March 23, 2026 SCT - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
Claim No: SCT 542/2025
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
OLAVE
Claimant/Respondent
and
OLEESA
Defendant/Appellant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E. JUSTICE ROGER STEWART
UPON the claim having been filed on 8 August 2025 and amended on 25 August 2025 (the “Claim”)
AND UPON the Judgment of H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser (the “Judgment”) giving judgment for the Claimant on 11 December 2025 (the “Judgment”)
AND UPON considering the Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 12 December 2025 seeking permission to appeal the Judgment (the “Permission to Appeal Application”)
AND UPON considering the Claimant’s Reply to the Permission to Appeal Application dated 30 January 2026
AND PURSUANT TO Parts 4 and 53 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Permission to Appeal Application is refused.
2. The Defendant shall pay the Claimant’s costs of responding to the Permission to Appeal Application to be assessed as follows:
(a) The Claimant is to file and serve a Statement of Costs and any short submissions in support of the costs claimed within 21 days of the date of this order.
(b) The Defendant shall provide any submissions in response to the costs claimed within 14 days of the service of the Statement of Costs.
(c) The Claimant is to provide any submissions in reply to the Defendant’s response within 7 days of service of that response.
(d) The quantum of costs to be paid by the Defendant to the Claimant will thereafter be assessed by way of immediate assessment on the papers.
Issued by:
Hayley Norton
SCT Judge and Assistant Registrar
Date of Issue: 23 March 2026
At: 11am
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
1. This is an application by the Defendant for permission to appeal and set aside the Judgment.
The Parties
2. The Claimant is Olave, a company registered and located in the DIFC, Dubai, UAE.
3. The Defendant is Oleesa, a company registered and located in Dubai, UAE.
Background
4. The Claimant provides payment collection and consolidation services to businesses. At the centre of the services which it provides is an electronic platform which allows payments to be made to client businesses as well as the management of corporate cards and expenses. Payments can be made by credit card which are then transmitted into the client’s electronic “wallet”.
5. The parties entered into a contract by email dated 25 June 2024 which set out the terms upon which the Claimant provided its services to the Defendant. This dispute concerns the validity of certain “charge-backs” and associated charges which the Claimant seeks from the Defendant.
6. “Charge-backs” occur when a customer disputes a payment made through the Claimant because, for example, the customer contends that goods or services were deficient. When that occurs the relevant credit card provider may issue a “charge-back” which is sent to the Claimant. The Claimant’s customer may then dispute such charge-back within a short period whereupon the dispute will be adjudicated by the relevant credit card company.
7. In this case, charge-backs duly occurred. The Defendant’s case is that such charge-backs demonstrated a pattern of fraudulent behaviour on the part of two of its customers. Although the charge-backs were disputed, some of them were not over-turned by the relevant credit card companies. The Claimant accordingly sought payment for such sums from the Defendant. The Defendant disputed the Claimant’s entitlement to such sums on a variety of grounds.
The Judgment
8. In the judgment, the judge carefully set out the procedural history and the parties’ rival contentions. His conclusions are set out in paragraphs 38 to 46 of the judgment in which he held:
(a) That the Defendant had presented evidence showing a pattern of co-ordinated and potentially fraudulent activity by some of its customers (see paragraphs 40 and 44);
(b) That the Defendant notified the Claimant of these matters on numerous occasions (paragraph 44);
(c) That the Claimant acted within the provisions of the parties’ agreement by facilitating the dispute of charge-backs and proceeding in accordance with protocol (paragraph 43);
(d) That the risk and burden of providing evidence and managing disputes lay with the Defendant (paragraph 44);
(e) That the Claimant acted for a facilitator and had forwarded the relevant evidence which had been rejected by the relevant scheme (paragraph 45); and
(f) That the Claimant’s actions did not constitute a breach of contract or gross misconduct with the result that the Defendant was liable to the Claimant as claimed.
