;

(4) On 9 April 2026 Alaryani refiled Mr Kuanyshev’s submissions saying that the “earlier filing was submitted in error on 6 April 2026”. The error was not explained, and the submissions appear to be in identical terms to the earlier.