The Test For Permission to Appeal
9. The circumstances in which the Court of First instance may give permission to appeal, are strictly circumscribed by Article 21 of the DIFC Courts Law No. 2 of 2025 which provides:
“21. Appeals Against Small Claims Tribunal Judgments
A. Judgments of the Small Claims Tribunal may be appealed before the Courts of First Instance in accordance with the procedures established under the DIFC Laws, DIFC Regulations, Rules of the Courts or any Practice Direction or Order issued by the DIFC Courts, where the appeal relates to:
1. A question of law
2. An allegation of a miscarriage of justice
3. An issue of procedural fairness; or
4. A matter provided for in or under DIFC Laws.”
10. There is no right to appeal on questions of fact. This is unsurprising given that hearings before the SCT are intended to be informal as set out in RDC 53.51 and that the strict rules of evidence do not apply as set out in RDC 53.53.
The Proposed Grounds of Appeal
11. The Defendant seeks to put forward 5 grounds of appeal namely:
(a) An alleged failure to consider or expressly refer to material evidence, in particular the recording of a call on 25 April 2025 between Mr Olenka representing the Defendant and a representative of the Claimant;
(b) An alleged failure to consider alleged estoppel whereby the Claimant represented that it was handling fraud concerns and guiding the process of substantiating the submission of evidence;
(c) An alleged incorrect factual finding that the Defendant failed to provide evidence to challenge the charge-backs relying on the fact that the same evidence led to some disputes being won and others lost;
(d) An alleged failure to deal with what were said to be contradictory statements and conduct by the Claimant in relation to the call of 25 April 2025 in which the existence of the recording had, at one stage, been denied; and
(e) An alleged internal contradiction in the Tribunal’s findings between the acceptance of fraudulent behaviour by customers and the finding that the Respondent was not responsible for the same.
The Claimant’s Response to the Application for Permission to Appeal
12. The Claimant provided a detailed response to the application in which it contended:
(a) That the application should be dismissed for procedural and factual irregularities namely:
i. Lack of service of the application for permission to appeal within 2 days contrary to RDC 53.109;
ii. Submissions of new submissions on 25 November 2025 after the hearing before the Judge (but before his judgment) to which the Claimant had no opportunity to respond and which are relied on in the application for permission to appeal; and
iii. Failure to comply with RDC 53.106 which requires an applicant for permission to appeal to set out clearly the reasons why it is said that the decision of the Court was wrong, or unjust in respect of a serious procedural or other irregularity and specify in respect of each reason whether the reason raised is an appeal against a finding of fact.
(b) That the grounds sought to be relied on were substantively insufficient to justify permission to appeal being granted as:
i. There was no procedural unfairness or miscarriage of justice by failing to refer to the 25 April 2025 call recording;
ii. That there was no pleading or reliance on alleged estoppel before the Judge with the consequence that the Defendant was not entitled to raise the same in relation to a prospective appeal;
iii. That, in any event, any statements made were not representations upon which the Defendant was entitled to rely but non binding indications of support for the Claimant’s position;
iv. That the alleged factual errors were not made out and would not, in any event, justify the granting of permission to appeal; and
v. That there was no logical internal inconsistency in the judgment.
Discussion
13. As set out above, the circumstances in which permission to appeal can be granted from SCT judgments is circumscribed by law. There are good reasons for this approach. The SCT is intended to provide a relatively low cost and informal method of determining lower value disputes between parties. The purpose of the jurisdiction would be undermined were factual appeals to be permitted or a too formalistic approach taken to the expression of conclusions.
14. By the same token, however, if it were otherwise appropriate to give permission to appeal it would be a relatively rare case where a procedural requirement which had been infringed in a relatively minor way and which did not prejudice the Respondent led to an application for permission to appeal being denied. In the present case, I do not consider that any of the procedural matters relied on by the Respondent were substantial or have caused the Respondent prejudice. In particular, the Respondent has been able to respond fully and helpfully to the application. It follows that I shall consider the substance of the proposed grounds.
15. In relation to Ground 1:
(a) I do not consider that there is any basis for criticising the Judge for making no express reference to the conversation of 25 April 2025;
(b) At the express invitation of Mr Olenka, I listened to the three recordings which made up the call as well as reading the transcripts with the passages upon which the Defendant wished to rely high-lighted;
(c) A fair summary of the call is as follows:
i. Mr Olenka was, for the majority of the call, somewhat agitated and exercised. He was plainly frustrated by what he regarded as the bureaucracy involved in submitting evidence of the alleged frauds;
ii. The Claimant’s representative was calm and emollient throughout;
iii. The Claimant’s representative was clear:
(1) That she was sympathetic to Mr Olenka and his concerns including that he had been a victim of fraud;
(2) That the procedure to challenge the charge-backs, which involved submitting evidence on the dashboard, had to be followed in each case even though this was plainly a source of frustration to Mr Olenka;
(3) That she, and the Claimant, were sympathetic to Mr Olenka and “on his side”;
iv. Despite the sympathy, the Claimant’s representative did not say anything which could have caused a fair minded listener to take the view that the Claimant took responsibility for the charge-backs or that it was responsible for the outcome of the process;
(d) The contents of the call were entirely consistent with the Judge’s findings that the Defendant had submitted evidence of fraud but that the Claimant was not responsible for the same and had not been guilty of relevant misconduct; and
(e) There is no basis for considering that the Judge did not consider the call which was entirely consistent with his findings.
16. In relation to Ground 2:
(a) The Judge was not guilty of any error in failing to consider estoppel when the same had not been alleged;
(b) In any event, I do not consider that there was any proper basis for such an estoppel;
(c) The alleged representations were principally said to have been made on the 25 April call which I have considered above. Nothing in that call could found an estoppel.
(d) The true position is that the risk of a fraudulent charge-back lay, as between the Claimant and the Defendant, with the Defendant. The Claimant submitted evidence supplied by the Defendant to the appropriate card scheme. The fact that this was not accepted does not mean that the risk shifts to the Claimant. The Defendant is, of course, at liberty to pursue the customers who are said to have been fraudulent.
17. In relation to Ground 3:
(a) The alleged ground is an express challenge to a finding of fact which cannot, by itself, succeed;
(b) In any event, there is no inconsistency between the same evidence being accepted in respect of one charge-back but not another; and
(c) What this shows is the extent to which the parties were at the mercy of the relevant card scheme and the relevant card issuer.
18. In relation to Ground 4:
(a) This again relates to the 25 April call; and
(b) The procedural history was irrelevant to any issue in the dispute and provides no possible basis for an appeal.
19. In relation to Ground 5:
(a) There was no internal inconsistency;
(b) The ground proceeds upon the false basis that the Claimant bore the risk of a fraudulent charge-back, which it did not; and
(c) The Judge sought to explain in simple and clear terms why, despite the evidence of fraud by the customers which the Defendant had adduced, the Defendant was still liable to the Claimant. I consider that he was correct to do so.
20. Having had the benefit of being addressed by Mr Olenka , I have no doubt but that he will be disappointed by this judgment. He is, understandably, frustrated by the activities of some of his customers. The Claimant was not, however, responsible for such activities. The Defendant took the benefit of the Claimant’s payment services and the Claimant received a relatively small fee for providing such services. The Claimant was not insuring the honesty of the Defendant’s customers and it was not guaranteeing the results of engagement with the card schemes but it did try and assist the Defendant in relation to a number of charge-backs. The decisions of the card schemes were not within the Claimant’s control.
Conclusion
21. It follows that I find there is no real prospect of success in the proposed appeal. Further I consider that the Defendant should meet the Claimant’s reasonable and proportionate costs of the application for permission to appeal.
